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THE CONCEPT OF NONALIGNMENT AND THE NIGERIAN 
FOREIGN POLICY 1960 - 1983 
By: Ufot Bassey Inamete
Major Professor: Donald E. Secrest, Ph.D.
This study examined the concept of nonalignment in 
relation to the Nigerian foreign policy. Specifically, it 
aimed at examining whether, and why, the Nigerian foreign 
policy manifested the phenomenon of nonalignment, or failed 
to do so, during the period spanning from 1960 - 1983.
The beginning of the study successfully handled the 
need to comprehensively rein in the conceptual profile of 
nonalignment; and, thus, this study developed a nonalignment 
conceptual scheme of an amalgam of perspectives and dimen­
sions.
It is with this conceptual scheme of nonalignment, that 
this study developed, that the nonalignment content in the 
Nigerian foreign study also developed another novel way of 
studying the phenomenon of nonalignment; which is that of 
evaluating how, or whether, it is manifested, in terms of 
conceptualizing nonalignment as an amalgam of perspectives 
and dimensions.
On the main issue of the nonalignment content in the 
Nigerian foreign policy, this study found that, during dif­
ferent political eras in Nigeria, different mixes of factors 
were at work. Namely, during the First Republic, the 
factors of a government made up of a coalition of moderates.
and the significant role of assertive radical elements in 
the fringes of the governmental structure, and as pressure 
groups, resulted in Nigeria being able to be nonaligned. The 
succeeding Ironsi government, due to its very brief, and 
crisis-ridden, duration, was also found to manifest non- 
alignment phenomenon in the same way as did the First 
Republic. The Gowon government that followed, however, due 
to the realities of the Civil War, and the existence of a 
cautious government, was able to exhibit a nonaligned pos­
ture that, despite warm relations with the East, was still 
firmly adequate. The assertive national leadership during 
the Muhammed/Obasanjo government meant also an assertive 
nonaligned posture, while the Second Republic nonalignment 
phenomenon was, more or less, a replication of the First 
Republic dynamics and posture.
Additionally, although the nonaligned content of the 
Nigerian foreign policy varied with different political 
eras, all of the eras (especially the last three) were found 
to have manifested a mostly Afro-centric conceptual perspec­
tive, and foreign policy mechanism dimension of nonalign­
ment.
XI
THE C O N C E P T  OF NONALIGNMENT AND THE 
NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY 1960-1983
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
General Objectives
About a hundred countries  subscribe to  nonalignment as t h e i r  
major foreign po licy  p r in c ip le .  Yet from 1961, when nonalignment was 
formally i n s t i t u t e d  as an in te rna t iona l  phenomenon t i l l  the p resen t ,^  
there  has been no general agreement on i t s  concep tua l iza t ion .  The 
seriousness  of t h i s  general lack of consensus in i t s  conceptualizat ion 
is  fu r th e r  deepened by the f a c t  tha t  the d i f f e r e n t  ways of understand­
ing nonalignment d i r e c t l y  con trad ic t  each o ther .
This general lack of consensus about the concept of nonalign­
ment has s p e c i f i c a l l y  necess i ta ted  t h i s  study. The abundance of d i f ­
f e r e n t  ways of understanding nonalignment has led to confusion over 
when, or where, nonalignment manifests i t s e l f .  This is  because the 
d i f f e r e n t  ways of understanding nonalignment have led to s i tu a t io n s
2where other coun t r ies  d ispute  the nonaligned s t a tu s  t h a t  some coun­
t r i e s  claim fo r  themselves.  The controversy th a t  clouded the  1979 non- 
al igned summit c l e a r ly  demonstrated th i s  u n sa t i s fa c to ry  s t a t e  of the 
conceptua l iza t ion  of nonalignment. On th a t  occasion many nonaligned 
coun t r ie s  s t rong ly  s ta ted  th a t  Cuba was not nonaligned. Thus, these 
countr ies  r e s i s t e d  the v i s ib le  ro le  Cuba was try ing to c rea te  fo r  i t ­
s e l f  within the nonaligned group. On the other hand, Cuba claimed 
t h a t  i t  was nonaligned. Using a curious understanding o f  nonalign­
ment, i t  claimed th a t  countr ies  with i t s  same foreign  policy  posture 
were those t h a t  were nonaligned. At the same time, Cuba also  viewed 
many nonaligned movement member countr ies  as not being nonaligned. 
This controversy was ser ious  enough to weaken the nonaligned movement 
fo r  a considerable  per iod .  Addit ionally ,  nonaligned meetings s t i l l  do 
continue to be plagued with th i s  so r t  of controversy.  Thus, to both 
the academicians who study nonalignment, and the policy  makers tha t  
are involved with t h i s  foreign  policy phenomenon, the s i tu a t io n  is  not 
s a t i s f a c t o r y .
A b e t t e r  conceptualization  of nonalignment i s  the main key to 
the  improvement of t h i s  s i t u a t i o n .  This study, t h e r e f o r e ,  develops a 
conceptual scheme th a t  t r i e s  to understand nonalignment as a varied 
and complex concept or phenomenon. Thus t h i s  approach c o n t r a s t s  with 
the  present tendency by many to understand nonalignment in a simple 
monoli thic f a sh io n .  Addi t iona l ly ,  th i s  study seeks to  understand how 
N ig e r i a ' s  nonaligned policy can be viewed in terms of t h i s  complex 
view of nonalignment.  This view of nonalignment e n t a i l s  i t  being seen 
as having various perspectives  and dimensions.
3Thus t h i s  study r e in s  in the various pe rspec t ives  of nonalign­
ment, and also t r i e s  to find  the commonalities among them. Addition­
a l ly ,  e f f o r t s  wi l l  be made to f i t  the various pe rspec t ives  into major 
schools of thought in terms of grouping them in to  various  dimensions 
of nonalignment.
This study a lso  seeks to find out whether Nigerian foreign po l­
icy from 1960 to  1983 manifested a nonaligned content .  Thus, t h i s  
study aims at  providing a novel way of studying the phenomenon of nona­
lignment by evalua t ing  how or whether i t  i s  manifested in terms of con­
cep tua l iz ing  i t  as an amalgam of pe rspec t ives .
As shown above, the  word "nonalignment" does not have a un iver-
2
sa l ly  accepted meaning. However, nonalignment can be t e n t a t i v e l y  
defined as an in t e rn a t io n a l  pol’ cy t h a t  s t r e s s e s  an independent pos­
tu re  and the avoidance of routine  a l l i a n c e  with any country,  or bloc 
of co u n t r ie s ,  t h a t  i s  engaged in a mainly c o n f l i c tu a l  re la t io n sh ip  
with another country  or bloc of co un t r ie s .  The phenomenon can addi­
t i o n a l l y  be understood as connoting an in te rn a t io n a l  policy of being 
a c t i v e ly ,  p o s i t i v e l y ,  and c rea t ive ly  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  in the i n t e r n a ­
tiona l  community with the purpose of promoting a more peaceful and 
prosperous r e l a t i o n s h ip  among the countr ies  and peoples of the world.
Thus, nonalignment does not mean an attempt to show i n d i f f e r ­
ence in the face  of global i s sues ,  withdrawal from the act ive  i n t e r a c ­
tion with o ther  in te rn a t io n a l  ac to r s ,  or r e fu sa l  to p o s i t iv e ly  c o n t r i ­
bute in the shaping of the  events in the in te rn a t io n a l  community. In 
r e a l i t y ,  i t  s tands  f o r  the opposite of a l l  t h e se .  However, i t  must be 
noted th a t  s ince  the nonaligned countr ie s  are  p re sen t ly  r e l a t i v e l y
4le ss  powerful, they shape events in the  world l e s s  than do the more 
powerful coun t r ie s .  Nonalignment i s  a lso  seen as not being agains t  
countr ies  grouping themselves fo r  broad or s p e c i f i c  cooperative  pur­
poses. Ins tead ,  i t  i s  seen as object ing to groupings having c o n f l i c t ­
ual r e l a t io n s h ip s  with another country,  or group of c o u n t r ie s ,  as 
th e i r  major driving fo rce .
The notion of nonalignment as a po l icy  of not genera l ly  favor­
ing very strong rou t ine  a l l i a n c e  with one group, fo r  the main purpose 
of being agains t  another ,  a lso  connotes t h a t  countr ies  should sub­
scribe to  the  idea of e i t h e r  commending, or condemning, any in t e r n a ­
t iona l a c to r ,  or a c to r s ,  fo r  t h e i r  a c t i o n s ,  based solely on how they 
perceive each p a r t i c u l a r  ac t ion .
However, i t  should a lso  be noted t h a t  nonalignment, as under­
stood in the above paragraphs ,  may not descr ibe  the actual  in t e r n a ­
tional behavior of any p a r t i c u l a r  nonaligned country.  As i s  the case 
with a l l  ideal c o n s t r u c t s ,  the aim of the above exposit ion of nonalign­
ment phenomena i s  not an attempt to r e p l i c a t e  any r e a l i t y ,  but an a t ­
tempt to construct  a u n ive rsa l ly  re levan t  conception of an idea by the 
process of abs t rac t ing  from various r e a l i t i e s ,  over time and space,  
the commonality of f e a t u r e s ,  and then f i t t i n g  them into  a new harmoni­
ous whole—but in t h i s  case an ideal one. Thus, while the  v a r i e t i e s  
of actual  nonaligned in te rn a t io n a l  behavior may approximate the ideal 
cons t ruc t ,  i t  i s  not necessary fo r  any of them to f i t  exac t ly  in to  the 
l a t t e r .
Various works on nonalignment often  adopt a perspec t ive  th a t  
s t r e s s e s  e i th e r  i t s  p o l i t i c o - s t r a t e g i c  or economic dimensions.  The
5p o l i t i c o - s t r a t e g i c  perspective  understands nonalignment mainly in
terms of some coun t r ie s  t ry ing  to  s t e e r  c l ea r  from issues  of mi l i ta ry
s t r a t e g i c  bloc r i v a l r y ,  and from superpower p o l i t i c a l  maneuvering to
gain more in fluence  in o ther c o u n t r i e s .^  Understanding nonalignment
in terms of an economic perspec t ive  i s  exemplified by C l i f fo rd  Edogun.
According to him,
the "glue" t h a t  has always un i ted  the movement even at  i t s  out­
s e t ,  has been economic in na ture :  the  shared economic depriva­
t ion  of i t s  members—the angry r e a l i z a t i o n  tha t  t h i s  dep r iva, 
t ion  e x i s t s ,  and the s t r i d e n t  demand th a t  i t  be amel iorated.
The above two pe rspec t ives  r e f l e c t  ideological  underpinnings.  The l a t ­
t e r  r e f l e c t s  the neo-Marxist view of socia l  r e a l i t y  which s t resses  
t h a t  the nature of global mater ia l  production and d i s t r i b u t io n  pro­
cesses  u l t imate ly  determines global p o l i t i c a l  and broad cu l tu ra l  r e a l i ­
t i e s .  Edogun seems even eager to make sure th a t  any person reading 
h is  a r t i c l e  c l e a r ly  apprecia tes  the ideologica l  underpinnings of his 
a n a ly s i s —thus his  t i t l e ,  "The Non-aligned Movement Today: Towards an
Ideological  Perspect ive of World O r d e r . O n  the o ther  hand, the 
former perspective (the p o l i t i c o - s t r a t e g i c )  i s  the t r a d i t i o n a l  social 
sc ience view which contends th a t  any attempt to understand every p o l i t ­
ical  and social  r e a l i t y  as being determined by economic r e a l i t i e s  is  
both s im p l i s t i c  and misleading. In t h i s  case ,  while not denying the 
increas ing  ro le  of economic r e a l i t i e s  as an important f e a tu re  of nona­
lignment,  t h i s  pe rspec t ive  does not hold th a t  every fe a tu re  of the phe­
nomenon, e sp ec ia l ly  in the l a t e  1950s and e a r ly  1960s, was, and i s ,  
determined by economic f a c t o r s .  Thus, t h i s  perspec tive  was not en­
cased in a st rong p o l i t i c a l  economy approach. Addi t iona l ly ,  t h i s
6perspective  holds t h a t  nonalignment can in most cases ,  e spec ia l ly  in 
i t s  ear ly  y e a r s ,  be understood in terms of the  behavior of less  power­
ful countr ies  t h a t  seek e i th e r  to  avoid being vic tims, or to maximize
t h e i r  r o l e s ,  in an in te rna t iona l  system where more powerful countr ies  
compete fo r  p o l i t i c a l  and economic in fluence and m i l i t a r y  su p e r io r i ty .  
The above two views represen t  the extreme among the perspect ives on
nonalignment phenomena. Others f a l l  along a spectrum between these  
two extremes,  s t r e s s in g  e i t h e r  of the  perspec t ives  to a grea te r or l e s ­
ser ex ten t .  The actual h is to ry  of nonalignment phenomena shows th a t  
i t  d isp lays  p o l i t i c a l ,  m i l i t a ry  and economic f e a tu r e s ,  with the f i r s t  
two being most s i g n i f i c a n t  in the  1950's and 1960' s ,  while the l a s t
f ea tu re  i s  becoming inc reas ing ly  important since then. Since non- 
alignment lends i t s e l f  to  various concep tua l iza t ions ,  there  is  a need 
for  understanding i t  as an idea-system; and t h i s  will  be attempted in 
t h i s  study.
United Nations documents will serve as primary research 
sources .  A dd i t iona l ly ,  t h i s  study will b a s ic a l ly  follow t r a d i t i o n a l  
chronological  and an a ly t ic  mode of re sea rch .  In terms of the arrange­
ment of chap te rs ,  i t  wil l  include chapters  on an overview of the h i s ­
to r i c a l  development of nonalignment and a survey of r e la ted  p o l i t i c a l  
themes, and on the conceptual p r o f i l e  of non alignment. A major sec ­
t ion  of  t h i s  study i s  t h a t  concerned with how the Nigerian foreign p o l ­
icy has been manifes ted ,  in r e l a t i o n  to i t s  being c lose r  to ,  or d i s ­
tanced from, the phenomenon of nonalignment.  This wil l  be followed by 
a concluding sec tion t h a t  presen ts  the major f ind ings  of th i s  study.
7Li te ra tu re  Review
The l i t e r a t u r e  re levan t  to th i s  study is t h a t  which e i t h e r  pro­
vides a general  understanding of the sub jec t  of nonalignment or of the 
foreign policy  of Nigeria within the context of nonalignment. An over­
view of the l i t e r a t u r e  on nonalignment reveals  t h a t  i t  can be grouped 
in to  th ree  major c a te g o r ie s—those th a t  focus on i t s  h i s t o r i c a l  devel­
opment as a movement, those tha t  examine i t s  conceptual p r o f i l e ,  and 
those th a t  deal with the nonaligned foreign policy of p a r t i c u l a r  coun­
t r i e s .
P rasad 's  work (1981) t r i e d  to understand nonalignment in terms 
of i t s  general h i s t o r i c a l  development as a movement.® His major 
focus was on the h i s t o r i c a l  foundations th a t  led to the development 
and the in te rn a t io n a l  v i a b i l i t y  of nonalignment.  He e s s e n t i a l l y  saw 
the elements of colonialism and the independence s truggles  t h a t  r e ­
moved the l a t t e r  (national experiences th a t  most nonaligned countr ies  
went th rough) ,  as t h a t  t h a t  provided a shared world view th a t  brought 
the nonaligned countr ies  toge ther to promote the  phenomenon of nona­
lignment in the in te rn a t io n a l  community. A ddi t iona l ly ,  Prasad saw the 
des i re  by these  countr ies  to  safeguard t h e i r  national independence and 
sovereignty  as the f a c to r  t h a t  has made nonalignment a durable and v i a ­
ble in te rna t iona l  phenomenon.
Mazrui (1980/1981), on the o ther  hand, sought to comprehend 
general h i s to r i c a l  development of nonalignment, as a movement, in 
terms of changes (or possib le  future changes),  in terms of the pa r t  of 
the nonaligned world th a t  a sse r t  much influence in the l a t t e r . ^
8Viewing the world through a cu l tu ra l  prism, he saw the increasing eco­
nomic resources  (petroleum) and m i l i t a r y  power in the  Arab world as 
having ind ica ted  th a t  the l a t t e r  might l i k e ly  occupy the pos i t ion  of 
influence in the  nonaligned world t h a t  the Hindu world ( India) had 
pioneered.
Bondarevsky and Sofinsky (1975, 1976) viewed the general devel­
opment of nonalignment in terms of in te rn a t io n a l  c l a s s  a n a ly s i s ,  and 
advanced the  view tha t  the s o c i a l i s t  world and the nonaligned world
Q
shared s im i la r  material  condi t ions .  Charting a d i f f e r e n t  course,  
Rothstein (1976) saw the nonaligned countr ies  as having moved away 
from a p r i o r  major concern with s tee r in g  c lea r  of superpower bloc 
alignments to a major focus on binding together to  t ry  to e f f e c t  
changes in the nature of contemporary in te rn a t io n a l  economic r e l a ­
t i o n s . ^
How the phenomenon of nonalignment has developed in regard to 
i t s  r e l a t i o n  to the United Nations and the superpowers i s  the sub jec t  
t r e a ted  by Jackson (1983);^*^ and his  work demonstrated th a t  nonalign­
ment had grown in to  a s ig n i f i c a n t  in t e rn a t io n a l  r e a l i t y .  This view of 
nonalignment as a s ig n i f i c a n t  in te rn a t io n a l  r e a l i t y  was also conveyed 
in W i l l e t ' s  (1978) and Mortimer's  (1980) works, and both imparted the 
view th a t  nonalignment manifested i t s e l f  as a Third World c o a l i t io n  
framework.^^
Misra (1981) and Mates (1983) sought to develop a conceptual
p r o f i l e  of nonalignment, and both were of the  general  view t h a t  many
scholars  have approached the subject  of nonalignment in a manner t h a t
indica ted  t h a t  they had a l e ss  than s a t i s f a c t o r y  understanding of the
1?concept of nonalignment.
9There had also  been many who had sought to comprehend the nona­
ligned foreign po licy  of  p a r t i c u l a r  c o u n t r ie s .  For example, Kashkett 
(1982),^^ in examining Iraqi nonaligned fo re ign  p o l i c y ,  saw such f a c ­
to r s  as the centra l  ro le  of the Baathis t  ideology (e spec ia l ly  in i t s  
p resen t  moderated form) in the Iraq i  national l i f e ,  the a b i l i t y  of the 
Baath is t  p o l i t i c a l  e l i t e  group to  be able to  have control  over and 
bring a measure of s t a b i l i t y  to  the Iraqi p o l i t i c a l  system, in c re a s ­
ing economic power through o il  revenue, and the  I r aq i  des i re  to play a 
more i n f lu e n t i a l  ro le  in the Arab world and the nonaligned group, as 
having led to Iraq pursuing vigorously a nonaligned foreign policy .
For i t s  s ize  and mate ria l  cond i t ions ,  Tanzania was seen as 
manifesting a very a s s e r t iv e  nonaligned fo re ign  policy  (Gupta, 
1981),^^ while Nepal was seen as a small geographica lly  constra ined 
country which t r i e d  to pursue a foreign policy  o f  nonalignment, but,  
a t  the  same time, was saddled with  a t r a d i t i o n a l  f e u d a l i s t i c  system at  
home (Baral ,  1981).^^
Some coun t r ie s ,  l ike  North Korea, were seen as using nonalign­
ment to gain in te rn a t io n a l  r e cogn i t ion ,  as a p la tform fo r  having an in ­
te rna t iona l  audience f o r  i t s  pos i t ion  on issues r e l a t i n g  to  the p re ­
car ious  s i tu a t io n  on the  peninsula  i t  i s  s i t u a t e d  on, and as a forum 
fo r  promoting l inks  with nonaligned countr ies  (Krishnan, 1981) 
Phadnis and Patnaik (1981), on the  other hand, saw a country l ike  Sri 
Lanka as using nonalignment to maintain i t s  s t a b i l i t y  and indepen­
dence.^^
Nigeria ,  whose nonaligned foreign policy  i s  the subjec t  of 
t h i s  study, has manifested foreign policy in various areas and
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s i tu a t io n s  tha t  r e l a t e  to the phenomenon (and there  have been studies 
on these  areas and s i t u a t i o n s  which provide much information fo r  the 
understanding of the Nigerian nonaligned foreign p o l icy ) .
Akinyemi (1974),  in an e f f o r t  to understand how the Nigerian
federal  po l i ty  r e l a t e d  to N ige r ia ' s  foreign pol icy ,  provided much in-
18formation on Nigerian foreign  policy from 1950 to 1966. Though 
the major outcome of t h i s  work was the th e s i s  tha t  the Nigerian fo r ­
eign po l icy  was much a f fec ted  by the then nature  of the Nigerian fed­
e ra l  system, the d e ta i l e d  analyses of the various major foreign policy 
act ions  Nigeria was involved with,  during th i s  per iod ,  provided ample 
information with which N ige r ia ' s  p o l i c i e s  r e l a t i n g  to  the Congo Cri­
s i s ,  the  Middle East problem, the r e l a t io n sh ip  with Nkrumah's Ghana, 
the apartheid problem in Southern A fr ica ,  and the decoloniza tion i s ­
sues could be examined in terms of nonalignment bear ings .
Also concerned with the Nigerian foreign policy  between 1960 
and 1966 i s  the study done by Idang (1973) which pos ited  th a t  internal 
p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t i e s  had a s i g n i f i c a n t  impact on N ig e r ia ' s  in te rna ­
tional b e h a v i o r . L i k e  Akinyemi, Idang also  provided an in-depth
ana lys is  of Nigerian foreign policy during the 1960' s ,  but,  unlike the 
former, ins tead of focusing on major issue areas he presented a compre­
hensive treatment of  Nigerian in te rn a t io n a l  ac t ions .  In r e l a t i o n  to 
t h i s  s tudy, such a comprehensive analys is  of the Nigerian foreign pol­
icy during the I 9 6 0 ' s enables one to examine how such foreign policy 
r e l a t e d  to the nonalignment p r in c ip l e .
Idang touched on the subjec t  of nonalignment; but he ap­
proached th i s  subjec t  mainly in conceptual pe rspec t ive .  Thus, he saw
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i t  mainly as one of "the ideological  bases" on which N ige r ia ' s  foreign
POpolicy might have r e s t e d .  Therefore,  to him, nonalignment was
21j u s t  one of the "body of ideas ,  do c t r in e s ,  b e l i e f s  and values" 
(which a lso  included Pan-Africanism) which might have impacted on Ni­
g e r i a ' s  foreign  po l icy .  Through th i s  pe rsp ec t iv e ,  nonalignment, in 
terms of i t s  impact on the  Nigerian foreign po l icy ,  was seen in terms 
of how i t  concerted with the other concepts.  For example, he saw nona­
lignment as "an extension of African nationa lism to the in te rna t iona l
l e v e l . "22
How scho la rs  look a t  the place of Nigeria  in the in te rna t iona l
23system was of i n t e r e s t  to  Shaw and Fasehun (1980). Their main 
view was th a t  two schools of thought dominate Nigerian foreign policy  
s tud ies  t h a t  r e l a t e  to  N ig e r i a ' s  ro le  in the  in te rna t iona l  system—the 
t r a d i t i o n a l  and the  rad ica l  schools .  They assoc ia te  the t r a d i t i o n a l  
school with the r e a l i s t /p o w er  p o l i t i c s  pe rspec t ive  in th a t  i t  concen­
t r a t e s  i t s  ana lys i s  on the soc ie ta l  supers t ruc tu res  and adopts a s t a t e -  
c e n t r i c  mode of a n a ly s i s .  Thus, th i s  school assumed th a t  Nigeria was 
an independent a c to r  in the in te rna t iona l  system, and tha t  i t  was a r e ­
gional and cont inen ta l  l eader .  I t  was a lso  seen as believing th a t  Ni­
geria  can achieve socioeconomic growth through capita li sm.  On the 
other hand, the rad ica l  school adopted a global p o l i t i c a l  economy per­
spective and concentra tes  on the global soc ie ta l  in f r a s t r u c tu r e s  
(which to  t h i s  school are economic—mainly the nature  of global eco­
nomic a c t i v i t i e s )  and the so r t  of global p o l i t i c a l  and cu l tu ra l  r e l a ­
t ions  t h a t  th r ived  on these .  Thus, i t  saw Nigeria as belonging on the 
per iphery ,  or semi-per iphery,  of a global c a p i t a l i s t  system (which i s
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made up of a few powerful countries a t  the  cen te r ,  and numerous l e s s  
powerful countr ies  a t  i t s  semi periphery  and per iphery) .  Unlike the 
t r a d i t i o n a l  school,  t h i s  school held t h a t  a c a p i t a l i s t  road would only 
lead Nigeria to underdevelopment. A dd i t iona l ly ,  s ince i t  saw Nigeria 
as being a t  the per iphery ,  or the semi per iphery ,  of the global system, 
i t  held t h a t  i t  was not possible  fo r  Nigeria  to  be an independent ac­
to r  in the in te rn a t io n a l  system. And t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  point  showed how 
Shaw and Fasehun's work re la ted  to the subjec t  of t h i s  study—nonalign­
ment. Extending the above view on c a p a b i l i t y  and noncapabil i ty  fo r  in ­
dependent action in the in te rna t iona l  system on the  pa r t  of Nigeria ,  
the  t r a d i t i o n a l  school would have held t h a t  given the sovereign power 
inherent  in the  Nigerian s t a t e ,  the enormous economic and human r e ­
sources i t  i s  endowed with ,  and i t s  sheer physical s i z e ,  i t  was p o s s i ­
ble for Nigeria  to pursue a nonaligned fo re ign  po l icy .  On the  other 
hand, the  rad ica l  school held the view th a t  given i t s  place in the 
semi per iphery ,  or the  periphery,  of the global c a p i t a l i s t  system, Nige­
r i a  was incapable of being an independent actor in the in t e rn a t io n a l  
system, and th e re fo re ,  by extension, t h i s  school might have seen Nige­
r i a  as being incapable of pursuing a nonaligned policy during the 
period covered by t h i s  study.
Shaw and Fasehun saw the w r i t in g s  of Bolaji  Akinyemi, Olajide 
Aluko, Ibrahim Gambari, and Mazi Ofoegbu as representing the t r a d i ­
t iona l  school of Nigerian foreign po licy  s tud ie s ,  while Ikenna 
Nzimiro, Claude Ake, and Segun Osoba, represented  the  rad ical  school.
They also noted th a t  while the  t r a d i t i o n a l  scholars were some­
how more i n f l u e n t i a l  in the foreign policy process ,  the rad ica l
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scho la rs ,  though not as i n f l u e n t i a l ,  did e x e r t  some influence a lso .  
The l a t t e r  seemed to have had t h e i r  inf luence  more in d i r e c t ly ,  through 
t h e i r  high v i s i b i l i t y  in the academic world and through t h e i r  impact 
on public  opinion (which was often enhanced by the  wide press coverage 
th a t  t h e i r  public  comments seemed to draw).  The authors even noted 
th a t  a then Nigerian Head of S ta te ,  Olusegun Obasanjo, in some of his  
speeches,  gave out views th a t  were quite  in consonant with the  radical  
view of N ig e r ia ' s  p lace  in the in te rn a t io n a l  system (which i s  tha t  of 
a country at the periphery of the global c a p i t a l i s t  s y s t e m ) . H o w ­
ever ,  in  t ry in g  to  gauge the influence of both schools of thought,  one 
might have also  considered what goes on in the professional bodies of 
those socia l  science d i s c ip l in e s  t h a t  r e l a t e  to  foreign policy s tud­
i e s .  An example of t h i s ,  which may be ca l led  the p o l i t i c s  of p o l i t ­
ical  science in  N iger ia ,  r e l a t e s  to the dynamics of the Nigerian P o l i t ­
ical  Science Assoc ia t ion .  The rad ica l  schola rs  a re  increas ingly mak­
ing s i g n i f i c a n t  impact on t h i s  body. On the other hand, both the Nige­
rian  Socie ty o f  In te rn a t io n a l  Law and the Nigerian Society of In te rna­
t iona l  Affa i rs  seem to  be dominated by the  t r a d i t i o n a l  schola rs .  Del­
ving in to  how these  bodies func t ion ,  and assess ing  t h e i r  influence in 
the l a rge r  so c ie ty ,  would have contr ibu ted  to  an evaluation of the in ­
fluence of both the  t r a d i t i o n a l  and rad ica l  scho lars  on Nigerian f o r ­
eign policy  s t u d i e s .
Though not pr im ari ly  concerned with fo re ign  policy ,  Nnoli
pc
(1981) addressed the  issue of f ind ing  an e f f e c t i v e  in t e l l e c tu a l  ap­
proach th a t  would have allowed the problems of N ig e r i a ' s  socioeconomic 
development (with due recognition  of global socioeconomic fa c to r s )  to
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be reso lved . Like Shaw and Fasehun, Nnoli saw two i n t e l l e c t u a l  ap­
proaches on t h i s  su b jec t—the t r a d i t i o n a l  and rad ical  approaches— a l ­
though he saw only one as being u se fu l .  Bas ica l ly ,  he did not view
Nigeria  as being capable of co n t ro l l in g  i t s  economic destiny  (and thus 
to  be able to achieve meaningful development) within i t s  present p o s i ­
t i o n  in the per iphery  of the global c a p i t a l i s t  system. By ex tens icn ,  
N no l i ' s  view of N ig e r ia ' s  economic pos i t ion  in the world can be used, 
e sp e c ia l l y  by those who revere  economic r e a l i t y  as the paramount so­
c ia l  r e a l i t y ,  to p o s i t  t h a t  fo r  countr ie s  l ik e  Nigeria ,  a nonaligned
fo re ign  policy i s  p r a c t i c a l l y  una t ta inab le .
There are many p a r t i c u l a r  foreign pol icy  issues  tha t  have en­
gaged the a t t e n t io n  of Nigeria ,  and the task of plowing through some
?6of these  was undertaken by Aluko (1981). His work s p e c i f i c a l l y  r e ­
l a t e d  to t h i s  study in two ways. F i r s t l y ,  h i s  de ta i led  analyses of 
major fore ign policy  issues  during the F i r s t  Republic and the f i r s t  
e ra  of m i l i t a r y  governments ( for  example, the e f f e c t s  of the Civil  War 
on foreign po l icy ,  r e l a t i o n s  with B r i t a in ,  a t t i t u d e s  towards the Euro­
pean Economic Community, the Middle East problem, the Southern Afr ica  
apar theid  problem, the n a t io n a l i za t io n  of the  asse ts  of  the B r i t i sh  Pe­
troleum Company, and r e l a t i o n s  with the superpowers) allows one to 
gauge the re levance of the p r in c ip le  of nonalignment in r e l a t io n  to  
how Nigeria dea l t  with these i s su e s .  Secondly, Aluko also  d i r e c t l y  ex­
amined the nonalignment content  of the Nigerian foreign policy during 
the  Civil War and during the Mohammed/Obasanjo government. In connec­
t i o n  with t h i s  second ta sk ,  Aluko l e f t  the general impression t h a t  the 
exper ience,  and the lessons ,  of the Civil War helped move a nonaligned
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fore ign  policy t h a t  was c le a r ly  leaning to the West during the p r io r
F i r s t  Republic to a nonaligned foreign  po l icy  t h a t  was more even in
27terms of the dealings with both the  West and East; and th a t  the as ­
se r t iveness  of Nigerian foreign po licy  (which in some instances  meant 
s ig n i f i c a n t  f r i c t i o n  with some western countr ies)  during the Mohammed/-
Obasanjo government e ra ,  did not r e s u l t  in the abandonment of the nona- 
28lignment policy.
However, though Aluko did pay d i r e c t  a t t e n t io n  to nonalignment 
in the above two in s tan ces ,  t h i s  subjec t  was not t r e a ted  in r e l a t i o n  
to  most of the policy  is sues  he d ea l t  with since the centra l  concern 
of h is  work was the general  analyses of other foreign  policy i s su e s .
N iger ia 's  e f f o r t s  to a t t a in  nuclear c a p a b i l i ty  i s  a sub jec t  
t h a t  s trongly r e l a t e s  to the Nigerian foreign p o l icy ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in 
terms of the des i re  to augment N ig e r ia ' s  s t r a t e g i c  and m i l i t a r y  p o s i ­
t io n  (though the domestic b en e f i t s  of nuclear c a p a b i l i t y ,  in terms of 
more energy production f o r  socioeconomic development, i s  pub l ic ly  more
often  considered as being important) .  Henderson (1981) provides some
29information on the na ture  of N ig e r ia ' s  nuclear po l icy .  By examin­
ing the issues of technica l  e x p e r t i s e ,  mineral resources ,  b u reaucra t ic -  
i n t e l l e c t u a l  c o n s t i tu en c ie s ,  nuclear energy f a c i l i t i e s ,  and technolog­
ica l  milieu th a t  r e l a t e d  to the prospects of a v iab le  nuclear indus­
t r y ,  he held the view t h a t ,  desp i te  c o n s t r a in t s ,  Nigeria would pursue 
the development of th i s  energy source in some form t h a t  would be d e t e r ­
mined by the way the above va r iab les  are manifested.  A ddi t iona l ly ,  
apar t  from these is sues  concerning how the nuclear indus try  might 
develop, Henderson also considered how N ig e r i a ' s  nuclear po licy  had
16
much to do with how the "latter perceived i t s  ro le  in the African r e ­
gional con tex t ,  p a r t i c u l a r ly  with reference  to the f e s te r in g  s i t u a ­
t ion  in southern Afr ica ,  which i s  a lso  accompanied by an acute v io le n t  
m i l i t a ry  s i t u a t i o n —and the ro le  Nigeria  plays in th i s  area.  This s i t ­
uation has much to do with nonalignment since the  tension in the area 
sharpens the apprehensions of both the West and the East (and within  
t h i s  context Henderson's work provided information fo r  understanding 
how, or whether, nonalignment was r e l a t e d  to how Nigeria perceived i t s  
ro le  in A fr ica ,  and more s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  in Southern Afr ica) .
Another study of the Nigerian foreign policy by Aluko 
(1977)^^ saw i t  in terms of th ree  concentr ic  policy a reas - -p o l i cy  
toward neighbours in the West African region, African policy ,  and 
extra-Afr ican  po l icy .  This approach allows a c l e a re r  understanding of 
Nigerian foreign policy  since Afr ica  i s  being increas ing ly  enunciated 
as the fo re ign  policy  cen terp iece .  However, in terms of nonalignment, 
Aluko gave the impression th a t  t h i s  phenomenon wil l  be mostly re levan t  
in the t h i r d  concentr ic  foreign policy  area (the extra-African po l icy  
a r e a ) ,  with p a r t i c u l a r  reference  to r e l a t io n s  with the superpowers. On 
the other  hand r e a l i t y  seems to in d ica te  t h a t ,  in terms of the r e l a ­
t io n s  with immediate neighbouring countr ies  and other African coun­
t r i e s ,  the  phenomenon of nonalignment may also be re levan t  (more so, 
since  many regional issues often assume in te rna t iona l  dimensions th a t  
engage the a t t e n t io n  of the superpowers).
How N ig e r ia ' s  p o l i t i c a l  scene,  economy, and external  i n f l u ­
ences are r e l a t e d  was explored by Gambari (1975).^^ He posited th a t  
the  growing p o l i t i c a l  e ff icacy  th a t  accompanied the end of the Civil
17
War, and the s i g n i f i c a n t  improvement in the economy due mostly to 
petroleum resources ,  had generally  been accompanied by a growing i n t e r ­
national inf luence .  The African regional area was seen as the area in 
which the impact of  Nigerian in f luence  was most f e l t ,  and Gambari pa r ­
t i c u l a r l y  pointed out N ig e r i a ' s  ro le  in t ry ing  to end the apar theid 
problem in Southern Afr ica  as a case in po in t .  A ddi t iona l ly ,  note was 
made of N ige r ia ' s  vigorous ro le  in helping Afr ican,  Caribbean and 
P a c i f ic  countr ies  to nego t ia te  b e t t e r  with the European Economic Com­
munity.  Nigeria was seen as re ly ing  on the basic premise of st rength  
through unity ;  and, Yakubu Gowon, a former head of s t a t e ,  was quoted 
as saying tha t  " I t  is  b e t t e r  f o r  a United Africa  to t a lk  to a United 
Europe.
N ig e r i a ' s  premier ro le  in the  founding of the Economic Commu­
n i ty  of West African S ta te s  (ECOWAS) was seen by Gambari as the  "most 
s i g n i f i c a n t  of a l l "  the  man i fes ta t ions  of a growing in te rna t iona l  
in f lu en ce ,  which he saw as being l inked to a growing p o l i t i c a l  e f f i ­
cacy and a growing economy. A dd i t iona l ly ,  he observed th a t  the ECOWAS 
might be used in "Undermining the pervasive in f luence  of France"^* 
in those African co un t r ie s  tha t  were formerly the fo rmer 's  co lon ies .
N ig e r ia ' s  growing in fluence was seen as a lso having an ex t ra -  
African dimension in the  general in te rna t iona l  community in the in ­
creas ing a t ten t ion  being paid to  Niger ia  by the superpowers. For exam­
p le ,  Gambari observed th a t  in the  mid-1970's the United S ta tes  ap­
pointed a former A ss i s tan t  Secre tary  of Sta te  fo r  African A f fa i r s  as 
i t s  Ambassador to N i g e r i a . The Soviet  Union was also seen as hav­
ing an increas ing i n t e r e s t  in Nigeria  desp ite  the f a c t  th a t  i t  was
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unable to carve out a special p r iv i leg ed  re la t io n sh ip  with Nigeria a f ­
t e r  helping i t  during the c iv i l  war. The ind ica t ions  th a t  the Soviet 
Union "has not given up hope"^® were seen as i t s  decision to help
bui ld  an 800 mil l ion  Naira iron and s t e e l  indus try  in Nigeria ,  and the 
f a c t  th a t  Vasily Solodovnikov, the then d i r e c to r  of the African I n s t i ­
t u t e  of the  Soviet  Academy of Sciences in Moscow, "announced th a t  a 
spec ia l  Nigerian sec tion  would be e s ta b l i sh e d "  in his th ink- tank "both 
to  demonstrate new hopes and prospects fo r  Soviet-Nigerian coopera­
t ion  and to underscore the place of Nigeria in Africa and the
W o r l d . "37
The dynamics of Nigerian fo re ign  policy during the ea r ly  phase 
of the Mohammed/Obasanjo government, which replaced the Gowon govern-
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ment in 1975, were analyzed by Aluko (1976). He notes t h a t  the 
Mohammed/Obasanjo government adopted "a rad ica l  m i l i t a n t  s ty le  in the 
conduct of external r e l a t i o n s , a n d  th a t  t h i s  new approach, as ex­
pected ,  r e s u l t e d  in many confron ta t ions  in the in te rna t iona l  scene
(and th a t  t h i s  con tras ted  with the cautious  foreign policy of previous 
governments). He a lso  added th a t  while Western countr ies  were those 
Nigeria  most often found cause to  d isag ree  with ,  "the bulk of the coun­
t r y ' s  ex terna l  economic, commercial and f i n a n c i a l ,  and even m i l i t a r y  
t ies"^® continued to remain with the former, as had been the case 
during the Gowon pe r iod .  Thus, Aluko saw N ig e r ia ' s  foreign policy  dur­
ing the Mohammed/Obasanjo government as s t i l l  coming under the um­
b r e l l a  of nonalignment. He also observed th a t  the various in te rna l  
c o n s t r a i n t s ,  and exte rnal r e a l i t i e s ,  would r e s u l t  in l i t t l e  change in 
the  fundamentals of N iger ia ' s  foreign  policy t h a t  had guided the
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country through previous governments. I t  was also observed tha t  while 
the preceding Gowon government paid more a t ten t ion  to  the formation of 
ECOWAS, fo r  the Mohammed/Obasanjo government Africa was the c e n t e r ­
piece  of N ig e r ia ' s  foreign pol icy .
Ef fo r ts  to build  a st rong viable  regional economic o rgan iza­
t ion  in West Africa (as c r y s t a l l i z e d  in the form of the above men­
tioned  ECOWAS), from the point of view of Nigeria 's  premier r o l e ,  were
analyzed by Ojo.*^ He traced Nigerian actions  before the formation 
of ECOWAS th a t  were r e l a t e d  to the idea of an economic union in West 
Afr ica  and analyzed the ac t ions  by both West African and extra-West 
African actors  tha t  led to  the formation of the o rgan iza t ion .  His 
main i n t e r e s t  was the examination of the fac to rs  tha t  made Nigeria  de­
cide to shoulder the major r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of bringing ECOWAS to f u l l  
f r u i t i o n .  Of p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t  to t h i s  study i s  Ojo 's  a s se r t io n  
th a t  Nigeria desired to reduce France 's  influence in African coun tr ies  
th a t  were formerly i t s  co lonies  (and in terms of ECOWAS, i t  had de­
cided to s t a r t  with i t s  immediate neighbours—the West African coun­
t r i e s ) .  France 's  leaning towards S ia fra  during the Nigerian Civil War 
(1967 -70), and inf luencing countr ies  l ik e  the Ivory Coast to  do the 
same, was seen as playing a major fac to r  th a t  made Nigeria  determined 
to check France 's  influence in Afr ica  s t a r t i n g  with a device l i k e  the 
ECOWAS. Addit ionally ,  important economic reasons were a lso  seen as mo­
t iv a t in g  f a c to r s  fo r  N ig e r i a ' s  desire  fo r  a framework l ik e  the 
ECOWAS. Nigeria was seen as needing an economic zone th a t  would help 
i t s  i n d u s t r i a l i z in g  economy (due to i t s  recognition of the f a c t  t h a t ,  
contrary  to the notion of global free  t r a d e ,  in p rac t ice  there  are a
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l o t  of c o n s t r a in t s  in the in te rna t iona l  economic system with regards 
to the expor ta t ion  of manufactured g o o d s ) . O j o  also  showed th a t  
Nigeria was very r e a l i s t i c  about the problems tha t  regional economic 
in teg ra t io n s  must experience and solve; thus ,  the c lea r  pragmatism 
th a t  is  inheren t  in most Nigerian moves.
Both in terms of foreign and domestic p o l i c i e s ,  the Mohammed/ 
Obasanjo government i s  often seen as the one th a t  was most innovative 
and dramatic in the Nigerian national  exis tence in comparison with 
other governments th a t  were in power during the 1960 to 1983 period 
(which i s  the period covered by th i s  s tudy) .  A comprehensive look at 
the Nigerian foreign policy during the era  of t h i s  government has been 
car r ied  out by Akinyemi (1979).^^ He was an act ive  p a r t i c ip a n t  
in the fo re ign  po l icy  process ,  and thus provided an ins ide  view of i t  
in his evalua t ion  of Nigerian foreign policy during the Mohammed/ 
Obasanjo government e ra .  He saw Nigerian foreign policy  during th i s  
period as being very a s s e r t iv e ,  with Africa  being the  primary a rea  of 
i n t e r e s t .  Nigeria was seen as marshall ing all  of i t s  resources  to 
shape even ts ,  e sp ec ia l ly  in Southern Africa (with specia l  re fe rence  to 
the outcome of the Angolan independence s t ru g g le ) .  In connection with 
t h i s  Angolan i s su e ,  Akinyemi went fu r th e r  to p o s i t  t h a t  N ige r ia 's  ro le  
in helping the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), 
the nat ional  l i b e r a t i o n  organizat ion th a t  succeeded in forming the gov­
ernment fo r  the new independent country,  was a j u s t  a c t ion .  Thus, he 
declared t h a t  " there  is  no i n t r i n s i c  r e la t io n sh ip  between success and 
jus tness  of one 's  cause in p o l i t i c s , "  and the re fore  even " i f  the MPLA 
had been defea ted .  . . .  we would s t i l l ,  however, have been convinced 
th a t  Nigeria was r i g h t  in recognizing the MPLA.
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The e f f o r t s  to bui ld  a viable  regional economic organizat ion 
in West Africa (as evidenced by ECOWAS), and Nigerian technica l  and 
f inanc ia l  a s s is tance  to  other African c o u n t r i e s ,  were a lso seen as 
other important preoccupat ions on the  in t e rn a t io n a l  scene during th is  
period.
Given Akinyemi's view of Nigerian fo re ign  policy during the 
Mohammed/Obasanjo government e ra ,  one may p o s tu la t e  th a t  during th is  
period Pan-African conceptua liza tion  of fo re ign  po l icy  r o l e s ,  being at  
the  fo re f ro n t  of the  Nigerian fo reign  pol icy fo rmula t ions ,  might also 
have meant tha t  nonalignment as a fo re ign  pol icy  p r in c ip le  was mainly 
re levan t  in terms of serving to re in fo rce  the Afr ican-cente red  foreign 
pol icy .
While Akinyemi*s a r t i c l e  was concerned with Nigeria foreign 
pol icy during the Mohammed/Obasanjo government pe r iod ,  Nigerian f o r ­
eign pol icy  during the e n t i r e  period of the f i r s t  e ra  of m i l i t a r y  gov­
ernments (which l a s t e d  from 1956 to  1979) was the sub jec t  examined by 
Ofoegbu (1979).^^ He has been quoted as saying t h a t
ex i s t in g  works on Nigerian foreign po l icy  contain lapses which 
I have endeavored to avoid . . . They devote a d isp ropor t ion ­
a te  amount of time and space to issues  of domestic p o l i t i c s ,
cons t i tu t io n a l  development, and domestic economy, and are  thus
unable to provide .adequate analys is  of the  substan t ive  issues  
of foreign po l icy .
Ofoegbu was not c r i t i c a l  of the l ink  between the domestic envi­
ronment and foreign  po l icy ,  but he asse r ted  t h a t  mere devotion to the
former by some schola rs  tended to r e s u l t  in t h e i r  not adequately evalu­
ating how Nigerian foreign policy s u b s ta n t iv e ly  manifested i t s e l f .
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In t h i s  a r t i c l e  he had t r i e d  to  f i l l  the gap in the l a t t e r  
area (with special  a t t e n t io n  to the f i r s t  e ra  of m i l i t a ry  govern­
ments) but without ignoring the domestic environment. He devoted h is  
a t t e n t io n  to the task  of evaluat ing Nigerian foreign policy during the 
period of each of the three  m i l i t a ry  governments (namely the I ro n s i ,  
Gowon, and Mohammed/Obasanjo governments).
Ofoegbu viewed the Ironsi government (January 1966 -  July 
1966) as one th a t  witnessed not much s i g n i f i c a n t  i n i t i a t i v e s  in the 
fo re ign  policy  arena due to the c r i s i s  na tu re  of the domestic p o l i t i ­
cal scene during t h a t  time (and i t  might a lso  be added th a t  the sheer 
short  l i f e  period of  t h i s  government also made s ig n i f i c a n t  foreign p o l ­
icy i n i t i a t i v e s  not p r a c t i c a l l y  a t t a i n a b l e . )
The succeeding Gowon government was c red i ted  with moving Africa to the 
fo re  of Nigeria fo re ign  policy  preoccupation,  while l inks  with Bri ta in  
(which were at the fore  during the F i r s t  Republic,  1960-1966) were r e l ­
egated to the secondary level of considera t ion  due to the Nigerian per ­
ception of B r i t a in ,  and the West genera l ly ,  as being h e s i t an t  in sup­
port ing i t  in maintaining i t s  t e r r i t o r i a l  i n t e g r i t y  during the i n i t i a l  
phase of the c iv i l  war. The Soviet Union, which allowed i t s  m i l i t a r y
hardware and know-how to be at  the disposal of  the Nigerian m i l i t a r y
(espec ia l ly  the Nigerian Air Force) during the  Civil War, was th e re ­
fore  seen as s i g n i f i c a n t l y  improving i t s  r e l a t i o n s  with Nigeria in com­
parison with the s t a t e  of pre-war Nigerian-Sovie t  r e l a t i o n s .
On the African scene,  the ECOWAS formation was seen as an im­
portan t  i n t e r e s t  to  the Gowon government; and cautious and r e a l i s t i c  
moves on the pa rt  of Nigeria was seen as the hallmark of i t s  moves in 
t h i s  policy  area due to  the many c o n s t r a in t s  i t  had to overcome.
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Ofoegbu saw the succeeding government ( the Mohammed/Obasanjo 
government) as t h a t  in which new i n i t i a t i v e s  were speedily  and d e t e r ­
minedly pursued; but he noted that  t h i s  a sse r t iveness  was accompanied 
with many confron ta t ions .  In f a c t ,  one wonders whether Nigeria was 
giving a new meaning to nonalignment po licy  (which i t  often professes  
to follow) in the way i t  r e l a t e d  to o the rs ,  e sp ec ia l ly  the  big powers. 
According to Ofoegbu, N ig e r ia ' s  " re la t io n s  with the U.S.A., B r i ta in ,  
the U.S.S.R. . . . were all  s t ra ined  at  one time or another . .
An ana lys is  of Nigerian foreign policy during the Second Repub-
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l i e  (1979-1983) was provided by Ogunbadejo (1980).  The general 
t h r u s t  of his  a r t i c l e  i s  an examination of how the 1979 Const i tution 
was r e l a t ed  to the foreign policy process and o r i e n t a t i o n .  Regarding 
the c o n s t i tu t io n a l  impact, he h ighl ighted  t r e a ty  p rov is ions ,  war p rov i ­
s ions ,  foreign  policy i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  general foreign policy  guide l ines ,  
and the f a c t  th a t  the cons t i tu t io n  s p e c i f i c a l l y  placed emphasis on the 
wel l-being of Africa by requir ing  Nigeria to do a l l  to promote African 
u n i ty ,  and the p o l i t i c a l ,  economic and social u p l i f t i n g  of the c o n t i ­
nent.
Ogunbadejo saw the Second Republ ic ' s  foreign  policy as being 
based mainly on two conceptual frameworks, namely the African-centered 
po l icy  and nonalignment; and he held the view th a t  the Nigerian f o r ­
eign policy during th i s  period was much in tune with those  two foreign 
po l icy  conceptual frameworks.
Unlike any of the l i t e r a t u r e  reviewed above, an a r t i c l e  by 
Mazrui (1982)*^ was devoted solely  to the examination of N iger ia ' s  
r e l a t i o n s  with a global power (the United S t a t e s ) .  His aim was not
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tha t  of analyzing the nature  of the r e l a t io n sh ip  between these  two 
countries  but,  as the t i t l e  of his  a r t i c l e  implied,  to comment on 
cer ta in  th ings  t h a t  should, or should no t ,  happen in the r e l a t i o n s  be­
tween both.  He implied throughout his  a r t i c l e  t h a t ,  though both could 
cooperate ,  Nigeria could not afford to be too close to  a global power. 
In r e l a t io n  to the concept of nonalignment, one may observe th a t  
Mazrui' s recognit ion of Nigeria not being able to a fford  in timate  r e l a ­
t ions  with a global power can also be taken to mean Nigeria  not being 
able to be aligned with a global power.
Another view on N ig e r i a ' s  r e l a t i o n s  with a global power was 
provided by Ogunbadejo (1978).^® His a r t i c l e  shows how, in i t s  r e l a ­
t ions  with Nigeria ,  the Sovie t  Union seemed not to  be very unbending 
in terms of i t s  ideological  o r i e n t a t i o n .  The Soviet decis ion to help 
Nigeria m i l i t a r i l y  solve the  problem of secess ion ,  and i t s  various mul­
t i l e v e l  economic and cu l tu ra l  contacts (both o f f i c i a l  and u n o f f i c i a l )  
with Nigeria ,  were e labora ted  on as key examples of i t s  pragmatism. 
Addit ionally ,  Ogunbadejo a lso  showed how, desp ite  a l l  these  e f f o r t s ,  
Nigeria had shown i t s e l f  capable of not being locked in to  a close  r e l a ­
t ionship  with the former.
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CHAPTER II
NONALIGNMENT: AN HISTORICAL OUTLOOK AND A SURVEY
OF RELATED POLITICAL THEMES
An His to r ica l  Outlook
The Conference of Nonaligned Countries in Belgrade in Septem­
be r ,  1961, marked the formal inauguration of the nonaligned movement, 
but the roo ts  of nonalignment as a phenomenon had been sown in various 
places and occasions f a r  e a r l i e r .
Before the Belgrade conference,  nonalignment had already been 
i d e n t i f i e d  as a phenomenon assoc iated with the foreign  policy of some 
c o u n t r i e s .  Thus, nonalignment manifested i t s e l f  f i r s t  as individual 
c o u n t r i e s '  fo re ign  po l icy ,  then as an organized in te rna t iona l  movement 
(and subsequently nonalignment has continuously been manifested in 
both ways).
Ind ia ,  Egypt, Ghana, Sukarno's Indonesia,  and Yugoslavia were 
some of the countr ies  th a t  helped develop the concept of nonalignment, 
adopted i t  as a major p r in c ip le  of t h e i r  foreign p o l i c i e s ,  and also 
helped make i t  a c o l l e c t iv e  in te rna t iona l  phenomenon.
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India ,  in p a r t i c u l a r ,  has played a very important ro le  in the 
h i s to ry  of the nonalignment phenomenon; and Jawaharlal  Nehru was very 
c ruc ia l  in determining how nonalignment developed, both as a concept 
and as an in t e rn a t io n a l  phenomenon. I t  i s  also r e l e v an t  to note tha t  
I n d i a ' s  exper ience with colonia li sm, and i t s  s t rugg le  to  f r ee  i t s e l f  
formally from i t ,  helped in molding I n d ia ' s  nonaligned in te rn a t io n a l  
behavior .  I n d i a ' s  sense of being an important in te rn a t io n a l  f a c to r  
and a p o t e n t i a l l y  g rea t  country (which Nehru well a r t i c u l a t e d ) ,  the 
Kashmir issue with Pakis tan (and the r e s u l t a n t  actions  of other i n t e r ­
national  ac to rs )  and the superpowers r i v a l r y  were a lso  some of the f a c ­
to r s  th a t  helped fashion nonalignment phenomenon in In d ia .
In the case of Egypt, Nasser was anxious to su s ta in  and a s s e r t  
the fu l l  sovereignty  of his country in a region where the global 
powers were keenly i n t e r e s t e d  in i t s  a f f a i r s  (as evidenced by the 
I s rae l i -A rab  i s sue  and the Suez Canal problem). Nasser was also 
highly conscious of the d e b i l i t a t i n g  e f f e c t  of c lose  fo re ign  contac t  
and foreign domination th a t  had been experienced by a weakened Egypt 
during the e ra  of the t r a d i t i o n a l  p o l i t i c a l  regime which he removed 
from power. All these  f a c to r s  impacted on the way N asse r ' s  Egypt pur­
sued nonaligned foreign pol icy .  S im ilar ly ,  but under d i f f e r e n t  circum­
s tances ,  for  Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Pan-African a s p i r a t i o n s ,  and his  
unceasing concern over the phenomenon of neocolonialism,  were c ruc ia l  
in shaping Ghana's nonaligned foreign policy.
For Indonesia,  under Sukarno, the circumstances under which i t  
a t t a in ed  i t s  independence, i t s  s truggles  to maintain i t s  sovereignty 
and t e r r i t o r i a l  i n t e g r i t y ,  regional problems with Malaysia,  and how i t
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perceived the actions  of other in te rna t iona l  acto rs  in r e l a t i o n  to 
these i s su e s ,  helped spark Sukarno's i n t e r e s t  in nonalignment. On the 
other hand, for Yugoslavia,  the precar ious  pos i t ion  of being located 
in Eastern Europe, and refusing to be p a r t  of the Eastern bloc in a 
cold war e r a ,  and the des i re  to build  a s o c i a l i s t  society ou ts ide  the 
formal in teg ra l  framework of the Soviet  Union posed a ser ious  problem 
to i t s  a b i l i t y  to maintain i t s  sovereignty .  And i t  i s  with in  t h i s  
context t h a t  Yugoslavia 's  i n t e r e s t  in nonalignment,  and the  ro le  i t  
has played in fo s t e r in g  the l e t t e r ’s in te rn a t io n a l  importance, can be 
understood.
For the above coun t r ie s  and many o the rs  (mostly in Afr ica  and 
Asia),  nonalignment increas ing ly  became a major foreign policy  p r i n c i ­
ple ;  and so also was t h e i r  d e s i r e  to have a co l le c t iv e  apprec ia t ion ,  
a r t i c u l a t i o n ,  development, and u t i l i z a t i o n  of t h i s  p r in c ip le .  (The 
l a t t e r  phenomenon became manifested in the  Bandung Conference of Afro- 
Asian s t a t e s  in Indonesia in 1955.)^ However, the  formal inaugura­
tion of nonalignment as a c o l l e c t i v e  in t e rn a t io n a l  phenomenon occurred 
at  the Belgrade Conference of Nonaligned Countries in 1961. Since 
then s ix  s im i la r  conferences have been held in Cairo (1964), Lusaka 
(1970), Algiers (1973), Colombo (1975), Havana (1979), and New Delhi 
(1983).
Nonalignment as a movement has continued to grow in terms of 
conceptua l iza t ion ,  goals,  and i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n .  For example, the 
e a r l i e r  prominent concerns about avoiding strong mi l i t a ry  and p o l i t ­
ical entanglements,  in the face of East/West r i v a l r y ,  have now sh i f ted  
to more concern about global socioeconomic i s sues ;  i t s  conferences and
32
meetings have become more regu la r ized  (though s t i l l  managing to avoid 
fu l l  sca le  i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n ) .  In terms of the i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
growth, s t ru c tu re s  such as coordinating bureaus,  consu l t a t ive  meet­
ings ,  working groups, a nonaligned news agency pool, e t c . ,  have p r o l i f ­
e ra ted .
In the area of concern fo r  global socioeconomic i s su e s ,  the 
New In te rna t iona l  Economic Order and the New In te rna t iona l  Information 
Order are the major anchors.  I t  i s  in t e r e s t in g  to note t h a t  the non- 
al igned countr ies  pursue t h e i r  goals in many and varied forms, most of 
them outs ide the formal forums of the nonaligned movement i t s e l f .  
Thus the United Nations,  i t s  special agencies,  and o ther  i n t e rn a ­
tiona l  trade  and economic nego t ia t ion  forums have been the prominent 
arenas of t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s ;  and th e i r  overlapping membership in these  
bodies fu r th e r  in ten s i fy  t h e i r  r o l e s .
Likewise,  the a t t i t u d e s  of the more powerful countr ies  toward 
the phenomenon of nonalignment have also undergone various changes. 
For example, from e a r l i e r  unenthusiasm towards i t ,  the United Sta tes  
now has long concluded th a t  nonalignment is  not a ser ious t h r e a t  to
O
i t s  i n t e r e s t s .  The Sovie t  Union has also changed from h o s t i l i t y  to 
the idea th a t  i t  i s  somewhat normal fo r  developing countr ies  to not 
view the world pr im ari ly  in terms of capit a li sm and communism. More­
over,  the Soviets have t r i e d  to  use close  a l l i e s ,  l ike  Cuba, to se l l  
the idea th a t  s o c i a l i s t  coun tr ies  are na tura l  a l l i e s  of the nonaligned 
countr ies  (though th i s  has not worked).
The nonaligned coun tr ies  have a remarkable c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of 
exh ib i t ing  various s o c i a l ,  p o l i t i c a l  and economic outlooks,  but having
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the desire  to be nonaligned in t h e i r  in te rna t iona l  ac t ions ;  and th i s  
seems to be a fe a tu re  t h a t  has helped to make sure t h a t  the phenomenon 
does not metamorphise in to  something tha t  i s  very r i g i d .  This ensures 
i t s  continued growth, v i a b i l i t y  and in te rna t iona l  s ign i f icance .
A Survey of Related P o l i t i c a l  Themes
S p i l l in g  d i r e c t l y  in to  the focus of th i s  research (the non- 
alignment concept and the nonalignment content of Nigerian foreign 
pol icy) i s  the p o l i t i c a l  th inking th a t  i s  r e l a t ed  to the phenomenon of 
colonialism in Afr ica ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  in regard to the decolonization 
process .  The decoloniza tion process was sometimes peacefu l ,  sometimes 
v io le n t ,  and a t  times a mixture of both. The ideas  expressed by 
Azikiwe are r ep resen ta t ive  of the p o l i t i c a l  th inking  tha t  t r i e d  to 
show th a t  i f  a colonizing agent is  capable of exh ib i t ing  p o l i t i c a l  
matur i ty  i t  could disengage i t s e l f  peacefu lly .  On the other hand, 
the re  i s  p o l i t i c a l  th inking th a t  sees decolonization as a v io len t  pro­
ces s .  Fanon i s  a key exponent of t h i s  l ine  of th ink ing .  Knowing the 
man himself  i s  also as important as knowing h is  ideas :  a person of
African ances try  born in Martinique,  who l a t e r  t rave led  to France to 
study medicine,  s p ec ia l iz in g  in psychia try ,  and afterwards to work fo r  
the  French government as a p sy ch ia t r i c  physician in Algeria  (which was 
then a French colony).  I n c id e n ta l ly ,  i t  was t h i s  sojourn in Algeria 
t h a t  was to  provide him with the material  condi tions  for  his p o l i t i c a l  
w r i t i n g s .  The f a c t  of being in Algeria ,  which was then waging a na­
t iona l  l i b e r a t i o n  war ag a in s t  France,  forced him to take s ides ;  and he
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chose to put his  material  and in t e l l e c t u a l  resources a t  the disposal 
of  the Algerian g u e r i l l a s ,  mostly as a revolu t ionary  th e o re t i c i an  and 
s t r a t e g i s t .  I t  was out of t h i s  experience th a t  came his c l a s s i c  p o l i t ­
ical  t r e a t i s e .  The Wretched of the Earth .^  In t h i s  book, with the 
th e o re t i c a l  c l a r i t y  which h is  exper t ise  in human behavior—both normal 
and pathological  (through h is  t r a in in g  as a p s y c h i a t r i s t ) — seems to 
have deepened, he ra ised  the phenomenon of violence to a new th e o re t ­
ical  l e v e l ;  but th i s  time as an instrument of thorough decoloniza t ion .  
His opening statement on violence in t h i s  book goes thus :
National l i b e r a t i o n ,  nat ional  rena issance ,  the  r e s to r a t i o n  of 
nationhood to the people,  commonwealth: whatever may be the
headings used or the new formulas introduced, decolonization 
is  always a v io lent phenomenon.
Using his  Algerian experience and those of other  p laces  t h a t  exper i ­
enced or were experiencing a decolonizat ion p rocess .  Fanon analyzed 
how violence is  synonymous with t h i s  process .  Another s trand of his  
thoughts on violence shows him holding the view th a t  i t  is  the only 
thing th a t  would enable the colonized to psychologica lly  decolonize 
themselves.
Undoubtedly, there  were many who were shocked and dismayed by
such r i g i d  views on violence.  Nevertheless,  people l ik e  Jean-Paul
S a r t r e ,  who wrote the p re fa c t  to th i s  book, challenged people to be
courageous enough to read the man who gave the concept of “Fanonian
Violence" to p o l i t i c a l  theory .
They would do well to read Fanon: for  he shows c le a r ly  tha t
th i s  i r r e p r e s s i b l e  violence i s  ne i the r  sound and fu ry ,  nor the 
re su r rec t ion  of savage i n s t i n c t s ,  not even the e f f e c t  of r e ­
sentment; i t  is  man re -c rea t in g  himself .
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In another book Fanon t i e s  the problem of decolonizing Afr ica 
with the g rea te r  issue of how an independent Africa can char t  a more
rewarding course in dealing with o th e r s .  Thus, in t h i s  work he
s t re ssed  the issue of African uni ty .^
Nkrumah i s  another person who wrote ex tens ive ly  on the subjec t  
of colonialism. In most of his  works, he sought to analyze the
colonial  phenomenon and the way to end i t .  Unlike Fanon, he s t ressed  
a nonviolent decolonizing process ca l led  "Posit ive  Action,"  which i s  
seen e s s e n t i a l l y  as involving mass socia l  and p o l i t i c a l  mobilization
of the colonized tha t  makes i t  qui te  c lea r  th a t  colonialism cannot
g
simply continue.
Nkrumah's writ ings  were also concerned with contemporary
Afr ica ,  and the most profound of these  i s  Neo-colonialism: The Last
Q
Stage of  Imperialism. However, ana lys is  is  not r e s t r i c t e d  to
Afr ica ,  but ra the r  applies to any t e r r i t o r y  t h a t  is  seen as having f o r ­
mal p o l i t i c a l  independence while i t  i s  a c tu a l ly  con t ro l led ,  both eco­
nomically and p o l i t i c a l l y ,  by a power source tha t  i s  foreign to  the
t e r r i t o r y .  According to him.
The essence of neo-colonialism is  th a t  the State which i s  sub­
j e c t  to i t  i s ,  in theory ,  independent,  and has a l l  the out­
ward trappings  of in te rn a t io n a l  sovere ignty .  In r e a l i t y  i t s
economic,(System and thus i t s  p o l i t i c a l  policy is  d i rec ted  from
outside.
This book, which is  a neo-Marxist -Leninis t  view of in te rna t iona l  r e l a ­
t i o n s ,  sees neocolonialism as an attempt by an assaulted  imperialism 
to surv ive ,  and argues th a t  through the un ity  of those under i t s  yoke 
i t  will not survive fo r  long. He also  a s s e r t s  th a t  neocolonialism
seeks to  perpetuate  i t s e l f  through the ba lkaniza tion of the neocolo­
nized peoples.
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This i ssue  of un i ty  among the  developing countr ies  lo g ic a l ly  leads to
a major theme in African p o l i t i c a l  th ink ing—which i s  the concept of
Pan-Africanism. Pan-Africanism can- l a rge ly  be seen as a loose concept
tha t  embodies ideas  which a r t i c u l a t e  the unity of A fr ica .  For some
th i s  means the un i ty  o f  African people,  wherever they may be, fo r
t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l ,  economic and cu l tu ra l  betterment;  and, fo r  others  i t
is  mainly the u n i f i c a t i o n  of  the  African continent in to  one p o l i t i c a l
e n t i t y .  Among the l a t t e r ,  some advocate immediate p o l i t i c a l
u n i f i c a t io n ,  while others  s t r e s s  gradual functional cooperation in
economic and socia l  spheres t h a t  will  l a t e r  s p i l l  in to  p o l i t i c a l
u n i f i c a t io n .  There is  a lso  a group th a t  emphasizes subregional
in teg ra t ion  t h a t  will  even tua l ly  lead to continent-wide economic or
supras ta te  p o l i t i c a l  u n i f i c a t i o n .  Pan-Africanism also includes the
idea of Africa e x i s t i n g  without foreign in te r fe rence  and i t s  a b i l i t y
to play a v i t a l  independent ro le  in the in te rna t iona l  community.
Idang, in examining the concept,  sees i t s  l a s t  focus as having much to
do with the phenomenon of nonalignment, and even see the l a t t e r  as a
der iva t ive  of the former.  Thus, as e a r l i e r  shown, he a s s e r t s  t h a t .
That there  i s  a l inkage between non-alignment and African na­
tionali sm admits of no debate .  Not only i s  non-alignment a de­
r iv a t iv e  of the  idea of Pan-Africanism, but i t  i s  a lso ao,ex­
tension of African na t iona l ism to the in te rna t iona l  l e v e l .
He a lso  p o s i t s  the view th a t  Pan-Africanism was a c tu a l ly  gener­
ated,  as a formal concept,  by the people of African ancestry  who were
not even l iv ing  on the co n t in e n t .  According to him,
. . . the ideas of Pan-Africanism . . . were sown ou ts ide the 
African c o n t in e n t .  Such American and West Indian Black i n t e l ­
l e c tu a l s  as W. E. B. Dubois, Marcus Garvey, Aime Cesaire ,  
George Padmore and Jean Price-Mars made s ig n i f i c a n t  con t r ibu ­
t io n s  to the  growth of Pan-African consciousness.
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Idang also documents the h i s to r i c a l  f a c t  th a t  these men were those who 
organized the six Pan-African Congresses in the f i r s t  ha l f  of the 20th
Century. Cognizant of t h i s ,  these men can also be cred ited  with im­
mensely con t r ibu t ing  to the decolonizat ion of Africa since some of
those who were to be c r i t i c a l  in the n a t i o n a l i s t  movements for the in ­
dependence of African countr ies  attended these meetings which were
held outs ide  A fr ica ,  and they undoubtedly benef ited from the ideas of 
the o rgan izers .  Notable among such p a r t i c ip a n t s  were Kwame Nkrumah 
and Jomo Kenyatta,  both of whom led Ghana and Kenya, re spec t ive ly ,  to
independence, the  former even more known fo r  h is  con t r ibu t ions ,  both
13p r a c t i c a l l y  and i n t e l l e c t u a l l y ,  to the continent as a whole. The 
indigenous Africans  were a lso  seen as l a t e r  leading the Pan-African 
movement, s ince  the "Western blacks were l a t e r  joined and eventually  
swamped at  the Pan-African congresses by the indigenous African i n t e l ­
le c tu a l s . " ^ *  The formation of the Organization of African Unity 
(OAÜ) gave the idea of Pan-Africanism a more concrete indigenous A f r i ­
can c h a rac te r ,  though Pan-Africanism Congresses (which are l ega l ly  
separate  from, but cooperating with ,  the former) s t i l l  continue to be
held.  The l a t t e r  now function more as cu l tu ra l  bodies within which
Africans and people of African ancestry in other continents  meet to
pursue common goa ls ,  while the OAU t r i e s  to give legal and p o l i t i c a l  
r e a l i t i e s  to  the  so r t  of ideas Pan-Africanism used to  generate.
As a l ready  noted before ,  Nkrumah was at  the fo ref ron t  of Pan- 
Africanism, and many of h is  ideas on th i s  subject  are a r t i c u la te d  in 
one of h is  w o r k s . H i s  main focus in t h i s ,  and others of his 
works, i s  the  idea th a t  there should be suprasta te  p o l i t i c a l
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u n i f i ca t io n  in Afr ica ,  and he showed how th i s  could be r e a l i z e d .  In 
the p rac t ica l  world, he was bent on rea l iz ing  th i s  goa l- -as  witnessed 
by the  number of unions he formed with the other c o u n t r i e s ,  and the 
f a c t  th a t  when he could not succeed in having supras ta te  p o l i t i c a l  uni­
f i c a t i o n  he r e a d i ly  compromised to allow un if ica t ion  to at  l e a s t  s t a r t  
from some lower l e v e l ,  in the form of the Organization of  African
Unity.^® Apart from the strength through unity  arguments, Nkrumah 
also seemed to  have seen African p o l i t i c a l  un if ica t ion  as such u n i f i c a ­
t i o n ,  in h is  statement above, i s  rep resen ta t ive  of the  economic argu­
ments fo r  African un i ty .
Nyerere seems to have also perceived th a t  mass African public 
support fo r  African unity was a considerable check on the ambition of 
some African leaders  who were loath to reduce t h e i r  power through the 
surrendering of some sovereignty of t h e i r  respective coun tr ies  through 
u n i f i c a t i o n .  Thus, he asse r t s  th a t :
. . . psychological ly we have been so successful  t h a t  no 
African leade r ,  even i f  he did not believe in such uni ty ,
would dare say so. What i s  needed, the re fo re ,  iSg not more
preaching about un i ty ,  but more p rac t ic ing  of unity .
The Balewa Government of Nigeria (1960-1955) was one of the
countr ies  t h a t ,  though supporting African un i ty ,  was unen thus ias t ic  
about the idea  of immediate suprasta te  p o l i t i c a l  u n i f i c a t io n ,  and pre ­
fe r red  to see th i s  as a future  ult imate goal.  Thus, though seeing Pan- 
Africanism as "the only so lution to our problems in A fr ica ,  no matter 
what kind of problems they a r e , "  and a lso  bel ieving tha t  "no one in 
Afr ica  doubts the idea of Pan-Africanism," i t  cautioned th a t  the advo­
cates  of immediate suprasta te  p o l i t i c a l  un i f ica t ion  of Afr ica  "must be
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r e a l i s t i c , "  and noted th a t  "at  th i s  moment the  idea of a Union of A f r i ­
can S ta te s  i s  premature" (while s t i l l ,  however, observing tha t  i t  did
"not d ispute  the s in c e r i t y  and indeed the  good in ten t ions  of those
19th a t  advocate" t h i s  so r t  of u n i f i c a t i o n ) .  Nigeria not only 
l imited  i t s e l f  to  the ro le  of cautioning the view of o thers  on th i s  
issue of u n i f i c a t i o n ,  i t  also had i t s  ideas  about how u n i f i c a t io n  in 
Africa would be r e a l i z e d .  Thus, i t  reasoned th a t
The a ssoc ia t ion  of s t a t e s  i s  . . . more acceptable fo r  i t  
i s  y e t  premature to form a Union of S ta te s  under one sover­
e ign ty .  We must f i r s t  break a ll  a r t i f i c i a l  b a r r i e r s ;  build i n ­
te rn a t io n a l  roads ,  promote mutual exchanges—exchange of i n f o r ­
mation,  s c i e n t i f i c  and l ikewise ,  e t c . ,  l i f t i n g  any ban on the 
movement of f r e e  trade  and people between the various African 
countr ies  . . . Yet one can hardly ignore  the necessity  fo r  
s t a t e s ,  to  be united under one sovere ign ty .  Something of a 
loose fed e ra t io n  at f i r s t  having got the  way c lear  may be a 
good beginning. Sooner or l a t e r  unity  w il l  come by necess i ty  
or c i r c u m s t a n t i a l ly .  Africans are A fr icans .  They are Africans 
by colour ,  they are Africans by s o i l ,  by cu l tu re ,  by ways of 
th ink ing ,  and indeed, Africans are insepa rab le .  The unity  of 
Africans comes a ^  a na tura l  course and the re  can e x i s t  no ba r ­
r i e r  aga ins t  i t .
The above statement shows th a t  Balewa's Government p referred  a 
gradual func t iona l  approach and/or subregional supras ta te  u n i f i c a t io n .  
Also, i t  ind ica ted  th a t  i t  would support the  formation of a continen­
ta l  a ssoc ia t ion  which was something in the form of a regional in t e r n a ­
tiona l  o rg an iza t io n —for example, the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) t h a t  was to  come l a t e r  in 1953.
There has also always been the view th a t  the Balewa Government 
was not very supportive of the immediate p o l i t i c a l  u n i f i c a t io n  of 
Afr ica ,  p a r t l y  due to i t s  speculation t h a t  Nkrumah's Ghana and i t s  
ideas ,  would be the leader  in such a union and the r e l a t i v e  higher 
national a t t r i b u t e s  of Nigeria ( th a t  most thought would make i t  play
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such a r o le )  no twiths tanding . Thus, while i t  congra tu la ted  "those 
African leaders  who" had "made such exce l len t  con tr ibu t ions  to the Pan- 
African movement," and a l so  lauded them as "the pioneers t h a t  have se t  
the ball r o l l i n g , "  i t  added tha t  " i f  anybody makes the mistake of f e e l ­
ing tha t  he i s  a Messiah who has got a mission to  lead A fr ica ,  the
21whole purpose of Pan-Africanism w i l l ,  I f e a r ,  be de fea ted ."
However, both Ghana and Nigeria ,  and other countr ies  th a t  held
s im i la r ly  d ispara te  views on the issue of u n i f i c a t io n  of Afr ica ,  were
very prepared to  compromise t h e i r  views on how u n i f i c a t io n  was to be
22achieved in Afr ica ,  and the OAU was the product of such an e f f o r t .
African Persona l i ty  i s  another concept t h a t  i s  important in 
contemporary African p o l i t i c a l  th ink ing ,  and i t  i s . . s e e n  as being 
c lose ly  r e l a t e d  "to o the r  p o l i t i c a l  ideas  . . . [such] as Pan-
Africanism, pos i t ive  a c t i o n ,  and nonalignment th a t  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to
po
d is t ingu ish  one from an o th e r ."  Nkrumah was the major c o n t r ibu to r  
to the a r t i c u l a t i o n  and the development of th i s  concept. He saw i t  e s ­
s e n t i a l l y  as the p e rsona l i ty  of the new African who, having rekindled  
h is  t r a d i t i o n a l  African values ,  seeks to build a new, m a te r i a l ly  ade­
quate ,  and morally sound soc ie ty ,  and also t r i e s  to p ro jec t  t h i s  per ­
so na l i ty  g loba l ly  fo r  the  improvement of the in te rna t iona l  community. 
Thus, while he saw the African pe rso n a l i ty  as being "def ined by the 
c l u s t e r  of humanist p r in c ip l e s  which underline the t r a d i t i o n a l  African 
so c ie ty , "  he said  th a t  t h i s  has to be u t i l i z e d  "to evolve new p a t ­
t e r n s ,  new socia l  customs, new a t t i t u d e s  to l i f e ,  so t h a t  while we 
seek the m a te r ia l ,  c u l t u r a l ,  and economic advancement of our people,  
while we r a i s e  th e i r  s tandard  of l i f e ,  we shal l  not s a c r i f i c e  t h e i r
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fundamental happiness ,"  and th a t  another accompanying phenomenon i s  
"the pro jec t ion  of the A f r i c a n  p e r so n a l i t y  in the in te rna t iona l  commun­
i t y .  "Z*
African persona l i ty  is  r e l a t e d  to  Pan-Africanism because i t  i s  
one of the main ingred ien ts  upon which the l e t t e r ' s  notion of a un i­
te d ,  v i r i l e ,  and independent Africa i s  based; and i t  i s  also r e l a t e d  
to Pos i t ive  Action because i t  i s  a s s e r t iv e  and seeks to ensure th a t  
Africans do have a new wholesome r e a l i t y  for themselves.  I t  i s  r e l a ­
ted to nonalignment in th a t  i t s  notion of Africans using t h e i r  r e ­
newed value system to crea te  a new soc ie ty  at  home, and also using the 
same to enhance a more peaceful in t e rn a t io n a l  community, connote a 
mostly independent con t r ibu t ion ,  and thus a mostly nonaligned i n t e r n a ­
t iona l  behavior .  Actual ly ,  t h i s  concept was more often t ied to an in ­
te rn a t io n a l  con tex t ,  and more s p e c i f i c a l l y  to  a new peaceful,  and e th ­
i c a l l y  s e n s i t i v e ,  in te rn a t io n a l  community; and, some see i t  as being
capable of bringing "a new era of peace in which power may be measured
25not by q u a n t i t i e s  of armaments but by the qua l i ty  of mora l i ty ."
A concept t h a t  i s  often mentioned when there  i s  discussion on 
African Pe rso n a l i ty  i s  th a t  of Negritude. The l a t t e r  is  a concept 
th a t  aims a t  the aff irmation and the g l o r i f i c a t i o n  of the black c u l ­
tu re  in a global sense ,  and i s  more c lose ly  id e n t i f i e d  with the w r i t ­
ings of people of African ances try  in the Western world, and of A f r i ­
cans who were perceived to be ass im i la ted  in to  Western culture  {speci­
f i c a l l y ,  as was applicable  under the  French colonial  system). Thus,
Aime Cesa ire ,  a person of African ances try  from the Caribbean, and L.
pc
S. Senghor, the former Sengalese l e a d e r ,  have come to be regarded 
as major con t r ibu to r s  to the development of the concept of Negritude.
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Though Negritude shared much in common with African Personal­
i t y ,  they  d i f f e r ed  in some areas .  In f a c t ,  some proponents of the l a t ­
t e r  were c r i t i c a l  of some aspects of the former.  Notably, African Per­
so na l i ty  proponents c r i t i c i z e  the concept of Negritude for not being
dynamic due to the f a c t  tha t  they view i t  as being charac terized by
27the lack of the "tendency to is sue  in to  p o l i t i c a l  a c t ion ."  Thus,
i t  was seen as being concerned only with the aff irmation of blackness
28and tending more toward l i t e r a r y  ( s p e c i f i c a l l y  poetic) exposit ions .  
Some of i t s  c r i t i c s  also see i t  mostly as a myth-making e xerc ise .  
African P e rsona l i ty ,  on the other hand, i s  mostly concerned with r e v i ­
t a l i z i n g  a stock of value systems in order to be more able to build a 
more humane environment fo r  man.
Another poin t  of d i s s i m i l a r i t y  between Negritude and African 
Persona l i ty  i s  t h a t ,  while the former was concerned with black people 
wherever they may be found, the l a t t e r  focused pr imari ly on the A f r i ­
can cont inenta l  mi l ieu .
The is sue  of acute r a c ia l  consciousness was another area of 
d i f f e r en ce .  While fo r  people of African ancestry l iv ing  in the west ­
ern world,  Negritude was something to  become highly emotionally r e ­
la ted  t o ,  to  Africans  in Africa i t  did not make much sense. Not being 
in an environment where rac ia l  consciousness i s  an all-consuming na­
t ional compulsive obsession,  Africans were mostly amused and bewil ­
dered th a t  there  was any need to g l o r i f y  onese l f .  Thus, while to  
those of African ancestry in the  western world i t  is  fashionable to 
exer t  t h a t  being black is  beau t i fu l  and noble ,  Africans take th i s  f o r  
granted and usually  see such g l o r i f i c a t i o n  as unnecessary. Soyinka,
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the l i t e r a r y  luminary, for example, noted th a t  “Negritude is  r a t h e r
s i l l y .  A f te r  a l l ,  a t i g e r  does not spend his  time going around ex-
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pressing h is  t i g e r tu d e .  A dd i t iona l ly ,  genera l ly ,  Negritude never
had much impact on Afr ica ,  and Potholm also notes tha t :
. . . fo r  a l l  i t s  poignancy and s h i f t i n g  concepts, Negritude 
as a movement never caught on in A fr ica .  I t s  s t reng th  and 
heart-wrenching power fo r  black men in Europe and America was 
i t s  weakness in Africa . . .The black w r i t e r  l iv ing  in Afr ica ,  
embedded in h is  own soc ie ty ,  did not need to claim his  black­
ness,  i t  was his  to begin with.  I t  was r a th e r ,  the black in ­
t e l l e c t u a l s  abroad, cut o f f  from t h e i r  sp i r i tu a l  and actual 
homeland whose a l iena t ion  was the rea l  source of the move­
ment.
Actual ly ,  a good number of l i t e r a r y  minds and p o l i t i c a l  th in k ­
ers  in Afr ica  were very c r i t i c a l  of Negritude—for  example, Nkrumah, 
Fanon, Soyinka, Quaison-Sackey and M. Iowa. M. Tow a even claims " th a t
i t  has done much more harm than good for  the  cause of African l i b e r a -
31 3?t i o n . "  Nkrumah, who "was not simply a Ghanian or an Afr ican,"
but a person whom a l l  tha t  are Afr ican,  or of African ances t ry ,  saw 
"as a symbol of t h e i r  own p o l i t i c a l ,  economic, and psychological eman- 
c ip a t io n ,"  was a lso  very c r i t i c a l  o f  Negritude.  As the major p ro ­
ponent of African P e rsona l i ty ,  he was more in te re s ted  in showing how 
the main ingredients  of his concept con tras ted  with th a t  of Negritude:
When I speak of the African genius,  I mean something d i f ­
f e r e n t  from Negritude, something not apo loge t ica l , but dy­
namic. Negritude cons is t s  in a mere l i t e r a r y  a f fe c ta t io n  and 
s ty l e  which p i l e s  up word upon word and image upon image with 
occasional reference  to Africa and th ings  African. I do not 
mean a vague brotherhood based on a c r i t e r i o n  of colour . . .
By the  African genius I mean something p o s i t iv e ,  our s o c i a l i s t  
conception of socie ty ,  the  e f f ic ie n cy  and v a l id i ty  of our t r a ­
d i t io n a l  s t a t e c r a f t ,  our highly developed code of morals,  our 
h o s p i t a l i t y  and our purposeful energy.
Quaison-Sackey also saw many th ings  wrong with Negritude; but,  
while he did not see i t  as a concept t h a t  i s  of any s ig n i f i c a n t  use in
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A fr ica ,  he tended to reason th a t  i t  might be very re levant to people
of African ances t ry  in the Western world .  In some ins tances ,  he
pra ised Negritude in th ings i t  i s  more s u i t a b l e  f o r .  Thus, to him;
. . . what Negritude does, i t  does b r i l l i a n t l y :  the psycholog­
ica l  ga ther ing  together of a l l  black peoples in order to make 
a moral a f f i rm at ion  of themselves . . . whatever t h e i r  condi­
t i o n s ,  whatever the t&  homelands—from Martinique to Mali, from 
Chicago to Zanzibar.
He evaluated Negritude in th i s  way due to h i s  empathy with the s i t u a ­
t ion of i t s  proponents ,  seeing them as "by and la rge ,  ’e x i l e s ' , "  in 
co n t ra s t  with the proponents of the African Persona l i ty  whom he saw as 
"conscious of t h e i r  ancient ro o t s ,  and from t h i s  sense of t r a d i t i o n  
they gain t h e i r  s t r e n g th ,  in a c t io n ,  in the  s t rugg le  towards ind iv id ­
ual emancipation and nat ional  r e a l i z a t i o n . " ^ ^  However, in other 
a reas ,  Quaison-Sackey seems more in t e re s t ed  in f o i s t i n g  African Person­
a l i t y  as being more v i t a l .  In d iscussing the is sue  of the lack of 
p o l i t i c a l  dynamism in Negritude,  fo r  an example, he pre fe rs  to  see i t  
as being incapable  of meaningful growth (in  the form of i t  l a t e r  incor­
porat ing t h i s  phenomenon of p o l i t i c a l  dynamism). Thus, he declares 
tha t  "perhaps i t  cannot and should not: perhaps t h a t  is  in the domain
of African P e rsona l i ty ."^^
Genera lly ,  desp ite  the above a rea  of d i f f e rences ,  Negritude 
and African Pe rso n a l i ty  do share many th ings  in common, the most basic 
of them being th a t  they both seek to r e v i t a l i z e  the  African socie ty  
and those t h a t  are l inked to i t  a n c e s t r a l l y .  In f a c t ,  most of the 
c r i t i c s  of Negritude are a lso  the main exponents of t h i s  l i n k .  
Quaison-Sackey, fo r  example, a s s e r t s  t h a t  African Personali ty  in some 
ways aims at r e a l i z in g  some idea l s  fo r  the  former by ca tego r ica l ly
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declaring t h a t  "the African Persona l i ty  . . . takes a c t i o n ,  c rea t ive  
action,  in t ry ing  to  r e a l i z e  the dreams of Negritude,  with  which, of
course,  i t  has nothing but sympathy and understanding, to  which i t  is
38close ly  r e l a t e d . "  This consensus on the convergence of the major 
ideas in both concepts may mean th a t  the proponents of Negritude,  due 
to t h e i r  experiencing a s o r t  of cu l tu ra l  limbo syndrome, were overzeal-  
ous in t ry ing  to conceptua l ize  t h e i r  ideas .  Like someone discovering 
th a t  he has been dropped in to  a deep hole and so anxious to get  out,  
he becomes so overcharged th a t  h is  behavior may be overreactions  which 
t r i g g e r  loss  of control  and an i n a b i l i t y  to c a lcu la t ing ly  improvise ob­
j e c t s  around him in an attempt to climb out.  The way both t r i e d  to con­
ceptua lize  r e a l i t y  a lso  might have contr ibuted to  some d i f fe rences .  
Negritude,  in the main, was more an attempt to explain the  her i tage  i t  
sprang from to  o ther  peoples and c u l tu r e s ,  and comparing and contras­
t ing  t h i s  with those  of o th e r s ,  while African Persona l i ty  was mostly 
concerned with how to  r e v i t a l i z e  i t s  value base and use t h i s  to launch 
Africa into a new e ra  of progress .  Thus, Quaison-Sackey views Negri­
tude as seeking "to reconci le  Negro cu l tu re  with Western c u l tu re , "
39while African p e r so n a l i ty  was seeking " f i r s t  to f ind  i t s e l f . "  
Thus, he saw the l a t t e r  as not being in the business of exp la in ing ,  or 
r eco n c i l in g ,  i t s e l f  to  anybody, but being in business to act  and c re ­
ate for  i t s e l f .  B r ie f ly ,  the African Persona l i ty  has been seen as be­
ing more r e lev an t  than Negritude because the former was not out to 
sing p ra i s es  fo r  a p a r t i c u l a r  color of mankind in a f e t i s h  way (which 
the c r i t i c s  of the l a t t e r  wil l  r e f e r  to as "myth-making"), but to r e ­
generate a new indiv idual fo r  new national and global s o c i e t i e s .  The
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proponents of the former a lso  seemed to have reasoned th a t  a preoccupa­
tion  with r a c ia l  consciousness was an e n te r p r i s e  th a t  saps a s o c i e ty ' s  
productive energy, leaves i t  e th i c a l l y  debased, and enfeebles i t s  so­
cia l  f a b r i c .  In a l l  l ike l ihood ,  the c r i t i c s  of Negritude did not mean 
th a t  race was not a s ig n i f i c a n t  social  r e a l i t y ,  but t h a t  i t  was not a 
supreme socia l  r e a l i t y .
The concept of African Pe rsona l i ty  and Negritude f ig u r e ,  con­
sciously or unconsciously,  in African foreign p o l i c i e s .  The former is  
roughly i d e n t i f i e d  with some progressive (or r a d ic a l )  a s s e r t iv e  coun­
t r i e s ,  while the l a t t e r  i s  l inked with some very moderate coun t r ies .  
This may be due to the f a c t  tha t  some progressive  countr ies  have na­
t ional ideologies  th a t  are of Marxist d e r iv a t io n ,  and thus place more 
emphasis on c l a s s ,  r a th e r  than r ac ia l  or e th n ic ,  understandings of so­
cia l  r e a l i t y .  Thus Angola, Tanzania, and Mozambique, fo r  example, can 
be seen as s o c i e t i e s  where the social  s ign i f icance  of Negritude type 
of ideas are most l i k e ly  to be o f f i c i a l l y  vigorously discouraged. 
Another reason seems to be tha t  progressive countr ies  are more a s s e r ­
t ive  and usually seek cont inental  influence and thus they do not want 
to see e i t h e r  the Sahara deser t  in the north or the Kalahari deser t  in 
the south of the continent as b a r r i e r s  to con t inen ta l  unity and r e ­
solve.  They have p r a c t i c a l l y  broken th i s  b a r r i e r ,  and the OAU is an 
example of such e f f o r t s . T h e  f a c t  tha t  most African countr ies  do 
not ac tua l ly  fee l  comfortable with ideas of Negritude was also mani­
fes ted  in the name, and the p a r t i c ip a to ry  n a tu re ,  of a cu l tu ra l  f a i r  
t h a t  was to h ig h l ig h t  the African her i tage  in 1977. The progressive 
coun t r ie s ,  and the  host  country (N iger ia ) ,  wanted the word "African"
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to appear on the f a i r ' s  name so tha t  African countr ies  t h a t  do not 
have predominantly black populations could a t t end .  Thus th i s  cultura l  
f a i r  was ca l led  the "Second Festival  of Black and African Culture ."  
While some countr ies  associa ted  with Negritude were viewed as wishing 
the f a i r  to be an a f f a i r  of black people,  N iger ia ,  and most African 
coun t r ie s ,  wanted an African cultura l  f a i r .  The l a t t e r  group pre­
va i led ,  and North African countr ies  were ac t iv e  p a r t i c i p a n t s .  (Nige­
r i a ,  which exerc ise s  an in f lu e n t i a l  ro le  in African a f f a i r s ,  was not 
e n th u s i a s t i c  in being associated with any s ig n i f i c a n t  African event,  
c u l tu r a l l y  or p o l i t i c a l l y ,  th a t  did not have a general continental  ap­
peal.
Another theme in p o l i t i c a l  thinking in Africa th a t  r e l a t e s  to 
in te rna t iona l  r e l a t i o n s ,  and to nonaligned in te rna t iona l  policy ,  spe­
c i f i c a l l y ,  i s  t h a t  of African socialism. In addit ion to the fac t  th a t  
many of the countr ies  in Africa tha t  espouse some form of socialism 
are not s trongly  t i e d  to e i th e r  the Soviet  Union or China, most of 
them tend to be more in tense ly  nonaligned in t h e i r  foreign policy be­
havior.
Socialism in Africa  has tended to d isp lay  v a r i a t io n s ,  and one 
of them i s  the Tanzanian model based on the concept of Ujamaa.^^ 
The Ujamaa concept s t r e s s e s  the concept and the qua l i ty  of the  African 
family system upon which the socie ty  r e s t s ;  and th i s  i s  characte rized 
fay in d iv idua ls  c rea t ing  wealth which in tu rn  i s  seen mostly as commu­
n i ty  property .^3 Thus, there  i s  a f in e  tuning of a value system 
th a t  makes poss ib le  the ind iv idua ls  working to c rea te  weal th,  and the 
exis tence  of a so c ie ta l  consensus that  such wealth will  not be allowed
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to c rea te  overwhelming socia l  advantages fo r  one man at the expense of 
another (and th i s  has a lso  been seen by some as a s i tua t ion  where the 
production process i s  p r iv a te ly  o r ien ted ,  while the d i s t r ib u t io n  pro­
cess tends to  be s o c i a l ) .  Ujamaa also s t r e s s e s  taking care of the
needy.
Nyerere i s  the ch ie f  proponent of the Tanzanian s o c i a l i s t  
model, and the major f e a tu re  th a t  rep resen ts  an African character  i s  
the notion t h a t  a s o c i a l i s t  socie ty  can come about without class  s t ru g ­
g le—his  reasoning being t h a t  t r a d i t i o n a l  African soc ie ty ,  before and 
a f t e r  Karl Marx, was based on a s o c i a l i s t  model th a t  was not created 
or susta ined through c la s s  c o n f l i c t .  Socialism in Tanzania may be
seen as the r e v i t a l i z a t i o n  of th i s  t r a d i t i o n a l  model, and thus without 
a c l a s s  s t ru g g le ,  and also  without the so c ie ty  going through the d ia ­
l e c t i c a l  process of moving through the d i f f e r e n t  h i s to r i c a l  phases of 
p r im i t ive  communism, s lavery ,  feudalism, c ap i t a l i s m ,  socialism and com­
munism (and thus socia l ism could occur in a so c ie ty  l ike  Tanzania tha t  
has not f u l l y  experienced cap i t a l i sm ) .  Nyerere also s tressed  tha t  so­
c ia l ism was a s t a t e  of mind, thus a poor person could be a potent ia l  
c a p i t a l i s t  and a r i c h  person could be a p o te n t i a l  s o c i a l i s t  (but t h i s  
does not mean th a t  he has stopped perceiv ing the existence of a few
rich  people,  in the  midst of many who are poor,  as a d e s tab i l iz ing  so­
cioeconomic phenomenon, or t h a t  he condones or encourages gross socia l  
in e q u a l i t y ) .
A dd i t iona l ly ,  L. S. Senghor espoused a va r ian t  of African so­
c ia l ism which s t r e ssed  th a t  although economic r e a l i t y  i s  very impor­
t a n t  i t  i s  not absolu te  in any s o c i e t y . H e  also  noted tha t  c lass  
s t rugg le  i s  not a must in order to have socia l ism in Afr ica .
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Countries l ike  Angola and Mozambique seem to follow s c i e n t i f i c  
socia li sm, a v a r i a n t  th a t  is more in tune with much th a t  Marxism 
stands f o r .
Most Marxists c r i t i c i z e  Nyerere 's  and Senghor's  conceptua l iza­
t ion  of socia l ism,  arguing th a t  socia li sm, though adaptable to d i f f e r ­
ent s i t u a t i o n s ,  maintains  i t s  major t e n e t s  of socia l  r e a l i t y  as being 
based mostly on economic r e a l i t y  and, s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  on the nature of 
the production process ;  and thus the  c lass  or ien ted  nature  of s o c i ­
e ty .  They a lso  emphasize th a t  the h i s to r i c a l  progress of socie ty  
i s  s t i l l  important .  Nkrumah, who was to be more s t rong ly  associated 
with s c i e n t i f i c  soc ia l i sm ,  espec ia l ly  in most of h is  l a t e r  w r i t ings ,  
believed t h a t ,  "There is  only one t rue  socia li sm,  the p r in c ip le s  of 
which are abiding and universal ."^®
Apart from soc ia l i sm ,  Nkrumah was also in t e r e s t e d  in conceptu­
a l iz in g  how contemporary African s o c i e t i e s  should genera l ly  function 
and develop, and achieve more nat ional  in te g ra t io n ;  and i t  i s  in Con- 
ciencism th a t  most of h is  ideas on such issues  are f o u n d . C o n c i -
encism is  mostly t h e o r e t i c a l  and philosophical ,  mainly r e l a t i n g  ph i ­
losophy, soc ie ty  and ideology in a way th a t  wil l  i l luminate  his 
ideas .  Also, in i t  he s t ressed  the need to channel and shape the 
Is lamic and the Western c u l tu ra l  elements tha t  are present  in Afr ica ,  
within the framework of t r a d i t i o n a l  African c u l tu r e ,  fo r  the purpose 
of bui ld ing  a so c ie ty  where i t s  value systems are more harmoniously a r ­
ranged. He a lso  presents  a model of such a r e o r i e n t a t i o n  as being 
able to  feed in to  the general scheme of making Afr ica  more p o l i t i c a l l y  
v i r i l e  and economically buoyant.
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Nkrumah's ideas  seem to have been ra d ic a l i z in g  with his  age, 
e sp e c ia l l y  when he was no longer the Pres ident of Ghana; thus his
l a t e r  works contain more emphasis on armed s t rugg le ,  and s c i e n t i f i c  so­
c ia l i sm ,  in order  to r id  the continent of neocolonialism and vest iges
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of apar theid .
The nature  of contemporary in te rna t iona l  economic r e l a t i o n s  is  
a sub jec t  tha t  commands the  a t ten t ion  of African coun t r ie s  and the
r e s t  of  the developing world.  Nyerere 's  views on t h i s  sub jec t  are 
often seen as being rep resen ta t ive  of those of most of these  coun­
t r i e s ;  and, s ince  his  country i s  economically very poor,  he seems to 
have a sharpened perception of present  global r e a l i t i e s .  To him the 
present  global economic r e l a t i o n s  need many improvements i f  global
peace i s  to be meaningful. Actually,  he equates i t  to a Hobbesian and 
Social Darwinian s t a t e  of nature:
When only the law of the jungle re igns ,  the s truggle  for e x i s t ­
ence must n a tu r a l l y  end up with survival of the f i t t e s t .  This 
may be a l l  r i g h t  when i t  applies to beas ts ;  as a method o f  con­
t a c t  between human beings i t  is  i n to le r a b le .
However, he seems to believe tha t  i f  both the rich  and poor countries  
r e a l i z e  the long term i n t e r e s t s  of mankind, t h i s  problem can be ma­
tu re ly  solved. A dd i t iona l ly ,  t h i s  subjec t  i s  very re lev an t  to nona­
ligned foreign policy  phenomena, since  the subjec t  of a new in te rn a ­
t ional economic order is  presen t ly  much l inked to the l a t t e r .
On the sub jec t  of global s ec u r i ty  and nonalignment, Armah a t ­
tempts to r e l a t e  i t  to contemporary global bloc p o l i t i c s .  Arguing 
th a t  contemporary global s t r a t e g i c  r e a l i t y  i s  so s o p h is t i ca ted  tha t  i t  
def ies  adequate eva lua t ion ,  and tha t  i t  i s  also very f l u i d  and
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unbalanced, he seemed to imply th a t  i t  is  unnecessary to see nonalign­
ment as a p a r t  of a re f ined  balance of power conception of the 
w o r l d . H e  sees contemporary s t r a t e g i c  th inking ,  which r e s t r i c t s  
i t s e l f  to r e a l i s t  perspec t ives  (s ince i t  is  always coming up with con­
ceptual schemes tha t  are so p h is t i c a te d  adapta tions  of balance of power 
framework), as misleading.  According to him.
The world i s  not i n e r t i a - r i d d e n .  I t  is  dynamic. I t  i s  always 
on the go. I t  is  e s s e n t i a l l y  unstable .  In a world in which 
i t  takes a l o t  of e f f o r t  to  keep the same pos i t ion ,  to suppose 
th a t  by speaking of agonizing r e p r i s a l s  of massive r e t a l i a t i o n  
balance can remain p e r fe c t  i s  to reveal a touching na ive te  in 
surroundings of so p h i s t i c a t io n  . . . nuclear balance i s  not an 
i n a b i l i t y  to  s t r i k e .  There remained only "the balance of t e r ­
ro r"  the triumph of which involves se l f -d e s t ru c t io n  and u t t e r ,  
h o r r i f i c ,  universal  de fea t .
He also  deplores  the tendency to  "put force above reason and above j u s ­
t i c e . "^3
I t  i s  in the context of such a s ta t e  of global a f f a i r s  th a t  
Armah sees the relevance of nonalignment,  which he sees as an "adven­
tu re  of improving and c i v i l i z i n g  the world 's  conduct of world a f ­
f a i r s . H e  fu r th e r  t r i e s  to  d is t ingu ish  nonalignment from c l a s s i ­
cal neutra lism by saying th a t  i t  i s  a pos i t ive  phenomenon, and th a t
while nonaligned coun tr ies  " re fuse  to engage in war-mongering and war-
55making, they are ac t ive  in promoting peace ."
Another view on global s ec u r i ty  and nonalignment i s  provided 
by Quaison-Sackey. He t r i e s  to  r e l a t e  th i s  concept to the  needs of 
Afr ica  and to show how, u n iv e r s a l l y ,  nonalignment works and the so r t  
of response i t  gets from the global p o w e r s . I n  connection with 
United S ta tes  e f f o r t s  (beginning with the Kennedy Administration) to 
reduce previous pa t te rn  of American h o s t i l i t y  toward nonalignment, and
52
become more understanding,  Quaison-Sackey i s  su sp ic ious .  He sees such 
makeshift to le rance  of  nonalignment as a screen to sh ie ld  c l i e n t  
s ta t e s  from in te rna t iona l  r i d i c u l e  and domestic upheaval.
The author a lso  shows th a t  the Soviet  Union and China had been 
very suspic ious of nonalignment at  the beginning, e sp ec ia l ly  the l a t ­
t e r  (though both now t r y  to  be less  suspicious and even t ry  to use i t  
to t h e i r  advantage).  He saw both countries as being very r i g i d  on 
th e i r  stand toward nonalignment,  at f i r s t ,  by t h e i r  t ry ing  to  maintain 
the view th a t  there  "can be no n e u t r a l i ty  on the is sue  of cap i ta l ism  
versus c o m m u n i s m . A t  p resen t ,  both countr ies  are pragmatic and 
t ry  to u t i l i z e  nonalignment phenomenon to fu r th e r  t h e i r  divergent in -
CO
t e r e s t s .  In p resen t ing  evaluat ions of the United S t a t e s ,  the 
Soviet Union, and Chinese reac t ions  to nonalignment,  Quaison-Sackey 
provided a somewhat balanced perspective .
On the sub jec t  o f  the world economic s i t u a t i o n  and global 
secu r i ty ,  Sekou Toure a s se r te d  tha t  the pursuance of major changes in 
global economic r e l a t i o n s  have a lo t  to do with nonaligned fo re ign  pol­
icy.  Like Nyerere, he was also very unimpressed with the contemporary 
in te rna t iona l  economic o rde r .  According to him.
In awareness of the  s p e c i f i c  problems r e s u l t in g  from our h i s ­
t o r i c  background and our material  cond i t ions ,  we may aff irm 
th a t  the gravest  imbalance in the world,  and the  most danger­
ous, i s  the imbalance created by the d iv is ion  intSg r ich  na­
t ions  and poor n a t io n s ,  the haves and the have-nots .
He implied th a t  i f  the re  i s  a genuine des i re  to have a more peaceful 
in te rna t iona l  system, the means are not through preoccupation with 
s tockpi ling  m i l i t a ry  a r s en a l s  (with the concomitant need to con t inu­
ously t r y  to correc t  the p e r s i s t e n t  perceived m i l i t a r y  imbalance with
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a given perceived h o s t i l e  ac to r ,  or se t  of a c t o r s ) ,  but through the 
correc t ing  of the imbalance of socio-economic condit ions  in the world. 
The best  way to c o r re c t  such an imbalance will be "to achieve harmony 
between the l iv ing  condit ions  of a l l  people on e a r t h , "  although not by 
"leveling out the most advanced and the l e a s t  developed s o c i e t i e s .  
Contrary to some p rev a i l in g  views, Sekou Toure did not conceptualize  
the so lu tion  to the global economic balance in terms of economic aid 
from the r ich  to the poor,  the t r a n s fe r  of technology, and other 
a l l i e d  s o lu t io n s .  Ins tead he held the view th a t  the  imbalance would 
be corrected i f  in te rn a t io n a l  r e l a t i o n s  changed in such a way th a t  al l  
fea tu res  assoc iated with "imperialism, co lon ia l ism ,  and th e i r  by­
product, neocolonia lism,"  and global m i l i t a ry  adventurism, ceased to 
be the dominant f e a tu re s  of how people,  and c o u n t r i e s ,  r e l a t e  to each 
o ther .
I t  i s  in the con text of the poor countr ies  being able to con­
t r i b u t e  to such a so lu t ion  tha t  the nonaligned foreign policy  becomes 
re levan t  to Sekou Toure; and he pointedly  noted th a t  such an in te rn a ­
tiona l  po licy  i s  action  o r ien ted .  He asser ted  t h a t  the nonaligned 
countr ies :
Want to be ac to rs  in th i s  evolu tion ,  which i s  the concern of 
a l l  of us,  and we sha l l  make our con t r ib u t io n ,  promoted by our 
m i l i t a n t  consciousness and by the noble ambition to work for 
the improvement of in te rn a t io n a l  r e l a t i o n s  and the advancement 
of socia l  j u s t i c e  and democratic progress in the world.
Toure also t i e d  nonaligned foreign policy  to regional economic 
and p o l i t i c a l  i n t e g r a t i o n ,  e sp e c ia l l y  in A fr ica .  He a lso  seemed to 
have been very o p t im is t ic  about the fu tu re  of mankind, noting p a r t i c u ­
l a r l y ,  "the r e a l i t i e s  of the twentieth  cen tury; the tremendous
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of fu tu re  human achievement as well as the knowledge, exper ience,  and
discover ies  accumulated in the course of pas t  c e n t u r i e s . H e  saw
nonalignment a lso  as
. . . the expression  of a l iv e ly  f a i t h  in a happy future  for  
mankind. I t  i s  something ac t iv e ,  a p a r t i c ip a t in g  fo rce ,  an ac­
t iv e  agent in the  s truggle  fo r  the achievement of a world so c i ­
e ty -e m an c ip a te d ,  f r a t e r n a l ,  and uni ted.
Thus, nonalignment i s  seen as a concept t h a t  can be used to  created a
more prosperous and peaceful world.
On the whole, the major concepts t h a t  r e l a t e  to the nonaligned 
foreign  pol icy phenomenon d isp lay  fea tu res  th a t  emphasize the need to 
overhaul in te rn a t io n a l  r e l a t i o n s  in such a way th a t  the  world will  be 
more u n iv e r s a l ly  m a te r i a l ly  sa t i s fy in g  and peacefu l.  Additionally ,  
they a lso s t r e s s  the  need for  reason and j u s t i c e ,  in s tead  of fo rce ,  to 
be the basis  of fo reign  pol icy actions  (reason and j u s t i c e  being seen 
as more l ik e ly  to  make the world more peaceful and m a te r ia l ly  prosper­
ous, and also seen as enriching the q u a l i ty  of human in te ra c t io n  since 
they nourish the capacity  of man to curb negative human excesses) .  
Some of the concep tua l iza t ions  also showed th a t  the  value of seeking 
knowledge in a way th a t  s i g n i f i c a n t ly  f o s t e r s  the concern for solving 
pressing  human problems (though th i s  should be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  from a 
s i t u a t io n  where almost a l l  pu rsu i t  of knowledge i s  synonymous with de­
l i b e r a t e  searching fo r  p ra c t ic a l  so lu t ions  to problems, in such a way 
th a t  basic  research  and uns tructured research for  knowledge—which are 
often the springboards of enormous c rea t ive  a c t i v i t y —are surely se­
verely l imited) .®^
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CHAPTER III
NONALIGNMENT AS A CONCEPT
Like most p o l i t i c a l  ideas ,  nonalignment has generated con tro­
versy over i t s  meaning. Thus, though i t  is  a foreign policy p r in c ip le  
assoc ia ted  with very many co u n t r ie s ,  i t  appears to mean many th ings  to 
many people.  Unlike some o ther  p o l i t i c a l  ideas ,  nonalignment as a con­
cept  is  not a t i g h t l y  documented system of ideas  handed down by one 
person (with the  understanding th a t  i t  is  not to be much adapted or 
l i b e r a l l y  i n t e r p r e t e d ) .  In s tead ,  i t  i s  a product of the va r ious ,  
though l ike-minded, thoughts and a sp i ra t ions  of statesmen and schola rs  
from various coun t r ie s  tha t  have been progress ive ly  forged into a gen­
e r a l l y  convenient concept.
In t h i s  chap te r ,  e f f o r t s  are made to  t r y  to achieve a concep­
tua l  p r o f i l e  of the  phenomenon of nonalignment.  In connection with 
t h i s  o b jec t ive ,  e f f o r t s  are a lso made to f ind  out how and why i t  lends 
lends i t s e l f  to  d iverse  concep tua l iza t ions .  The po in ts  of s im i l a r ­
i t i e s  and d i f f e r en c es  between, or among, the  diverse  conceptua l iza­
t io n s  are eva luated and grouped into d i f f e r e n t  schools of  thought.  
Also,  there  is  an evaluation of the pronouncements and d ec la ra t ions  
emanating from the meetings and summits of the  nonaligned co un t r ie s .
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Although the various concep tua l iza t ions  of nonalignment can be 
grouped in to  d i f f e r e n t  pe rspec t ives ,  i t  is  important to note tha t  
these  d i f f e r e n t  concep tua l iza t ions ,  though d i s t i n c t  enough to  be c l a s ­
s i f i e d  in to  d i f f e r e n t  pe rspec t ives ,  also over lap .
The Equidistance from the Superpower Blocs 
Policy Perspective
The essence of th i s  conceptual p e rspec t ive  of nonalignment i s  
t h a t ,  to be nonaligned, a country has to maintain an in te rna t iona l  r e ­
l a t io n sh ip  t h a t  manifests an equid is tance  pos i t ion  from the two super­
power blocs (headed by the United S ta tes  and the Soviet Union in the 
contemporary in te rna t iona l  system).  Thus, i m p l i c i t l y ,  t h i s  perspec­
t i v e  r e s t s  on the assumption th a t  the in te rn a t io n a l  system, from the 
1950' s  when nonalignment gained momentum as an in te rn a t io n a l  phenome­
non to the p re sen t ,  has always been pr im ar i ly  charac te r ized  by a bipo­
l a r  conf igura tion  of power (and, genera l ly ,  t h i s  assumption i s  cor­
r e c t ,  since during t h i s  period,  even with due considera t ion  given to 
the  era  of de ten te  and the emergence of new power foci in places l ike  
China and Europe, the world has been more or l e s s  charac te r ized  primar­
i l y  by b i p o l a r i t y ) .  However, i t  must a lso  be noted th a t  the asse r t ion  
th a t  the contemporary world is  b ipo lar  does not mean th a t  t h i s  perspec­
t i v e ,  which i s  th a t  nonalignment pr im ari ly  involves  the maintenance of 
an equid is tance  in te rna t iona l  pos it ion  from the two superpower b locs ,  
has been t o t a l l y  accepted without any con troversy .  As w il l  be shown 
below, there  are some who disagree  with t h i s  view of  nonalignment.
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This notion of nonalignment, b a s ic a l ly  in terms of e q u id i s t an t  
p os i t ion ,  i s  fo r ce fu l ly  pos ited by Nair (1980) who saw "the p u r i t y  of 
the nonaligned philosophy" as the maintenance of "a t r u l y  nonaligned 
ro le  in East-West r e l a t i o n s . "  He fu r th e r  c l a r i f i e d  these views by say­
ing tha t  such a ro le  i s  played by the  moderate nonaligned countr ies  
which, he a s s e r t s ,  prevents  nonalignment from condoning any " s l id in g  
in to"  a superpower o r b i t . ^  Addi t iona l ly ,  he is  c l ea r ly  concerned
about the i n a b i l i t y  of the nonaligned countr ies  to maintain the
7"middle-of-the-road pos tu re ."  Crabb (1965), though admitt ing to 
the complex nature  of nonalignment, a lso  held tha t  "nonalignment r e ­
f e r s  to a coun t ry ' s  pos i t ion  towards"^ the superpowers, and thus 
a lso  connoting th a t  the nonaligned countr ies  need to maintain an equi­
dis tance pos i t ion  from the two blocs.
In analyzing N ig e r ia ' s  foreign policy during the era of Muham- 
med/Obasanjo government, Aluko (1981) s t a t e s  th a t  Nigeria had been 
able "to keep i t s  d is tance  from both" b locs ,  and thus was non- 
a ligned/*  This view a lso  connotes an understanding of nonalignment 
in terms of maintaining an equid is tance  pos i t ion  from the two b locs .  
Gambari (1975) and Ihonvbere (1983), in analyzing N ige r ia ' s  F i r s t  
Republic foreign  po l icy ,  saw i t  as not being adequately nonaligned 
since they, r e s p e c t iv e ly ,  viewed i t  as being " largely pro-West," and 
s ta ted  th a t  " i t s  economic, cu l tu ra l  and p o l i t i c a l  r e l a t io n s  were pro- 
West; and thus both a lso  connoted nonalignment in terms of an equi­
dis tance  pos it ion  from the two blocs.
As already noted above, some do disagree  with the  equid is tance  
perspective of nonalignment. Blazevic (1981), fo r  example, sees the
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nonaligned countries as being "pushed by a l ien  i n t e r e s t  into a f a l s e  
dilemma."® Furthermore, he p o s i t s  th a t  the "a l ien  i n t e r e s t  . . . 
m i s in te rp re t s  and d i s t o r t s  basic  p r in c ip le s "^  in order to c rea te  
t h i s  f a l s e  dilemma. To him, nonalignment "imposed from the very begin­
ning ac t iv e  involvement in defusing or overcoming world c o n f l i c t s ,  g lo ­
bal or l o c a l , "  and th a t  i t  "was genera lly  i r r e l e v a n t  to id en t i fy  the 
r i g h t s  and wrongs but to qua l i fy  the  offense and t r y  to reduce the con-
O
sequences or fu r the r  complications."  Thus, he also sees nonalign­
ment as always having the a b i l i t y  " to  take the stand according to the
g
meri t  of the case and not depending on the pa r t i e s  involved," 
There fore ,  his  argument connoted not paying much a t ten t ion  to mainta in­
ing equid is tance  between the p o s i t io n s  of the two superpower blocs.
The Avoidance of Alignment with the Superpower 
Blocs Policy  Perspect ive
This perspective  is  s im i la r  to  the above equidis tance perspec­
t iv e  in th a t  both seek to understand the essence of nonalignment 
mainly in terms of the  nonaligned coun tr ies  seeking to char t  a course
of ac t ions  tha t  does not put them close to the poles of the two b locs .
However, they d i f f e r  in terms of the f a c t  t h a t  the l a t t e r  perspec t ive  
i s  p r im ar i ly  concerned about the a b i l i t y  of the nonaligned countr ies
to maintain an equ id i s tan t  pos i t ion  on a policy  spectrum th a t  has the 
two superpowers a t  two extreme p o le s .  On the other hand, the former 
i s  p r im ar i ly  concerned about the a b i l i t y  of the nonaligned to avoid
formal alignment with e i t h e r  of the  two blocs (thus,  im p l i c i t l y .
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seeing nothing quite  wrong with a nonaligned c o u n t r y  f lu c tu a t in g  
somehow to e i th e r  s ide  of the blocs '  po les  from the  eq u id i s tan t  
pos it ion  on the spectrum as long as i t  does not get  too close  to 
e i t h e r  pole and become a l ig n e d ) .
M i l l e r ' s  (1967) views f i t  in with the avoidance of alignment 
perspective  (which in v a r iab ly  i s  also more prepared to gran t t h a t  the 
nonaligned can be somehow f l e x i b l e ,  unlike  the equid is tance perspec­
t i v e ) ,  and thus he s t a t e d  t h a t  a "Third world s ta te  wil l  p re fe r  to 
keep out of the quarre ls  of the major powers i f  i t  can."^^
Rothstein  (1976) even assumes t h i s  perspective to be s e l f -  
evident ,  due to the nature  of the  in te rn a t io n a l  system, and th a t  the 
essence of th i s  perspective  i s  what nonalignment i s  a l l  about. Thus, 
to him "Nonalignment—l i t e r a l l y ,  not taking s id e s —has almost always 
appealed to the weaker members of a b ipo la r  in te rna t iona l  sys­
tem.
The Global Power Configuration Perspective
fh is  perspec t ive  conceptualizes  nonalignment in terms of the 
general configura tion of power in the in te rna t iona l  system. There­
fo re ,  i t  seeks to comprehend nonalignment in terms of how i t  f i t s  in 
within the general framework of the s t ru c tu re  and dynamics of power in 
the in te rna t iona l  system.
The two perspec t ives  described above are also concerned about 
the nature  of power r e l a t i o n s  in the in te rn a t io n a l  system, but th i s  
th i rd  perspec t ive ,  unlike the preceding two, views t h i s  global power
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configura tion in a very general sense and, most importantly ,  i t  is not 
primari ly  concerned with understanding nonalignment in terms of a 
phenomenon t h a t  negatively  aims a t  s tee r ing  c lea r  of major global 
power po les .  Addit ionally ,  th i s  perspective  does not stem from the 
assumption t h a t  nonalignment only makes sense in an in te rna t iona l  
r e a l i t y  where there  is a t i g h t  and neat conf igura tion of global power 
only around two power poles .
Rosecrance (1973), for example, comprehends nonalignment as an 
in te rna t iona l  phenomenon th a t  responds to  the dynamic nature of the in-
ip
te rna t iona l  system. He sees the period s t a r t i n g  from the end of
World War II  to  the end of 1950' s ,  as an era when nonalignment was a 
phenomenon t h a t  manifested i t s e l f  as the re fusa l  of the emerging coun­
t r i e s  of  Asia and Africa "to be drawn in to  e i t h e r  the  Western or the 
Eastern a l l i a n ce  s y s t e m s . L a t e r  on, nonalignment i s  seen by Rose­
crance as manifest ing i t s e l f  as one of several  "secondary f a c to r s "  in 
the in te rn a t io n a l  system since the two major powers, the United Sta tes  
and the Soviet  Union, could not win over the nonaligned countr ies  and 
from "1963 to 1967 . . . looked on themselves as the fundamental d e te r ­
minants" of the in te rna t iona l  s y s t e m . H o w e v e r ,  from the begin­
ning of the 1970 's,  the two superpowers were not seen as "the sole de­
terminants of in te rna t iona l  r e l a t i o n s "  since "China and Japan had 
emerged as independent f a c to r s "  in global p o l i t i c s  and "Western Europe
was taking a more s e l f - r e l i a n t  course ;"  and Rosecrance sees th i s  as
re s u l t in g  in each of the  two major powers again hoping to change the 
global conf igura tion of power in t h e i r  favor by t ry ing  to seek new 
a l l i e s  among the nonaligned co un t r ie s .
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Nonalignment i s  also seen by some, through the global power 
conf igura t ion  perspec t ive ,  as amounting to a global power bloc in i t ­
s e l f .  Udokang (1975), fo r  example, notes
. . . t h a t  the countr ies  of the developing world, many of
which are committed to nonaligned fo re ign  policy,  have come to 
be i d e n t i f i e d  in the  present period as. the Third World, the 
th i r d  force  in in te rn a t io n a l  r e l a t i o n s .
On the other hand, to Graham (1980), nonalignment, in terms of 
global power conf igura t ion ,  serves "as a p ro tec t ive  buffer between 
pressures  of East and West."^^ In f a c t ,  he sees th i s  manner of con­
cep tua l iz ing  nonalignment as a way of viewing i t  "in i t s  t r a d i t i o n a l
18r o l e ; " ind ica t ing  th a t  there  are o the r  perspectives  from which 
t h i s  phenomenon can be conceptualized.
Rothstein (1968) understands nonalignment in terms of how
19power i s  d i s t r ib u te d  in a global balance of power system. Accord­
ing to him, the v i a b i l i t y  of the phenomenon of some countries not j o i n ­
ing any of the superpower group is  " d i r e c t ly  r e l a t e d  to the power b a l ­
ance between" these powers. Furthermore,  while i t  is  "af fected  by 
th a t  balance" i t  also "in turn exerc ises  some influence over" the 
opera tion of such a ba lance ."  Thus, he a s se r t s  t h a t .
Nonalignment i s  not only impossible in condit ions of overt 
Great Power war or substantive cooperat ion;  i t  is  also nonvi- 
able fo r  Smal 1 Powers in a balance of power system where the 
Great Powers pnm anlM  seek the support  of t h e i r  peers r a th e r  
than t h e i r  i n f e r i o r s .
Generally,  as shown above, the global power configura tion p e r ­
spec t ive  of conceptual iz ing nonalignment assumes tha t  t h i s  phenomenon 
can be understood in terms of some coun t r ie s  jo in ing ,  or not j o in in g ,  
a power bloc,  or forming a bloc of t h e i r  own. Some scho la rs ,  l i k e
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Subrahmanyan (1981),^^ d isagree  with such an assumption. He notes
th a t  while some "argued in favour of a th i r d  force  as the basis of non-
alignment," the countr ies  th a t  are nonaligned "ca teg o r ica l ly  refused
to  play" such a r o le  and thus are seen as r e j e c t i n g  the notion tha t
23they became part  and parcel of a b ipo lar  p o l i t i c s .
The reasoning for such pos i t ions  by the nonaligned countr ies ,  
according to Subrahmanyan, i s  t h e i r  des i re  to  find out ways to fashion 
a new global conf igura tion of power th a t  w i l l  r e s u l t  in more in te rn a ­
t iona l  cooperation and democratizat ion; thus ,  to him, nonalignment sym­
bolizes  "progress ively  increas ing in te g r a t io n  of the in te rna t iona l  sys­
tem not fo r  f r ac t io n a t io n  or h ie ra rch ica l  s t r a t i f i c a t i o n . " ^ ^
S tra teg ic  R a t io n a l i ty  Perspective
Like the above global power conf igura t ion  perspec t ive ,  th is  
perspective  is  concerned with how power manifest s  i t s e l f  in the i n t e r ­
national system, but d i f f e r s  in t h a t  i t  seeks to conceptual ize non-
alignment mainly in terms of how i t  is  keyed into the global m i l i t a ry  
s t r a t e g i c  r e a l i t y  ins tead of in terms of general global power dynamics 
and s t ru c tu re  (which includes p o l i t i c a l ,  economic, c u l t u r a l ,  as well
as the m i l i t a r y / s t r a t e g i c  a spec ts ,  of global power). Therefore,  t h i s  
perspective  understands nonalignment as a phenomenon tha t  helps l im i t  
c o n f l i c t  between the  two superpower blocs (and i t  was seen as being es­
p ec ia l ly  very useful in th is  regard during the cold war e ra ) .
Using t h i s  perspec t ive .  Hoi broad (1981), notes th a t  the non-
aligned countr ies  by "s teer ing  c lea r  of a l l i a n ce s  and opposing bloc
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p o l i t i c s  . . . secured a degree of looseness in the system" and thus
prevented a s i tu a t io n  where the c o n f l i c t s ,  and outright brinkmanships,
between the two superpowers would have had a more pervasive dimension
25throughout a ll  nooks and corners of the globe.  He a lso  adds th a t
since the two "super powers were too preponderant and the po lar iz ing
tendencies  too strong fo r  any group of l e s s e r  power," the nonaligned
26group could not "se t  i t s e l f  up as an e f f e c t iv e  t h i r d  p a r ty ."
Thus, "the function of the nonaligned middle powers in the  cold war,"
which "was to help l im i t  the c o n f l i c t  between the camps," was mostly
27performed through the "s teer ing  c l e a r "  approach mentioned above.
While Hoi broad's  s t r a t e g i c  conceptualization  of nonalignment
was concerned with the cold war e r a .  G i r l i n g ' s  (1981) focused on the 
28era of de tente .  Since the l a t t e r  was e s s e n t i a l l y  one of lessening 
tension between the superpowers, in a s t r a t e g i c  sense the nonaligned 
c o un t r ie s ,  according to G ir l ing ,  "were no longer ' i n d i s p e n s a b l e , ' "
since the "function of the bridge between the r i v a l s  performed by the
nonaligned s ta t e s  was increas ingly  taken over by the superpowers them- 
se lves .
All iance  Against  Alignment with Superpower 
Blocs Policy Perspective
This perspective seeks to explain the nonalignment phenomenon 
as an a l l i a n ce  whose primary essence i s  the des i re  not to be aligned 
with any of the superpower b locs .  While in some of the above perspec­
t iv e s  there  were notions of nonalignment as a bloc phenomenon in
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r e l a t i o n  to the general global configura tion of power, t h i s  perspec­
t i v e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  narrows the essence of nonalignment mainly to the de­
s i r e  to  be a bloc tha t  i s  not al igned with any of the superpowers.
For example, Liska (1968) a s s e r t s  tha t  " a l l i an ces  among less  
developed countr ies  cannot matter much as con t r ibu t ions  to world order 
i f  they are mere extensions of great  power p o l i c i e s . T h u s ,  to 
him, these  countr ies  can only play a "pos i t ive  ro le "  in the in t e r n a ­
t iona l  system i f  they "can evolve into r e l a t i v e l y  separa te  subsystems 
re g io n a l ly , "  and also have the " a b i l i t y  to evolve r e l a t i v e l y  s p ec i f i c  
fo re ign  p o l i c i e s  n a t io n a l ly . "
However, some disagree  with these so r t s  of concep tua l iza t ions  
of nonalignment, which are hinged on t h e i r  being manifested as a d i s ­
t i n c t  in te rna t iona l  bloc,  since the Declaration of the Belgrade Confer­
ence of the nonaligned countr ies  had s ta ted  th a t  the nonaligned coun-
33t r i e s "  do not wish to form a new bloc and cannot be a b loc ."
The Natural Ally  Logic Perspect ive
This perspective conceptua lizes  nonalignment (which i s  seen by 
i t  as also being concerned with the asse r t ion  of nat ional  indepen­
dence, the enhancement of socio-economic condi t ions ,  and the playing 
of a more v iable  in te rna t iona l  r o le  by some developing c o u n t r ie s )  as 
n a tu ra l ly  leading the nonaligned countr ies  in to  a l ly ing  with the group 
of coun t r ie s ,  and in te rna t iona l  fo rces ,  tha t  shares the above goals 
with them and tha t  are also engaging in actions  th a t  will  help in 
r e a l i z in g  these  goals.  In p rac t ica l  terms, the proponents of th i s
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so r t  of concept of nonalignment pos i t  th a t  the s o c i a l i s t  world i s  the 
group of countr ies  tha t  have th i s  i d e n t i t y  of i n t e r e s t s  and goals with 
the nonaligned coun t r ies ;  and tha t  t h i s  r e a l i t y  inev i tab ly  makes these 
two groups of countr ies  na tura l  a l l i e s .  However, i t  i s  important to 
note tha t  the majority  of the nonaligned coun t r ie s  do not agree to 
th i s  concept of nonalignment. The main exponents of t h i s  concept are 
the p o l i t i c a l  leaders  and th e o re t i c i an s  of the Sovie t  Union, other mem­
bers of the Warsaw Pac t,  and the nonaligned coun t r ies  tha t  have very 
close  t i e s  with the former two.
Another fea tu re  of t h i s  na tura l  a l ly  log ic  perspective  of con­
ceptua l iz ing  nonalignment is  th a t  i t  d i r e c t l y  c o n f l i c t s  with the equi­
dis tance  from the superpower blocs policy pe rsp ec t iv e ,  already de­
scribed above. The l a t t e r  conceptualizes  nonalignment in terms of the 
maintenance of in te rna t iona l  r e l a t i o n s  which manifest s  an eq u id is tan t  
pos i t ion  from both the Western and the Eastern b locs ,  while the former 
conceptualizes i t  in terms of the nonaligned coun t r ies  na tu ra l ly  a l l y ­
ing with the Soviet bloc due to i t s  assumption th a t  both groups of 
countr ies  share iden t ica l  i n t e r e s t s  and goa ls .  For example, Singham 
(1980) sees the equid is tance  perspective  as having a " s t a t i c  q u a l i ty , "  
and a lso  bringing "into the fo re f ro n t  a g e o -p o l i t i c a l  concept of the 
world r a th e r  than a more dynamic m a t e r i a l i s t  concept of the world. 
Addi t iona l ly ,  t h i s  statement about a " m a te r i a l i s t "  concept of i n t e r ­
national  r e a l i t y  a lso connotes th a t  t h i s  perspec t ive  i s  wholly a neo- 
Marxist th e o re t ic a l  in t e r p r e t a t i o n  of nonalignment (the reasoning 
being tha t  th i s  perspective  seems to assume the primacy of the mate­
r i a l  basis  of r e l a t i o n s  among the countr ies  and peoples of the world
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and a concomitant manifestat ion of so r t  of an in te rna t iona l  c lass  d i f ­
f e r e n t i a t i o n ) .  A fu r the r  extension of t h i s  s o r t  of reasoning might be 
th a t  the world is  divided into only two c la s s e s ,  the owning c lass  of 
countr ies  th a t  hold the monopoly on global economic r e l a t i o n s ,  and the 
nonowning c la s s  of countr ies  th a t  are the victims of the former. In­
va r iab ly ,  the natural a l ly  logic  perspective  assumes tha t  the c a p i t a l ­
i s t  world is composed of the owning c lass  of countr ies ,  while the 
Soviet  bloc and nonaligned countr ies  are seen as composed of the non­
owning c l a s s  of countr ies .  Therefore ,  since there  are only two groups 
of countr ies  (with the nonaligned countr ies  assumed to share the same 
camp with the Soviet b loc ) ,  the natural  a l ly  log ic  perspective assumes 
th a t  any re fe rence  to the nonaligned coun tr ies  as being eq u id i s tan t  to 
both the Soviet  and the Western blocs i s  i r r e l e v a n t  s ince  t h i s  group
of countr ies  i s  already being assumed to be the natural a l ly  of the
Soviet  bloc .
I t  is  the above s o r t  of reasoning th a t  led Fidel Castro of 
Cuba to implore the nonaligned countr ies  "to c learly  apprecia te  what 
were the fo rces  of progress and what were the forces of react ion  in
OC
the world."  He also a sse r ted  th a t  such an appreciation of r e a l i t y  
led Cuba in to  choosing "a s o c i a l i s t  path of development," an action
which in turn also led to i t s  al igning "with a l l  those forces  t h a t  op- 
pose the ravages created by cap i t a l i sm ."  Thus, while many coun­
t r i e s  have vehemently disputed whether Cuba i s  quali f ied  to belong to 
the nonaligned group of c o u n t r ie s ,  Cuba i t s e l f  has used th i s  natural  
a l l y  logic  conceptualizat ion of nonalignment to present the view tha t
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i t  is nonaligned, and th a t  other countr ies  with the same ideology and 
in te rna t iona l  posture a re ,  in f a c t ,  those tha t  are t r u l y  nonaligned.
Cuba, along with other nonaligned countr ies  exhib it ing  i t s  
same behavior,  has t r i e d  to f o i s t  t h i s  na tura l  a l ly  logic  perspective 
on the e n t i r e  group of the nonaligned coun t r ie s .  In 1979, when i t  
hosted the nonaligned summit conference,  i t  vigorously t r i e d ,  but with­
out success,  to achieve th i s  ob jec t ive ;  and i t s  f a i l u r e  showed that  
the majori ty  of the nonaligned countr ies  i s  s t i l l  f a r  from embracing 
the natura l  a l ly  logic pe rspec t ive .
I t  i s  a lso  important to  note tha t  th i s  natural  a l ly  logic per­
spective  is  as old as the nonalignment phenomenon. For example, 
Sukarno of Indonesia,  an important f igure  during the formative years 
of th i s  phenomenon, held the view th a t  "there can be no coexistence be­
tween independence and j u s t i c e  on one side and imperial ism-colonial  ism 
on the o t h e r . H e  thus implied th a t  the nonaligned countries  
should not regard the S o c i a l i s t  and Western blocs as two blocs to be 
accorded equal dealings since one of the blocs was more on the side of 
the a sp i ra t ions  of the nonaligned countr ies  than the o th e r .
As noted above, the Sovie t  Union i s  a major exponent of th is  
natura l  a l ly  logic  perspective  of conceptualizing nonalignment, and 
Anatoly Gromyko, the Director of Africa I n s t i t u t e  of the USSR Academy 
of Sciences, re f le c ted  the view of the Soviet foreign  po licy  studies
community when he asser ted  t h a t  the "des tiny of Africa i s  an embodi-
38ment of  the ideas of the October Revolution in p r a c t i c e . "  By a l ­
luding tha t  the philosophical  framework th a t  la id  the foundations for 
the es tabl ishment  of the Soviet  system in the Soviet Union i s  the same
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th a t  moves Afr ica ,  Gromyko implies t h a t  Afr ica ,  which i s  mostly made 
up of nonaligned countr ies ,  i s  a na tu ra l  a l ly  of the Soviet  Union 
(though i t  might be i n t e r e s t i n g  to specula te  whether t h i s  kind of re a ­
soning is  based on the p o t e n t i a l i t y  f o r  such a r e a l i t y  in the fu tu r e ,  
or on contemporary r e a l i t y ) .
The important role  of c la s s  approach is  an understanding of so­
c ia l  r e a l i t y  in r e l a t io n  to the formulations  of natural  a l ly  logic  per­
spective  of conceptual iz ing nonalignment; and th i s  i s  very c lea r ly
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elaborated  by Kiva (1973). Building on his understanding tha t
Marxism-Leninism emphasizes tha t  foreign po l icy  i s  so­
c i a l l y  condit ioned,  and th a t  r e l a t i o n s  among s t a t e s ,  with al l  
t h e i r  c o n t ra d ic t io n s ,  obvious and seeming, as well as unexpec­
ted tu rn s ,  can be c o r re c t ly  understood only through a c lass  ap­
proach, i . e . ,  with due cons idera t ion  of the r e l a t i o n s  and 
c lass  charac te r  of the s t a t e ,
he i n t e r n a t io n a l i z e s  the ana lys is  of c la s s  r e a l i t y  by noting tha t
. . . the co r re la t io n  of s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  forces  on a worldwide 
sca le ,  and the course of the s t ru g g le  and competition between 
the two social  systems are the major in te rna t iona l  f a c t o r s .
Therefore,  Kiva, in simple terms, a lso  views the world as divided 
between the Western world and the S o c i a l i s t  bloc (and also implying 
th a t  the nonaligned countr ies  are an a c tu a l ,  or p o t e n t i a l ,  pa r t  of the 
l a t t e r ,  and thus i t s  natural  a l l y ) .  This reasoning a lso becomes more 
obvious when he s t a t e s  t h a t .
When the foreign pol icy  of the young s t a t e s  r e f l e c t s  th e i r  
real  national i n t e r e s t s  i t  in e v i ta b ly  runs counter to the 
course followed by the i m p e r i a l i s t  powers and ob jec t ive ly  coin­
cides w i t f i . t h e  a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t  fore ign policy of s o c i a l i s t  
coun t r ie s .
Furthermore, -he also  a sse r t s  th a t  nonalignment is  "a form of a n t i -  
imperialism; " and thus there  is no wonder tha t  he holds the view " tha t
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the pos i t ions  of s o c i a l i s t s  and developing countr ies  are often  i d e n t i ­
c a l . "*2
Kiva even bu i lds  an aura of i n e v i t a b i l i t y ,  a s o r t  of ' i ro n  
law' s i t u a t i o n ,  in to  t h i s  apt ly  ca l l ed  'n a tu r a l '  a l ly  r e l a t io n sh ip  be­
tween the s o c i a l i s t  and nonaligned coun t r ies .  Thus, to  him.
The people of the newly-free countries are becoming in­
creas ingly  convinced, through th e i r  own exper iences ,  tha t  
t h e i r  f r iendsh ip  with the Soviet  Union and o ther  s o c i a l i s t  
countr ies  is  determined by h i s to ry  i t s e l f ;  t h a t  t h e i r  suc­
cesses in the s t ru g g le  fo r  strengthening p o l i t i c a l  indepen­
dence, and for economic and socia l  progress are ind isso lub ly  
l inked with the successes of the  forces of peace,  progress and 
socialism in t h e i r  global confronta tion with the fo rces  of 
war, reaction and imperialism.
Bondarevsky and Sofinsky (1975) also echo t h i s  notion of the 
i n e v i t a b i l i t y ,  or ' n a t u r a l n e s s '  of th e i r  so-claimed a l l i a n ce  between 
the nonaligned and s o c i a l i s t  countr ie s  when they p o s i t  th a t  the "uncom­
promising s truggle  a g a in s t  colonialism and neo-colonialism" ca r r ied  
out by the nonaligned c o u n t r ie s ,  "ob jec t ive ly  s o l i d i f i e d  the  a l l i a n ce  
of the nonaligned and s o c i a l i s t  co un t r ie s .
Bondarevsky and Sofinsky (1975) also t ry  to r e fu te  the notion 
th a t  the nonaligned coun t r ie s  should t r e a t  the Western bloc and the 
S o c i a l i s t  bloc in the same m a n n e r . T h e y  a s se r t  t h a t .
The Soviet Union and o ther  s o c i a l i s t  countr ies  r e j e c t  the 
f a l s e  conception of a world being divided according to wealth 
and indus t r ia l  development,  with no regard fo r  the  fundamental 
d i s t i n c t io n s  in t h e i r  socio-economic systans and h i s to r i c a l  
r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  to the developing countr ies .
To fu r th e r  attempt to show th a t  both blocs should not be regarded as
exh ib i t ing  the same domestic and in te rna t iona l  behavior ,  they also
fashion th e i r  own sense of h is to ry ;  and according to them.
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The developing countr ies  learn from t h e i r  own experience 
tha t  th e i r  very l ib e ra t io n  and exis tence were determined by 
the growing ro le  of the countr ies  of the s o c i a l i s t  community, 
and tha t  the o r ig in  of the nonalignment po licy  and i t s  imple­
mentation had been made possible  only when the balance of 
power in the world r a d ic a l ly  changed in favour of socialism.
and the re fore  they deplore  those who.
Treat on a par  those who are t ru ly  to blame fo r  the cur­
ren t  s t a t e  of the  economy in the former co lon ies ,  who have op­
pressed and exp lo i ted  them fo r  decades, on the one hand, and 
those who have always opposed colonialism, helping the peoples 
to throw off the colonia l  yoke and to take the  path of indepen­
dent development, on the o ther .
Based on t h i s  so r t  of world view, i t  i s  also not surpris ing 
th a t  Bondarevsky and Sofinsky come to the conclusion th a t  the "theory 
and p rac t ice  of nonalignment have inva l ida ted  the over-s impl i f ied  ap­
proach to the idea of  t h i s  movement as being mere nonpar tic ipation  in 
b l o c s , a n d  thus they claim th a t  "the s o c i a l i s t  community"^^ is 
the "natural  and most r e l i a b l e  ally"^® of the nonaligned coun t r ie s .
As already noted ,  t h i s  natural  a l ly  log ic  conceptualization of 
nonalignment does have many c r i t i c s ,  and, i r o n i c a l l y ,  the most not­
able c r i t i c i sm s  of t h i s  perspective  emanate from scholars  who are also 
ardent followers of the Marxist philosophy. These are the t h e o r e t i ­
cians from nonaligned Yugoslavia (a country which, though very so c ia l ­
i s t i c ,  does not belong to the Soviet  bloc—and thus a member of a so­
c i a l i s t  community, but not a member of the Soviet  camp). Blazevic 
(1981) views the idea th a t  the nonaligned countr ies  have a 'na tu ra l  a l ­
l i an ce '  with the Sovie t  bloc as baseless  reasoning, and a s s e r t s  that 
the "Supporters of blocs are f igh t ing  each o ther  over our heads and 
often succeed in confusing the i s s u e . H e  also  argues th a t  i t  "is  
very important to analyze the relevance of Power b locs ,"  and questions
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whether they are not " s t i l l  objec t ive ly  the b igges t  th re a t  to peace or
52is  i t  only the imperialism tha t  should be fought back?"
Blazevic a lso answers his question and p o s i t s  tha t  the non- 
aligned countr ies  should not see themselves as a l l i e s  of any of the 
superpower blocs.  According to him.
I t  is  quest ionable  also to suppose th a t  only a spec if ic  
bloc can be good and others bad. At l e a s t  the course of 
events in the l a s t  t h i r t y  years has not proved th i s  assumption 
and nonalig%d policy  on blocs has genera l ly  been sanctioned 
by h i s to ry .
The Global Morality Fountain Perspective
This perspec t ive  conceptualizes nonalignment as a phenomenon 
that  serves as a global mora l i ty  fountain th a t  supplies  e th ica l  o r ien­
ta t ion  to the conduct of r e l a t io n s  among the peoples and the countries 
of the world. For example, Sukarno conceptualized  Indonesian non- 
aligned foreign po l icy  as being "congruent with the social  conscience 
of man," and also  a sse r ted  th a t  i t  needed to be converted into "a coor­
dinated accumulated moral fo rce .
This conceptua l iza t ion  of nonalignment as a moral force  in the 
in te rna t iona l  community i s  a lso  echoed in the statements made by 
Nasser of Egypt, Bourguiba of Tunisia,  Makarios of Cyprus, Nehru of 
India and Tito of Yugoslavia, who saw nonalignment as "moral p o te n t i ­
a l i t i e s , "  "moral a u th o r i t y , "  "moral p r i n c i p l e s , "  "moral force" and 
"moral success ,"  r e sp ec t iv e ly .^ ^  A ddi t iona l ly ,  Haile Se lass ie  of 
Ethiopia also conceptualized  nonalignment as "the moral element in the 
conduct of human a f f a i r s .
78.
The A l t r u i s t i c  Policy Perspective
Like the preceding perspec t ive ,  the a l t r u i s t i c  policy perspec­
t iv e  i s  also concerned with the proper e th ica l  o r i e n t a t i o n  in in te rna­
tional r e l a t i o n s ;  but the l a t t e r  perspective ,  in ad d i t io n ,  emphasizes 
the unself ish  upli f tment of humanity as a whole, in s te ad  of a mere con­
cern for the b e n e f i t s  such an approach to in te rn a t io n a l  r e l a t io n s  
might bring to the  nonaligned countr ies alone.  For example, Haile 
Selass ie  saw nonalignment as a tendency,
to judge . . . p o l i c i e s  . . . as we see them e i t h e r  con t r ibu ­
ting to  or d e t r a c t i n g  from the re so lu t ion  of th e  world 's  prob­
lems, the p resen ta t ion  of peace and th|, improvement of the gen­
eral  level of man's l iv ing  conditions .
Tito also a sse r ted  t h i s  a l t r u i s t i c  nature of nonalignment when he 
noted th a t  the nonaligned "countr ies are f igh t ing  fo r  the broadest  in ­
t e r e s t s  of  mankind as a whole, and not fo r  some narrow goals of the i r
own."58
In t e rn a t io n a l  Peace Guarantor Perspect ive
The in te rn a t io n a l  peace guarantor perspec t ive  of nonalignment 
conceptualizes t h i s  phenomenon, pr im ari ly ,  as a framework fo r  the en­
hancement and the guaranteeing of peace in the in te rn a t io n a l  commu­
n i ty .  For example, Narayanan's (1981) view—tha t  world peace " is  the 
highest  national and in te rn a t io n a l  good . . . for the nonaligned coun- 
t r i e s " 5 9 —f i t s  in to  t h i s  perspective of conceptualiz ing nonalign­
ment.
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Nehru even c a t e g o r i c a l ly  s ta ted  t h a t ,  f o r  the  nonaligned coun­
t r i e s ,  the goal of procuring and maintaining world peace is  th e i r  f o r e ­
most p r i o r i t y ;  and thus ,  according to him.
Everything we have contended against  and th a t  we are con­
tinuing to s t rugg le  ag a in s t—imperialism, co lon ia l ism ,  r a c i a l ­
ism, and the r e s t —all  these  are somewhat overshadowed. . . .
For i f  war comes all e lse  fo r  the moment goes.
He even believed th a t  i t  is  the duty of the nonaligned countries to
shoulder the primary r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  the procurement and the
guaranteeing of world peace:
When the re  i s  a c r i s i s  involving the p o s s i b i l i t y  of war, 
the very f a c t  th a t  we are nonaligned should s t i r  us to action,  
should s t i r  us to thought,  should s t i r  us to  feel th a t  now 
more than ever i t  i s  up to us to do^whatever we can to prevent 
such a calamity  coming down upon us,
Kwame Nkrumah a lso  shared th i s  view of nonalignment as the
guarantor of world peace,  and thus he asser ted  t h a t  the "policy of non-
alignment" had the c a p a b i l i t y  of having the "most powerful e f f e c t  fo r  
62world peace."
The nonaligned co u n t r ie s '  ro le  as the guarantors  of world 
peace is  even seen by Singh (1981) to  involve the  duty of l ib e ra t in g  
ce r ta in  sec tions  of the world population,  which he sees as being condi­
t ioned in a way th a t  does not s u i t  the p u r s u i t  of world peace. 
After a s se r t ing  t h a t .
The doc t r ines  of nuclear war have over the  years sought to 
condition the popula tions  of the i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  nations  into 
accepting mass te r ro r i sm  and mass k i l l i n g s  as l e g i t im a te ,
and also claiming th a t  the
present r i s e  in in te rna t iona l  te r ro r ism  is  by no means unre­
lated to the l e g i t im iz a t io n  of te r ror ism through the doctr ines  
of nuclear war, the NPT, nuclear-weapon-free zones,  e t c . .
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he pos i t s  th a t  nuclear weapons should be " s t r ipped  of the i r  glamour 
and p r e s t i g e , "  and tha t  nonalignment "has to . . . l i b e r a t e  the popula­
t ions  of the i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  nations  from th i s  conditioning."^^
However, the above views of Singh seem to assume that  the only 
th re a t  to  world peace are nuclear weapons and global wars, and thus 
seem to ignore the f a c t  tha t  conventional and regional wars can also 
threaten  world peace.
Sa ra jc ic  (1981) a lso  a s s e r t s  the " ro le  of the nonaligned move­
ment in the  p reserva t ion  of world peace . . . He observes
th a t ,  by supporting
the basic  r ig h t s  of countr ies  and nations  throughout the 
world, the non-aligned movement is  o b jec t iv e ly  the only h i s t o r ­
ical  force  a t  the present moment t h a t  can influence the so lu ­
tion of the d i f f e r e n t  i n t e r e s t s  by not being undertaken by
force and t h r e a t s ,  which could eventua l ly  jeopard ize  peace in 
the whole world.
While most people usually focus on nonalignment as a phenome­
non belonging to  the developing world, S ara jc ic  a s s e r t s  the universal  
r e a l i t y  of t h i s  phenomenon (which has often  been s t ressed  by those in 
the nonaligned coun t r ies )  by noting t h a t ,  in f a c t ,  the best  and most 
glaring demonstration of nonalignment as a force  fo r  world peace has
been in Europe. Thus, he notes th a t  the "mobi lizat ion of neutral  and
nonaligned European countr ies  in the s t ru g g le  fo r  European peace and 
secur i ty  i s  the best  p r o o f o f  t h i s  r o l e .  He also adds " th a t  the
nonaligned and neut ra l  European countr ies  are the only subject  capable 
of s t a r t in g  i n i t i a t i v e s  and preserving the elementary confidence neces­
sary fo r  agreement between European coun t r ie s  facing great  dangers,"  
and furthermore,  tha t  a l l  " th i s  i s  happening in circumstances of
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s t ra ined  r e l a t i o n s  between the big powers in Europe, which i s  at the
moment the g re a te s t  m i l i t a r y  arsenal ev e r . "
The world peace essence of nonalignment is  a lso  noted by
Hameed (1983)^^ who, while observing th a t  the nonaligned group " i s  a 
c oa l i t ion  of d i f f e r in g  p o l i t i c a l ,  economic and social  systems—a c o a l i ­
t ion  of d i f f e r e n t  democracies—d i re c t  and i n d i r e c t , "  adds tha t  i t s
"g rea te s t  success is  tha t  i t  has prevented the world being divided 
in to  two cheering or f i r i n g  squads.
Hameed also attempts to weave an analysis of the re la t io n sh ip  
ex is t ing  among peace, nonalignment and power;
I t  could be said t h a t  i f  nonalignment has f a i l e d  to  de­
fuse tension i t  has at l e a s t  avoided adding to  i t .  Peace be­
comes a chimera i f  sought on the basis  of p a r i ty  of m i l i t a r y  
s t reng th .  I t  has to be sought on the pa r i ty  of confidence and 
understanding. Peace f lo u r i sh es  in a climate devoid of t en ­
sion.  Any con tr ibu t ion  to defuse tension i s  a contr ibution 
towards peace.  This is  what non-alignment seeks to do.
In te rna t iona l  Rela t ions  Pos i t ive  Innovator Perspective
This way of conceptual iz ing nonalignment sees the essence of
t h i s  phenomenon as the framework for  the  p o s i t iv e  innovation of the
way countr ies and peoples of the world r e l a t e  among themselves (be i t
in p o l i t i c a l ,  economic or c u l tu ra l  con tex ts ) .
This pe rspec t ive ,  fo r  example, i s  revealed in Singham's (1980)
view of nonalignment as a "s t ruggle  fo r  c rea t ing  a more humane and 
17j u s t  world." Add i t iona l ly ,  John Kotelawala, a former Sri Lankan 
leader ,  even sees th i s  duty of creating a new world order,  or r e a l i t y ,  
as the r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  which the less  powerful countries can best  carry
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out than the more powerful coun t r ie s ,  and thus he contends t h a t  "the
sa lvation of the world depends not on the great  powers but on the
73le s se r  coun tr ies  of the world."
To Nehru, with a strong f a i t h  in the  phenomenon of nonalign­
ment, the p o s s i b i l i t y  of a fu ture  world, where the r e la t io n s  among the 
nations and peoples i s  marked pr imari ly  by the  s p i r i t  of cooperation,  
appeared to be i n e v i t a b le .  Thus, he observed t h a t .
The world,  in sp i te  of i t s  r i v a l r i e s  and hatreds and inner 
c o n f l i c t s ,  moves inevi tab ly  towards c lo se r  co-operation and 
the build ing  up of a world commonwealth.
A dd i t iona l ly ,  he also saw th i s  phenomenon of global coopera­
t ion as not being divorced from a united world tha t  is b u i l t  on a j u s t  
world o rder .  Thus, he asserted  tha t
I t  i s  f o r  th i s  One World tha t  Free India will  work, a 
world in which there  is  the f r e e  coo&aration of f ree  people 
and no c la s s  or group explo i ts  another.
To Remington (1980), the pos i t ive  innovation of the natu re  o f
in te rna t iona l  r e l a t i o n s  as the essence of nonalignment i s  seen as ,
a demand fo r  new ru le s  of the game based on equal i ty  and democ­
r a t i z a t i o n  of in te rna t iona l  decisionmaking; ru les  which would 
mean the e limina tion  of^spheres of inf luence ,  power p o l i t i c s ,  
and superpower hegemony.
Furthermore, Remington also  believes  in the a t t a i n a b i l i t y  of t h i s  so r t
of in te rn a t io n a l  system. For example, he notes tha t  Yugoslavia, by
u t i l i z i n g  i t s  r o le  as a nonaligned country,  played a very important
ro le  in the
two important European negotia tions  of the 1970' s :  the 1975
Helsinki Conference on European Security and Cooperation and 
the 1975,-,Berlin Conference of European Communist and Worker's 
P a r t i e s .
83
Thus, he saw "the d i rec t ion  of European p o l i t i c s  in the 1970's as in ­
d ic a t iv e  of both the v i t a l i t y  and the d i v e r s i t y  of the nonaligned move­
ment.
Lebedev (1975) is  another exponent of t h i s  in te rna t iona l  r e l a ­
t ions  p o s i t iv e  innovation perspective  of nonalignment, but he seems to
79base h is  ideas primar i ly  on Marxism-Leninism. He sees the task of 
improving the waj na tions  and peoples of the world r e l a t e  among them­
selves  as one which, based on an adequate understanding of in te rna ­
t iona l  r e a l i t y ,  can be designed, planned, implemented and controlled .
80While a s s e r t in g  "the c lass  content of in te rn a t io n a l  r e l a t i o n s , "
and a lso  observing t h a t ,  desp i te  "a l l  t h e i r  complexity, d iv e rs i ty  and
checkered ch a rac te r ,  in te rna t iona l  r e l a t i o n s  are not an unordered
81congeries of fo r tu i to u s  l inks  between s t a t e s  and people," he
pos i t s  t h a t  the " in te rna t iona l  r e l a t i o n s  . . . r e s t ru c tu r in g  can never
82be spontaneous or automatic ."  Furthermore, to him,
"Marxis tLeninis ts  cannot r e ly  on spontaneous development in
in te rn a t io n a l  a f f a i r s ,  or in p o l i t i c a l  a f f a i r s  in general . "  and he
advocates th a t  any "fundamental r e s t r u c tu r in g  of in te rna t iona l
83r e l a t i o n s  must be planned, con t ro l led  and co r rec ted ."  He also 
adds t h a t .
Such re s t ru c tu r in g  c o n s i s t s  not in pass ive  adaptation to 
changing in te rna t iona l  r e l a t i o n s  but in the adoption by s t a t e s  
and peoples of active  measures aimed at  acce le ra t ing  the demo­
c r a t i c  transformation of in te rn a t io n a l  l i ^ e  and at consolida­
t in g  in c ip ien t  pos i t ive  changes within i t .
And in r e l a t i n g  the place of nonalignment to  the above exposi t ion,  he
noted th a t
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The newly independent c o u n t r i e s ,  which have become an in ­
f l u e n t i a l  i n t e rn a t io n a l  fo rce ,  have an ever growing ro le  to 
play in the development of worJj^ r e l a t i o n s  and the pos i t ive  
changes going on in t h i s  sphere.
Also echoing th i s  pos i t ive  innovation of in te rna t iona l  r e l a ­
t ion by nonalignment, Labh (1982) a s s e r ted  tha t  Nehru "endeavoured to
Of
keep t h i s  pa r t  of the world f ree  from big power p o l i t i c s . "
To Armah (1975), the innovation of in te rna t iona l  r e l a t i o n s  by
nonalignment was seen mostly in terms of i t s  c i v i l i z i n g  influence;
thus ,  as al ready noted in a preceding sec t ion ,  while viewing the s t a t e
of in te rna t iona l  r e l a t i o n s ,  assoc ia ted  with big power bloc p o l i t i c s ,
87as one th a t  "put force  above reason and above j u s t i c e , "  he ob-
88served tha t  the "bege t te rs  of Non-alignment" are leading "in the 
adventure of  improving and c i v i l i z i n g  the world 's  conduct of world a f -
fairs ."89
A b e t t e r  fu tu re  world for mankind, as a r e s u l t  of the in t e rn a ­
t iona l  r e l a t i o n s  innovation,  was seen by Toure (1975) as a possible  
product of nonalignment. He saw nonalignment, as noted above, as an,
expression of a l iv e ly  f a i t h  in a happy fu tu re  for mankind 
. . . something a c t iv e ,  a p a r t i c ip a t in g  fo rce ,  an active  agent 
in the s t ruggle  for the achievement of a world soc ie ty—eman­
c ip a ted ,  f r a t e r n a l ,  and united .
However, Toure seemed to have believed th a t  t h i s  so r t  of a b e t t e r  
world fo r  man would be more possible  i f  the whole world r e a l ized ,  and 
supported,  the innovating ro le  of nonalignment; and thus he hoped 
" tha t  the highly developed nations and peoples can understand th i s  h i s ­
to r i c a l  movement in i t s  universal  s ig n i f ic an ce  and tha t  they will take
91f ul l  pa r t  in i t , "  implying tha t  the world wi l l  be b e t t e r  i f  the 
whole world embraced the nonalignment philosophy.
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Also, some see the innovating task of nonalignment primar i ly  
in terms o f  a  more j u s t  in t e rn a t io n a l  order.  For example, Misra 
(1981) sees the goal of nonalignment as tha t  of e s tab l i sh ing  "an i n t e r ­
national order based on j u s t i c e ,  whether in the f i e l d  of the economy,
go
information or science and technology."
Rajan (1981) i s  another person th a t  attempted to comprehend
nonalignment as a phenomenon t h a t  aims to pos i t ive ly  innovate the  way
nat ions  and peoples of the world r e l a t e ;  and he attempts to do t h i s  by
comparing and con t ra s t ing  i t  with other theo re t ic a l  framework tha t
have inf luenced in te rna t iona l  r e l a t i o n s .  Thus, he notes tha t .
The t r a d i t i o n a l  bases of the functioning of the system of 
sovereign nation s t a t e s  . . . were: iso la t ionism,  a l l i a n c e s ,
n e u t r a l i t y ,  balance of power, imperialism, and universal ism 
(Pax Romana, Pax B r i tan n ica , and so on)
and tha t  one "feature  common to  a l l  these  choices i s  the d iv is ion  of
93the in te rna t iona l  community in to  opposing groups." In c o n t r a s t ,  
he sees nonalignment as being "c lea r ly  and s t r i d e n t ly  opposed to  ideo­
logical  or power blocs and bloc p o l i t i c s  in in te rna t iona l  r e l a -  
t i o n s . "  Addi t iona l ly ,  he notes th a t  the d i s l ik e  fo r  bloc p o l i t i c s
has not allowed the nonaligned group to  be much i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  in a
95sense th a t  makes i t  look l ike  a b loc .  (Thus, p resently  the nona­
ligned group has no permanent s e c r e t a r i a t  but coordinating bureaus.)  
Unlike the other in te rn a t io n a l  concepts,  Rajan also sees nonalignment 
as having the q u a l i t i e s  of "novelty  and d i s t in c t iv e n e s s , "  and these 
are a t t r i b u t e d  to i t s  des i re  to seek "to be cohesive,  not d iv i s iv e ,  of 
the in te rna t iona l  c o m m u n i t y . T h e r e f o r e ,  to him, a "nonaligned 
s t a t e  has by d e f in i t io n  no enemies: other s t a t e s  are e i the r  presen t
07
or p o ten t ia l  f r i e n d s . "
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The Total Social R ea l i ty  Perspect ive
The essence of t h i s  perspec t ive  i s  tha t  nonalignment seeks to 
tackle  problems in the in t e rn a t io n a l  system in a to ta l  r e a l i t y  perspec­
t ive  ( th a t  i s ,  in i t s  global p o l i t i c a l ,  economic and cultura l  ram if ica ­
t i o n s ) .  Another s trand of t h i s  perspec t ive  is  tha t  all of the  con­
tex t s  in which in te rn a t io n a l  a c t i v i t i e s  occur—p o l i t i c a l , economic and 
c u l t u r a l —are seen as being in te rconnected .  For example, the solving 
of a problem, or understanding of the r e a l i t y ,  in one context i s  seen 
as being connected with those of other contexts .
Thus, the to ta l  socia l  r e a l i t y  perspective of nonalignment 
takes on the ta sk  of comprehending and solving global problems in a 
to ta l  social  r e a l i t y  sense with an emphasis on the in te r re la tedness  of 
a l l  i s sues  in a l l  con tex ts .
Rao (1981), fo r  example, saw the nonaligned countries as being 
"led by a new generation of leaders  who, though steeped in t h e i r  r e ­
spective national and p o l i t i c a l  t r a d i t i o n s ,  are tempered by the r e a l -  
p o l i t i k  of in t e rn a t io n a l  r e l a t i o n s  of the 1960's  and the 1970 's. 
Addi t iona l ly ,  he a lso  s ta t ed  th a t
The search for development and fo r  natural  and energy r e ­
sources ,  the inner tensions  of the newly developing s o c i e t i e s ,  
the very real  danger of thermonuclear des t ruc t ion ,  and the new 
and i n d i r e c t  forms of p o l i t i c a l  and economic domination 
are a l l  "par t  of the subconscious mot ivations  of the new leadership  in
99the nonaligned movement."
Also, Akindele (1976) expresses  a to ta l  social  r e a l i t y  concep­
tu a l i z a t i o n  of nonalignment when he notes tha t  the members of the
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Organization of African Unity, who are pa r t  and parcel of the nona­
ligned group, work in conjunction with the l a t t e r  to deal with
the necess i ty  fo r  the democratization of in te rn a t io n a l  r e l a ­
t i o n s ,  the  ever-widening gap between the more- and l e s s -d e v e l ­
oped c o u n t r i e s ,  as well as the fo rces^^f  racism and reaction 
which cont inue to bedevil world peace.
Gromyko (1977), in an analys is  of the in te rna t iona l  conduct of 
African coun tr ies  (which are a par t  of the nonaligned group),  also un­
d e r l in e s  the interconnectedness of domestic and in te rna t iona l  r e a l ­
i t i e s ,  and the p o l i t i c a l  and socio-economic r e a l i t i e s ,  when he ob­
serves  tha t
changes in domestic l i f e  and in te rna t iona l  a f f a i r s  have taken 
place in most African countr ies  which have car r ied  out deep- 
going progressive transformations  in the course of the mount­
ing f i g h t  against  imperialism, fo r  p o l i t i c a l  eq u a l i ty ,  eco­
nomic independence and socia l  progress.
Nehru also r e f l e c te d  the to ta l  socia l  r e a l i t y  concep tua l iza ­
t ion  of nonalignment when he asser ted  tha t
disarmament u lt imate ly  depends on fa r- reach ing  changes in the 
p o l i t i c a l  and economic s t r u c tu r e  of the world, leading to a r e ­
moval of the basic  causes of war. So long.«as t h i s  is  not 
done, the c o n f l i c t s  continue and lead to  wars.
This interconnectedness of a l l  r e a l i t i e s ,  in a l l  contexts ,  is  also em­
phasized by Chari (1983), who observes tha t  "Proceeding towards the 
New In te rna t iona l  Economic Order, and e s tab l i sh in g  s o c ia l ly  j u s t  s o c i ­
e t i e s ,  could alone remove these  fundamental causes of c o n f l i c t , "  and 
th a t  "No con t rad ic t io n ,  t h e re fo re ,  obtains between the non-aligned
s t rugg le  fo r  peace and the l a rg e r  s t rugg les  fo r  ega l i t a r ian i sm  in the
103in te rna t iona l  system."
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The Cultural Autonomy Assertion Perspect ive
This perspective conceptualizes  nonalignment in a somewhat na r ­
rower sense in t h a t  i t  sees i t  as a form of cu l tu ra l  asser t ion  in s o c i ­
e t i e s  t h a t  h i s t o r i c a l l y  had been, or are now being, blanketed by ou t ­
side c u l tu ra l  in f luences .  Dinh (1977),  in p a r t i c u l a r ,  expresses t h i s  
so r t  of conceptualization of nonalignment when he a s s e r t s  t h a t ,  though 
"the roo ts  of non-alignment can be t raced  back to the 1955 Asian- 
African conference in Bandung, Indones ia ,"  i t s  foundations "however, 
' a re  found in the f i r s t  s t i r r i n g s  of na t iona l  sentiments among Asians
and Afr icans  . . . which "led to a reexamination of indigenous
104values and c u l tu r e s . "  Furthermore,  he also sees "the p resen t  
s t a t e  of non-aligned coun t r ie s '  a n t i - c u l t u r a l  im p e r ia l i s t  s t rugg le "  as 
being manifested by " the i r  demands for a New Information Order.
Indira  Gandhi of India a lso  r e f l e c t s  on the need for the non- 
aligned countr ies  to be c u l tu r a l l y  a s s e r t i v e ,  while advising some 
sense of logic in the course of such a s s e r t i v e n e s s .  She echoed the ad­
vice of Mazi Mbonu Ojike, a l a t e  Nigerian n a t i o n a l i s t :  'boycott  the
boycot tables  and leave the unboycottables unboycotted. '  Thus, she 
also advised th a t  " i t  is necessary fo r  the older cu l tu res  to make con­
scious e f f o r t s  to safeguard th e i r  p e r s o n a l i t i e s , "  while also d i s c r im i ­
nat ing
between what in western legacy i s  b en ef ic ia l  and what i s  un­
s u i t a b l e  fo r  us and s im i la r ly  in our own her itage  and ways of 
l i f e  how much tha t  is obsole te  needs to be discarded and what 
should be preserved because of i t s  continuing re levance,  u t i l ­
i t y  and beauty. . . .  We must s t r i v e  to  c r ^ e  new in te rn a ­
t i o n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and reform e x is t in g  ones.
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The Anti- Imper ial ism Worldview Perspective
Like the preceding c u l tu ra l  autonomy asser t ion  perspective ,  
t h i s  perspective  also conceptualizes  nonalignment in a somewhat nar­
rower sense in th a t  i t  views i t  simply as an anti - imperia li sm phenome­
non .
F a r e r ' s  (1975) concep tu a l iz a t io n ,  for example, f i t s  in to  th is  
perspective  in th a t  he views the nonaligned countr ies  as being "linked 
by a s ingle  world view, a kind of ideology, which imparts to them an 
in tense  emotional coherence" and which in turn is  shaped "by a special  
h i s t o r i c a l  experience to produce a d i s t i n c t  amalgam" of ideas,  "which 
can most usefu l ly  be described as the developing s ta t e s  in f a c t  
describe  i t :  ' an t i co lo n ia l i sm .
However, i t  must a lso  be noted th a t  Parer appears to under­
stand the word "co lon iza t ion ,"  f o r  the  purpose of his study, not in a 
de ju re  sense.  His understanding of a colonial  phenomenon i s  not
l im i ted  to formal/ legal  control  of a soc ie ty  by a foreign power, but 
r a th e r  in i t s  de fac to  sense in t h a t  such a r e a l i t y  does ex i s t  
though not being lega l ly  i n s t i t u t e d .  Therefore ,  P a r e r ’s understanding 
of th is  phenomenon seems very c lose  to how Kwame Nkrumah, a major th e ­
o r e t i c i a n  on the phenomenon of neo-colonia l ism, understood t h i s  phe­
nomenon. For example, to Nkrumah a "Colony i s  an economic-poli t ical
108term, not a legal one."
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The In te rn a t io n a l  Collective Bargaining 
Framework Perspective
This perspec t ive  views the essence of nonalignment as being a 
framework fo r  in te rn a t io n a l  co l lec t ive  bargaining by a group of coun­
t r i e s .  I t  is  through t h i s  perspective  th a t  Graham (1981) sees non- 
alignment "as a focus of Third World pressure on key p o l i t i c a l  and eco­
nomic i s su e s , "  and "as a coordinating and lobbying tool in the United 
l O QNations system." Also,  to Howe (1975), nonalignment i s  the "idea 
of poor-country s o l i d a r i t y , "  which has moved from tha t  of s tee r ing  
c lea r  of bloc p o l i t i c s  to th a t  of focusing "on the ob ject ive  of ob ta in ­
ing a b e t t e r  share in the materia l  benef it s  from man’s economic a c t iv -  
i t , . . 110
Jones (1980) even more fo rce fu l ly  asserted the essence of non- 
alignment as being a framework for  in te rna t iona l  bargaining by p o s i t ­
ing th a t  some nonaligned countr ies  tha t  have acquired soph is t i ca ted  
technica l  know-how, fo r  example, in the  area of nuclear science and 
technology, ac tua l ly  press  such knowledge into use for helping the 
nonaligned group in t h e i r  task of bargaining with the developed world. 
Thus, he notes th a t  the
nuclear-capable  LDCs are b e t t e r  equipped to challenge the tech ­
n ical  arguments and policy  pos it ions  of developed s t a t e s  on 
equal terms, and to  organize coa l i t ions  of less  expert  LDCs on 
m at te rs ,  of common i n t e r e s t  in in te rna t iona l  negotia ting  
fora.^^^
To some l ik e  Singhara (1976), the idea of nonalignment as an in ­
te rn a t io n a l  c o l l e c t iv e  bargaining framework is so real th a t  he sees
the nonaligned coun t r ies  as having even succeeded in g loba l iz ing  a
112trade  union m en ta l i ty .  Thus, he a sse r t s  that
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The Non-aligned Movement has developed what can be broadly 
descr ibed as a trade union s t r a teg y  in dealing with c a p i t a l i s t  
na tions  of the world,
and has,  th e re fo re ,  " e s s e n t i a l l y  advanced a trade union bargaining pro-
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cess onto a global l e v e l . "
The Global P o l i t i c a l  Economy Perspective
Through t h i s  pe rspec t ive ,  the  essence of nonalignment i s  th a t  
of a phenomenon th a t  in te r fa c e s  the global economic and p o l i t i c a l  r e a l ­
i t i e s  with the assumption th a t  the perception of such in te r f a c in g  pro­
vides a more adequate way of dealing with global r e a l i t i e s .  However, 
i t  i s  important to d i f f e r e n t i a t e  t h i s  perspective from the to ta l  so­
c ia l  r e a l i t y  and the in te rna t iona l  c o l l e c t iv e  bargaining framework p e r ­
s p e c t iv e s .  The former, p r im ar i ly ,  conceptualizes nonalignment as a 
phenomenon tha t  deals with in te rna t iona l  r e a l i t y  as a matrix of 
in te rconnectedness  of a l l  global r e a l i t i e s  in all contexts (and thus 
unlike  t h i s  pe rspec t ive ,  i t  does not r e s t r i c t  i t s e l f  to the in te rcon ­
nectedness of global p o l i t i c a l  and economic r e a l i t i e s ) .  Also the l a t ­
t e r  see the essence of nonalignment, p r imari ly ,  as an in te rna t iona l  
c o l l e c t i v e  bargaining framework.
Nworah (1977), in try ing to analyze how African countr ie s  deal 
with in te rna t iona l  issues in t h e i r  region seems to r e f l e c t  t h i s  pe r ­
spec t ive  since he views t h e i r  act ions  in economic and p o l i t i c a l  areas 
as in t e r fa c in g  to make one whole action a p p r o a c h . T h u s ,  he saw 
these  countr ies  as focusing on the "serious  needs of regional economic 
co-opera t ion and national welfare ,  and the more urgent problems of
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colonialism on the con t in en t , "  and th e re fo re ,  saw th e i r  approach as 
" s t r a t e g i c a l l y  more rewarding.
The Global Economy Reordering Policy Perspective
Through t h i s  perspective  nonalignment i s  seen as a framework 
fo r  the reorder ing  of the ex is t ing  in te rn a t io n a l  economic r e a l i t y  sys­
tem. The nonalignment concept i s  thus  seen as guiding and inspir ing  
the whole gamut of ford,  f a c i l i t i e s ,  and platforms c reated  or u t i l i z e d  
by the members of the nonaligned countr ies  to work fo r  a new in te rn a ­
t iona l  economic order th a t  will  be more equ i tab le  than the present g lo­
bal economic s t a tu s  quo, which they perceive as p a r t i c u l a r l y  unfa i r  
and unjust  to  them.
However, i t  also seems necessary to d i f f e r e n t i a t e  t h i s  perspec­
t iv e  from the to t a l  socia l  r e a l i t y ,  in t e rn a t io n a l  c o l l e c t iv e  bargain­
ing,  and global p o l i t i c a l  economy pe rsp ec t iv e s .  The f i r s t  is con­
cerned with deal ing with in te rna t iona l  r e a l i t y  as a matrix of r e l a t e d ­
ness of a l l  r e a l i t i e s  in a ll  contexts ,  the second with in te rna t iona l  
c o l l e c t iv e  bargaining process ,  and the t h i r d  with dealing with i n t e rn a ­
tiona l  r e a l i t y  as an in t e r fa c e  of economic and p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t i e s .  
This perspective  sees the essence of nonalignment, s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  as
the reordering of the in te rna t iona l  economic r e a l i t y .  Thus, in r e ­
gard to the a c t i v i t i e s  of the nonaligned c o u n t r i e s ,  Mortimer (1980) 
notes tha t  "Not only was the rh e to r ic  regarding the in te rna t iona l  eco­
nomic system becoming more m i l i t an t  but a s t r a t e g y  fo r  implementing 
economic change was more f u l l y  spelled  out."^^®
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To Mphaisa (1983), the "Collec tive  economic depr ivation v i s -  
a -v i s  former colonial  powers seems to be the"^^^ glue th a t  binds 
the nonaligned countr ies  of Asia and Africa in t h e i r  pu rsu i t  of the r e ­
ordering of in te rna t iona l  economic i n s t i t u t i o n s  and processes ,  and i t  
was in th i s  sense th a t  Ind ira  Gandhi implored these  countr ies  to
influence the world economic fo rces  in such a way th a t  develop­
ing na t ions ,  e spec ia l ly  those in Asia,  Africa^,«Latin America 
and Caribbean can overcome t h e i r  poverty .  . . .
There i s  also the view which a s s e r t s  th a t  the focus on the 
need to reorder the in te rna t iona l  economic r e a l i t y  was mostly due to 
the des i re  by the nonaligned countr ies  to have something they can use 
as a r a l ly in g  i s sue .  Jayaramu (1982) f e e l s  t h a t  these  co u n t r ie s '  g iv ­
ing p r i o r i t y  to the is sue  of change in the in t e rn a t io n a l  economic r e l a ­
t io n s  "was a natural  coro l la ry  to the f a c t  th a t  by the seven t ies ,  de­
colon iza t ion  as a p o l i t i c a l  ob jec t ive  was nearing complete achieve- 
119ment." However, people l ike  Nyerere hold the view tha t  the non- 
al igned c o u n t r i e s '  des i re  to change global economic r e a l i t i e s  is  more 
due to the des i re  to be t ru ly  sovereign: thus ,  he a s s e r t s  tha t  "Depen­
dence, whether i t  be economic or m i l i t a r y ,  reduces the r e a l i t y  of our 
freedom," and, th e re fo re ,  "The purpose of non-alignment is  to increase
IPO
th a t  r e a l i t y . "  More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  he a s s e r t s  tha t
The ul t imate  incompat ib i l i ty  of extreme poverty and eco­
nomic dependence on the one s id e ,  and equal freedom fo r  all
sovereign nations on the o th e r ,  l i e s  behind the demand fo r  a 
New In te rna t iona l  Economic Order,  a demand which was f i r s t  a r ­
t i c u l a t e d  in an organized faon (although not under tha t  t i t l e )  
a t  a nonaligned conference.
Volkov (1970) sees the demand fo r  a new in te rna t iona l  economic
order as involving the " re s t ruc tu r ing  of the whole system of e x p lo i ta -
122t i v e  r e l a t i o n s  within the world c a p i t a l i s t  economy," while
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Sofahanlal Mookerjea be l ieves  tha t  "the v i a b i l i t y  of the non-aligned 
coun t r ie s ,  in d iv idua l ly  as well as c o l l e c t i v e ly ,  mainly depends on how 
f a r  and how best  can they  fo s te r  a new in te rna t iona l  economic
o r d e r . " 1 2 3
To Edogun (1981), th e  very exis tence of a phenomenon l i ke  non- 
alignment i s  the r e a l i t y  of contemporary in te rna t iona l  economic r e l a ­
t ions  since he sees the fo rm er 's  "major ra ison d ' e t r e " as being "the
124gross in e q u i t i e s  in in te rn a t io n a l  economic r e l a t i o n s h ip s . "
There are a lso  views th a t  ind ica te  th a t  the change desired by 
the nonaligned coun t r ie s ,  in  order to  co r rec t  the aforesa id  inequi­
t i e s ,  are not merely the p u r s u i t  of reforms, but the pursu i t  of a fun­
damental reorder ing of the na ture  of the e n t i r e  in te rna t iona l  economic 
r e l a t i o n s .  For example, to Abdelaziz Boutefl ika ,  the Algerian Foreign 
Minis ter ,  the goal of those countr ies  pursuing the c rea t ion  of a new 
in te rna t iona l  economic order
is  not . . . j u s t  a m a t te r  of providing access to markets and 
correc t ing  p r ice  formation mechanisms in order to reduce the 
s ize  of f l u c tu a t io n s  in the  p r ices  of products exported by the 
developing countr ies  bu t ,  r a th e r ,  of transforming a l l  the work­
ings of in te rn a t io n a l  t r a d e ,
and tha t  th i s  so r t  of goal
presupposes a new type of re la t io n sh ip  in which concerted ac­
t ion and some degree of planning on the in te rna t iona l  sca le  
are s u b s t i tu ted  fo r  the so-ca l led  laws of supply and demand, 
which, in r e a l i t y ,  merely r e f l e c t  an imposed re la t io n sh ip  
based on the re spec t ive  st rengths  of the s e l l e r  and buyer.
There are numerous in te rna t iona l  fora  and bodies through which 
e f f o r t s  are made a t  r e s t ru c tu r in g  the in te rna t iona l  economic r e l a ­
t ions ;  and many perceive most of them as being formally,  or informally
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p ar t  of the nonaligned group. The fac t  tha t  the members of the l a t t e r
mostly c o n s t i t u t e  these fo ra  and bodies even make some to accept the
exis tence of such r e l a t io n s h ip s  among these bodies as given. To some,
l ik e  Gupta (1981), these bodies are even seen as the nonaligned group
in an economic context .  To him, "the Group of 77, which has come up
in recent y ea r s ,  i s  the economic counterpar t  of the non-aligned
group," and the two groups la rg e ly  overlap; and the s p i r i t  with which
126they funct ion i s  very much the same.
Another angle to t h i s  pursu i t  of a new in te rna t iona l  economic 
order is  the assumption th a t  the nature of the contemporary order i s  
not immortal, and also t h a t  i t  is  inherent ly  unsound. To Kerim 
(1977), for example.
The ever deeper c r i s i s  of the ex is t ing  in te rna t iona l  eco­
nomic order and the d i s in te g ra t io n  of c e r ta in  of i t s  parts  
(for  example, the in t e rn a t io n a l  monetary system),  while con­
firming the h i s to r i c a l  obsoleteness of the conception upon 
which the system was founded, has g rea t ly  contributed to 
s trengthening awareness among the progressive ranks of mankind 
tha t  the problem of bridging the gap between developed and de­
veloping coun t r ie s  can only be l a s t i n g ly  resolved through a 
radical  rev is ion  of the e x i s tÿ ig ,  and establishment of a new 
in te rn a t io n a l  economic o rder .
Kerim also does express some optimism th a t  the r e s t ru c tu r in g  of the
ex is t ing  world economic order has somehow, though slowly, s ta r ted  due
128"primari ly  to the persevering a c t i v i t i e s  of the . . . nonaligned"
coun t r ie s .  E s s e n t i a l l y ,  he sees these a c t i v i t i e s  as having spurred
the in te rn a t io n a l  community to take "decisive s teps in iden t i fy ing  the
insurmountable problems inherent  in the ex i s t in g  system," and that  the
world "has s t a r t e d  out along the road to the construct ion of a new in-
i p g
t e rna t iona l  o rd e r . "
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The Foreign Policy S tra tegy  Perspective
Through t h i s  pe rspec t ive ,  nonalignment is  conceptualized p r i ­
marily as a foreign po licy  o r i e n ta t io n  which encases a p a r t i c u l a r  man­
ner of designing and planning ac t ions  in order to achieve some s ta ted  
goa ls .  Vasudevan (1983), fo r  example, sees nonalignment as "a foreign 
po licy  approach, a means to an end."^^^ Also, i t  seems tha t  Kwame 
Nkrumah was conceptual iz ing i t  in the same way when he ca l led  fo r  "a
new and vigorous approach to the problem of peace and war."^^^
Rana (1980) seems to accept t h i s  concep tua l iza t ion  of nonalign­
ment as the most adequate way of perceiv ing the phenomenon; thus ,  to
him i t  is  more sens ib le  to carry out "a carefu l a n a ly t ica l  review of
13?nonalignment as a foreign  policy s t r a t e g y . "  Some, l ike  Kumar
(1980),  even imply th a t  nonalignment i s  j u s t  one of the s t r a t e g i e s  
ava i lab le  to the developing world, and thus he a s s e r t s  th a t  "They have 
t r i e d  various diplomatic s t r a t e g i e s  to safeguard t h e i r  s e c u r i t y , "  and 
th a t  "Non-alignment has been one of them."^^3
The nature of the in te rn a t io n a l  system is  a lso  seen by some as 
influenc ing the adoption of nonalignment as a foreign  policy s t ra teg y .  
For example, Rothstein (1975) sees such an approach to foreign  policy 
as a "response to a p a r t i c u l a r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of power between the great  
powers.
The Opportunis tic  Foreign Policy  Perspective
Like the above foreign policy  s t r a teg y  pe rsp ec t iv e ,  t h i s  per­
spective  sees nonalignment as a type of foreign  policy  approach, but 
i t  sees i t  as pr im ari ly  a foreign pol icy  of opportunism.
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Through t h i s  pe rspec t ive ,  nonalignment is  seen as the foreign 
policy of some developing countr ies  which aim, p r im ar i ly ,  a t  serving 
th e i r  own immediate i n t e r e s t s .  Addi t iona l ly ,  another major s trand of 
th i s  perspec t ive  i s  the perception th a t  the upholding of the i n t e g r i t y  
of some declared p r in c ip l e s ,  in the course of foreign policy conduct,  
does not augur as a p r i o r i t y  ob l iga t ion  to those subscr ibing to th i s  
pol icy ,  since  the essence of the  po l icy  i s  the a b i l i t y  to be f l e x ib l e  
enough in order to achieve i t s  function of maximizing the s e l f - i n t e r ­
es ts  of  the countr ies concerned. Therefore ,  as a co ro l la ry ,  t h i s  con­
cep tua l iza t ion  of nonalignment assumes tha t  the nonaligned c o u n t r i e s '  
major fo re ign  policy  goals do not include those goals tha t  aim a t  pro­
viding or promoting con tr ibu t ions  to the improvement of in te rn a t io n a l  
community as a whole, or some aspects  or pa r ts  of  i t  (of course,  un­
less  such actions  mean the promotion of t h e i r  s e l f - i n t e r e s t s  too).^^^
In a p rac t ica l  sense, and within the context of contemporary 
superpowers bloc p o l i t i c s ,  t h i s  perspec t ive  sees nonaligned countr ies  
as out to play the game of playing the blocs agains t  each o th e r ,  and 
always looking to seek out ways to maximize the i r  benef i t s  from the in­
te rna t iona l  system, through the gray and muddy areas  of c o n f l i c t s  and 
s t i f f  competition between the b locs .
Crabb (1955), f o r  example, observed th a t  the
Nonaligned countr ies have been accused of  " s t radd l ing  the 
fence"  d ip lomat ica l ly ,  of o p p o r tu n i s t i c a l ly  seeking the "best  
of both worlds ," or of merely endeavoring to "play off  Washing­
ton against  Moscow (or Peking)."
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However, he was of the opinion th a t  the above view of the nonaligned 
countr ies  was le ss  than adequate in understanding what nonalignment 
was a l l  about.
Liska (1958),  on the other hand, held the view th a t  the non- 
al igned countr ies  a c tu a l ly  "engaged in active  po licy  of p lay -o ff  and
1 OQ
u n so l ic i ted  mediation between the grea t  powers." Stremlau (1980) 
a lso  suggested t h a t ,  even while try ing  to take advantage of blocs com­
p e t i t i o n ,  the nonaligned countr ies  avoided strong l inks  to any of the 
superpower blocs;  t h u s ,  he notes tha t  behind the minds of the founders 
of nonalignment was the notion of opening "up g rea te r  oppor tuni t ies  to 
take advantage of the  Soviet-American competition while avoiding an 
id e n t i t y  with e i t h e r  side."^^^
However, Idang (1973), though acknowledging tha t  some "regard 
non-alignment merely as a p ro f i t a b l e  short -term Machiavell ian s tra tegy  
employed by the new African s t a t e s  to enjoy the bes t  of both sides in 
the curren t  East-West c o n f l i c t , "  a s s e r t s  t h a t .
Non-alignment as a technique or a basis fo r  the conduct of 
foreign r e l a t i o n s  ( p a r t i c u l a r ly  with the great  power b locs)  im­
p l i e s  more l o f t y  idea l s  than mere s e l f i s h ,  diplomatic maneuver­
ing of playing one major power agains t  another.
The Global Input of a Regional Ideology 
(Pan-Africanism) Perspective
In t h i s  p e rspec t ive ,  nonalignment is  conceptual ized as the 
global m an ife s ta t ion ,  or even equ iva len t ,  of a regional ideology 
(which in t h i s  case i s  Pan-Africanism). Therefore,  through th i s  pe r ­
spec t ive ,  the augmenting and safeguarding of sovereignty and p o l i t i c a l
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v i a b i l i t y ,  the developing of be t te r  socio-economic cond i t ions ,  the fo s ­
t e r in g  of cont inenta l  unity ,  and the ensuring and safeguarding of 
social  j u s t i c e  in Africa (which are the goals of Pan-Africanism) are 
represented a t  the global level by the phenomenon of nonalignment, 
which is assumed by the proponents of t h i s  view to share the same 
goals with the former.
Nkrumah (1975), for example, when noting th a t
. . . the  th ree  basic  aims of Ghana's foreign policy are
African independence, African unity ,  and the maintenance of 
world peace through a policy of p o s i t ive  neutra lism and non- 
alignment,
a lso added th a t  "The th i r d  aim i s  c lose ly  assoc ia ted  with the other 
two.
An Organization of African Unity (GAU) statement i s  also 
quoted as p o s i t in g  tha t  the nonalignment phenomenon "offers  an ade­
quate framework f o r  the e f fe c t iv e  mobil ization of the countr ies  of the
Third World, and for the concrete af f irmation  of t h e i r  s o l i d a r i t y  in
favor of Africa cause ."  Thus, th i s  view sees nonalignment mainly
in terms of how i t  re in fo rces  Pan-Africanism.
For some l ik e  Idang (1973), the notion " tha t  there  i s  a l i nk­
age between non-alignment and African nationalism admits of no debate 
. . . ,"14^  and th i s  view log ica l ly  flows from h is  assumption tha t
for  the nonaligned countr ies  "the primary concern is  not neutra lism
t is  
.145
but national i s m . "144 Therefore,  to him, nonalignmen "an exten
sion of African nationalism to the in te rna t iona l  l e v e l . '
However, i t  must be noted tha t  i f  Pan-Africanism is i n t e r p r e ­
ted as a concept tha t  serves the i n t e r e s t  of one con t inen t ,  f i r s t  and 
foremost, t h i s  perspective  appears to con t rad ic t  some of the above
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perspectives  tha t  tend to emphasize the universal  purpose and goals of 
nonalignment. On the other hand, i f  Pan-Africanism is  in te rp re ted  as 
a concept tha t  emphasizes tha t  p o l i t i c a l ,  economic and cu l tu ra l  prog­
ress  in Africa a lso  mean progress for mankind as a whole (in the sense 
t h a t ,  through increased development, s t a b i l i t y  and cooperation in 
Afr ica ,  th is  progress i s  also assured for a l l  mankind), then Pan- 
Africanism and nonalignment do appear to have much in common.
The Pos i t ion  of Strength Policy Perspect ive
This perspective  sees the essence of nonalignment in a speci­
f i c  procedural manner in the sense th a t  i t  emphasizes a s p e c i f i c  ap­
proach to the atta inment of cer ta in  goa ls .  B as ica l ly ,  t h i s  perspec­
t iv e  views nonalignment as a phenomenon th a t ,  through a pos it ion of 
s t reng th ,  can bring a more sane and ra t iona l  in te rn a t io n a l  r e a l i t y .  
The nonaligned countr ies  are seen as being more able  to bring about a 
more socio-economically progressive ,  and a p o l i t i c a l l y  s tab le  and 
peaceful world, through th e i r  a b i l i t y  to maintain v i s ib l e  and credible  
s trength  with which they can be able to crea te  new global r e a l i t i e s .
Elaigwu (1983) i s  a viv id  exponent of t h i s  way of conceptuali ­
zing n o n a l i g n m e n t . B e i n g  concerned with a more peaceful and a 
less  m i l i t a r ized  in te rn a t io n a l  soc ie ty ,  he sees nonalignment as being 
capable of achieving i t s  vis ions  when the nonaligned countr ies ,  
through a strong m i l i t a r y  pos it ion of t h e i r  own, are able to make the 
world r ea l ize  tha t  the present soph is t ica ted  s t a t e  of m i l i t a r y  technol­
ogy is  not something to be used by some coun t r ie s  to massage th e i r
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national egos,  and play old-t ime m i l i t a r i s t i c  competition and domina­
tion games, to the detriment of mankind. Addi t iona l ly ,  he implied 
tha t  nonalignment, as a philosophy, by being able to create  a more 
peaceful and s tab le  world,  will  also be able to  c re a te  more improved 
socio-economic condi t ions  in the whole world. Thus, he views the pres­
ent e sca la t ing  global arms race as a perplexing r e a l i t y .  Spec if ­
i c a l l y ,  he sees t h i s  r e a l i t y  as creat ing a global s i tu a t io n  in which 
"the choice is  d i f f i c u l t "  and "c ru e l" since " i t  c rea te s  a dilemma for 
leaders to choose between buying guns fo r  survival  or bread fo r  sur­
v iva l . "  While noting th a t  the "arms race d e t r a c t s  from development 
programmes," he be l ieves  th a t  the nonaligned c o u n t r i e s '  advocation of 
"disarmament is  u n r e a l i s t i c . H e  even sees such a view on the 
par t  of the nonaligned countr ies  as not being in consonance with the 
r e a l i t y  of t h e i r  a c t i o n s ,  by observing " that  even some non-aligned
countr ies  who s t a r t e d  out c a l l in g  fo r  disarmament were invest ing heav-
148i l y  on arms themselves and others  had gone nuc lea r . "
Elaigwu's p os i t ion  th a t  the nonaligned countr ies  should arm
themselves more in order to c rea te  a s i tu a t io n  where the whole world
is  brought around to the r a t i o n a l i t y  tha t  weaponry should be scaled
down, seems to be based on the assumption tha t  "The United S ta tes  and
149the Soviet Union . . .  wil l  not disarm." Furthermore, he bases
th i s  assumption. on the view t h a t ,  "Despite i t s  dangers,  advantages of 
arms race fo r  the superpowers are s t i l l  g rea t"  since  he sees such con­
cen t ra t ions  "of the technology of des t ruc t ion"  as enabling them to 
"have an e f f e c t  on the present economic, m i l i t a r y  and social  or- 
der.  . . .15°
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In d i r e c t  bear ing to the phenomenon of nonalignment, he sees
"the i n t e r e s t "  of the  nonaligned coun t r ie s—the " r e s t r u c tu r in g  of the
p o l i t i c a l ,  economic and social  order . . — as "being undermined by
excessive funds invested  in arms race to keep the old order.
Therefore,  he p o s i t s  t h a t  "Only by democratizing nuclear technology
will  the dangers of everybody owning dangerous weapons dawn on the 
15?superpowers." Fur thermore,  he also advocated th a t  nonalignment 
should mean shunning in te rn a t io n a l  frameworks l ik e  the nuclear nonpro­
l i f e r a t i o n  t r e a t y  s ince  such a t r e a t y  " i s  only a mortgage of l i b e r t y  
to nuclear imperialism of a few suzerains who cow others  to in ev i tab le  
subservience.
However, i t  seems th a t  Elaigwu's view of nonalignment was i n ­
fluenced by his view of in te rn a t io n a l  r e a l i t y  as much as by his  des i re  
to provide a r a t iona l  bas is  on which N ige r ia ' s  a sp i r a t i o n s  and a c t i v ­
i t i e s  in the area of  nuclear energy resources can be compatible with 
one of the coun t ry ' s  major foreign  policy p r i n c i p l e s —nonalignment. 
Thus, according to him, "For Nigeria ,  as well as other co u n t r ie s ,  un­
l e ss  the technological  nuclear monopoly of the old i s  broken, there  
will  be no disarmament—only cosmetic attempts.
On the whole, conceptualiz ing nonalignment as a pos i t ion  of 
s trength  policy again p re sen ts  a perspective th a t  runs d i r e c t l y  coun­
t e r  to some other p e r s p ec t iv e s .  S p e c i f ic a l ly ,  i t  tends to counter 
some of the main t h r u s t s  of the in te rna t iona l  r e l a t i o n s  p o s i t ive  inno­
vator perspective  of  conceptualiz ing nonalignment in t h a t  a major 
t h ru s t  of the l a t t e r  perspec t ive  i s  the view th a t  nonalignment i s  an 
in te rna t iona l  phenomenon th a t  t r i e s  to improve the the ways nations
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and people r e l a t e  among themselves by helping to get r i d  of in t e r n a ­
tiona l  act ions  embedded in power p o l i t i c s  notions and other s imi la r  
r e a l i s t  concepts .
The Linking of National Goals with In te rn a t io n a l  
Goals Tool Perspective
This pe rspec t ive  sees the essence of nonalignment as a phenome­
non tha t  provides a bridge for  national i n t e r e s t s  to be pro jected  in 
such a way th a t  they make the in te rna t iona l  goals of a group of coun­
t r i e s  to be compatible,  and thus providing a basis fo r  a more peace­
f u l ,  progressive  and cooperative world.
Kumar (1983), fo r  example, holds the view t h a t ,  as a concept, 
nonalignment does rep resen t  a framework for such na tiona l i n t e r e s t s  
linkage; however, he a lso  contends tha t  in actual m an i fe s t a t ions ,  the 
foreign policy of some nonaligned countr ies  does allow t h e i r  national 
i n t e r e s t s  to be p ro jec ted  in such a way tha t  they are  not adequately 
tuned in with the wave length of the c o l l e c t iv e  in te rn a t io n a l  goals of 
the nonaligned g r o u p . T h u s ,  he holds the pos it ion t h a t
I f  nonalignment i s  to play success fu l ly  i t s  h i s t o r i c  ro le  
in recons t ruc t ing  the in te rna t iona l  p o l i t i c a l  and economic sys­
tem, i t s  well-conceived in te rna t iona l  goals must dominatarand 
override  the shor t - te rm national in t e r e s t s  of i t s  members.
Based on the above main th rus ts  of t h i s  p e r spec t ive ,  i t  can
be in te rp re ted  tha t  nonalignment will have a pos i t ive  impact on the 
in te rna t iona l  system only when the actual actions  of the countr ies  
tha t  subscribe to and support i t  are in conformity with the way th i s
104
perspective conceptua lizes  i t .  And, in p ra c t i c e ,  t h i s  will  mean the 
national i n t e r e s t s  of the  nonaligned countries not being allowed to be 
incompatible with the c o l l e c t i v e  in te rna t iona l  goals of the nonaligned 
group (which i s  th a t  of crea t ing  new and b e t t e r  global p o l i t i c a l ,  
economic and socia l  r e a l i t i e s )  through national i n t e r e s t s  being made 
to be superseded by the c o l l e c t iv e  in te rna t iona l  goa ls .
The Independent In te rna t iona l  I n i t i a t i v e s  and 
Actions Capabil i ty  Perspective
This pe rspec t ive  conceptualizes nonalignment as a c ap a b i l i ty  
phenomenon—the c a p a b i l i t y  of the countr ies ,  th a t  subscribe to t h i s  
concept as t h e i r  foreign policy p r in c ip le ,  to be able to independently 
carry out t h e i r  own in te rna t iona l  i n i t i a t i v e s  and ac t ions .
Some views of Haile Se lass ie  p a r t i c u la r ly  f i t  in to  t h i s  p e r ­
spective  of conceptualiz ing  nonalignment. According to him, to be 
nonaligned is  to be able "to judge actions and p o l ic ie s  objec­
t i v e ly  . . . , "  thus the nonaligned may find themselves "now opposing, 
now suppor ting,  now voting with,  now voting aga ins t ,  f i r s t  the East ,  
next the West." The ult imate  determinant of the course of action 
taken will  then be "the worth of the po l ic ie s  themselves,  and not the 
source of sponsor.
Some aspec ts  of Narayanan's (1981) conceptua l iza t ion  of non- 
alignment f i t  even more in to  th i s  perspective .  He simply a s se r t s  th a t  
"Nonalignment has often been defined as an independent foreign
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1p o l icy ."  Furthermore,  he also sees i t  as "an expression in the 
in te rna t iona l  f i e l d  of the  independent s p i r i t  and the independent judg-
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ment of a n a t io n . "  Nehru, in some of his  views, a lso  sees non- 
alignment through t h i s  perspec t ive .  Thus, when he asked "what does in­
dependence c o n s i s t  of?" he gave the following answer:
I t  c o n s i s t s  fundamentally and b a s ic a l ly  of foreign r e l a ­
t i o n s .  That i s  the t e s t  of independence. All e lse  i s  local 
autonomy. Once foreign r e la t i o n s  go out of your hand, into 
the charge of somebody e l s e ,  to th a t  extent and in th a t  mea­
sure you are not independent . . . Our sole purpose i s  to be 
l e f t  in peace ourselves  to solve our problems,and, where poss i ­
b le ,  to help and cooperate with o ther people.
The National Sovereignty Guarantor Perspective
While the above independent in t e rn a t io n a l  i n i t i a t i v e s  and ac­
t ions  c a p a b i l i ty  perspective  views the essence of nonalignment in 
terms of the a b i l i t y  to exerc ise  independence mainly, though not exclu­
s iv e ly ,  in the narrow area of foreign po l icy ,  t h i s  perspective  views 
nonalignment in a broader sense—as the guarantor of national sover­
eignty  in a general  sense.
Misra (1981), f o r  example, holds the view th a t
Non-alignment was chosen to be an inst rument or a means of 
foreign pol icy  by i t s  founders l ik e  India in order to give 
f u l l e r  meaning and content to t h e i r  newly achieved p o l i t i c a l  
independence,  . . .
s ince he saw these  countr ies  as not being
. . . con tent with j u s t  formal t r a n s f e r  of p o l i t i c a l  power: 
they wanted to go beyond and shape th e i r  des t iny  autonomously 
and in a manner which protected and promoted t h e i r  national 
i n t e r e s t  which lay e s s e n t i a l ly  in acce lera ted  socio-economic 
development of t h e i r  weak and backward s o c i e t i e s .
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oosip Broz T i to ,  the l a t e  Yugoslav leader ,  a lso  paid much a t ­
ten t ion  to the socio-economic dimension of a country being able to 
guard i t s  national sovereignty .  He tended to see the socio-economic 
aspect as being fundamental in na ture ,  and reasoned th a t
As long as the re  are undeveloped c o u n t r ie s ,  the aggressive 
forces  will endeavour to  subordinate and exp lo i t  them. The 
more developed a country becomes, the l e s s e r  wil l  be the p o s s i ­
b i l i t i e s  of i t s  su b jec t ion .  Accordingly,  there  are two tenden­
c ies  in the world today: one d i rec ted  toward the subjection
of undeveloped c o u n t r i e s ,  and the other d i rec ted  towards a use­
ful  understanding among the nations  and prevention of h o s t i l ­
i t i e s .  For t h i s  reason I consider i t  to be most r a t io n a l  fo r  
progressive  fo r c e s  to  jo in  in defense and development of the 
most underdeveloped coun t r ie s .  I can see no o the r  p o s s i b i l ­
i t i e s .
However, to  him, meaningful development meant th a t  which was car r ied  
out mainly by each country ,  with cooperation with o ther countr ies  con­
sidered a useful but not an indispensable  phenomenon. In the case of 
Yugoslavia, Tito sa id  tha t  such an approach was s t e a d f a s t l y  held; 
t h e re fo re ,  to him, Yugoslavia "will  p re fe r  to  be naked i f  necessary
. . . un t i l  we are  capable of crea t ing  with our own c ap a c i t i e s  what- 
162ever we need ."
To S ara jc ic  (1981), the phenomenon of nat ional sovereignty is  
seen not only as having a strong r e l a t io n s h ip  with economic r e a l i t y ,  
but the l a t t e r  i s  seen as the paramount r e a l i t y  impacting on the 
former. Thus, while being "Conscious th a t  th e re  can be no absolute  in ­
dependence," and t h a t  "nat ions are s t rugg l ing  fo r  real  in te rdepend­
ence,"  he added t h a t
The main i s su e  of t h i s  na tional s t rugg le  i s  p o l i t i c a l ,  eco­
nomic, and c u l tu r a l  freedom, with economic emancipation as 
t h e i r  central  concern.  Being the e s se n t ia l  condition  for  a 
fac tual  and e f f e c t i v e  independence, economic emancipation i s
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the most pronounced issue of the s t rugg le .  From the re q u i re ­
ments fo r  economic and real  p o l i t i c a l  l i b e ra t io n  have devel­
oped the fundamental determinations r e j e c t i n g  the doc tr ines  of 
" r e l a t i v e  sovere ign ty ,"  and l imited  national  independence 
throÿg^ "global interdependence," "natural  a l l i a n c e s , "
As a Yugoslav schola r ,  the r e a l i t y  of h is  c oun t ry ' s  nat ional  
experience might have helped to sharpen his  views on national sover­
e ignty .  An adequate understanding of the h i s t o r i c a l  experience of the 
smaller national groups in Central and Eastern Europe, over the centu­
r i e s ,  makes one apprec ia te  how th i s  sor t  of concern dominates the a t ­
ten t ion  of Yugoslavs (even more so in view of t h e i r  contemporary e f ­
f o r t s  to susta in  t h e i r  national sovereignty  and maintain an autonomous 
i d e n t i t y  within a geo p o l i t i c a l  area dominated by the Warsaw Pact a l l i ­
ance).  I t  is  no su rp r i s e  tha t  Yugoslavs, l ike  Sa ra jc ic ,  see "The pro­
tec t ion  of nat ional  independence,  sovereignty and the r i g h t  of each 
country to opt for  t h e i r  own socio-economic, p o l i t i c a l  and cu l tu ra l  de­
velopment without in t e r f e r e n c e ”^®^, as "representing the cen t ra l  com­
mitment and platform of the non-aligned countr ies  . . . of
which Yugoslavia, i t s e l f ,  is  a pioneer and a leading member.
I n t e r e s t i n g ly ,  an overal l  evaluat ion of the e f fec t iveness  of 
the nonalignment po l icy  which Yugoslavia has s t e a d f a s t l y  adhered to ,  
according to Mazrui (1980),  has been demonstrated to be very p o s i t iv e .  
According to him, " T i t o ' s  e f f o r t  to prevent or avoid Soviet  domination 
without f a l l i n g  in to  the arms of the Western embrace was a c l a s s i c  
dramatization of susta ined  non-alignment."
This way of conceptual iz ing nonalignment (as a guarantor of na­
tional sovereignty) i s  also evident in W i l l e t ' s  (1978) work. He sees
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nonalignment as being synonymous with the phenomenon of national 
sovereignty in the developing world. To him, "Non-alignment i s , "  
simply, "the a sse r t io n  of s t a t e  sovereignty in Afro-Asia."^®^
In connection with the manifestat ion of nonalignment in
Guinea, Ademolekun (1977) a lso  supports th i s  view. He noted tha t
A most f a s c in a t in g  i l l u s t r a t i o n  of the complex pa t te rn  
th a t  Guinean foreign policy sometimes assumed was the i n t e r a c ­
tion between developments in the domestic and in te rn a t io n a l  
p o l i t i c a l  scenes tha t  made possible  the dramatic demonstra­
t io n s  of p o s i t iv e  n e u t r a l i t y  (based on the doc tr ine  of na­
tiona l  independence) . .
Bel isaro  Betancur,  the President of Colombia, even gave the
reason of sovereignty  p ro tec tion  as the fuel th a t  drove i t s  des i re  to 
become a nonaligned country. In ear ly  1983, j u s t  before his coun­
t r y ' s  formal admission in to  the nonaligned group, he noted th a t  i t s
. . . proposal to jo in  the non-aligned group is  an af fi rmat ion 
of sovereignty and a search for new forums, fo r  new p a r tn e r ­
ships with those who have problems s im i la r  to Colombia's.
I t ' s  a question of not being a s a t e l l i t e  of any ope power cen­
te r  and of maintaining our own power of dec i s io n .
Another head of s t a t e ,  Saddam Hussein of I r aq ,  echoed similar 
views. While noting t h a t ,  "Every great  power t h a t  is given the oppor­
tun i ty  to turn  i t s  r e l a t i o n s  of f r iendship  into another kind of r e l a ­
t ionsh ip  will  do so ,"  and hoping " tha t  in the Arab world there  will  be 
no s a t e l l i t e s  fo r  the Americans or the Soviets . . . , "  he sees non- 
alignment as "a d e f i n i t e  guarantee of independence.
For the r e l a t i v e l y  le ss  powerful c o u n t r i e s ,  nonalignment was 
seen by Nehru as an appropr ia te  policy; thus ,  according to Appadorai 
(1981), some of h is  statements implied th a t  "a non-aligned and m i l i t a ­
r i l y  weak country can hope to maintain i t s  t e r r i t o r i a l  in teg r i ty . "^^ ^
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However, according to Appodorai, the  Indo-China c o n f l i c t  led Nehru to
augment m i l i t a r y  power as a complementary, and more r e a l i s t i c ,  means
172of p ro tec t ing  I n d ia ' s  sovereignty .
Never theless,  many scholars  s t i l l  hold the view th a t  nonalign­
ment was seen by Nehru as a paramount guarantor of I n d i a ' s  sover­
e ign ty .  According to Damodaran (1983), "There was no doubt from the 
very beginning in Nehru's mind th a t  the essence of independence lay in
the a b i l i t y  of the  . . . Indian s t a t e  to take decis ions  f r ee  of any ex-
173t e rn a l  in f lu en ce ,"  and also t h a t  in h is  " th inking ,  non-alignment 
was in timate ly  r e l a t e d  to the safeguarding of I n d i a ' s  own honour and 
i n t e r e s t s . T o  Sukarno, the former Indonesian le ader ,  the concep­
t u a l i z a t i o n  of nonalignment as a guarantor of na tional sovereignty  was 
even having a contagious e f f e c t :
The experiences of one country in discovering th a t  a p o l ­
icy of non-alignment is  the  b e s t  guarantee for safeguarding 
our national in te rna t iona l  pos i t ion  b a ^  undoubtedly helped 
o thers  to  come to a s imi la r  conclusion.
Some, l i k e  Narayanan (1981), add some novel fea tu re s  to the na­
t io n a l  sovereignty guarantor perspec t ive  of nonalignment.^^® While 
agreeing tha t
The core of the policy of nonalignment cons is t s  in a coun­
t r y ' s  urge to  safeguard i t s  independence, nat ional i n t e g r i t y ,  
and national i n t e r e s t s  and in i t s  freedom to choose i t s  own 
path in in te rnal development and external p o l i c i e s ,
and t h a t .
The nonaligned coun tr ies  toge ther  may id e n t i fy  c o l o n i a l ­
ism, imperialism, hegemonism, e t c . ,  as t h r e a t s  to t h e i r  inde ­
pendence.
he fu r th e r  p o s i t s  th a t .
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Each country has to deal with i t s  s p ec i f i c  t h r e a t  percep­
t io n s  and o r i e n t  i t s  polic^v^ accordingly within the general 
framework of non-alignment.
Thus, he defends some nonaligned countr ies  which develop close  r e l a ­
t ionsh ips  with a superpower:
To deny the r i g h t  of such d i f f e r in g  o r i e n ta t io n  in p o l i ­
c ies  to d i f f e r e n t  non-aligned coun tr ies  would be to deny them 
the r ig h t  of independent appra isa l  of t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  , ^ d  to 
reduce non-alignment to  an a b s t r ac t  generalized concept.
However, i t  must be noted tha t  Narayanan's conceptua l iza t ion  of non-
alignment again presents  a case where a perspective  of nonalignment
c o n f l i c t s  with o ther  pe rspec t ives .  His view, in p a r t i c u l a r ,  c o n f l i c t s
with some of the views of the proponents of the equ id is tance  from the
superpower b locs ,  and the avoidance of alignment with the superpower
blocs po l icy ,  pe rspec t ives  (presented above).
An Overview
The variance and d i f ferences  among the  above various concep­
tual  pe rspec t ives  of nonalignment shows i t s  conceptual d i f f i c u l t y .  
The u n s e t t l in g  conceptual p ro f i l e  of nonalignment i s  fu r th e r  empha­
sized by the f a c t  tha t  a lo t  of in d iv id u a ls ,  in a s ing le  study or 
s ta tement,  or in various studies or on various occasions,  have concep­
tu a l iz ed  nonalignment in many various perspec tives  (as can be not iced 
in the above analyses of each of the  above p e r s p e c t iv e s ) ,  and th a t  in 
some cases the various perspectives  through which an individual con­
cep tualized  the phenomenon may s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r  among themselves.
I l l
Nonalignment, obviously,  i s  not a c lear and concise concept,  
nor an idea handed down by one person. Instead i t  i s  one th a t  deve l ­
oped as a r e s u l t  of the shared a sp i r a t io n s  and goals of most of the  
coun t r ies  in A fr ica ,  Asia,  and to a l e s s e r  ex ten t ,  Latin America. An 
important f e a tu re  of the development of the concept i s  the f a c t  t h a t  
the  world leaders  who la id  i t s  foundation did not see any need fo r  a 
s i n g l e ,  i ron -c lad  d e f in i t io n  of th i s  phenomenon. Possibly  they f e l t  
t h a t  t h e i r  a s p i r a t i o n s  and goals were close  enough and c lea r ly  under­
stood by a l l  the  nonaligned coun t r ie s ,  and thus d id  not feel  the need 
fo r  a formal d e f in i t io n  of nonalignment. Another p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  t h a t  
i t  might have been more expedient for the various nonaligned coun t r ie s  
not to  be concerned about the need for a r ig id  d e f i n i t i o n ,  thus a llow­
ing themselves more f l e x i b i l i t y  to i n t e r p r e t  nonalignment in ways more 
convenient to them. However, the manifesta tions  of the nonalignment 
phenomenon tend to indica te  th a t  the above two explanations  combine to  
explain  the absence of i t s  formal d e f in i t io n  s in ce ,  as a phenomenon, 
i t  continues  to  have s ig n i f i c a n t  relevance in r a l l y in g  a ll  the non- 
a ligned coun tr ies  to achieve common in te rna t iona l  goals ,  and i t  a l so  
has exh ib i ted  s ig n i f i c a n t  v a r ia t io n s  and changes in how the nonaligned 
c o u n t r ie s ,  in m u l t i l a t e r a l  and u n i l a t e r a l  in te rn a t io n a l  i n i t i a t i v e s  
and a c t io n s ,  conceptualize  i t .  Thus, i t  is  in t h i s  sense tha t  the e f ­
f o r t s  by some to deduce the concept of nonalignment so le ly  from the 
d ec la ra t io n s  and statements issued by the various nonaligned co n fe r ­
ences and summits may be inadequate because such dec la ra t ions  and 
statements  are more of ten a r e s u l t  of s ig n i f i c a n t  e f f o r t s  to a r r ive  a t  
p o s i t ions  th a t  are acceptable to most members of an organizat ion made
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up of about a hundred countr ies  by 1983. Expectedly, such pos i t ions  
th a t  are found t o  be acceptable to most members in a very la rge group 
are often not synonymous to  the true idea l s  on which the ex is tence  of 
the group r e s t s .  Furthermore,  th i s  so r t  of reasoning may be but­
t re s sed  by the f a c t  tha t  a concept i s  often s ig n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  
from the actual course of action tha t  is car r ied  out in an e f f o r t  to 
t r a n s l a t e  the concept into r e a l i t y ,  though they are of ten close  enough 
to be seen as being a manifestation in r e a l i t y  of the concept (and 
r e a l i t y ,  as a lready noted above, is  not expected to r e p l i c a t e  th e o r e t ­
ical  c o n s t r u c t io n ,  but only to adequately approximate i t ,  in order to 
be considered as a manifestat ion in r e a l i t y  of a said th eo re t ic a l  con­
s t r u c t i o n ) .
Therefore ,  the major trends of  the pos i t ions  of the various 
nonaligned summits, analyzed below, may be seen as only providing 
part  of the  knowledge needed to understand the concept of nonalign­
ment.
To f u r t h e r  i l l u s t r a t e  the d i f f i c u l t y  of def ining nonalignment,
as l a t e  as 1983, Nyerere, a leading statesman in the nonaligned group
since the pioneer ing days, declared t h a t  "The concept of non-alignment
179has never been o f f i c i a l l y  defined."
The " e f f o r t s  to def ine non-alignment . . . based on the analy­
s i s  of the term i t s e l f "  a lso  re s u l t s  in misleading no t ions ,  according
ion
to Mates (1983).  He notes tha t  those who t ry  to understand non-
alignment through such an approach assume
. . . even, unwit t ingly ,  the notion th a t  the name of the 
movement was chosen a f t e r  i t  was conceptually  defined and with 
the g r e a t e s t  care taken to find the  r i g h t  word to describe i t  
as completely as possible
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but th a t  such "did not happen, nor does i t  happen in most cases of a
181s im i la r  na tu re ."  To fu r ther  b u t t r e s s  h i s  view he also notes tha t
In te rna t iona l  movements, organizat ions  and other events or 
developments are given the name, which they t h e r e a f t e r  carry 
and by which they are recognized from ou ts ide ,  l ike  human be­
ings who also receive t h e i r  names before anybody (ÿ^ ld  know 
how they would develop and without t h e i r  being asked.
Therefore ,  "The A t lan t ic  Alliance and i t s  organization NATO includes 
Greece and Turkey, although they are much more remote from the Atlan­
t i c  than,  fo r  ins tance ,  Czechoslovakia," and th a t  "The Warsaw Pact is
183not centered around Warsaw, but Moscow."
Mates notes th a t  the word nonalignment might have been used at 
the 1961 Belgrade Conference due to the tense  cold war atmosphere tha t  
was preva len t  during the conferences.  But, the f a c t  th a t  the p a r t i c i ­
pants  in the conference might have r ig h t ly  paid a t t e n t io n  to the preva­
l e n t  in te rna t iona l  s i t u a t i o n ,  a t  the t ime, did not necessa r i ly  make
such concern the very essence of the a sp i r a t i o n s  and goals tha t
184brought the various countries  toge ther .
This point th a t  Mates makes means th a t  the essence of nonalign­
ment, l ike  with other concepts, cannot be found only in "the term i t -  
185s e l f . "  Therefore,  i t  may be misleading to pr im ari ly  t r y  to under­
stand nonalignment simply as nonalignment.
While in the above sec t ions  there  have been attempts to rein  
in the broad spectrum of the various conceptua l iza t ions  of nonalign­
ment, t h i s  does not mean there have not been s i g n i f i c a n t  conceptual 
c o n t ro v e rs ie s .  Notably, some have viewed nonalignment as being a nega­
t i v e  concept in terms of both i t s  substance and terminology, the main 
argument being tha t  nonalignment was merely a reac t ion  to the global
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power configura tion presented by the Cold War; and also th a t  nonalign­
ment, in terms of i t s  terminology, connotes negativism since  i t  is  a 
negative  noun. However, o the rs  hold the view t h a t ,  on the contra ry ,  
nonalignment both in terms of substance and terminology i s  a pos i t ive  
and ac t ive  concept.  K. P. M isra ' s  view, fo r  example, i s  th a t  most of 
those who hold the opposite  view from him concentrated almost e n t i r e ly  
on understanding nonalignment in terms of global systemic f a c t o r s .  He 
be lieved ,  in s tead ,  th a t  in t e rn a l  dynamics were a lso  very s ig n i f i c a n t  
in how the concept developed; and he sees t h i s  mainly in terms of the 
s e n s i t i v i t y  of most nonaligned countr ies  to t h e i r  pas t  formal control 
by other foreign countr ies  and th e i r  contemporary r e l a t i v e  socio­
economic underdevelopment. Thus, he noted tha t ;
Nonalignment was chosen to be an instrument or a means of
foreign policy  by i t s  founders l ike  India in order to  give 
f u l l e r  meaning and content to t h e i r  newly achieved p o l i t i c a l  
independence. They were not content with j u s t  formal t r a n s f e r  
of p o l i t i c a l  power: they wanted to go beyond and shape t h e i r
des t iny  autonomously and in a manner which pro tec ted  and pro­
moted th e i r  na tional i n t e r e s t s ,  which l a v - e s s e n t i a l l y  in a c c e l ­
e ra ted  socio-economic development . . .
Misra thus a s s e r t s  th a t  "the Cold War was not the sole re fe rence  point
187of  nonalignment," and a lso  not "even a c r i t i c a l  one." To fu r the r
b u t t r e s s  his po in t ,  he noted "the f ac t  tha t  the genesis  of nonalign-
188ment preceded the Cold War" s ince ,  as Subimal Outt observed, "The 
p r in c ip le  of nonalignment . . . was accepted by the Congress at the 
Haripura session (1939)."^^®
Another important observat ion of Misra i s  t h a t ,  l ik e  other con­
c ep ts ,  nonalignment in actual  application  cannot ignore the environ­
ment within which i t  unfolds;  thus ,  "when the Cold War between the two
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Super Powers was in i t s  i n t e n s e s t ,  i t  was log ica l  th a t  the movement
190should give high p r i o r i t y  to  th i s  item on i t s  agenda of work." 
However, according to h is  reasoning, nonalignment addressing i t s e l f  to 
an important global r e a l i t y ,  a t  one p a r t i c u l a r  t ime, should not be mis­
taken to mean th a t  th a t  r e a l i t y  was the essence,  the cause, and the be-
191ginning of the  l a t t e r .
In terms of his view tha t  nonalignment i s  a lso ,  terminolog- 
i c a l l y ,  a p o s i t iv e  concept,  he implores th a t  " i t  is  re levan t  to  con­
sider  the ways of thinking of the Indian people" since according to
192him the  concept "owes i t s  or ig in  to India . . . ."  He does t h i s  
by delving in to  the l i n g u i s t i c  relevances in Indian society;
Even a cursory look at the philosophical  and c i v i l i z a -  
t i o n a l  t r a d i t i o n  in d ica te s  tha t  the Indians have been fond of 
nouns with nega t ives .  I t  is  through negat ive terms tha t  they 
have expressed p o s i t ive  and a f f i rm at ive  ideas  of profound s i g ­
n i f i can ce  in t h e i r  socia l  evolu t ion .  The poin t can be i l l u s ­
t r a t e d  by giving some examples. Instead of saying "v ic to ry  
and d e f e a t , "  what i s  said i s  "v ic to ry  and non-victory"  
(j ayaa jayau ) .  Ins tead  of "many" th e re  is "non-one" 
(aneka) .  At the more popular level we are fam i l ia r  with non- 
-v io lence  (abimsaa) as agains t  peace, non-idleness 
( apramaada) as agains t  exer t ion ,  and non-grudge (a v a i r a ) 
as aga ins t  to le rance .  These examples can be m ul t ip l ied ,  par-  
t i c u l a r l y  from the l i t e r a t u r e  on Buddhism and Jainism. What 
i s  evident i s  tha t  th e se  negative words have pos i t ive  meanings 
of great  s ig n i f ic an ce .
In a n u t s h e l l ,  while "to other nations  . . . showing the moral p re ­
cepts in the negative form seemed somewhat powerless and u n s a t i s f a c ­
to r y , "  to the Indian people,  "who lay s t r e s s  on the negative phase and
pursue the non-determinant,  the negative form of expression has more
194po s i t ive  and powerful meaning."
In summary then, Misra be lieves  t h a t  "ne i the r  from the sub­
s t a n t iv e  po in t of view, which i s  very important,  nor from the te rm i­
nological  poin t  of view, i s  nonalignment a negative  concept.
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Another conceptual controversy involving nonalignment has been 
the way i t  has been l inked to  n e u t r a l i t y ,  the main argument being on 
whether both are s im i la r  to or d i f f e r e n t  from each o the r .  Misra holds 
the view tha t  n e u t r a l i t y  i s  a legal concept while nonalignment i s  d i f ­
f e r e n t  in th a t  i t  i s  mainly a p o l i t i c a l  one. According to him, the
former i s  "founded on e i t h e r  municipal or in te rna t iona l  law" and that
such a "legal s t a tu s  cannot be transformed without v io la t ing  the legal 
provis ions re levant to them," while the l a t t e r  " i s  based on p o l i t i c a l  
considera tions  and can be changed without recourse to l e g a l i t i e s .  
Thus, he pos i ts  tha t
. . . n e u t r a l i t y  i s  an in teg ra l  pa r t  of the in te rna t iona l  law 
of  warfare,  the legal bas is  of which is  mostly to be found in 
the Hague Conventions of 1907. The conventions vest  cer ta in  
duties  obliga to ry  fo r  them. Under them, a neu tra l  s t a t e  i s  ob­
l iged  to abs ta in  from p a r t i c ip a t io n  in an armed c o n f l i c t  and 
a l so  from a s s i s tan ce  to any of the p a r t i e s  to  such a c o n f l i c t .  
P a r t i c ip an ts  in a c o n f l i c t  are on t h e i r  p a r t  required to r e ­
spect the t e r r i t o r y  of neutra l  coun t r ies ,  which includes ab­
s ten t ion  from use of such t e r r i t o r y  fo r  movement of troops and 
munitions of war. This i s  what is  ca l led  the c las s ica l  notion 
of  n e u t r a l i t y ,  which i s  simple and l imited  in scope in terms
of  the area and the time (period)  of i t s  opera tion .  I t  i s  e v i ­
dent tha t  t h i s  fragment of n e u t r a l i t y  i s  Sgd i f fe ren t  concept 
and has l i t t l e  in common with non-alignment.
The above comments on the  nature of n e u t r a l i t y ,  to Misra,
throw more l ig h t  on i t s  d i f f e r en ces  with nonalignment. For example,
"The main concern of a l l  . . . n e u t r a l s  is  war, i . e . ,  to  stay neutral
in t h a t  ev en tu a l i ty , "  and th a t  " th e i r  peace-time n e u t r a l i t y  is  re a l ly
a p re requ is i te  to  t h e i r  main war-time o b je c t iv e , "  while nonalignment
198" is  bas ica l ly  and almost e n t i r e l y  a peacetime po l icy ."  Another 
poin t  of d i f ference  he sees is t h a t ,  while the  neutral  s t a t e s  are 
le g a l ly  disabled in taking sides  in wars, the nonaligned s t a t e s ,  "on
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199the merits  of each case as they see i t , "  are  f r ee  to take sides 
i f  they so wish.
While n e u t r a l i t y  general ly  denotes p a s s iv i ty  and negativism in 
in t e rn a t io n a l  conduct, nonalignment i s  more of an ac t ive  pos i t ive  con­
cept  as i s  demonstrated by the r e l e n t l e s s  act iv ism by the nonaligned 
countr ies  in the in te rna t iona l  arena through various forums th a t  deal 
with global p o l i t i c a l ,  economic and socia l  i s s u e s .  This i s  e a s i ly  a t ­
te s t e d  to by the demand fo r  a new in te rn a t io n a l  economic order and a 
new in te rn a t io n a l  information order,  the i n t e n s i t y  of the a tten t ion  
they devote to a new law of the sea,  attempts to shape global trade  r e ­
l a t io n s  through instruments l ike  the OPEC, tendencies  to extend, to 
the most possib le  l i m i t s ,  the scope of t h e i r  inf luence  in the p o l i t ­
ica l  and the socio-economic forums of the United Nations system, e tc .  
The issue i s  not t h e i r  r e l a t i v e  success or f a i l u r e  in these  endeavors, 
but the ac t ive  and pos i t ive  nature  of t h e i r  r o l e s .  Even on a country 
by country bas is ,  nonaligned countr ies  do not exh ib i t  behavior that  
can be l ikened to neutra l  s t a t e s .  One of the ch ie f  a r c h i t e c t s  of non- 
alignment, Jawaharlal Nehru, declared tha t  India  has "an army and a 
navy and an a i r  force  and i f  danger th rea tens  us we shall  use 
them,"200 which does not sound l ik e  a statement from the statesman 
of a country whose cardinal  foreign policy p r in c ip l e  has anything to 
do with the l e g a l i s t i c  concept of n e u t r a l i t y .  The eagerness of India 
to acquire nuclear c ap a b i l i ty  as soon as i t  became independent also 
was not an action th a t  is  associa ted with a neutra l  s t a t e .  Egypt, un­
der Nasser (one of the moving forces  of nonalignment), also did not 
por t ray  a neutral  s t a t e ;  note the Suez C r i s i s ,  the Middle East wars.
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the Yemen involvement,  m i l i t a ry  pacts  with the Soviet Union, and the 
quest fo r  the leadership of the Arab world. Ghana, under Kwame 
Nkrumah (another major pioneer of nonalignment),  was also without the 
tendency of a neutral  s t a t e .  Apart from h is  preoccupation with shap­
ing events on the continent  of Afr ica ,  Nkrumah was very much i n t e r ­
es ted  in backing his  diplomatic e f f o r t s  with a formidable and v i s ib le  
power. Thus, fo r  example.
In February 1961 . . . Ghana signed an agreement with the 
Soviet Union for a research r e a c to r ,  fuel rods,  const ruction 
of a research f a c i l i t y  at Kwabenya (near Accra), and the t r a i n ­
ing of Ghaflaian personnel.  The f a c i l i t y  began opera ting in
1964 . . . z u f
In summary, the above behavior of these  major nonaligned countr ies  had 
nothing in common with l e g a l i s t i c  n e u t r a l i t y ;  and even in contemporary 
times most nonaligned countr ies  are more ac t ive  and p o s i t ive  in t h e i r  
eagerness to  be included in ,  and to shape,  events around them despite 
a ll  the odds.
Another broad conceptual d i f f e rence  between n e u t r a l i t y  and non- 
alignment i s  th a t  while the former i s  a by-product of  the various mani­
f e s t a t i o n s  of power p o l i t i c s  (which connotes an in t e rn a t io n a l  regime 
imbued with r e a l i s t  tendencies,  and thus portraying phenomena as b a l ­
ance of power, e t c . ) ,  nonalignment aims at introducing new ways tha t  
people and countr ies  should r e l a t e  to each other.  I t  holds tha t  the 
basis  of such r e l a t io n s h ip s  should be the concern fo r  peace,  coopera­
t iv e  ex is tence ,  socio-economic p rogress ,  j u s t i c e ,  and the e leva t ion  of 
the qua l i ty  of human r a t i o n a l i t y ,  r a th e r  than the e x a l t a t io n  of brute  
fo rce  and survival  of the f i t t e s t  m en ta l i ty .  Thus, ins tead of opera t­
ing on the notion th a t  in te rna t iona l  r e a l i t y  can only make sense i f
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there  are opposing co n f l i c t in g  camps, nonalignment operates on the no­
tion th a t  human goals are the same (more abundant and rewarding human 
l i f e ) ,  and th a t  in pursuing these goals with d i f f e r e n t  means, mankind 
can resolve i t s  problems without i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z i n g  c o n f l i c t .  I t  i s  
through t h i s  way th a t  i t  can be seen t h a t ,  though nonalignment does ap­
p rec ia te  the ex is tence  and u t i l i t y  of power (in the various forms i t  
can be manifes ted) ,  i t  does not seek to mobilize and d i s t r i b u t e  i t  in 
such a way th a t  makes c o n f l i c t  chronic,  as does power p o l i t i c s .
N eu t ra l i ty  and nonalignment also d i f f e r  in the sense t h a t ,  
while the former seems to resign i t s e l f  to the global s t a tu s  quo, the 
l a t t e r  seeks to change the global s t a tu s  quo and i t  does t h i s  mainly
in a way th a t  wil l  bring more p o l i t i c a l  e f f i c a c y ,  and economic and so-
202c ia l  progress,  to  a ll  countr ies  of the world.
The f a c t  t h a t ,  as noted e a r l i e r ,  nonalignment i s  not a concept 
th a t  is  a product of a t i g h t l y  documented system of ideas devised by 
one individual  (with an understanding th a t  not much of i t s  conceptual 
formulations i s  to be tampered wi th) ,  but t h a t  i t  i s  a product of the 
various ,  but l ike-minded, views of many statesmen and scholars  in many 
coun t r ie s ,  has led to nonalignment often  being given a va r ie ty  of mean­
ings by d i f f e r e n t  proponents a t  various t imes.  But a ll  these meanings 
do appear to have some common major in g red ien ts .  Jawaharlal Nehru, 
fo r  example, conceptual ized nonalignment as containing th ree  basic  i n ­
g red ien ts ,  one of which i s  the need fo r  each country having "an inde­
pendent approach to foreign policy" and "not being t i e d  down to  any
p a r t i c u la r  l in e  of ac t ion"  due to a p a r t i c u l a r  commitment to one or a 
203group of a c to r s .  Another basic ingredient was the need to avoid
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being a member of a l l iances  (whose sole  aims are m i l i t a r y ,  and thus r e ­
quire rout ine  support fo r  one ac to r ,  or group of ac to r s ,  against  
another ac to r ,  or group of a c to r s ) ,  while the other ingred ien t  was the 
need to "attempt to maintain f r i en d ly  r e l a t i o n s  with a l l  coun­
t r i es ."^® ^  However, these  views do not imply a naive view of a 
world with no c o n f l i c t  but,  ins tead ,  tha t  countr ies  and peoples should 
aim more to increase  the cooperative aspects  of in te rn a t io n a l  r e l a ­
t io n s  and avoid the conf l ic tue l  r e la t io n sh ip  wherever and whenever i t  
can be avoided.
The prepara tory  meeting in Cairo,  for the f i r s t  Nonaligned Con­
ference  in Belgrade, saw nonalignment mainly in terms of countr ies  hav­
ing independent p o l i c i e s ,  f o s te r in g  in te rna t iona l  peace, supporting 
movements of na tional independence, and avoiding entanglement in m i l i ­
t a ry  bloc a l l i a n c e s .  The Belgrade conference i t s e l f  showed tha t  the 
members conceptualized nonalignment as a l e s s  s t ruc tu red  arrangement 
fo r  in t e rn a t io n a l  cooperation,  r a th e r  than as a b loc;  thus they de­
c lared tha t  they "do not wish to form a new bloc and cannot be a 
b l o c . "205
Beginning with the Lusaka summit of 1970, the nonaligned coun­
t r i e s  seemed to become more act ive  in try ing to shape in te rna t iona l  r e ­
l a t io n s  in such a way tha t  would allow them to achieve more national 
p rogress ,  e sp e c ia l l y  in the economic sphere; thus ,  at  t h i s  summit they
"se t  the tone and drew a b lueprin t  fo r  an a s s e r t iv e  action by the non-
206aligned countr ies  for  the establishment of a NIEO." However, 
even before t h i s  the nonalignment phenomenon was concerned about the 
New In te rna t iona l  Economic Order (NIEO). The f i r s t  conference in
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Belgrade in 1961, f o r  example, ta lked of the need for "a new order
207based on . . .  social  j u s t i c e  fo r  the promotion of p rospe r i ty ,"
and the second conference in Cairo in 1964 urged
. . .  a l l  the countr ies  to contr ibute  to the rapid evolution 
of a new and j u s t  economic order under which al l  nations can 
l iv e  without f e a r  or want or despair  and r i s e  to t h e i r  fu l l  
s t a tu re  in the Family of Nations,  [because] the s t ruc tu re  of 
the world economy and the ex i s t in g  in te rn a t io n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
of in te rna t iona l  trade and development have f a i l ed  e i th e r  to 
reduce d i sp a r i ty  . . . or . . .  to r e c t i f y  serious  and^growing 
imbalances between developed and developing coun t r ies .
The Havana Conference of 1979 saw the economic and socia l  components 
of nonalignment as being one of i t s  c ruc ia l  concerns.  Thus, i t  de­
clared  tha t
. . . the establishment of the New In te rna t iona l  Economic 
Order is  one of the most important and most urgent tasks  f a c ­
ing the Non-aligned Movement and tha t  democratization of i n t e r ­
national economic r e l a t i o n s  c o n s t i tu t e s  i t s  p o l i t i c a l  sub­
s tance .
The New Delhi Conference of 1983, l ike  a l l  the conferences a f t e r  the 
Lusaka conference,  a lso  paid a t t en t io n  to global economic and socia l
i s s u e s . 210
In order to pursue t h e i r  global economic and social concerns, 
the nonaligned countr ies  have been adept both in u t i l i z i n g  ex is t ing  
global i n s t i t u t i o n s  and in devis ing new ones—thus the United Nations 
systems (espec ia l ly  i t s  spec ia l ized  bodies) .  Group of 77, OPEC, ACP 
(African-Caribbean and Pac i f ic )  group, e t c . ,  have all  been involved in 
these  e f f o r t s .
Running all through the various meanings and concerns of non- 
alignment, r ig h t  from the days of Nehru, T i to ,  Nkrumah and Nasser to 
the p resen t ,  as shown above, has been a s t e a d f a s t  conceptualization of
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nonalignment as a phenomenon which seeks to ensure t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  peo­
ples with d i f fe r ing  social  philosophies  can p o l i t i c a l l y ,  economically, 
and s o c ia l ly  enhance themselves,  act  independently in the in t e rn a ­
t iona l  system and, according to th e i r  best  judgments, r e l a t e  to others 
in a cooperative and peaceful manner, and generally promote peace and 
social  j u s t i c e  in a ll  pa r ts  of the world.
At th i s  junc tu re ,  i t  may be re levant to note th a t  a conceptual 
f e a tu re  of nonalignment i s  the need not to allow i t s e l f  to be reduced 
to  a s h o r t ,  t i g h t ly  held idea-system, but ra the r  to e x i s t  as an encom­
passing idea-system th a t  adapts to various circumstances while main­
ta in ing  i t s  e ssen t ia l  t e n e t s .  Thus, X. R. Narayanan, l i k e  other schol­
ars of nonalignment, has often noted th a t  nonalignment i s  not a dogma
"to be in te rp re ted  by a Coordinating Bureau or a S e c r e t a r i a t  or even a
211Summit." Also, i t  must be noted th a t  th eo re t ic a l  cons t ruc t ions ,  
in order to be va l id ,  do not need to r e p l i c a t e  any r e a l i t y  but mainly 
to approximate i t ,  ( in  f a c t ,  a theo re t ic a l  const ruction i s  the product 
of the abs t rac t ions  from an adequate sample of the various  manifesta­
t io n s  of r e a l i t y ,  and need not f i t  exac tly  in to  any of the manifesta­
t i o n s ,  since  the essence of a theo re t ic a l  construct ion i s  the a b i l i t y  
to have universal  a p p l i c a b i l i t y ) .  Thus, while i t  would be in te re s t in g  
to see how much of Hungarian socie ty  does not conform to Marxist the­
ory,  th a t  socie ty i s  s t i l l  seen as operating under Marxist theo re t ica l  
formula t ions;  and, while i t  would be in te re s t in g  to note how much of 
Dutch soc ie ty  does not conform to c a p i t a l i s t  theory,  t h a t  socie ty  is  
s t i l l  seen as operating under c a p i t a l i s t  th eo re t ica l  formulations 
(and, a c tu a l ly ,  i t  i s  hard to find any s ing le  human soc ie ty  tha t  f i t s
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exactly  in to  e i t h e r  Marxist  or C a p i t a l i s t  th e o re t i c a l  formulat ions) .  
Likewise, though i t  would be hard to find any country t h a t  has a f o r ­
eign policy t h a t  f i t s  e x a c t ly  in to  the conceptual formulat ions  of non- 
alignment, as examined above, a l o t  of countr ies  are considered as be­
ing nonaligned.
On the  whole, many of the above various perspec t ives  of the 
concept of nonalignment do share some common themes. One of these  i s  
the maximization and the u t i l i z a t i o n  of the p o ten t ia l  f o r  independent 
act ions  in the in te rn a t io n a l  system. The avoidance of rout ine  a t tach­
ment to a country or bloc  of c o u n t r i e s ,  engaged in an i n s t i t u t i o n a l ­
ized con f l ic tu a l  r e l a t i o n s h ip  with another country or bloc of coun­
t r i e s ,  and the promotion of more progressive and ra t io n a l  economic, 
so c ia l ,  and p o l i t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  among countr ies  and peoples,  are 
also other major themes. A ddi t iona l ly ,  many of the perspect ives  also 
emphasize the themes of s trengthening cooperative r e la t io n sh ip s  (and 
thus the avoiding of c o n f l i c tu a l  r e l a t io n s h ip s  wherever and whenever 
po ss ib le ) ,  and the general  p u r su i t  of ac t ions  th a t  promote peace and
social  j u s t i c e  in a l l  p a r t s  of the world.
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CHAPTER IV
NONALIGNMENT AND NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY
In order to evaluate the nonaligned component of Nigerian f o r ­
eign policy ,  separa te  a t t e n t io n  will  be given to Nigerian foreign p o l ­
icy during the  various governmental regimes since  each of the govern­
ments from 1960 to 1983 manifested d i s t i n c t i v e  foreign policy s ty le s  
and substances .
This examination of the Nigerian foreign policy will  be done 
through the examination of the main foreign policy is sue  areas th a t  
were manifested during each of the per iods ,  so as to por t ray  the non- 
alignment component in fu l l  pe rspec t ive .  From 1960 to 1983, there  
were five  governmental periods  in Nigeria,  the F i r s t  Republic, the 
Ironsi  Government, the Gowon Government, the Mohammed/Obasanjo Govern­
ment, and the  Second Republic.  The nonaligned foreign policy content 
in the Nigerian foreign  policy will  be evaluated fo r  each of these gov­
ernmental pe r iods ,  s t a r t i n g  with the f i r s t  one.
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The F i r s t  Republic
The F i r s t  Republic covers the period from 1960 to 1965, during 
which Nigeria  was under a parliamentary system with Tafawa Salewa s e r ­
ving as the Prime Min is ter .  Notably, the F i r s t  Republic was the 
maiden period of modern Nigeria ex i s t in g  as an independent and a sover­
eign na t ion .  Thus, the F i r s t  Republic foreign policy  manifestat ion 
was a lso  modern N ig e r ia ' s  maiden foreign policy m an ifes ta t ion ;  and, 
th e re fo re ,  i t  is f i t t i n g  th a t  the na ture  of the Salewa Government r e l a ­
t ions  with B r i ta in  (the country th a t  had colonized Nigeria)  should 
f i r s t  be examined.
The Salewa Government and Brita in
An understanding of the nature of the F i r s t  Republic r e l a t io n s  
with Sri t a in  is  very important to the understanding of the nonaligned 
foreign policy adopted by the F i r s t  Republic fo r  two reasons.  One i s  
tha t  the a b i l i t y  to exerc ise  independent a c t io n s ,  both in foreign and 
domestic a f f a i r s ,  and to demonstrate o ne 's  de fac to  possession of sov­
ere ignty  (apart  from the de ju re  possession of such a s t a t u s ) ,  con­
s t i t u t e  major f e a tu re s  of nonalignment (although these  fe a tu re s  have 
to be complemented by o the rs ,  which have been analyzed in a preceding 
chapter on the subjec t  of the conceptual p r o f i l e  of nonalignment). 
The nature  of the F i r s t  Republic ' s  r e l a t io n s  with Br i ta in  (the country 
tha t  had colonized Nigeria)  i s  one of the important ways of assessing 
the nature  of these fea tu re s  of independence and sovereignty  as mani­
fes ted  by Nigeria during th i s  era .
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Another reason an assessment of the F i r s t  Republ ic ' s  r e la t io n s  
with B r i ta in  is  important i s  the f a c t  tha t  the nature of r e la t io n s  
with B r i ta in  i s  also one of the important ways of assess ing the nature 
of N ig e r i a ' s  r e l a t i o n s  with one of the  twosuperpower blocs in the 
contemporary in te rna t iona l  system—the Western bloc.  The nature of a 
n a t i o n ' s  r e l a t i o n s  with the superpower blocs (in terms of demonstra­
t ing th a t  there  is  no routine  l ink with any of the bloc against  the 
o ther) i s  another major fea tu re  of the  phenomenon of nonalignment. 
More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  the nature of N ig e r i a ' s  r e l a t io n s  with Bri ta in  r e ­
f l e c t s  the nature of N ig e r ia ' s  r e l a t i o n  with the West since  Bri ta in  is  
a very important country in the Western bloc (and B r i t a i n ' s  posi t ion 
in t h i s  bloc is  determined la rge ly  by the exis tence of the Common­
wealth of Nations,  the nature of B r i t a i n ' s  r e l a t io n s  with the United 
S ta te s ,  and B r i t a i n ' s  ro le  in the North A t lan t ic  Treaty Organization) .  
The Commowealth of Nations i s  an in te rn a t io n a l  organization composed 
of most of the countr ies  th a t  were formerly under B r i t i sh  colonial  con­
t r o l ; ^  and, B r i t a i n ' s  pos it ion  in t h i s  body, as i t s  nerve cente r,  
gives the former much avenue fo r  in t e rn a t io n a l  influence even though 
all  member s t a t e s  are l ega l ly  deemedas having equal s t a tu s  within the 
body. After the grandiose B r i t i sh  global colonial  empire was disman­
t l e d ,  except fo r  some few i n s i g n i f i c a n t  t e r r i t o r i e s ,  the phenomenon of 
Commonwealth afforded Br i ta in  something to remind i t  of i t s  past  
global s t a t u r e  (though, p r a c t i c a l l y ,  a poor re f l e c t io n  of tha t  p a s t ) ,  
and an in te rna t iona l  platform to show t h a t  i t  has not been reduced to 
standing on the global s i d e l in e .  During th i s  period,  when Bri ta in  was 
not an o f f i c i a l  member of the European Economic Community, the
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Commonwealth was p a r t i c u l a r l y  very important to i t  in order to  have 
something to c l in g  to and remain in t e r n a t io n a l ly  s i g n i f i c a n t .  Since 
Br i ta in  is an important Western country,  i t s  a b i l i t y  to claim to  have 
some close r e l a t io n s h ip s  with many countr ies  in Africa and Asia, 
through the Commonwealth l inks ,  was important in helping i t  remain 
s i g n i f i c a n t  in the Western world.
Addi t iona l ly ,  B r i ta in  i s  often perceived as having a very spe­
c i a l  r e l a t io n sh ip  with the United S ta tes  ( the leader of the West), and 
as being i t s  c l o s e s t  European a l ly  although the United States has an 
e x ce l l e n t  r e l a t i o n s h ip  with a ll  Western European coun t r ie s .  This is  
f u r t h e r  demonstrated by the fa c t  t h a t  though some countr ies  l ik e  the 
Federal Republic of Germany can be seen as having r e l a t io n s  with the 
United States th a t  is  close to th a t  which Britain  enjoys,  France, 
though also having good r e la t io n s  with the United S ta te s ,  may not be 
perceived as having as close  a r e la t io n s h ip  with the l a t t e r  as does 
B r i t a i n .  And the important s ign i f icance  of B r i t a i n ’s special  r e l a ­
t io n s  with the United Sta tes  is  the f a c t  th a t  i t  can contr ibute  to 
B r i t a i n ' s  being seen as a very i n f l u e n t i a l  Western country.  One p a r ­
t i c u l a r  example of such an in f lu e n t i a l  ro le  in the West is  B r i t a i n ' s  
r o l e  in NATO, which i s  tha t  of a h ighly  regarded member-state which 
has the confidence and respect of the United Sta tes  (the leader  of 
t h i s  m i l i t a ry  a l l i a n c e ) .
Therefore,  the Nigerian F i r s t  Republ ic ' s  closeness to ,  or d i s ­
tance from, B r i ta in  also meant i t s  closeness  to ,  or d is tance  from, the 
West, and thus ,  is  an ind ica to r  of the nonalignment content in the 
F i r s t  Republ ic ' s  fo re ign  policy .
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One main f e a tu re  of N iger ia ' s  r e l a t io n s  with Bri ta in  was tha t  the co­
a l i t i o n  government, formed by the Northern Peoples'  Congress (NPC) and 
the National Council of Nigerian Ci t izens  (NCNC), with the former s e r ­
ving as the sen ior  coa l i t ion  pa r ty ,  pursued a very cooperative r e l a ­
t ionsh ip  with Br i ta in  as a p r i o r i t y  foreign  policy.  This was re f l e c te d  
in the manner which the Federal Government of Nigeria was often p re­
pared to  reach accommodation with Br i ta in  in many foreign policy 
areas ,  although B r i t a i n ' s  posi t ion conf l ic ted  with the general pos i ­
t ion of most Nigerians.  For example, when there  was "widespread and 
b i t t e r "  c r i t i c i s m  in Nigeria of B r i t i sh  p o l i c i e s ,  in connection with 
the u n i l a t e r a l  decla ra t ion  of independence in Zimbabwe (then ca l led  
Rhodesia),  the Nigerian Prime Minister ,  Tafawa Balewa, was of the opin­
ion t h a t  B r i t a in  was not being very in sen s i t iv e  to  the pos i t ion  of 
African coun tr ies  th a t  belonged to  the Commonwealth. Addi­
t i o n a l l y ,  when some Nigerian l e g i s l a t o r s  were c r i t i c i z i n g  the B r i t i sh  
government f o r  supporting Portugal in the United Nations Security Coun­
cil  debates over the s i tu a t io n  in Angola, the then Minis ter for  Exter­
nal A f fa i r s ,  J a j a  Wachuku, was of the simple opinion th a t  B r i ta in  was 
a sovereign s t a t e ,  and tha t  i t  was not the duty of another country to 
i n t e r f e r e  in i t s  a f f a i r s . ^
The natu re  of the F i r s t  Republ ic ’s power e l i t e  seems to be the 
reason such f o r  th i s  so r t  of leanings .  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  the NPC, the 
senior c o a l i t i o n  pa r ty ,  was thoroughly controlled  by the t r a d i t i o n a l
p o l i t i c a l  system th a t  then had the grip on the northern areas  of 
N iger ia .^  Many NPC members also were t r a d i t i o n a l  e l i t e s ;  and, t h e r e ­
fo re ,  the NPC in jec ted  a large dose of conservatism into  N ig e r ia ' s
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domestic and fo re ign  p o l i c i e s .  Thus, Ihonvbere (1983), r e l a t i n g  the 
nature  of the F i r s t  Republic ' s  power e l i t e  to N ig e r ia ' s  foreign 
po l icy ,  noted "the capture of p o l i t i c a l  power by a conservative and 
a r i s t o c r a t i c  power e l i t e  which in te rp re te d  in te rn a t io n a l  p o l i t i c s  in 
m o ra l i s t i c  and l e g i t i m i s t  terms.
Though the other c o a l i t io n  government pa r ty ,  the NCNC, grew 
out of a mass movement, and also had a progressive outlook, i t s  des i re  
to be a pa r t  of the government meant th a t  they had to mostly give in 
to the conservative  pos it ion  of the  c o a l i t io n  government's senior 
pa r ty ,  the NPC, and thus avoid "s t ick ing  to t h e i r  radicali sm and m i l i ­
ta n t  a sse r t iveness ."® Thus, in fo re ign  a f f a i r s  the NCNC mostly gave 
in to the NPC favoring of p r o - B r i t i s h ,  and genera l ly  pro-West, p o l ­
i c i e s .  This s o r t  of foreign policy pos ture was also re in forced  by the
p laca t in g ,  and avoidance of provocation,  personal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of
7 8Tafawa Balewa, which meant th a t  he had a "naive and u n r e a l i s t i c "
view of in te rn a t io n a l  p o l i t i c s ;  and, in p a r t i c u l a r ,  in r e l a t io n  to r e ­
la t io n s  with B r i t a in ,  th i s  meant t h a t  the l a t t e r  was able to have a 
l o t  of room to maneuver in .
Another important means of assess ing the F i r s t  Republic r e l a ­
t ions  with B r i ta in  is  through an assessment of i t s  regard fo r  the Com­
monwealth, since the l a t t e r  i s ,  by and la rg e ,  an organizat ion tha t  i s  
perceived as p ro jec t ing  B r i t i sh  in te rna t iona l  inf luence .
In addi t ion  to a m in is te r  in charge of foreign a f f a i r s ,  there
were two ju n io r  m in is te r s—a Minis ter of S ta te  fo r  Commonwealth Rela-
q
t ions  and a Min is ter of S ta te  for In te rna t iona l  A ffa i r s .  That the 
Balewa Government thought i t  necessary to accord Commonwealth
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re la t i o n s  a m in i s t e r i a l  pos it ion th a t  would be only concerned with i t s  
a f f a i r s ,  while no o the r  spec i f ic  foreign policy  issue area,  whether a 
geographical or a func tiona l issue area,  was accorded such a pos i t ion ,  
amounted to a deployment of diplomatic r e sou rce s ,  both in terms of 
human and materia l  re sources ,  in the a rea  of Commonwealth r e l a t io n s  
th a t  was g la r ing ly  fa r  higher than the deployment of resources  in 
other areas of Nigerian foreign r e l a t i o n s .  Thus, t h i s  dramatically  
demonstrated th a t  the  Balewa Government had high regard for the Common­
wealth and considered i t  a major diplomatic arena.  However, i t  is  im­
por tan t  to note t h a t  t h i s  m in is te r ia l  pos i t ion  fo r  Commonwealth r e l a ­
t ions  ended with the F i r s t  Republic.
Apart from t h i s  so r t  of s t ru c tu ra l  arrangement, tha t  showed 
the importance of Commonwealth r e l a t i o n s ,  the Prime Minister and other  
leading p o l i t i c a l  f i g u r e s ,  by devoting a s i g n i f i c a n t  portion of t h e i r  
personal a t t e n t io n  to Commonwealth a f f a i r s ,  also demonstrated the im­
portance the government accorded the l a t t e r .  For example, important 
Cabinet m in is te r s  of ten  attended Commonwealth events ,  and the Prime 
Minis ter always valued his  attendance a t  Commonwealth conferences. In 
the case of Prime Minis ter  Tafawa Balewa, h is  attachment to Common­
wealth a f f a i r s  was ac tua l ly  a devotion to i t s  a f f a i r s .  For example, 
even when Nigeria was in great  turmoil ,  due to  p o l i t i c a l  c r i s i s  in the 
then Western Region, he found i t  necessary to host  a Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers Conference in Lagos, in January,  1966, in order to d i s ­
cuss the problem of  decolonizing Zimbabwe (then cal led  Rhodesia). 
This was a lso  his l a s t  public a c t i v i t y ,  fo r  the F i r s t  Republic was 
brought to a conclusion on January 15, 1966 by the advent of a m i l i ­
t a ry  government.
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The Commonwealth economic agencies a lso  played a great  ro le  in 
the  F i r s t  Republ ic ' s  external economic r e l a t i o n s .  For example, they 
made ava i lab le  to Nigeria 7.7 mill ion Naira and 20 mil l ion  Naira 
loans ,  in 1960 and 1962, r e spec t ive ly .^^  Therefore,  in the area of 
foreign economic r e l a t i o n s ,  the F i r s t  Republic also u t i l i z e d  the Com­
monwealth framework as a very important avenue fo r  foreign economic 
co n tac t s .
In addit ion to these  Commonwealth economic l i n k s ,  the re  were 
Nigerian economic l inks  with B r i ta in ,  which was c l e a r l y  more important 
than the Commonwealth economic t i e s  per se.  The economy of F i r s t  
Republic Nigeria was a c tu a l ly  s t i l l  a r e f l e c t i o n  of a colonial  legacy 
(an economy hinged on the periphery of the Western economic s t ru c ­
t u r e ) ,  and, having a conservat ive government l ike  the Balewa Govern­
ment (which was not ready f o r  much fundamental r e s t ru c tu r in g  of the
economy of an independent N iger ia ) ,  meant th a t  B r i ta in  continued to
play a very important ro le  in the Nigerian economy. Thus, in 1960, 
Br i ta in  was s t i l l  the  major Nigerian foreign trade  pa r tne r  by accoun­
t ing  fo r  42.3 and 47.6 percent of the l e t t e r ' s  imports and exports ,  re -  
1 9sp ec t iv e ly .  However, t h i s  major B r i t i sh  ro le  was gradually  
decreas ing ,  though not s i g n i f i c a n t ly  s ince ,  at  the end of the F i r s t  
Republic,  i t  was s t i l l  the major foreign t rade  pa r tne r  in 1965 by 
accounting for 30.9 and 37.8 percent of N ig e r ia ' s  imports and exports ,  
r e sp ec t iv e ly .^ ^
As expected, t h i s  dominant Br it ish  ro le  in N ig e r i a ' s  foreign
trade  r e l a t i o n s  was also followed by the West being N ig e r ia ' s  main
trade  p a r tn e r ,  genera l ly .  The West In 1960 accounted fo r  about 85 and
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90 percent  of N ig e r ia ' s  imports and exports ,  r e sp ec t iv e ly ;  and in
1965, about 80 and 85 percent of N ig e r ia ' s  imports and expor ts .
Western economic i n t e r e s t s  were also very prevalent in the
Nigerian domestic economy with the manufacturing sec to r ,  the mining in­
dus t ry ,  the huge marketing conglomerates,  and the banking indus t ry ,  
v i r t u a l l y  con tro l led  by them.
Thus, during the F i r s t  Republic,  N ig e r i a ' s  foreign economic r e ­
l a t io n s  were mostly with the West; and in terms of the relevance of 
the concept of nonalignment in connection with t h i s  area of N ig e r i a ' s  
foreign r e l a t i o n s ,  i t  can be said th a t  Nigeria was aligned with B r i t ­
a in ,  s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  and with the West, generally .
Another major area  of N iger ia ' s  r e la t io n  with Bri ta in  i s  the 
na ture  of cu l tu ra l  l inks  between both; and for  the F i r s t  Republic era 
an examination of t h i s  area of th e i r  r e l a t i o n s  is  very important since  
t h a t  period in N ig e r ia ' s  national l i f e  was the maiden era  of modern 
Nigeria e x i s t in g  as an independent country a f t e r  j u s t  gaining indepen­
dence from B r i ta in .
Clear ly  the new independent Nigeria had to e x i s t  with a cons id­
erable  amount of c u l tu ra l  legacy th a t  was the d i r e c t  r e s u l t  of the 
B r i t i sh  colonial  con tac t ;  and the most v i s ib l e  manifestat ion of t h i s  
was the use of English as the o f f i c i a l  language of Nigeria (the Eng­
l i s h  language s t i l l  serves  t h i s  function in N iger ia ) .  Being an impor­
t a n t  c u l tu ra l  dynamic, the English language has served to help main­
t a in  a considerable  amount of cu l tu ra l  t i e s  between both countr ies  and 
between Nigeria  and West. Spec i f ic a l ly ,  the use of t h i s  language in 
Nigeria has helped p r in ted  and broadcasted forms of communication
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(with e i t h e r  scho lar ly  or popular appeal emphasis),  and communication 
through visual and performing a r t s ,  from English-speaking c o u n t r ie s ,  
to be a v a i l ab le  in Nigeria .  Also, the use of English in Nigeria has 
allowed the above forms of communication, o r ig ina t ing  from the l a t t e r ,  
to be ava i lab le  in many English-speaking coun t r ie s .  Addi t iona l ly ,  
many Nigerians v i s i t  or l ive  in B r i t a in ,  and vice versa;  which also  
helps in maintaining cu l tu ra l  l inks  between the two co u n t r ie s .
The colonia l  era  in Nigeria also meant the in t roduct ion  of 
B r i t i sh  p o l i t i c a l  and legal values,  through the in t roduct ion  of 
B r i t i sh  p o l i t i c a l  and legal frameworks into Nigeria .  At independence, 
though the re  were many p o l i t i c a l  and legal s t ru c tu ra l  changes, due to 
the d es i re  to ensure th a t  an independent Nigeria a lso r e f l e c ted  new 
Nigerian p o l i t i c a l  and legal values,  t h i s  was not done by discard ing  
the B r i t i s h  p o l i t i c a l  and legal frameworks. I t  was accomplished by 
r e ta in in g  those of them th a t  had come to be perceived as part  o f  the 
Nigerian socia l  r e a l i t y ,  and by also bringing new p o l i t i c a l  and legal
frameworks t h a t  were Nigerian social  products .  For example, the Fed­
eral  and Regional Const i tu t ions  adopted in 1950 and 1963, while r e f l e c ­
t ing  a lo t  of the B r i t i sh  p o l i t i c a l  framework, was a lso  geared toward 
the c re a t io n ,  sustenance and growth of an independent and sovereign 
Nigeria .  Also,  the legal system frameworks, while s t i l l  contain ing a 
lo t  of the B r i t i sh  legal frameworks, inculcated  legal frameworks from
the various legal t r a d i t i o n s  tha t  are indigenous to Niger ia .
On the whole, the cu l tura l  l inks  with B r i t a in ,  as shown above, 
through the use of common o f f i c i a l  languages, frequent human co n tac t s ,  
and the shar ing of some s im ilar  p o l i t i c a l  and legal frameworks, meant
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tha t  Nigeria and Bri ta in  had tremendous cu l tu ra l  l in k s .  In terms of 
the relevance of th i s  r e a l i t y  to the nonalignment concept,  i t  can be 
said t h a t  the West was much c lose r  to Nigeria ,  c u l t u r a l l y ,  than the 
East ,  since the B r i t i sh  c u l tu ra l  t r a d i t i o n  i s  prominent in the West 
(though other cu l tu ra l  t r a d i t i o n s ,  l ik e  the French and the broader 
Latin cu l tu ra l  t r a d i t i o n s ,  at  o ther h i s t o r i c a l  epochs, dominated the 
West), and a t  p resen t ,  many countr ies  in the West, share f a i r l y  common 
cu l tu ra l  t r a d i t i o n s .  More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  the f a c t  tha t  the United 
S ta te s ,  the leader in the West, does share the language, has f requent  
human c on tac ts ,  and has s im i la r  p o l i t i c a l  and legal t r a d i t i o n s ,  with 
Brita in  also means th a t  Nigeria has many cu l tu ra l  l inks  with the 
dynamic cente r  of the West.
However, i t  must also be noted t h a t  B r i t a in ,  in s p i t e  of i t s  
colonial  presence in Nigeria ,  did not have a wholesale cu l tu ra l  impact 
on Nigeria ,  i r o n i c a l ly ,  pa r t ly  because of some aspects  of B r i t i sh  co lo ­
nial p o l icy .  The most s i g n i f i c a n t  of these  was the In d i r ec t  Rule p o l ­
icy whereby in most pa r t s  of Nigeria the B r i t i sh  colonial  a u t h o r i t i e s  
almost l e f t  i n t a c t  the p o l i t i c a l  systems they came to find in Nigeria .  
This policy  was due to the sheer l o g i s t i c a l  problems they envisaged in 
any attempt to d i r e c t l y  adminis ter a country the s ize  and complexity 
of Nigeria ,  the lessons they learned in India  (in terms of r e a l i z i n g  
tha t  i t  is  fa r  more prudent not to tamper much with the p o l i t i c a l  
s t ru c tu re s  they come into con tac t  w i th ) ,  and th e i r  admiration of the  
strong p o l i t i c a l  and adm in is t ra t ive  systems th a t  they found in p laces  
l ike  the Oyo and Benin Empires and the Emirates in the northern p a r t s  
of Nigeria .  Thus, with the Obas and Emirs, continuing to ru le  t h e i r
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domains^^ to such an ex ten t ,  the B r i t i sh  cu l tu ra l  values did not per­
meate the Nigerian soc ie ty  in such a pervasive amount t h a t  the French 
and Portugese c u l tu ra l  values were able to more considerably  permeate 
the countr ies  th a t  came under t h e i r  colonial t e n t a c l e s .  The net prod­
uct was t h a t  Nigeria became independent not only with some B r i t i sh  cu l ­
tu ra l  legacy, but a l so ,  with Nigerian t r a d i t i o n a l  c u l tu ra l  values
s t i l l  having much impact in many spheres of l i f e .  For example, while 
some Nigerians l iv ing  in urban areas  could speak English (though most 
of these continue to use a Nigerian language as a primary medium of 
communication), most Nigerians could only speak, or understand, a Nige­
r ian  language. Add i t iona l ly ,  while those l iv ing in urban areas came
under p o l i t i c a l  and legal frameworks tha t  inculcated a l o t  of B r i t i sh
p o l i t i c a l  and legal frameworks, many Nigerians had primary contacts  
with p o l i t i c a l  and legal frameworks tha t  contained more t r a d i t i o n a l
Nigerian p o l i t i c a l  and legal va lues .
Thus in an overa l l  assessment,  the nature  of N ig e r i a ' s  c u l ­
t u ra l  l inks  with Br i ta in  has not been as strong (as should have been 
expected from the fo rm er 's  co lon ia l  co n t ro l ) ,  e spec ia l ly  when compared 
with the French, Portuguese,  or Spanish cu ltura l  impacts in countr ies  
t h a t  are th e i r  former co lon ie s .
The nature  of m i l i t a r y  l inks  between the F i r s t  Republic and 
B r i ta in  i s  another important area to consider.  Most Nigerian m i l i t a r y  
personnel had undergone o f f i c e r s '  t r a in ing  courses in B r i t i sh  m i l i t a r y  
i n s t i t u t i o n s  s ince ,  during the  F i r s t  Republic, such f a c i l i t i e s  were 
l im i ted  in Nigeria .  Add i t iona l ly ,  Br it ish  m i l i t a ry  o f f i c e r s  also 
served under con t rac t  in Nigeria  to help in fu r th e r  t r a in in g  and
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m il i t a ry  development programs. Nigeria m i l i t a r y  hardware a lso  mostly 
came from B r i ta in .
Thus, in the area of m i l i t a ry  r e l a t i o n s ,  the F i r s t  Republic 
had most of such l inks  with B r i ta in ,  and thus  with the West. However, 
as will  be shown below, close m i l i t a ry  r e l a t i o n s  with B r i ta in  was 
widely unpopular in Nigeria ,  due to the l e t t e r ' s  colonial  past  and the 
tense Cold War s i tu a t io n  between the Western and Eastern b locs.
On the whole, a general assessment of the F i r s t  Republ ic ' s  r e ­
la t io n s  with Br i ta in  in the p o l i t i c a l ,  economic, cu l tu ra l  and m i l i ­
tary  spheres has demonstrated a s i tu a t io n  of close r e l a t i o n s ;  and in 
the context of nonalignment i t  can be sa id  th a t  F i r s t  Republic Nigeria 
was much c lose r  to the West than to the Eas t ,  since Bri ta in  i s  an im­
portant Western country.  However, due to  tremendous pressures  from 
various i n t e r e s t  groups and many radical  ind iv idua ls  and forums ( th a t  
were p a r t  of the F i r s t  Republ ic 's  federal  c o a l i t io n  government), the 
F i r s t  Republic was not able to be rou t ine ly  l inked to  Br i ta in  or the 
West in g e n e r a l . T h i s  phenomenon was fo rce fu l ly  demonstrated by 
the controversy surrounding, and the dismal f a te  o f ,  the e f f o r t  to in ­
s t i t u t e  a pact to cover N ig e r ia ' s  r e l a t i o n s  with Bri ta in  in the m i l i ­
ta ry  a rea .
The Anglo-Nigerian Defense Pact
This pac t ,  which took e f f e c t  in 1960, was a legal compact 
aimed at promoting cooperation in m i l i t a ry  a f f a i r s  between Nigeria and 
Bri ta in  in a way th a t  many Nigerians f e l t  was very involving.  Essen­
t i a l l y ,  i t  provided for  the B r i t i sh  a b i l i t y  to use m i l i t a ry  f a c i l i t i e s  
in Nigeria.
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However, the pact sparked much public resentment, and within a 
year a f t e r  i t s  exis tence i t  was p o l i t i c a l l y  immobilized due t o  the in­
tense  public  ag i ta t ion  fo r  i t s  abrogation.  This massive pub l ic  ou t­
rage was very c a t a l y t i c ,  and led to a very b r i e f  and i n e f f e c t i v e  l i f e  
span fo r  the pact since i t  r e su l ted  in the fo rmer 's  abrogation in 
1962.
The pact was favored by the important p o l i t i c a l  c i r c l e s  of the 
F i r s t  Republic federa l  c o a l i t io n  government. These cons is ted  of the 
upper echelon of the NPC and NCNC, which were the c o a l i t i o n  govern­
ment p a r t i e s .  However, the same coa l i t ion  government es tab li shment 
harbored a s ig n i f i c a n t  number of rad ica l  and a sse r t ive  p o l i t i c a l  c i r ­
c l e s ,  though mostly at the level of  the p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s '  o rgan iza­
tional framework (and then a lso  mostly as the radical  wings or  a f f i l i ­
a te s  of the p a r t i e s —especia l ly  the  NCNC), or at  the reg iona l  govern­
mental l eve l s .  For example, the Z i k i s t  National Vanguard (ZNV) was 
the rad ica l  wing of the NCNC and was much opposed to the p a c t .  The 
Nigerian Youth Congress and the Nigerian S o c ia l i s t  Group were some of 
the  very vocal pressure  groups aga ins t  the pact,  and many of t h e i r  mem­
bers  belonged to the NCNC.
Being par t  of the governing establishment ,  the in d iv id u a ls  in 
these  rad ica l  groups who held government pos i t ions  were very e f f e c t iv e  
in destroying the pact from within the government i t s e l f .  For exam­
p le ,  Adewale Fashanu, the President-General  of ZNV was one of  the  d i ­
r e c to r s  of the Nigerian National P ress ,  which was owned by the  Federal 
18Government. His was a s i g n i f i c a n t  pos it ion  regarding na t iona l  com­
municat ions.  Also, the ZNV Vice-Chairman, R. B. K. Okafor, was a
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federa l  l e g i s l a t o r  who l a t e r  held the post  of  Parliamentary Secretary
in the Ministry of J u s t i c e ;  and i t  was he who tabled a motion in the
House of Representatives  tha t  disapproved of Nigeria enter ing into  any
external  arrangement,  such as the one provided fo r  in the pac t .  A.
Abangwu, the Chairman of the Nigerian S o c i a l i s t  Group, who was also
the Deputy Speaker of the NCNC-controlled Eastern House of Assembly,
a lso  asserted  th a t  i t  was his o r g a n iz a t i o n ' s  pressure  which made the
Federal Government decide not to include the  provision for m i l i t a ry
19bases in the f ina l  d r a f t  of the pac t .
With such prominent opposit ion the p a c t ' s  f a t e  was doomed. How­
ever ,  the most c r i t i c a l  blow was the acce le ra t ing  of public awareness
about the negative implica tions  of the pact (in terms of compromising
N ig e r ia ' s  a b i l i t y  to be independent and sovereign) ,  t h a t  was fueled by 
vocal denunciation by nonestablishment groups.  For example, the s tu ­
den ts '  group th a t  led a march to  the Parl iament ,  in p r o t e s t  of the 
20pact ,  and thereby focused national a t t e n t io n  on the pact as a men­
ace to N ige r ia ' s  independence (thus hastening i t s  abrogation which 
came in 1962).
On the whole, the s ign if icance  of the Anglo-Nigerian Defense 
Pact episode,  in terms of nonalignment, was the f a c t  th a t  i t  demon­
s t r a t e d  t h a t ,  though the F i r s t  Republic governing group was a conse­
rva t ive  lo t  th a t  was prepared to have a very close  r e la t io n s h ip  with 
the West, e sp e c ia l l y  B r i t a in ;  however, t h e re  were a lso in ex is tence ,  
within  the p o l i t i c a l  system, c e r t a in  p o l i t i c a l  forces  and dynamics 
with enough momentum to  counter-balance ,  o r ,  as in the case of th i s
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pac t ,  to n u l l i f y  the tendencies within the governing e l i t e  th a t  would 
have re su l ted  in Nigeria being routinely  aligned to a superpower bloc.
Thus, the Anglo-Nigerian Defense Pact episode demonstrated 
th a t  the F i r s t  Republic had enough p o l i t i c a l  dynamics to ensure th a t
Nigeria was not ro u t in e ly  aligned to any superpower bloc.
However, the successful  abrogation of the pact d id  not mean 
th a t  the F i r s t  Republic c o a l i t io n  government became very a s s e r t i v e  in 
the  foreign policy a rea .  Nevertheless,  i t  did ac tua l ly  have a s i g n i f i ­
cant impact fo r  the Balewa Government, which had very c lose  r e l a t i o n s  
with Bri ta in  at  the ear ly  phase of the F i r s t  Republic and t r i e d  to 
show th a t  i t  could exh ib i t  some a sse r t iveness ,  e sp ec ia l ly  in the area  
of African a f f a i r s .  S t i l l ,  even such an e f f o r t  a t  a s s e r t iv e n es s  was 
a t  a very mild level (espec ia l ly  i f  the Balewa foreign po l icy  i s  com­
pared to tha t  of Nkrumah's Ghana); and although throughout the F i r s t  
Republic era  Nigeria had very good r e l a t io n s  with Br i ta in  and the West 
in genera l ,  such re la t io n s h ip s  were not charac te r ized  by any rou t ine  
Nigerian l ink to the l a t t e r .
The F i r s t  Republic and Pan-African Ideals  and Goals
The F i r s t  Republic era coincided with the f i r s t  h a l f  of the 
1960' s ,  a period when many countr ies under colonial  regimes gained 
t h e i r  independence; and in Africa th i s  dramatic decoloniza tion pro­
cess re su l ted  in almost a l l  African countr ies  (except coun t r ies  mostly
under the Portuguese colonia l  regimes, and those under minor ity  r e ­
gimes in Southern Afr ica) being able to regain t h e i r  independence.
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A very important in te rn a t io n a l  is sue  th a t  engaged the a t t e n ­
t io n  of these  African countr ies  was the search fo r  frameworks through 
which they could cooperate with each other in order to c rea te  b e t te r  
p o l i t i c a l ,  s o c i a l ,  and economic s i tu a t io n s  in the con t inen t .  Also
fue l ing  the i n t e r e s t  in t h i s  i s sue  area was the f a c t  t h a t  the clamor 
fo r  such an African framework had a rich h i s to r i c a l  legacy due to the 
Pan-Africanism concepts and movements tha t  had developed in the West­
ern countr ies  among both people of African Ancestry within those coun­
t r i e s  and s tudents  from Africa tha t  sojourned to those countr ies  for 
education (led by people l ik e  W.E.B. Dubois, Marcus Garvey and George 
Padmore. However, i t  must a lso  be noted t h a t ,  while the  Pan-African 
id e a l s  and goals of the leaders  of African countr ies  emphasize more 
the r e a l i t y  on the con t inen t ,  the Pan-Africanism id e n t i f i e d  with the 
above i n i t i a t i v e s ,  or a c t io n s ,  of people of African ancestry in the
Western world i s  more of a movement tha t  seeks c loser  t i e s  among peo­
p le  from, or  o f ,  Afr ica ,  wherever they may be,  in order to fo s te r  the 
betterment of t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l ,  social  and economic s i t u a t i o n s .  However 
these  two tendencies shared the same ideals  and goals .
To the Balewa Government of the F i r s t  Republic of Nigeria ,  the 
pu rsu i t  of African unity ,  in order to u p l i f t  Africa p o l i t i c a l l y ,  so­
c i a l l y  and economically,  was a lso  an important po licy .  Thus, i t  saw
the  "future  s trength"  of Africa as lying in i t s  "c lose r  in teg ra -
t i o n . "  This view was based on N ig e r ia ' s  convict ion t h a t  "the havoc 
wrought by im pe r ia l i s t s  and co lon is ts  had been the carving up of the
continent"  and " th a t  the road to  fu ture  s t reng th  and p rospe r i ty  lay in
22coming together once more in c lose r  in t e g r a t i o n . "
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However, Nigeria d i f fe red  s ig n i f i c a n t ly  from some other Afr i ­
can countr ies  on how such in tegra t ion  could be achieved, and on what 
the natu re  of such an in tegra t ion  should be. I t  conceived the best  
means of achieving African in tegra t ion  as being through gradual and
functional cooperation in social  and economic spheres ,  which would
23l a t e r  s p i l l  over in to  cooperation in p o l i t i c a l  spheres .  Addition­
a l l y ,  i t  favored cooperation s t a r t in g  at  the level  of sub-regions in 
the various  parts  of A fr ica ,  for example. West, East  and Central Afr i­
can reg ions ,  though i t  a lso  believed tha t  some form of p o l i t i c a l  coop­
e ra t ion  was necessary (but i t  only viewed such p o l i t i c a l  cooperation
in terms of "a loose f e d e ra t io n ,"  in order to ensure "a good begin­
ning"^^) .  Therefore,  to Nigeria,  the establi shment  of an immediate 
su p ras ta te  un i f i ca t ion  of Africa was not a good idea ,  and i t  thus as­
ser ted  i t  would be "premature to form a Union of S ta te s  under one sov- 
25e re ig n ty . "
This so r t  of Nigerian policy on Pan-African a f f a i r s  was much 
in d i r e c t  con trad ic t ion  with the p o l ic ie s  of coun tr ie s  l ike  Ghana. Es­
s e n t i a l l y ,  to Ghana, African unity was understood only in terms of an 
immediate supras ta te  un i f ica t ion  of Afr ica .  In f a c t ,  in Ghana th i s  
idea of  African unity  was "no longer a matter for public p o l i t i c a l  de­
bate" because th a t  c o un t ry ' s  co n s t i tu t ion  " s p e c i f i c a l l y  s t a t e s  tha t  
Ghana is  prepared,  at any time, to surrender her sovereignty  in whole 
or in p a r t ,  in the i n t e r e s t  of a Union of African S t a t e s . "
In a c t u a l i t y ,  these  d i f fe r ing  views on African unity  were of 
much s ign i f icance  in the African p o l i t i c a l  scene due to the f a c t  tha t  
those th a t  had the same view as Nigeria formed a bloc ca l led  the
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Monrovia bloc,  while those who had the same view as Ghana's formed the 
Casablanca bloc."
The Monrovia bloc consis ted mainly of moderate, and mostly pro-
no
West, African co un t r ie s ,  while the Casablanca bloc was made up of 
the  rad ica l  countr ies  which genera l ly  sought to  d r a s t i c a l l y  reduce 
l in k s  to the West. Herein l i e s  the bas is  fo r  evalua t ing  the  F i r s t  Re­
p u b l i c ' s  policy in the  area of Pan-African a f f a i r s  in terms of the con­
cept of nonalignment. To the ex tent t h a t  Nigeria was id e n t i f i e d  with 
the  Monrovia bloc,  which favored a gradual and functional in t e g r a ­
t ion  of Africa and which had pro-West tendenc ies ,  N ig e r i a ' s  policy 
a lso r e f l e c te d  some pro-West tendencies .
However, the Nigerian Pan-African po l icy  was not s t a t i c
throughout the F i r s t  Republic era ;  thus ,  i t  inc reas ing ly  added some as-
2 9s e r t i veness,  pa r t ly  to calm domestic c r i t i c s  and p a r t l y  to  adjust  
i t s  pos i t ion  in order not to appear to o ther African s t a t e s  as not be­
ing s t rongly  committed to a strong united A fr ica .  Indeed, Nigeria 
played an act ive  ro le  in building the bridges t h a t  helped in the e s tab ­
lishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 (and thus 
i t  helped in crea t ing  a framework which embraced the whole con t inen t ,  
and which also led to the Casablanca and Monrovia blocs ceasing to 
e x i s t ) .
Thus, toward the end of the F i r s t  Republic,  Nigeria had become 
more a s se r t iv e  in Pan-African a f f a i r s .  For example, in 1965 i t  could 
f o r c e fu l ly  declare th a t  "Africa cannot be subverted unless African 
s t a t e s  aid such subvers ion,"  and th a t  no foreign power "can get a 
foothold  on the African continent save with the aid and abettment of
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A f r i c a . H o w e v e r ,  Nigerian a sse r t iveness  did not reach a level in 
which i t  saw i t s e l f ,  or was seen by o th e r s ,  as a rad ica l  e i th e r  in 
terms of domestic or foreign pol icy .  Therefore,  i t  i s  not surpr is ing  
th a t  when the F i r s t  Republic was brought to an end, and the Prime Min­
i s t e r  during t h a t  e ra ,  Tafawa Balewa, was a s sa s s in a te d ,  Kwame Nkrumah 
of Ghana described the l a t t e r  as
. . .  a victim of forces  he did not understand and a mar­
ty r  to a n e o -c o lo n i a l i s t  system of which he was merely a f i g ­
urehead. . . . S t r iv ing  v a l i a n t l y  to  master a s i t u a t i o n  which 
was beyond h is  c a p a c i ty , ,h e  has f a l l e n  in a s t rugg le  whose na­
tu re  he never understood.
Nigeria and the Congo C r i s i s
The e a r ly  1950 's ,  t h a t  heralded the rega in ing  of independence 
by many African coun t r ies ,  also witnessed the debacle  t h a t  was made 
out of Z a i r e ' s  (then ca l l ed  the Congo) e f f o r t  to maintain i t s  sover­
eignty  and t e r r i t o r i a l  i n t e g r i t y  a f t e r  regaining i t s  independence from 
Belgium. This global unnerving spec tac le  was ap p rop r ia te ly  re fe r red  
to as the Congo Cris is  in many c i r c l e s .  I t  manifested i t s e l f  in terms 
of leadership  t u s s l e s  th a t  re su l ted  in long periods  of confusion over 
where, or whether,  adequately recognizable  p o l i t i c a l  au thor i ty  
e x i s t e d ,  and was also accompanied by general p o l i t i c a l  immobilism,a 
paralyzed s t a t e  apparatus ,  and th r e a t s  of secess ion .  There was a lso  a 
galore of a l l e g a t io n s  of  undue in te r fe rence  in the  in te rn a l  a f f a i r s  of 
the Congo by Belgium, the two superpowers, and even the United Nations 
(whose c iv i l i a n  and m i l i t a r y  opera tions  in th a t  country were conceived 
by the global body as a means of providing the environment fo r  the r e s ­
to ra t io n  of a v iable  p o l i t y ) .
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Nigeria  expectedly was c lo se ly  involved in the Congo C r is is  
since i t ,  l i k e  other African coun t r ie s ,  was eager to  ensure th a t  the 
Congo should not be subjected  to forces  tha t  were only out to enfeeble 
i t .  Notably,  N ig e r ia ' s  policy in the Congo was th a t  of supporting the 
United Nations '  ro le  in the Congo; and thus ,as  i t  regained i t s  own in ­
dependence in 1960 and became a member of the United Nations,  i t  pro­
vided m i l i t a r y  personnel to aid in the l e t t e r ' s  m i l i t a r y  operations  in 
32the  Congo. Addi t iona l ly ,  Nigeria was a lso  very anxious to support
the  UN c i v i l i a n  opera t ions ,  and forwarded two of i t s  senior c iv i l  serv-
33a n t s ,  T. A. R. Oki and Francis Nwokedi, to serve with tha t  body,
with the l a t t e r  being the th i r d  person to hold the pos i t ion  of head of
United Nations opera tions  in the Congo, a f t e r  Rajeshwar Dayal (Indian) 
and Robert Gardiner (Ghanaian).
On the purely p o l i t i c a l  p lane ,  Nigeria a lso  sought to  fo s te r  
the  UN r o l e .  JaJa Wachuku, a Nigerian,  as the Chairman of the UN Con­
c i l i a t i o n  Commission, helped the UN to  play a c red ib le  ro le  in helping
35to deal with the p o l i t i c a l  issues Congo faced.
S ig n i f i c a n t l y ,  t h i s  Nigerian policy of overwhelming support 
fo r  UN r o l e  seems to have stemmed from the Nigerian foreign e l i t e  con­
ceiving the  Congo C r i s i s  in terms of a s i tu a t io n  of a breakdown of law 
and order in the Congo due to the exis tence of a weak p o l i t i c a l ,  so­
c ia l  and economic i n f r a s t r u c tu r e  a t  the time i t  regained i t s  indepen­
dence. For example, to  J a ja  Wachuku of Nigeria ,  the "lesson to be 
learned from the Congo" was that  the " f a i lu r e  to ensure the education 
of indigenous people" before independence leads to "chaos and the risk 
of a world c o n f l i c t .
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Having diagnosed the cause of the Congo C r i s i s  as above, Nige­
r i a  saw the solu tion as the provision of p o l i t i c a l ,  socia l  and eco­
nomic in f r a s t r u c tu r e s  t h a t  can support a sovereign s t a t e  and thus 
bring p o l i t i c a l  v i a b i l i t y  to the Congo. Therefore ,  N ig e r i a ' s  Congo 
policy r e f l e c te d  a mostly "nonpo l i t i c a l ,  adminis t ra t ive"^^  charac­
t e r .
I n te r e s t in g ly ,  the  Balewa Government of F i r s t  Republic Nigeria 
diagnosis o f ,  and so lu t ion  to ,  the Congo C r is i s  was much in consonance 
with those of the UN and major Western powers (and, a t  th a t  per iod,  
the l a t t e r  had much influence  on the former).
However, the Nigerian policy had many c r i t i c s  both a t  home and 
abroad. The NCNC, the o the r  party  in the c o a l i t io n  government, was 
s trongly in support of Lumumba and what he stood f o r ,  and was also
Op
very c r i t i c a l  of the United Nations.  This put i t  a t  odds with the
Balewa Government's fu l l  support of the UN and the  fo rm er 's  e f f o r t s
not to appear to support any of the p o l i t i c a l  groups in the Congo.
The Action Group, the Opportunity Party,  was also s t ro n g ly  against  the
o f f i c i a l  Nigerian ro le  and according to i t s  leade r ,  Obafemi Awolowo,
the forces against  Lumumba represented forces  t h a t  did not stand for
39the genuine independence of the Congo. This implied th a t  Nigeria
had to take s ides  in the Congo C r i s i s —and tha t  i t  should support the
40Lumumba f o r ce s .  A dd i t iona l ly ,  much of the p re s s ,  the pressure 
g r o u p s , a n d  the mass public opinion^^ were a l so  in support  of
the Lumumba fo rces ,  and saw them as representing the  genuine i n t e r e s t  
of Congo and a ll  of A f r i ca ,  and thus opposed the government 's  po licy .
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N ige r ia ' s  ro le  in the Congo was a lso  very displeas ing to some 
African co un t r ie s .  The role tha t  J a ja  Wachuku played, in his leade r ­
ship ro le  in the UN forums concerned with the Congo C r i s i s ,  earned him 
the following e p i th e t s  from African ambassadors tha t  r e f l e c te d  how 
those countr ies  f e l t  about N ige r ia ' s  ro le  in the c r i s i s :  "lackey of im­
per ia l ism and neo-colonia l ism,"  " f ro l i c k in g , "  " th i s  r id i cu lo u s ly  s e l f -  
s a t i s f i e d  and dangerously i r r espons ib le  despo t ,"  "human wreck," and "a 
t r a i t o r  and an enemy of Africa.
The Balewa Government, which s t rong ly  believed tha t  i t  was 
playing a sane and level-headed ro le  in the Congo C r i s i s ,  was appalled 
by these  domestic and in te rna t iona l  c r i t i c i s m s  (but convinced of the 
soundness of  i t s  r o l e ,  i t  never theless  continued th i s  r o l e ,  at  l e a s t  
in terms of substance) .
On the other hand, a t  l e a s t  in terms of s t y l e ,  the Balewa Gov­
ernment t r i e d  to assuage domestic c r i t i c i s m  and in te rna t iona l  r i d i ­
cule by l a t e r  on occasional ly  taking some ac t ions  th a t  f e l l  in l ine  
with progressive po s i t io n s .  For example, "Nigeria  began to canvass 
fo r  some kind o f  rapprochement with the Casablanca p o w e r s , w h i c h  
consis ted  of  the rad ica l  African countr ies  t h a t  were pro-Lumumba. Addi­
t i o n a l l y ,  toward the end of the F i r s t  Republic, Nigeria would be heard 
saying th a t  i t  was "ready to work with a l l  fel low African countr ies
within the OAU in a renewed search for a plan of ass is tance  fo r  the
C o n g o , t h u s  ind ica t ing  tha t  Nigeria be lieved t h a t ,  apar t  from the 
UN, the so lu t ion  to the Congo C r is is  also can be found in purely A fr i ­
can forums. This was a s ig n i f i c a n t  change from an e a r l i e r  view th a t
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such African i n i t i a t i v e  should be within the UN f r a m e w o r k . H o w ­
ever ,  i t  must a lso  be noted tha t  Nigeria had always s t r e s se d  a strong 
African ro le ,^^  no matter what forum i t  was to be manifested.
Also, i t  must be noted th a t  Nigeria ,  r i g h t  from the beginning sup­
ported the s a n c t i t y  of the Congolese t e r r i t o r i a l  i n t e g r i t y .  For exam­
p le ,  Ja ja  Wachuku warned t h a t ,
. . . any country t h a t  dares to suggest tha t  Katanga will 
by any means be taken out ^  the Congo i s  an enemy of Africa  
so f a r  as we a re  concerned.
However, N ig e r i a ' s  support  fo r  the UN ro le  in the Congo Cris is
remained constan t ;  thus ,  even towards the end of the F i r s t  Republic
49such support was r e i t e r a t e d .
On the whole,  supporting the UN ro le  in the  Congo C r i s i s  can 
be in te rp re te d  to a lso  mean a Nigerian pol icy  towards the Congo c r i s i s
t h a t  was c lose r  to the Western pos i t ion  (s ince the UN then was much in ­
fluenced fay i t  and such inf luence was apparent in UN Congo i n i t i a ­
t i v e s ,  though some of such UN i n i t i a t i v e s  did d i f f e r  with the pos i ­
t io n s  of some Western countr ies  sometimes). Also, some schola rs  l ike  
Akinyemi hold the view t h a t ,  " the f a c t  t h a t  the Western s t a t e s ,  espe­
c i a l l y  the United S t a t e s ,  opposed Lumumba," and Nigeria ,  did not sup­
por t  Lumumba, but ins tead  t r i e d  to show th a t  i t  did not favor any of 
the p o l i t i c a l  groups in the  Congo, made "the Nigerian policy  . . . 
even more s u s p e c t . T h e r e f o r e ,  assess ing N ig e r i a ' s  pol icy  towards 
the Congo C r i s i s ,  in terms of nonalignment, shows th a t  i t s  pol icy was 
c lose r  to t h a t  of the  West.
160
The F i r s t  Republic and Southern Africa
While the process of decoloniza tion was sweeping Africa in the 
1960s, in most coun t r ie s  in Southern Afr ica  such winds of change had 
in s i g n i f i c a n t  momentum. Coupled with t h i s  was the lack of any prog­
r e s s  in moves to dismantle the offensive and explosive  r ac ia l  s i t u ­
a t ion  of suppression and exp lo i ta t ion  in Zimbabwe (then cal led  South­
ern Rhodesia) and South Afr ica .
In p r i n c i p l e ,  the Balewa Government f u l l y  supported the e f f o r t  
to solve the problem of colonizat ion and/or rac ia l  oppression in South­
ern Afr ica ,  which during th a t  period p e r s i s te d  in Angola, Sao Tome, 
Mozambique, Namibia, South A fr ica ,  Zimbabwe (then Southern Rhodesia),  
Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia),  Botswana (then Bechuanaland), Lesotho 
(then Basutoland),  and Swaziland. Some, l ike  the l a s t  fou r ,  were not 
ser ious problem areas  and did eas i ly  regain  t h e i r  independence. How­
ever ,  the  Balewa Government policy towards the so lu t ion  of the prob­
lems in these  areas  was loaded with concern fo r  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y  and 
adequate p repara t ion  fo r  independence;^^ and t h i s  underlying empha­
s i s  of i t s  policy  made many, ins ide  and outs ide  of Nigeria ,  d i s s a t i s ­
f i e d  with N ig e r i a ' s  ro le  in the  Southern Africa problem area .  Al­
though the Balewa Government wanted colonization  and r a c ia l  oppression 
to be wiped out in Southern Afr ica ,  i t  had almost no sympathy fo r  any 
group th a t  wanted to use armed s truggle  to achieve t h i s .  Thus, during 
the F i r s t  Republic,  while supporting the e f f o r t  to solve the Southern 
African problem, Nigeria  was, genera l ly ,  not very c lose  to many na t ion­
a l i s t  groups from t h i s  area (though i t  gave moral and materia l  help to 
them, through the OAU Libera tion Committee, as African countr ies  were.
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and are s t i l l ,  required to do). For example, the Salewa Government 
did not make these  n a t i o n a l i s t  groups feel  th a t  Lagos was a very under­
standing place to  them, even though these  groups made e x t ra  e f f o r t s  to
52create  such a c limate .  A ddi t iona l ly ,  Salewa mostly avoided per­
sonal contac ts  with the l eade rs  of these groups.
Another important aspect of  N ige r ia ' s  po licy  towards the South­
ern African problem was i t s  lack of s ig n i f i c a n t  resentment towards the 
colonial  and apar theid a u th o r i t i e s  in th i s  a rea .  For example, desp ite  
a general outcry inside and outs ide  of Nigeria over the  Sharpevi l le  
Massacre of March, 1960, and the f a c t  that  a l l  the Nigerian p o l i t i c a l  
p a r t ie s  demanded the banning of trade  with, and the Commonwealth termi­
nating the membership o f .  South A fr ica ,  the Salewa Government inv i ted  
South Afr ica  to the Nigerian independence ceremonies and did not break 
trade r e l a t i o n s  with t h a t  country un t i l  Apr il ,  1961.^^ Also,
On the eve of the March 1961 Commonwealth Conference, 
Salewa s t i l l  said he had not made up his  mind whether to op­
pose South African membership or not,  despite  the r a r e  unanim­
i t y  among Nigerian p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  and the press in demand­
ing the expulsion of South Afr ica .
And th i s  p a r t i c u l a r  episode shows t h a t ,  in some cases ,  N ig e r i a ' s  f o r ­
eign policy  was s t rongly  dependent on the whims and capr ices  of Salewa 
(as a person).
The Salewa Government, by recognizing d ip lom at ica l ly  the shor t ­
l ived Central African Federation (which would be perceived mostly as 
an e f f o r t  to thwart the e f f o r t s  to  regain genuine independence in Zam­
bia ,  Zimbabwe, and Malawi through the d i lu t ion  of the  n a t i o n a l i s t  
s trengths  in these  coun tr ies  by br inging them under a federa l  umbrella 
tha t  could be e f f e c t iv e ly  con tro l led  from Harare,  then Sa l i sbury ) ,  
also showed how fa r  i t  went in f r a t e rn iz in g  with a u t h o r i t i e s  t h a t  were
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seen as representing  the impediments to  the so lu t ion  of Southern
African problems. And fo r  the record i t  should be noted t h a t ,  "unti l
the d i s so lu t io n  of the Federa tion,  Salewa allowed the Federation to 
keep i t s  diplomatic mission in L a g o s . T h i s  was another s i t u ­
ation in which Salewa stuck to such a policy despi te  considerable
c r i t i c i s m  from inside and outs ide Nigeria.  For example, both the gov­
ernment and the opposit ion party  l e g i s l a t o r s  in the House of Represen­
t a t i v e s  were agains t  the course of action followed by Salewa. 
Also, such an i n s e n s i t i v i t y  on the pa rt  of Salewa drew the following 
r e t o r t  from a Zimbabwean n a t io n a l i s t  group:
Your lack of understanding of the African p l ig h t  from 
Welensky's oppression i s  shocking, d is tu rb ing  and unbe f i t t ing  
an African Prime Minis ter .  Yourg/riendship with Roy Welensky 
has warped your sense of j u s t i c e .
Another strand of the Salewa Government's policy towards the
Southern African problem areas was an underlying overdose of f l e x i b i l ­
i t y  which, in some ins tances ,  bordered on policy actions  th a t  many con­
sidered to be p o l ic ie s  th a t  could perpetuate  the problems in these 
a reas .  For example, Oaja Wachuku proposed "a fede ra t ion  of 'b lack '
and 'w h i t e ' s t a t e s  in South Africa"^^ as a so lu t ion  to the South 
African problem. I t  should a lso  be noted t h a t ,  in t h i s  ins tance,
Wachuku's proposal did not only appear capable of perpetuat ing the
South African problem but i t  was also iden t ica l  to a solution the
South African a u th o r i t i e s  (which at present are try ing to implement
such a p o l icy ,  desp ite  domestic and in te rna t iona l  opposi t ion) had con­
ceived as 'Bantus tan ism ' ,  and which at present  t r a n s l a t e s  into carving 
South Africa into 'b lack '  and 'white* s t a t e s .  In r e a l i t y  t h i s
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represents  the wish th a t  the black population can vanish from the main­
stream of South African p o l i t i c a l  l i f e  and the i l l u s io n  th a t  they can 
achieve t h e i r  fu l l  p o l i t i c a l  pa r t i c ipa t ion  in the so -ca l led  'homeland' 
s t a t e s .  In a n u t s h e l l ,  the 'Santustan '  po licy  b a s ic a l ly  r e s t s  on the 
notion th a t  blacks and whites can best  l i v e  in separa te  s o c ie t i e s  
(which the South African a u th o r i t i e s  a lso  purports to mean two so c i ­
e t i e s  with equal o p p o r tu n i t i e s ,  but which the  majori ty  of South A f r i ­
cans and the in te rn a t io n a l  community sees as an arrangement which per ­
petuates very l im ited  p o l i t i c a l ,  social and economic oppor tun i t ies  fo r  
b lacks) .  A ddi t iona l ly ,  t h i s  notion of r a c ia l  separa tion  i s  the bed­
rock of the apar theid  po l icy ,  and the fa c t  t h a t  the 'Bantustan '  policy  
also r e s t s  on such a notion means tha t  the idea of separa te  ' b l ac k '  
and 'w h i t e ' s t a t e s  i s  an e f f o r t  to c rea te  new s t ru c tu re s  to perpetuate  
the apar theid  phenomenon.
Thus, Wachuku, by proposing the crea tion  of 'b lack '  and
'w h i te ' s t a t e s  in a federa ted  South Africa as a so lu tion  to the South 
African problem, f a r  from being seen as a form of f l e x i b l e  po l icy ,  was 
perceived as a Salewa Government policy  t h a t  bordered on support fo r  
the apar theid  policy of 'Bantus tanism'.  Though the Balewa Government 
did drop t h i s  proposal,  i t  appears tha t  such a perception of  the pro­
posal,  due to i t s  shocking value,  stuck in the minds of many as a 
statement t h a t  r e f l e c te d  an endemic pa t te rn  of thought in the Salewa 
Government fo re ign  policy c i r c l e s .
Expectedly,  t h i s  Wachuku proposal t r iggered  an avalanche of
outrage from the p res s ,  the mass public and pressure  groups. Some
cal led  for  Wachuku's dismissal  from the government, while o thers  saw
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his actions as demoralizing and shocking and also "accused him of sub­
scr ibing to the idea of Bantustanism.®^
However, there is  a need to r e i t e r a t e  th a t  the F i r s t  Repub­
l i c ' s  fo re ign  po l icy  was not s t a t i c  and, in the case of i t s  policy 
towards the Southern African problem, there  was some change over time 
(though such changes were gradual and often were changes involving 
s ty le  ra th e r  than the substance of i t s  po l icy ) .  In connection with 
the s truggle  fo r  the independence of Zimbabwe, which occurred during 
the ear ly  phase of the F i r s t  Republic, Nigeria seemed to have shown 
much f a i t h  in the  B r i t i sh  a u t h o r i t i e s '  having the p o l i t i c a l  will  to 
help bring genuine independence to th a t  country®^ (on the basis  th a t  
the Bri t i sh  Government, being the de ju re  colonial au thor i ty  in the 
country then,  had the legal and moral r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  to ensure th a t  
the l a t t e r  was able to  have nothing le ss  than genuine independence). 
Addit ionally ,  Nigeria ,  along with several  other African coun t r ie s ,  en­
dorsed the pos i t ion  championed by Ghana th a t  the s i tu a t io n  then in Zim-
cp
babwe "represented colonia li sm in i t s  worst form." The Balewa Gov­
ernment appeared to have been much impressed with the chances of con­
s t i t u t i o n a l  reforms being able to make a l l  the segments of the Zimbab­
wean population wi l l ing  "to work together."®^ I t  also made s t a t e ­
ments which implied tha t  i t  s trongly  prefe r red  the process of bringing 
independence to tha t  country to be marked with gradualism and adequate 
preparat ion for  independence, even though i t  saw the conditions  in 
th a t  country as being grave.  Thus, while in one breath i t  recognized 
the question of independence fo r  th a t  country as being "very explo­
s ive ,"  in the same breath i t  was advocating th a t  the people of
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t h a t  country should "learn to govern by governing" during an implied 
p repara t ion for independence period.
Nevertheless,  towards the end of the F i r s t  Republic,  the
Balewa Government did become a l i t t l e  b i t  more a s se r t iv e  in i t s  pos i ­
t io n  on the  s i tu a t io n  in Zimbabwe. For example, i t  was becoming more 
fo rce fu l  in demanding economic sanct ions agains t  the i l l e g a l  regime 
t h e n  in power In  th a t  c o u n t r y . ^  Also. "  even began to  pub l ic ly  
doubt the s in ce r i t y  of those big powers th a t  i t  regarded as i t s
f r i e n d s ,  and thus i t  posi ted tha t  the question of independence fo r  Zim­
babwe "was going to be a t e s t  of the s in c e r i t y  of the big powers which 
claimed to be f r i ends  of Africa."®® The t h r e a t  of African countr ies  
using "al l  forces a t  t h e i r  d isposal"  to bring independence to tha t  
country was not even ruled out by Nigeria.®^
The above pos i t ions  represented an increas ing  level of  a s s e r ­
t iveness  over the question of Zimbabwean independence; but,  even then, 
the  change was mostly in terms of s ty le  (while the substance of policy 
b a s ic a l ly  remained moderate).  Such a sse r t iveness  was s t i l l  very mild
r e l a t i v e  to  the p o s i t ions  i d e n t i f i e d  with many radica l  African coun­
t r i e s .
Nigeria ,  on the whole, s t i l l  t ru s t e d  the B r i t i sh  "to spare no 
i n i t i a t i n g  some ' c o n s t i t u t i o n a l '  arrangements to solve
the problems in th a t  country.  Thus, while countr ies  l ike  Mali were of
the view th a t  the Unila te ra l  Declaration of Independence (UDI) car r ied  
out by the regime then in power in Zimbabwe "had occurred with the en­
couragement and even complicity of the United Kingdom,"®^ and Tan­
zania  also saw the ro le  by the l a t t e r  as dismal enough to warrant i t s
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terminat ion of diplomatic r e l a t i o n s  with th a t  c o u n t r y , N i g e r i a
. . accepted the B r i t i sh  view th a t  ' l im i t e d  economic s an c t io n s '  and
not force of arms would be adequate to bring"^^ the regime then in
Zimbabwe to submission, "and hence were the more appropria te  react ion  
7?to  UDI . . The F i r s t  Republ ic ' s  pol icy  towards the Zimbabwe
is s u e ,  the re fo re ,  showed tha t  i t s  e a r l i e r  hope for "a peaceful and 
o rde r ly  manner"^^ of bringing independence to  th a t  country prevailed  
throughout th a t  era of Nigerian government.
With regards to the s i t u a t io n  in South Afr ica ,  Nigeria  a lso  en­
dorsed the idea of hoping for  "a peaceful change"^^ in t h a t  coun­
t r y ' s  p o l i c i e s ,  though i t  was a lso  aware of the grav i ty  of the f e s t e r ­
ing s i t u a t i o n .  For example, i t  noted th a t  the th ree  most ser ious con­
cerns i t  saw facing the United Nations then,  namely, disarmament, colo­
nia li sm and slavery,  as a l l  e x i s t in g  in South A f r i c a . T h i s  Nige­
r ian  policy of helping to  look fo r  peaceful so lu t ions  to the South 
African problem thus led i t  to cons tan t ly  advocate economic sanc tions  
aga ins t  tha t  c o u n t r y . A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  i t  a lso  worked towards u t i l i z ­
ing the United Nations f a c i l i t i e s  and resources  to expose and dissemi­
nate  information about the e v i l s  of the apar theid  system, and about 
those  outs ide elements tha t  help to keep i t  a l i v e . T h u s ,  implic­
i t l y  by emphasizing these two methods of solving the apar the id  prob­
lem, Nigeria appeared to have held the view th a t  South Afr ica ,  and the 
coun t r ie s  Nigeria considered to be economically, m i l i t a r i l y  and p o l i t ­
i c a l l y ,  helping the l a t t e r ,  were capable of being ra t iona l  and wi l l ing  
to  respond to in te rna t iona l  public opinion in favor of an immediate 
termination of the apartheid  system, e i t h e r  through the concern for
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global moral ind ignation or through the physical  hardship th a t  sanc­
t i o n s  might bring.  But the h i s to ry  of the past  decades seems to i n d i ­
ca te  tha t  the Balewa Government overestimated South A f r i c a ' s  moral 
capacity  and p o l i t i c a l  w i l l ,  while underestimating th e i r  capacity  to 
be obsessed with and impressed by the power th a t  can be susta ined 
through the possession of coercive fo rce s .
With regard to the s i tu a t io n  in Namibia, Nigeria was also hope­
fu l  tha t  in te rn a t io n a l  forums l ik e  the United Nations "would f u l f i l l
i t s  obl iga t ions  to the inhab i tan ts  of the t e r r i t o r y  by rescuing them
78from the "monster of Apartheid . " And here again recent h i s to ry  
t e s t i f i e s  to  the f a c t  th a t  Nigeria overestimated the capacity of i n t e r ­
national  organiza t ions  l ik e  the United Nations,  and the a b i l i t y  of the 
wor ld 's  more powerful countr ies  to help solve t h i s  issue.
However, i t  seems th a t  Nigeria did sometimes doubt the good­
w i l l  and s i n c e r i t y  of some c o u n t r ie s .  For example, in connection with 
i t s  su rpr ise  at the level of foreign m i l i t a r y  support tha t  Portugal
go t ,  and often used, to  maintain i t s  colonial  regimes in Africa and
elsewhere,  Shettima Ali Monguno of Nigeria asser ted  that  the "NATO 
powers were responsib le  for the arms build-up . . .  in Por tugal,"  and
t h a t  he could not understand t h e i r  "pleading the nece ss i t i e s  of 
79western defence ."  Addi t iona l ly ,
Nigeria f a i l e d  to see th a t  South Africa could properly be 
regarded as p a r t  of the f r ee  world in view of i t s  rac ia l  p o l i ­
c ies ,  denia ls  of fundamental human r i g h t s ,  repressior^gand op­
pression of ind iv idua ls  and the aggressive  tendencies.
Nevertheless,  desp i te  some of t h i s  doubt,  the F i r s t  Republic,
as shown above, was mainly in support of peaceful solutions  to the
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problems of Southern Afr ica ,  and was not advocating armed s t rugg le .  
This so r t  of po l icy  pos it ion  was mostly p a r a l l e l  to  the policy pos i ­
t ion of Western co un t r ie s ,  and was fa r  from the p o l i c i e s  of the  East 
which was a c t i v e ly  supporting the armed s t rugg le  in these areas .  
Therefore,  in terms of nonalignment during the F i r s t  Republic, the  l e t ­
t e r ' s  policy pos i t ion  toward Southern African problems was much closer 
to the policy pos i t ion  of the West than th a t  of the East .
The General Decolonization Process and the F i r s t  Republic
Apart from the problems in the Congo and Southern Afr ica ,  the 
1960' s  a lso  witnessed the s truggle  for independence and social  j u s t i c e  
in other p a r t s  of Africa and throughout the world,  genera l ly .
N ig e r i a ' s  a t t i t u d e  toward the decoloniza tion process in these 
places ,  as was app l icab le  to the Congo and Southern African s i tu a t io n s  
as a lready shown above, was marked by the concern fo r  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ­
i t y ,  gradualism, and prospects fo r  s t a b i l i t y  (though i t  undoubtedly 
wanted a l l  t e r r i t o r i e s  to be free from colonia l  yoke and social  oppres­
s ion) .  For example, the radical  Algerian Provis iona l Government was
not recognized by the Balewa Government, and i t  refused "to in v i t e  i t
81to the Lagos Conference of African Heads of Sta tes  and Government." 
The Balewa Government also reasoned th a t  independence should only be 
granted to coun t r ie s  a f t e r  adequate p repa ra t ion ;  and in 1961, i t  pro­
posed 1970 as the date fo r  al l  the  colonia l  t e r r i t o r i e s  to be indepen-
82dent.  This ac t ion  was also another one th a t  was highly c r i t i c i z e d  
both within and outs ide  of Nigeria, and many African countr ies  were
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83p a r t i c u l a r l y  shocked by t h i s  proposal.  The level of the unpopular­
i t y  of t h i s  proposal was demonstrated by the strong dismay expressed
even by an important member of the pa rty  co n t ro l l in g  the government, 
the NPC, who complained th a t  Nigerians "have completely neglected non- 
independent African na t io n s , "  and tha t  he would " l i k e  the Ministry of 
Foreign a f f a i r s  fo r  goodness sake, to avoid giving the impression
t h a t "  Nigerians were "B r i t i sh  stooges because circumstances" showed
t h a t  Nigeria was " s t i l l  a s a t e l l i t e  of the United Kingdom.
However, the Balewa Government's policy a lso  had some a s s e r ­
t i v e  aspects toward the general decolonizat ion p rocess ,  though these  
were r e l a t i v e l y  mild.  For example, "since 1953 Nigeria  has been a mem­
ber and the b iggest  con tr ibu tor  to the funds of the OAU Liberation Com-
OC
mit tee  which a s s i s t s  freedom f ig h t e r s  in the areas  of Afr ica"  
s t i l l  under colonial  or r a c ia l  oppression.
On the whole, in terms of to nonalignment,  N ig e r i a ' s  ro le  in 
the decoloniza tion process,  as shown above, was much in tune with West­
ern pos i t ions  since  i t ,  l ike  the l a t t e r ,  emphasized the elements of 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y ,  nonradicalism, and gradual changes based on ade­
quate national p o l i t i c a l  and admin is t ra t ive  p repara t ions  fo r  indepen­
dence. A ddi t iona l ly ,  i t  should a lso be noted tha t  some observers l ike  
Akinyemi s t a t e  tha t  while admirers may term Balewa's actions  as those
of a "moderate," h is  c r i t i c s  term his  ac t ions  as those of a
86"neo-colonial  a g e n t . "
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The Middle East Problem and the F i r s t  Republic
The F i r s t  Republic of Nigeria  maintained diplomatic r e la t io n s
with both the Arab countr ies  and I s r a e l  in such a way th a t  there  was a
somewhat balanced perspective to i t s  r e l a t io n s  with both.  Thus, even
in r e l a t io n  to the conf l ic tue l  r e l a t i o n s  between both,  Nigeria mostly
avoided act ions  th a t  portrayed i t  as favoring one s ide.  This was
often done by refusing to take any committed p o s i t io n ,  and also by urg-
87ing both sides to compromise.
This so r t  of even-handed r e la t io n s h ip  with Is rael  and the Arab 
world had much to do with the Nigerian domestic r e a l i t y .  With an a l ­
most equal population of Nigerians adhering to the Chris t ian and Mus­
lim re l ig io u s  f a i t h s ,  and with the members of the two f a i t h s  res id ing  
mostly in the southern and northern parts  of Nigeria, re spec t ive ly ,  
there  were also tendencies which showed t h a t  the mostly Chris t ian 
South was p r o - I s r a e l ,  while the mostly Muslim North was pro-Arab. The 
fa c t  t h a t  the p o l i t i c a l  forces in the  two areas reinforced these ten­
dencies also re inforced  the l e t t e r s '  s ig n i f ic an ce ,  in terms of th e i r  
impact on the Nigerian policy towards the Is rae l i /A rab  c o n f l i c t .
The fac t  th a t  ne i ther  of the  two r e l ig io u s  groups was over­
whelmingly more populous, in addit ion  to the na ture  of Federal Govern­
ment during the F i r s t  Republic, meant tha t  not only were the p o l i t i c a l  
forces within the country more or l e s s  balanced, but th a t  they were 
also mostly incorporated into broad-based c o a l i t io n  governmental frame­
works. The Federal Government consis ted  of a coa l i t ion  government 
formed by the Northern-based NPC and the Eastern-based NCNC, during
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the e a r ly  and middle period of the  F i r s t  Republic, and by a more broad 
based compromise coa l i t io n  government of the NPC, NCNC, and the 
Western-based Nigerian National Democratic Party—NNDP—during the 
l a t e r  period of the F i r s t  Republ ic ) .  This resu l ted  in considerable  
compromising and balancing acts  (more so since most of the c o a l i t io n  
p a r t i e s  were incompatible with o th e r s  and only joined the c o a l i t io n  to 
share power).
In re la t io n  to  I s r a e l i /A ra b  i s su e s ,  t h i s  compromising and b a l ­
ancing ac t  was very s ig n i f i c a n t  in t h a t  the compromising and balancing 
between the p o l i t i c a l  forces  of both the mostly Chris t ian p ro - I s r ae l  
South, and the mostly Muslim pro-Arab North, produced the Nigerian Mid­
dle  East policy tha t  showed an even-handed dealing with the I s r a e l i s  
and the Arabs. However, i t  must be noted th a t  the compromising and 
the  balancing of  views also might have been made more possib le  by the 
very accommodating, and p la ca t in g ,  pe rso n a l i ty  of the Prime M in is te r ,
go
Tafawa Balewa.
Addit ionally ,  i t  is  also important to note tha t  the a b i l i t y  to 
compromise views on the I s r a e l /  Arab i s sue ,  fo r  the sake of na tiona l 
i n t e r e s t s ,  did not ac tua l ly  mean th a t  the pa r t isan  tendencies,  which 
had st rong spec i f ic  regional anchors,  a lso  disappeared. In s tead ,  they 
were waxing strong a t  the regional l e v e l .  For example, the Premier of 
the then Northern Region, Ahmadu Bel lo ,  over-involved himself with the 
e f f o r t s  to r a l l y  the Islamic world against  I s r a e l ,  while the govern­
ments of the then Western and Eastern Regions were also very in tense
89in t h e i r  l inks  with I s r a e l ,  e sp e c i a l l y  in the economic areas .
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On the whole, the Federal Government, which has the f u l l  r e ­
s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  fo re ign  policy (though th i s  did not mean a curb on in­
dividual or regional i n i t i a t i v e s ,  as shown above) made sure t h a t  Nige-
90r i a  did not favor e i th e r  side in the I s rae l i /Arab  i s sue .  There­
f o r e ,  in terms of nonalignment, N ig e r ia ' s  policy towards the I s r a e l i /  
Arab issue was nonaligned, since i t  did not favor e i t h e r  I s r a e l ,  which
was backed by the West, or the Arab world, then led by N asse r ' s  Egypt,
91which was backed by by the Soviet  Union. In f a c t ,  the  F i r s t  
Republ ic 's  policy towards the I s rae l i /A rab  issue appears to be the one 
th a t  most manifested nonaligned content in foreign pol icy .
Foreign Economic Relations
The nature  of N ig e r ia ' s  fo re ign  economic r e l a t i o n s  will  be 
evaluated by examining the volume and the d i rec t ion  of i t s  t rade  r e l a ­
t io n s  with other c o u n t r i e s ,  the sources of foreign  investment and as­
s i s t a n c e ,  and the magnitude and d i rec t ion  of s c i e n t i f i c  and technica l  
cooperation with o ther  co u n t r ie s .
The F i r s t  Republic of Nigeria,  having an economy th a t  was 
s t i l l  much a r e f l e c t i o n  i t s  colonia l  legacy (an economy hinged on the 
periphery of the Western economic s t ru c tu re )  and a conservative  govern­
ment l i ke the Balewa Government (which had no in c l in a t io n  fo r  d r a s t i c  
changes in the  economic s t ru c tu re  of an independent N ig e r ia ) ,  meant 
t h a t  Nigeria ,  in 1960 and 1965, had about 85 percent and 80 percent  of 
i t s  imports,  r e s p e c t iv e ly ,  from the West, while only 1.2 and 2.7 per­
cent of i t s  imports,  in 1960 and 1965, re sp ec t iv e ly ,  came from the
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whole of Eastern Europe, and 0.8  and 1.8 percent of imports,  in 1950
op
and 1965, came from the  People 's  Republic of China. In terms of
the d i re c t io n  of export  t rade ,  the same pa t te rn  was app l icab le ,  with
about 95 and 90 percents  of the exports ,  in 1960 and 1965, going to
the West, while only 0 .4  and 2.5 percents  of the ex p o r t s ,  in 1960 and
1965, went to  Eastern Europe, and 0.3 percent  in 1965 (and v i r t u a l l y
no recordable amount in 1960),  of the exports went to  the People 's  Re- 
93public of China. Thus,  in terms of the pa t te rn  of t rade  p a r tn e r s ,
N ige r ia ' s  l in k s  during the F i r s t  Republic were overwhelmingly with the
West.
B r i ta in  was c l e a r l y  the most f a v o r i t e  Western t rade  par tner  as
demonstrated by the f a c t  t h a t  Nigeria got 42.3 and 30.9 percent of i t s
imports,  in 1960 and 1965, from the former, which a lso  received 47.6
94percent ( in  1960) and 37.8 percent (in 1965) of N ig e r ia ' s  exports .
I t  i s  a lso important to note th a t  though N ig e r i a ' s  trade l in k s  
were overwhelmingly with the West, there  were some e f f o r t s  to  d iv e r ­
s i fy  external t rade  r e l a t i o n s  (though t h i s  was c l e a r ly  very neg l ig ­
i b l e ) .  For example, t rade  r e la t io n s  with Eastern Europe and China
were gradua l ly  r i s in g  (from a to ta l  of about 2.0 and 0 .4  percent  of im­
ports and exports  in 1960, to  about 4.5  and 2.8 percent of imports and
exports ,  in 1965).^^ However, as the  f igu res  show, th e  percentage 
of trade  r e l a t i o n s  with Eastern Europe and China, was s t i l l  very 
small ,  while Nigeria t r ad e  l inks  continued to be overwhelmingly with
the West.^G
During the F i r s t  Republic most manufacturing f i rm s ,  large mar­
keting conglomerates, and some banks were also owned, wholly or
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TABLE 1
PATTERN OF NIGERIA'S IMPORT TRADE RELATIONS, 1960-1965
Countries
1960
Million
Naira %
1965 
Mill ion 
Naira %
Bri ta in 132.8 42.3 170.1 30.9
U. S. A. 23.2 5.4 66.2 12.0
Japan 55.6 12.9 51.2 9 .3
Federal Republic of Germany 30.4 7.0 59.1 10.7
I t a l y 14.4 3.3 25.4 4.6
France 9.8 2.3 24.2 4 .4
Netherlands 23.2 5.4 20.9 3.8
Belgium and Luxemburg 6.5 1.5 6.9 1.2
Norway 14.4 3.3 11.4 2.1
People 's  Republic of China 3.6 0.8 9.7 1 .8
Eastern Europe 5.1 1.2 14.6 2 .7
Africa 4.6 1.1 7.8 1.4
Other Countries 58.2 13.5 83.8 15.1
TOTALS 431.8 100.0 550.8 100.0
Source; Culled from Olufemi Fagana, " In te rna t iona l  Trade and Balance 
of Payments,” in F. A. Olaloku, e t  a l . ,  e d s . .  S t ruc tu re  of 
the  Nigerian Economy, New York: St .  Mar tin 's  Press,  19797
pp. 235-236 (which based i t s  data on data co l lec ted  from the 
Federal Office of S t a t i s t i c s ,  Trade Report and The Review 
of External Trade, and Central Bank of Nigerfaj  Annual 
Report) .
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TABLE 2
PATTERN OF NIGERIA'S EXPORT TRADE RELATIONS, 1960-1965
Countries
1960 
Mi 11i on 
Naira %
1965 
Mi 11i on 
Naira %
Bri ta in 161.4 47.6 202.9 37.8
U. S. A. 31.8 9.4 52.4 9.8
Japan 5.1 1.5 6.3 1.2
Federal Republic of Germany 25.8 7.6 55.7 10.4
I t a ly 14.4 4.2 21.9 4.1
France 12.9 3.8 36.5 6.8
Netherlands 43.1 2.7 63.1 11.8
Belgium and Luxemburg 6.6 1.9 15.4 2.8
Norway 2.1 0.6 1.5 0.3
People 's  Republic of China 1.4 0.3
Eastern Europe 1.3 0.4 13.6 2.5
Africa 8.7 2.6 7.8 1.4
Other Countries 26.2 7.7 58.0 10.8
TOTALS 339.4 100.0 536.5 100.0
Source: Same as TABLE 1.
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p a r t i a l l y ,  by Western inves to rs ,  while investments by organizations  
from Eastern Europe or the People 's  Republic of China were v i r t u a l l y  
absent in a l l  sec tors  of the economy. In the area of foreign a s s i s ­
tance ,  the West was also in a c lea r  lead ,  with the United S ta tes  and 
Bri ta in  providing most of the d i r e c t  b i l a t e r a l  a s s i s tan c e  (in addit ion
to t h e i r  contr ibut ions  to in te rna t iona l  f inanc ia l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  which
97also accounted fo r  much of the external  a ss i s tan ce  to N iger ia ) .
Also, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands,  I t a l y ,  I s r a e l ,
and Switzerland (a ll  of which belong to the Western camp) were the
go
other major aid donors. On the other hand, the Balewa Government
re jec ted  the "Soviet  Union's i n t e r e s t - f r e e  loan" of about 40 mil l ion
99Naira offered to Nigeria soon a f t e r  i t  became independent.  How­
ever,  due to increasing e l i t e  and mass public opinion clamoring fo r  a 
more independent foreign policy ,  and the pressures  of the vocal and 
v i s ib l e  organized groups, the F i r s t  Republic, in i t s  middle and l a t e r  
phases, became more open to Eastern bloc a s s i s t a n c e .  Thus, in June 
1962 and September 1965, i t  got a 30 mil l ion  Naira Polish  loan and 10 
mil l ion  Naira Czechoslovakian loan, r e sp ec t iv e ly ,  and in March 1962 i t  
also received "credi t  fo r  an unspecified amount" from the Soviet  
U n i o n . T h u s ,  though the West contr ibuted more economic a s s i s ­
tance to F i r s t  Republic Niger ia ,  the East was not t o t a l l y  l e f t  out.
In the areas  of in te rna t iona l  s c i e n t i f i c  and technica l  coopera­
t io n ,  Nigeria a lso  had most of i t s  l inks  with Western coun t r ie s .  This 
was a r e s u l t  of i t s  having most of i t s  foreign t r a d e ,  investments and 
a ss i s tance  with those countr ies  (which meant th a t  most s c i e n t i f i c  and
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technica l  components, processes and systems, e x i s t e n t  then in Nigeria 
were overwhelmingly from the West, p a r t i c u l a r l y  B r i t a in ) .
Thus, on the whole, the F i r s t  Republic Nigeria foreign eco­
nomic r e l a t i o n s  was mostly with the West, and in terms of evaluating
the relevance of nonalignment on th i s  aspect of N ig e r ia ' s  foreign r e l a ­
t ions  i t  can be asser ted  tha t  Nigeria  leaned c l e a r l y  towards the West. 
However, the nature  of N ig e r ia ' s  foreign economic r e l a t i o n s  with the 
West did not mean th a t  the former thought everything was normal, or 
was unconscious of the implication of such r e l a t i o n s ,  in terms of i t s  
a b i l i t y ,  or i n a b i l i t y ,  to  be in adequate control  of i t s  domestic eco­
nomy, or to be able to pursue an independent foreign po l icy .  For in ­
s tance ,  the Balewa Government refused to accept an a ssoc ia te  member­
ship in the EEC on the grounds th a t  such an act ion would compromise
i t s  foreign policy p r in c ip le  of nonalignment.
The F i r s t  Republic and the East
When Nigeria regained i t s  independence, in 1960, i t  was very
h e s i t a n t  to e s t a b l i s h  r e l a t i o n s  with the East .  For example, i t  was
only in 1961 th a t  the Balewa Government allowed the Soviet  Union to
open an embassy in Lagos, and even a f t e r  deciding not to fu r th e r  delay
the Soviets in opening th e i r  foreign  mission i t  "placed an unpreceden-
102ted r e s t r i c t i o n  on the number of Soviet diplomats in N ige r ia ."
Addi t iona l ly ,  by 1965, Nigeria had only one foreign mission in the
103East,  and tha t  was at  Moscow.
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However, in response to the pressures  from rad ica l  domestic 
groups, and the Casablanca group of African s t a t e s ,  the F i r s t  Repub­
l i c ,  in the middle and l a s t  phase was more forthcoming in i t s  r e l a ­
t ions  with the East.^®^ By 1965 Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslo­
vakia,  Bulgaria,  Hungary and the Soviet Union had e s tab l i sh ed  foreign 
missions in Nigeria;  and each of these  countr ies  had also  concluded 
trade  agreements with Nigeria (Poland in 1961, Czechoslovakia and Bul­
gar ia  in 1962, Hungary and the Sovie t  Union in 1963, and Yugoslavia in 
1964.^^^ In November 1961, Nigeria took ac t ions  th a t  expanded r e l a ­
t ions  with the East ,  such as the l i f t i n g  of the ban on important Com­
munist l i t e r a t u r e ,  the modif ication of t rave l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  to Eastern 
countr ies  and the approval of Sovie t-bloc  scholarsh ips  fo r  Nigerian 
s t u d e n t s . T h e  l a s t  was to  become very important to the East for 
i t  was then a maiden e f f o r t  to  f o s t e r  d i r e c t  cu l tu ra l  con tac ts ;  and i t  
appears they have found these  educational l inks  to be a very important 
l ink for d i r e c t  cu l tu ra l  con tac ts  (since they have con t inua l ly  asked 
the Nigerian Government to send more students  and the program is now 
in a very expanded form).
'Cul tu ra l  m u l t i p l i e r s '  from these educational l inks  have been 
some marriages tha t  have accompanied i t ;  and to the East ,  which before 
the 1960s had very l i t t l e  c u l tu r a l  contac t  with Nigeria ,  the impact of 
th i s  cu l tu ra l  m u l t ip l i e r  has a c tu a l ly  has been the m u l t ip l ica t io n  of 
r e l a t i o n s ,  since i t  often means the contact  of two people from two d i f ­
f e r e n t  countr ies  r e s u l t i n g  in the contacts  of two f a m i l i e s ,  and even 
communities, in two d i f f e r e n t  co u n t r ie s .  Another cu l tu ra l  m u l t ip l ie r  
has been language, since apar t  from serving as a communication link i t
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also represents  an energ ize r  of the  cu l tu re  i t  springs  from. The f ac t  
tha t  former Nigerian s tudents  in Eastern European countr ies  are now ad­
m in i s t r a to r s ,  t e ache rs ,  doc tors ,  businessmen, engineers and public o f ­
f i c i a l s  who are f lu e n t  in Po l i sh ,  Russian,  Bulgarian,  Czech, Hungar­
ian,  Yugoslavian or Romanian languages also means a s ig n i f i c a n t  impact 
of the cu l tu re  of the s o c i e t i e s  those languages belong to (and the s ig ­
n if icance  of such an impact a lso  increases when considera tion is given 
to the f a c t  tha t  before the 1960' s  such c u l tu re s ,  unlike the cu l tu res  
of Western n a t i o n a l i t i e s ,  had very l i t t l e  impact in Niger ia ) .
There was a lso  some economic l ink with the East ,  although th i s  
was very neg l ig ib le  in comparison to the overwhelming l ink with the 
West (as shown in the preceding sec tion ) .  Addi tionally ,  economic a s ­
s is tance  from the East to ta le d  only about 40 million Naira.
Thus, on the whole, the F i r s t  Republic 's  l inks  with the East 
were weak, in comparison with i t s  Western l inks .  As a c lear demonstra­
t ion of th i s  during the F i r s t  Republic,  the highest  Soviet o f f i c i a l  to 
v i s i t  Nigeria was Deputy Foreign Minister M a l i k . A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  
one incident served to cool r e l a t i o n s ,  and th is  was an alleged Soviet
involvement in a plan to overthrow the Balewa Government by providing
108m i l i t a ry  t r a in in g  and weapons to  Nigerians in Ghana, This i n c i ­
dent resu l ted  in a w e l l -pub l ic ized  t r i a l  in which many prominent Nige­
rian p o l i t i c i a n s  were t r i e d ,  convicted,  and imprisoned.
Thus, in terms of nonalignment, the F i r s t  Republ ic 's  r e la t io n s  
with the East were considerably diminutive,  in comparison to c lose r  
and more extensive r e l a t i o n s  with the West.
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An Overview
On the whole, Nigerian polic ie s  in the various policy issue 
areas  discussed above show th a t  the F i r s t  Republic had very warm r e l a ­
t io n s  with the West, while i t s  re la t ions  with the East were s i g n i f i ­
cant ly  diminutive.  I t  can, the re fo re ,  be posi ted tha t  i f  the  F i r s t  Re­
p u b l i c ' s  foreign policy is evaluated in terms of the "equidistance
from the superpower blocs" policy perspective of conceptualizing nona- 
109lignment,  i t  can be said  th a t  i t  was not nonaligned.
However, i t  must also be noted tha t  the Balewa Government was 
aware tha t  Nigerian foreign policy did not r e f l e c t  i t s  po tentia l  as an 
independent country,  e sp ec ia l ly  at the early phase of the F i r s t  Repub­
l i c .  Thus, i t s  convening of  the All-Nigerian People 's  Conference in 
1951 was an e f f o r t  to c o l l a t e  "ideas and proposals"^^® from a wide 
spectrum of the Nigerian socie ty  in order to be able to fashion a more 
a s se r t iv e  foreign policy (and there fore  also assuage the mounting c r i t ­
icism of Nigerian foreign policy  by various Nigerian pressure  groups, 
in addi t ion to e f f o r t s  to modify the image the radical  Casablanca 
group of African countr ies^^^  portrayed of Nigeria as a c l i e n t - s t a t e  
of the West).
Though the All-Nigerian People 's  Conference did not ac tua l ly  
r e s u l t  in the Balewa Government pursuing a more a sse r t ive  foreign pol­
icy ,  during the middle and l a t e r  phase of the F i r s t  Republic,  Nigeria 
was displaying some act ions  th a t  showed tha t  i t  was not ac tua l ly  rou­
t i n e l y  l inked to the West. One of these was the abrogation of the de­
l l ?fense pact with Bri ta in  not long a f te r  i t  was signed (and even 
when i t  was in fo rce  i t  did not t r a n s la t e  to much in r e a l i t y  due to 
considerable  domestic pressure  against  i t ) .
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The re fusa l  to become an a ssoc ia te  member of the European Eco­
nomic Community (EEC), "on the grounds t h a t  acceptance of associa te  
s ta tu s  in the  organizat ion would not only be in co n s i s ten t  with Nige­
r i a ' s  nonalignment po licy  but would perpetuate  A f r i c a ' s  economic depen-
1 1 3
dence on the West," was a lso  another ins tance  where the Balewa 
Government demonstrated i t  could carry out an action tha t  posi ted an 
independent Nigerian posture and showed th a t  the l a t t e r  was not rou­
t i n e l y  l inked to the West. A ddi t iona l ly ,  the f a c t  tha t  Nigeria,  in 
1961, broke o f f  al l  diplomatic and commercial l inks  with France as a 
p ro te s t  over the l e t t e r ' s  t e s t i n g  of atomic bombs in the Sahara, and 
the add i t iona l  f a c t  th a t  Nigeria was the only African country to take 
such an a c t i o n , f u r t h e r  demonstrate t h a t  although the F i r s t  Repub­
l i c  had very good r e l a t i o n s  with the West on the whole , i t  was not rou­
t i n e ly  l inked to the l a t t e r .  This independent element in Nigerian 
foreign policy  was a lso  demonstrated by the  fac t  th a t  the Balewa Gov­
ernment l i f t e d  the ban on the shipment of columbite to Eastern bloc 
countr ies  in sp i te  of the f a c t  tha t  the United S ta te s  had a law allow­
ing i t  to end economic a ss is tance  to coun t r ie s  th a t  allowed the ship­
ment of s t r a t e g i c  m a te r ia ls  to the Eastern bloc.^^^ As ear ly  as 
1961, Nigeria  also ca l led  for the admission of the People 's  Republic 
of China in to  the UN.^^®
On the whole, the above actions  show th a t  F i r s t  Republic Nige­
r i a  was not rou t ine ly  l inked to the West (though i t  had very good r e l a ­
t ions  with the l a t t e r ) ,  and th a t  i t  could carry  out independent f o r ­
eign po l icy  ac t ions .  Thus, in evaluating the F i r s t  Republ ic 's  foreign 
policy in terms of the avoidance of alignment with the superpower bloc
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pol icy,  and the independent i n i t i a t i v e  and c a p a b i l i t y  perspectives  of 
conceptualizing n o n a l i g n m e n t , i t  can be s a id  th a t  the F i r s t  Repub­
l i c  was nonaligned.
Other fo re ign  policy  pos it ions  adopted by Nigeria also show
tha t  i t  subscribed to o ther  perspectives  of nonalignment. Nigeria was
one of the f iv e  coun t r ie s  tha t  recommended the establishment of the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (o thers  were Burma,
118Ghana, Indonesia and S y r i a ) ,  and toge ther  with Egypt and Yugo­
s lav ia  i t  a lso  advocated t h a t  in te rna t iona l  loans on longer terms and 
at  lower i n t e r e s t  be made avai lab le  to developing co u n t r ie s ,  and th a t
the l a t t e r  should a lso  to have access to an increased amount of cap i-  
119t a l .  These ac t ions  showed tha t  Nigeria shared the perspective
tha t  nonalignment should a lso  mean the reorder ing  of the global eco- 
1?0nomy. (Also note t h a t  these coun tr ies  tha t  Nigeria consorted
with to push these  i n i t i a t i v e s  belong to the nonaligned group.) Nige­
r i a  a lso  r e f l e c t e d  th i s  perspective of nonalignment when i t  asserted
tha t  "t rade as a means of fas tening the economic development of the
121developing c o u n t r i e s , "  was "the key issue of the decade."
Nigeria sometimes behaved in such a way which implied tha t  i t
shared the view t h a t  nonalignment i s  an o p p o r tu n i s t i c  foreign p o l ­
ie?icy.  For example, when there were problems over the choice of a
new UN Secretary-General  as the successor to  Dag Hammarskjold, Nige­
r i a  was of the view tha t  " i f  ne ither the East or West could produce a
lp-3
su i tab le  man . . .  the smaller s ta t e s  will  produce one . . ." 
Thus, i t  appears t h a t  Nigeria  was comfortable with the idea of e x p lo i t ­
ing stalemates  between the superpowers as an opportuni ty  fo r  advancing
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the in te r e s t  of the nonaligned countr ies.  However, i t  is  not easy to 
determine whether such an oppor tun is t ic  behavior played an important 
p a r t  in the appointment of U Thant of Burma as the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations.
Other views of Nigeria also indicated tha t  the l a t t e r  also sub­
scribed to the view of  nonalignment as an a l l i a n ce  aga ins t  alignment
124with the superpower b locs .  For example, Wachukwu of Nigeria,  a f ­
t e r  re fu ting the argument th a t  greatness means the possession of "weap­
ons of (mass) d es t ruc t ion"  and pos it ing  th a t  Afr ica  wil l  not be 
"dragged in to  th i s  human s u ic id e , "  he added tha t
the time has come when we have to abandon the g rea t  powers 
. . .give them some d is tance  and l e t  them feel t h a t  they are 
now gradually  being confined in a cold chamber . . .  l e t  them 
feel  the coldness of the  a t t i tu d e  of the smaller powers, and 
l e t  us withdraw to  the warmer environments within our own c i r ­
cle . . . and l e t  us see whether we cannot^ formula te  some 
ideas tha t  wil l  make them amenable to reason!
Nigeria also took ac t ions  t h a t  conformed to the view of nonalignment
126as an in te rna t iona l  r e l a t i o n s  peace guarantor.  For example, i t  
did not share the view th a t  having nuclear weapons, in order to deter 
the h os t i le  actions  of  o th e r s ,  was a ra t iona l  and sane way of conduct­
ing re la t io n s  among coun t r ie s  and peoples of the world ,  and i t  was at
the fo re f ron t  of demanding the reduction of the level  of armaments,
127espec ia l ly  nuclear weapons. Nigeria also was op t im is t ic  t h a t ,
even in Europe, where the West and East are physica l ly  c lose ,  both
blocs could l ive  together  peacefully;  thus,  i t  declared th a t  the "d iv i -
128si on of Europe into East and West was "unreal " That i t  shared 
t h i s  conception of nonalignment as an in te rna t iona l  peace guarantor 
was fu r ther  demonstrated by i t s  be l ie f  th a t  " i t  was the duty of . . .
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nonaligned countr ies"  to help the great  powers to avoid the f u r ­
the r  hampering of world peace through th e i r  acce le ra ted  arms race and 
confron ta t ion .
The Ironsi  Government
The Ironsi  Government was very b r i e f ( l a s t i n g  from Janu­
ary to July 1955) and focused more on the domestic policy arena,  appar­
e n t ly  due to the f r a g i l e  s t a t e  of th i s  government and p o l i t i c a l  sys­
tem during th i s  period.  Thus, during the Ironsi  Government era the 
caree r  diplomats appeared to have been allowed to handle most of the 
rou t ine  diplomatic l in k s  since the p o l i t i c a l  leaders  were le ss  in­
c l ined  to i n i t i a t e ,  or ge t  much involved with,  major foreign  policy i s ­
sues .
The only s i g n i f i c a n t  action the Ironsi  Government took was to
assure  the world t h a t  i t  honored a ll  the in te rna t iona l  commitments and
ob l iga t ions  of the previous government and to d r a s t i c a l l y  reduce the
v i s i b l e  in te rna t iona l  a c t i v i t i e s  which the then Regional Governments
111c a r r i e d  out abroad.
Thus, in terms of the nonaligned content of the Nigerian f o r ­
eign policy during the era of th i s  government the s i tu a t io n  was not 
s i g n i f i c a n t ly  d i f f e r e n t  from tha t  which ex is t ed  during the F i r s t  
Republic.
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The Gowon Government
The Gowon Government la s ted  from 1966 to 1975, and due to the 
major dramatic events which Nigeria experienced during t h i s  period i t  
i s  necessary th a t  t h i s  era also be viewed in d i f f e r e n t  phases.  These 
phases also connoted s ig n i f i c a n t  changes in the Nigerian body p o l i t y  
which were also accompanied by s i g n i f i c a n t  s h i f t s  in the approach of 
handling domestic and in te rna t iona l  r e a l i t i e s .
The Gowon Government, t h e r e f o r e ,  can be viewed as cons is t ing  
of four phases: the  f i r s t  phase,  corresponding to the immediate Pre-
Civil War period (which was marked by deep soc ie ta l  cleavages,  and 
ser ious th rea t s  to the survival of Nigeria  as one whole e n t i t y ) ;  the 
second phase, corresponding to the Civil  War period (which was marked 
by e f f o r t s  a t  the fragmentation of N ige r ia ,  as the then Eastern Region 
of Nigeria made a s ec e ss io n i s t  at tempt through the decla ra t ion  of the 
l a t t e r  as the Republic of Biafra ,  and a lso  by the successful  e f f o r t  of 
the Nigerian Government to stop such s ec e s s io n i s t  attempts and main­
ta in  i t s  t e r r i t o r i a l  i n t e g r i t y ) ;  the t h i r d  phase, corresponding to  the 
immediate pos t -C iv i l  War years (which was marked by national recon­
s t ru c t io n ,  r e c o n c i l i a t i o n ,  and conso l ida t ion  e f f o r t s  a f t e r  the success ­
ful  countering of the s ec e ss io n is t  e f f o r t  and by g rea te r  economic p ros ­
per i ty  due to increas ing  oil  revenue and p o l i t i c a l  s t a b i l i t y ) ;  and the 
fourth and f ina l  phase, corresponding to the period in which Nigeria 
seemed to be searching fo r  a more permanent p o l i t i c a l  fu tu re  (which 
was s t i l l  marked by economic p ro sp e r i ty  but with increasing demand for 
a firm and purposeful p o l i t i c a l  d i re c t io n  and for the formulation of a 
more permanent p o l i t i c a l  framework, whether c iv i l i a n  or m i l i t a r y ) .
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Yakubu Gowon was the Head of S ta te  during t h i s  period,  and un­
der his  leadership Nigeria tackled various domestic and in te rna t iona l  
i s su es .  For purposes of t h i s  study, a t t e n t io n  will only be focused on 
the l a t t e r  is sue  area.  Thus, in order to examine the  nonaligned f o r ­
eign policy  content of the Gowon Government, a t t e n t io n  will  be focused 
on the nature of Nigerian r e l a t i o n s  with the  West, the Civil War and 
how i t  r e la ted  to r e l a t i o n s  with the Eas t ,  the  na ture  of foreign eco­
nomic r e l a t i o n s ,  the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), the posture  in African A f f a i r s ,  and the policy toward the 
Southern African and Middle East problems.
Relations  With the  West
During the f i r s t  phase of the  Gowon Government, which as noted 
above corresponded to an era of grea t  domestic upheaval,  Nigeria was 
occupied with domestic problems and thus was not much involved in s ig ­
n i f i c a n t  new i n i t i a t i v e s  in the foreign policy arena ( ju s t  l ike  the 
preceding I ronsi  Government). Therefore ,  during the  f i r s t  phase of 
the Gowon Government there  were not many s i g n i f i c a n t  new i n i t i a t i v e s  
in the area of N ig e r i a ' s  r e la t io n  with the West.
However, the second phase of the Gowon Government, in terms of 
general foreign policy o r ien ta t io n  and r e l a t i o n s  with the West w i t ­
nessed many changes. The second phase was the Civil  War period,  and 
the Gowon Government was very much in need of m i l i t a r y  hardware and in ­
te rna t iona l  support  in i t s  e f f o r t s  to end the secession of the then 
Eastern Region (which had declared i t s e l f  the Republic of S i a f r a ) .  How­
ever Bri ta in  did not appear very forthcoming in assuring Nigeria tha t
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the former could be fi rmly counted on to  extend support in the areas
lop
t h a t  the l a t t e r  requ ired .  Thus although Bri ta in  did provide some
small arms to  N iger ia ,  the l a t t e r  perceived the types and amounts of
arms the former was w i l l ing  to s e l l  as inadequate fo r  i t s  war 
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needs.  Moreover, Nigeria perceived B r i ta in  as not staunchly com­
mit ted  to the idea of bringing the secession to a speedy end at all 
c o s t s .  B r i t i sh  c r i t i c i s m  of N ig e r i a ' s  economic blockade of the seced­
ing area as agains t  in te rn a t io n a l  law, and the fac t  th a t  some Br i t i sh  
o il  f irms paid r o y a l t i e s  to the  a u th o r i t i e s  in the seceding area^^^ 
(c rea t ing  N ig e r ia ' s  suspic ion th a t  such e f f o r t s  might l a t e r  amount to 
B r i ta in  according to  the seceding area in te rna t iona l  r e s p e c t a b i l i t y  
and reco g n i t io n ) ,  were very c r i t i c a l  to t h i s  perception of the Br i t i sh  
p o s i t io n ,  in r e l a t i o n  to the Civil War, by Nigeria .  However, Brita in  
saw i t s e l f  as being neutra l  between the two sides  involved in the war; 
but to Nigeria,  which had considered the former to be a f r i en d ,  such 
e f f o r t s  at por t ray ing  i t s  ac t ions  as neutra l  were seen as a form of be­
traya l. 3^5
Most Western coun t r ie s  followed the Br i t i sh  p o s i t io n ,  and por­
trayed themselves as being n e u t r a l .  Some, l ik e  France, openly suppor­
ted the secess ion ,  supplied arms to the seceding s id e ,  and provided 
diplomatic support  f o r  i t  (by t ry ing  to  get  some African countr ies ,
t h a t  were i t s  former co lon ies ,  to recognize the seceding area as an in-
1dependent and sovereign s t a t e ) .
On the whole, Niger ia  perceived the West as not understanding 
of i t s  pos i t ion ;  and i t  even perceived some Western coun t r ie s ,  l ike  
France,  as a c t iv e ly  campaigning to v io la te  i t s  t e r r i t o r i a l  i n t e g r i ty
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and sovereignty .  Thus, compared to the F i r s t  Republic 's  r e l a t io n s  
with the West, N ig e r ia ' s  r e l a t i o n s  with the l a t t e r  during the second 
phase of the Gowon Government was in dec l in e .  The extent of such a de­
c l ine  was shown by the f a c t  th a t  e f f o r t s  by some Western organizat ions  
to provide humanitarian serv ices  to c i v i l i a n s  in Biafra ,  who were su f ­
fe r ing  severely from the ravages of the war, were met with much susp i­
cion on the par t  of the Nigerian Government. Thus, Nigeria questioned 
those i t  termed as
neo -co lo n ia l i s t  c i r c l e s  why these so -ca l led  humanitarian f e e l ­
ings are not so read i ly  expressed with respect to South 
Afr ica,  Angola- Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau),  Southern Rhodesia 
and Namibia.
Furthermore, Nigeria even perceived these  same c i r c l e s  as urging "the
138rebe ls  to hold out despite  the r e a l i t i e s "  of Nigeria being in a
pos it ion to e a s i ly  m i l i t a r i l y  end t h e i r  e f f o r t s  at seceding.
At one point during the war, Nigeria  even had cause to warn
agains t  the t r a n s la t io n  of "humanitarian considera tions  into p o l i t i c a l
concepts," and converting "them in to  an acceptance or recognition of a
rebel regime;" and also added th a t  such actions  would be "a b la tan t
and crude v io la t ion  of a ll  standards of c iv i l i z e d  in te rna t iona l  con-
13Qduct and p r a c t i c e . "  Thus, N ig e r ia ' s  r e l a t io n s  with the West had 
de te r io ra ted  to the point tha t  Nigeria was accusing the l a t t e r  of t r y ­
ing to use humanitarian services  as a cover to aid the secession and 
accord i t  in te rna t iona l  recogn i t ion .  Such an accusation was even more 
d i r e c t  when Nigeria noted th a t  the secession would have ended by the 
end of 1969 i f  not "for the in transigence  of the sece ss io n is t  leader­
ship ,  which is  f inanced and sustained by n eo -co lon ia l i s t  Powers
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outs ide A f r i c a . T h e r e f o r e ,  Nigeria ,  in addit ion to i t s  a s s e r t ­
ing tha t  there  was "no longer any s ec re t"  who was supporting and sus­
ta in ing  Biafra ,  also noted tha t  personnel "from Sweden, France, 
Canada, Por tugal ,  Belgium, South Afr ica ,  Rhodesia, the United S ta tes  
and other Western countr ies"  were also helping the seceding area.^^^
Thus, throughout the Civil War years N ig e r i a ' s  r e l a t io n s  with 
the West was in a much poorer condit ion,  e spec ia l ly  when compared with 
the very good r e l a t i o n s  tha t  exis ted  between both during the F i r s t  Re­
public .  However, the successful  ending of the secess ion resu l ted  in a 
post  Civil War Gowon Government tha t  repaired some of i t s  r e l a t i o n s  
with the West. One of the reasons fo r  the augmentation of the Western 
l inks  was a des i re  to ensure tha t  Nigeria  was locked in to  a very t i g h t  
re la t io n sh ip  with the East ,  upon whom the former heavily depended, 
m i l i t a r i l y ,  in order to end the secess ion .  For an example, the Nige­
r ian  Air Force being " la rgely  equipped with Soviet  MiG 17 and 21 and 
Iluyshin-28 war planes"  occasioned "the need f o r  c lose  t i e s  with the 
Soviet U n i o n . T h u s ,  i t  was observed
tha t  in order not to be e n t i r e ly  dependent on Moscow for the 
development and expansion of the country 's  a i r  fo rce ,  the fed­
eral  m i l i t a r y  government has taken s teps ,  s in ce . th e  end of the 
war, to buy some planes from the United S ta te s .^
Diplomatic l inks  with the West were also improved in comparison to the
Civil War years ,  e sp ec ia l ly  with B r i ta in  (which was one of the th ree
prominent countr ies  Yakubu Gowon, the then Head of S ta te ,  paid s t a t e
144v i s i t s  to ,  the o thers  being the Soviet  Union and China).  How­
ever ,  though the pos t -Civ i l  War period of the Gowon Government did w i t -
145ness much improvement in N ige r ia ' s  r e l a t io n s  with the West, the
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r e l a t i o n s  between both could not be said  to have re turned to the very 
warm and close  r e l a t i o n s  th a t  ex is ted  during the F i r s t  Republic.
On the whole, in terms of the nonalignment content of Nige­
r i a ' s  r e l a t i o n s  with the West during the  Gowon Government e ra ,  i t  can 
be posi ted th a t  while the f i r s t  phase of the Gowon Government (the im­
mediate pre-Givi 1 War period) did not witness any change in the good 
r e l a t i o n s  with the West, the Civil War years  meant a period in which 
Nigeria moved away from very c lose  Western l i n k s .  F ina l ly ,  the post-  
Civil  War Gowon Government did witness improved r e l a t io n s  between both
(but the s t a t e  of t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s  did not re turn  to F i r s t  Republic
level  of very c lose  t i e s ) .
The Civil War and the East
During the f i r s t  phase of the Gowon Government (the immediate 
pre -Civ il  War period) N ig e r i a ' s  r e l a t i o n s  with the East did not exper i ­
ence any dramatic changes; but as soon as the Civil War ensued, the
Soviet  Union's readiness  to supply Nigeria  with the huge amount of 
m i l i t a r y  hardware i t  needed in i t s  e f f o r t s  to end the secession 
(while,  as al ready noted above, the l a t t e r  unsuccessful ly t r i e d  to get 
such m i l i t a r y  hardware from the Western coun t r ies )  resu l ted  in r e l a ­
t io n s  between Nigeria and the East  changing from a diminutive low-key 
one to a very expanded and close r e l a t i o n s h ip .  However, N ige r ia ' s  im­
proved r e l a t i o n s  with the East did not r e s u l t  in a s i tua t ion  in which 
the former was t i g h t l y  locked in to  the l e t t e r ' s  o r b i t ,  and th i s  was 
shown by the fac t  tha t  even during the war years (during which Nigeria 
needed Soviet m i l i t a r y  support the most) Nigeria did not show any in d i ­
cation of i n t e r e s t  in p a r t i c ip a t in g  in any Eastern m ul t i l a te ra l
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m i l i t a r y  and economic frameworks l ik e  the Warsaw Pact or the Council 
fo r  Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), and there was no attempt to 
transform the Nigerian socia l  r e a l i t y  into one which f i t t e d  a 
Marxis t-Lenin is t  pe rspec t ive .  Thus, i t  seems N ig e r i a ' s  improved 
re l a t io n s  with the East were more centered on the m i l i t a ry  support i t  
was ge t t ing  from the l a t t e r  to prosecute the Civil War than on any 
yearning to fundamentally share much with the l a t t e r  in terms of broad 
p o l i t i c a l ,  socia l  and economic p e rspec t ives .  Surpr is ing ly ,  th i s  lack 
of deep p o l i t i c a l  or ideological  commitment, beyond the cooperation in 
the m i l i t a r y  a rea ,  on the  pa r t  of Nigeria did not r e s u l t  in the Soviet  
Union withholding or dragging i t s  m i l i t a ry  support to the former 's  war 
agains t  the secess ion.
However, the f a c t  th a t  the  Soviet Union decided to aid Nige­
r i a ,  in s tead  of B iafra ,  i s  puzzling since the l a t t e r  represented an 
area t h a t  was more progressive  in i t s  socia l  and p o l i t i c a l  outlook in 
comparison with the former,  and also since some of the African coun­
t r i e s  tha t  had s o c io - p o l i t i c a l  outlooks which were c loser  to  those of 
the Soviet  Union supported the Biafran cause,  fo r  example, Tanzania 
and Zambia. Thus, Soviet  support for Nigeria did not seem consonant 
with i t s  ideological  he r i tage  (which is  supposed to be the c r i t i c a l  
fac to r  guiding i t s  a c t i o n s ) . T h e  Soviet  Union also  seemed to 
have perceived t h i s  seemingly ideological  con t rad ic t ion ,  and thus saw 
the need for more th e o re t i c a l  explanation and c l a r i f i c a t i o n ,  which peo­
ple l ike  Vladimir Kudryavtsev, a Soviet exper t  on African a f f a i r s ,  ap­
peared to have embarked upon.
Kudryavtsev reasoned tha t  the Soviet  action was in l ine  with 
the task of c lass  s t ru g g le ,  and universal socia l  l i b e r a t i o n .
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He quoted from Lenin to the e f f e c t  tha t  each case must be
considered in the l i g h t  of "social  development as a whole" and
that fo r  the benef i t  of the workers one must s t r iv e  "to form 
as l a r g e , ^  s t a t e  as poss ib le"  in the i n t e r e s t  of "merging" i t s  
na tions .
Put s t a r k ly ,  Kudyravtsev appeared to have meant th a t  the Soviet  Union
supported Nigeria in order to make sure tha t  no par t  of i t s  t e r r i t o r y
permanently seceded, due to i t s  view tha t  the existence of a big coun­
t r y  in A fr ica ,  whether with a progressive government or no t ,  would be 
a great  a s se t  in removing colonia lism, neo-colonialism and rac ia l  in ­
j u s t i c e  on the con t inen t .  This perception also connotes a Soviet be­
l i e f  tha t  in Nigeria there wil l  always be an adequate domestic progres­
sive force  which will  always ensure t h a t ,  no matter how conservative 
any government may be, on the issues  of decoloniza tion,  combating the 
phenomenon of neo-co lon iza t ion ,  the need fo r  the genuine re so lu t ion  of 
the  problem of r a c i a l  i n ju s t i c e  in South Afr ica ,  and the fo s te r in g  of 
more unity  in A f r i ca ,  Nigeria will  always be in support of them. This 
would also  mean a big country 's  support fo r  long-term Soviet  objec­
t iv e s  since  the l a t t e r  often believes  tha t  the support fo r  these i s ­
sues will  enhance i t s  ro le  in Africa;  even though Nigeria and other 
African coun tr ies  often champion these issues for a d i f f e r e n t  reason— 
the to ta l  p o l i t i c a l ,  economic and social  emancipation of A fr ica .
When some s o c i a l i s t - o r i e n t e d  countr ies  l ik e  Tanzania,  which 
supported Biafra ,  charac te r ized  those who opposed the secession as op­
pressors and im p e r i a l i s t s ,  Kudryavtsev observed th a t  i t  was naive for
these countr ies  to equate Soviet  support to Nigeria with th a t  which
148Bri ta in  a lso  provided.  He posi ted th a t  the Soviet and Brit ish 
supporting for the same side was merely a matter of "external
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coincidence," and th a t  i t  did not mean tha t  both supported Nigerian
uni ty  "on the same premise."^^^ According to him
Brita in  supported the unity of Niger ia,  j u s t  as France,
West Germany, and Portugal supported the s e c e s s io n i s t s ,  be- 
caus^ggf r i v a l r y  over o i l ,  over a s s e t s ,  and influence in Nige-
On the other hand, he sa id  th a t  the Soviet Union supported Nigerian
unity  due to i t s  considera tion fo r
the African peoples '  a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t  s truggle  both for
strengthening the independence of the l ibe ra ted  countr ies  and 
fo r  the comple tg^l idera t ion  of the continent from the remains 
of colonia lism.
However, though the Soviets  did think in terms of to t a l  African l i b e r a ­
t ion  (and the benef i t s  i t  wi ll  bring to i t s  ro le  in A f r i ca ) ,  i t  was 
a lso  in te re s t ed  in changing the Nigerian s o c io - p o l i t i c a l  system,
though in a r e s t r a in e d  way (but s t i l l ,  t h i s  e f f o r t  was t o t a l l y  unsuc­
c e s s f u l ) .
In connection with the S ov ie ts '  attempt to t ry  to change Nige­
r i a ' s  s o c io - p o l i t i c a l  o r i e n ta t io n  during th i s  period ,  they t r i e d  to ac­
complish th i s  through the organizat ion of " 'p ro g re s s iv e '  elements in 
153the country," E s s e n t i a l ly  t h i s  meant try ing to have influence on 
the labor unions,  the general  working c l a s s ,  and c r i t i c a l  radical  
elements,  informal ly ,  by bypassing the Government. However, since the 
Gowon Government saw these  as informal l inks  th a t  might be used by the
Soviet  Union to l a t e r  topple  the government (and replace i t  with one
which might have been w i l l in g  to  be used to create  a new soc ie ty  along 
Marxis t-Lenin is t  l i n e s ) ,  i t  e f f e c t iv e ly  countered any Soviet  move to 
organize ' p ro g re s s iv e '  elements,  e i t h e r  openly or c lan d es t in e ly .  On 
the other hand, the Soviet  Union was also re s t ra ined  in i t s  moves; and
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once i t  r ea l ized  th a t  the Government was determined to ensure th a t  i t  
did not unduly meddle in N ig e r ia ' s  in te rna l  a f f a i r s ,  i t  re laxed i t s  e f ­
f o r t s  and appeared to have been prepared to l im i t  i t s e l f  to helping in 
the war e f f o r t s .  However, t h i s  did not mean th a t  i t  had t o t a l l y  
shelved i t s  i n t e r e s t  in Nigeria ,  or i t  was not w i l l ing  to t r y  other 
means, since  "in April 1969 the Soviet Union asked i f  she could be a l -
1 C O
lowed to se t  up consular posts in" a l l  of the s t a t e s  in Nigeria
except one tha t  was s t i l l  then e f f e c t iv e ly  under Biafran co n t ro l .  The 
Gowon Government turned down t h i s  reques t ,  which would have meant a
sprawling network of Soviet  bureaucracies a l l  over Nigeria posing a
possible  th rea t  to the Government.
Addi t iona l ly ,  in external  ac t ions  even during the Civil War, 
Nigeria was independent s ince ,  apar t  from s t i l l  maintaining some r e l a ­
t ions  with the West, as mentioned above, i t  was a lso  not t i e d  down to 
play the Soviet tune on in te rna t iona l  i s sues .  Thus
in August 1963 when Soviet  m i l i t a r y  aid was s t i l l  crucia l  
there  was an outcry of condemnation of the invasion of Czecho­
slovakia by the Soviet  Union and other Warsaw Pact coun t r ie s .
Although the government did not issue  an o f f i c i a l  statement
about^j-üie invasion,  a l l  the coun t ry ' s  newspapers saw i t  as
e v i l . 1=4
However, even though the Nigerian Government "did not condemn the War­
saw Pact in August 1968, i t  has c r i t i c i z e d  i t  on some o the r  occa­
s i o n s . T h e r e f o r e ,  the Gowon Government was adequately non-
a ligned, even during the Civil  War.
However, even though Nigeria was not locked into very close 
t i e s  with the Sovie t  Union, r e l a t i o n s  with the l a t t e r  were c l ea r ly  
warm. For example, a r t i c l e s  by Soviet  w r i t e r s  appeared f requen t ly  in
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Nigerian newspapers, and many of these  a r t i c l e s  were aimed at  i l l u s t r a ­
t ing  the dysfunct ional role of the p r iva te  sec to r  in the Nigerian eco­
n o m y . I t  has a lso been noted tha t  from 1967 onward the Sovie t
Union had been s e c r e t l y  urging the Nigerian Government to n a t io n a l i z e
Western o i l  f i rm s ;  and though i t  i s  not easy to p rec ise ly  a sc e r ta in  
the e f f e c t  of such pressures ,  " i t  was no acc ident  tha t  the Government 
had to announce a 55 per cent takeover of the  equity  shares of a l l  
these  firms in April 1974, l e ss  than a month a f t e r  General Gowon's 
s t a t e  v i s i t  to the Soviet Union.
A ddi t iona l ly ,  the ex tent of the warm r e l a t i o n s  between Nigeria  
and the Soviet Union can also be i l l u s t r a t e d  by the fac t  tha t  the l e t ­
t e r ' s  ambassador to Nigeria,  A. I .  Romanov, was given the opportuni ty
to explain  h is  c oun t ry ' s  policy in Nigeria through a Nigerian radio
158broadcas ting system. At the end of the Civil War, Romanov also
had conferred upon him one of the highest  t i t l e s  in Nigeria ,  
Commander of the Order of the Niger (CON), by General Gowon in 
apprec ia t ion  of his ' c o n s t r u c t iv e '  ro le  during the Civil
War.159
Nigerian-Soviet  m i l i t a ry  r e l a t i o n s  were also s trong.  For exam­
ple ,  as noted above, the Nigerian Air Force was la rge ly  supplied with 
Soviet MiG 17 and 21 and Iluyshin-28 m i l i t a ry  planes and "Moscow sup­
p l ied  the heavy 122 tmi a r t i l l e r y  guns which were decis ive in ending 
the s ece ss io n is t  rebe l l ion  . . . To fu r th e r  more emphasize the 
strong m i l i t a r y  component of Nigeria-Soviet  r e la t io n s  during t h i s  
period,  the Soviet  Embassy in Lagos had "Colonel Mikhail Medvedev 
armored warfare ex p e r t ,  l a te  of Kiev, Peking, Cairo,  and Khartoum'" as 
i t s  m i l i t a r y  a t t a ch e .
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The warm r e l a t i o n s  with the Soviet  Union also meant warm r e l a ­
t ions  with o ther Warsaw Pact co u n t r ie s ,  as shown by increased contacts
1 c p
with those c o u n t r ie s .
However, the post-Civ il  War years of the Gowon Government 
meant improved r e l a t io n s  with the West (which were s t ra ined  during the 
Civil War) B r i t a in ,  in p a r t i c u l a r ,  fos te red  very good r e l a t i o n s  with
Nigeria as shown by the fa c t  th a t  Gowon paid a very f r u i t f u l  s t a t e
v i s i t  to B r i ta in  and a B r i t i sh  o i l  f irm seemed to have even managed a
p re fe re n t i a l  treatment .
Never theless ,  the improved Western r e l a t io n s  did not mean tha t  
Nigeria did not continue to have good r e l a t io n s  with the Eas t .  How­
ever ,  to the  ex ten t  tha t  the West was also enjoying very good r e l a ­
t ions  with Nigeria ,  p a r t i c u l a r ly  through a strong B r i t i sh  l i n k ,  the 
East ,  unlike during the Civil War per iod ,  did not have r e l a t i o n s  tha t  
were more favorable  than those with the West.^®^ Thus, in terms of 
the nonalignment,  the Gowon Government could be seen as being very 
close with the East (though, as shown above, th i s  did not mean routine  
c lose ly  locked t i e s ) ,  and tha t  during the pos t -Civ i l  War years  i t  
moved toward having good r e l a t io n s  with both the West and the Eas t .
Foreign Economic Rela tions
N ig e r ia ' s  foreign economic r e l a t io n s  during the era of the
Gowon Government, viewed from the angle of the d i re c t io n  and magnitude 
of in te rna t iona l  t rade ,  showed th a t  Western countr ies  were the biggest  
trade  p a r tn e r s .  For example, in 1970, B r i ta in ,  the U.S.A., and the 
Federal Republic of Germany accounted fo r  30.7,  14.5,  and 13.0 percent
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of N ige r ia ' s  imports, r e spec t ive ly  (while a l so ,  re sp ec t iv e ly ,  r e ce iv ­
ing 28.2, 11.4, and 6.7 percent of N ig e r ia ' s  exports in 1970.)^®^
In 1974, the three b iggest  trade par tne rs  were B r i ta in ,  the U. S. A., 
and the Netherlands, which accounted for 23.2,  12.3, and 4.7 percent,  
r e sp ec t iv e ly ,  of N ig e r ia ' s  imports,  in addit ion to 16.9 ,  27.3,  and 
13.7 percent ,  r e spec t ive ly ,  of N ig e r ia ' s  e x p o r t s . A l s o ,  during 
t h i s  period,  N iger ia ' s  other major trade par tners  were Japan, I t a l y ,  
France, Belgium and Norway
On the other hand, during the same period.  Eastern European
countr ies  (including the Soviet Union) accounted fo r  only 5.1 and 4.2 
percent  of N iger ia 's  imports in 1970 and 1974, r e spec t ive ly ;  while in 
terms of N iger ia 's  exports they received in 1970 and 1974, only 3.6
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and 1.6 percent respec t ive ly .
Thus, though the Gowon Government did witness improving r e l a ­
t ions  with the East genera l ly ,  the  West was s t i l l  N ig e r ia ' s  leading 
t rad ing  par tne r .  However, though s t i l l  sharing a smaller percentage 
of N ige r ia ' s  foreign t rade ,  the East did experience an increase in 
t h e i r  trade re la t io n s  during th i s  period.  East bloc exports to Nige­
r i a  increased almost f ive fo ld  from 1960 to 1970 (from 1.2 percent in
1960 to 5.1 percent in 1970).^®® The amount of N ig e r ia ' s  exports
they received also increased from 0 .4  percent in 1960 to 3.6 percent 
in 1970.170
This change in the economic l inks  with the East was even more 
not iceable  in the kinds of goods ava i lab le  in the Nigerian market 
since a s ign i f ic an t  number of " t rucks  and passenger cars ,  motor scoot­
e r s ,  welding machines, cement, f a b r i c s ,  sugar,  and many other consumer
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goods''"^ were made in the Soviet Union, with s im i la r  and other a r ­
rays of products also coming from other East European coun t r ies .  
While during the F i r s t  Republic Soviet-made vehic les  were ra re  in Nige­
r i a ,  during the Gowon Government e r a ,  Moskvitch, Volga, and Lada cars  
were fam i l ia r  and popular brand names in Nigeria (with some of these  
being even assembled in Nigeria).  On the other hand, ag r icu l tu ra l  pro­
ducts l ike  cocoa, groundnuts, palm products and t imber went to the 
Soviet  Union.
However, i t  was through cooperation in the area of heavy indus­
t r i e s  development tha t  the East made an impact th a t  has turned out to 
have a long-term fundamental s ign if icance  in the Nigerian economy; and 
the most important of these  was the  agreement of the Soviet  Union to 
cooperate in the development of the  iron and stee l  indust ry  in Nige­
r i a .  Thus, during the Gowon Government e ra ,  the ground work for the 
development of t h i s  industry  was in te n s i f i e d  with Soviet  help in "aero-
magnetic and ground surveys of N ig e r ia ' s  potent ia l  iron and coal r e -  
173sources ,"  and other kinds of f e a s i b i l i t y  s tu d ie s .  The construc­
tion  industry  was also another area where the Eastern European coun­
t r i e s '  presence was f e l t ;  fo r  example, a Bulgarian firm got i t s e l f  a 
not i n s ig n i f i c a n t  opportunity of build ing a national th e a t e r  in Nige­
r i a .
Another fea tu re  of Eastern economic l inks  with Nigeria was a 
tendency by the smaller Eastern European countr ies  to choose some i n ­
d u s t r i e s ,  and some s t a t e s ,  with which to concentrate t h e i r  economic in ­
t e r e s t s .  Romania, for example, in t e n s i f i e d  i t s  e f f o r t s  in the wood 
processing and manufacturing in d u s t r i e s ,  and in some s t a t e s  l ike  the
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TABLE 3
PATTERN OF NIGERIA'S IMPORT TRADE RELATIONS,, 1970-1974
Countries
1970
Million
Naira %
1974
Million
Naira %
B ri ta in 232.0 30.7 402.2 23.2
U. S. A. 109.6 14.5 213.1 12.3
Japan 47.4 6.3 160.2 9 .2
Federal Republic of Germany 98.6 13.0 264.7 15.3
I t a l y 36.2 4.8 94.0 5 .4
France 25.2 3.3 114.6 6.6
Netherlands 26.8 3.6 81.0 4 .7
Belgium and Luxemburg 16.2 2.1 35.0 2.0
Norway 5.0 0.7 11.3 0 .6
People 's  Republic of China 14.0 1.8 30.4 1.7
Eastern Europe 38.9 5.1 73.1 4.2
Africa 9.3 1.2 20.1 1.1
Other Countries 97.4 12.9 237.6 13.7
TOTALS 756.4 100.0 1737.3 100.0
Source: Same as TABLE 1.
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TABLE 4
PATTERN OF NIGERIA'S EXPORT TRADE RELATIONS, 1970-1974
Countries
1970
Million
Naira %
1974 
Mi 11 i on 
Naira %
Bri ta i  n 249.6 28.2 978.3 16.9
U. S. A. 100.8 11.4 1583.5 27.3
Japan 6.8 0.8 238.3 4.1
Federal Republic of Germany 59.2 6.7 413.8 7.1
I t a l y 38.0 4.3 91.1 1.6
France 74.5 8.4 581.8 10.0
Netherlands 149.0 16.8 794.1 13.7
Belgium and Luxemburg 6.8 0.8 37.1 0.6
Norway 9 .4 1.0 32.2 0.6
People 's  Republic of China 0 .8 0.1 3.6 0.1
Eastern Europe 32.0 3.6 91.9 1.6
Africa 6 .0 0.7 106.2 1.8
Other Countries 152.4 17.2 842.9 14.6
TOTALS 885.4 100.0 5794.8 100.0
Source: Same as TABLE 1.
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Cross River.  Thus, i t  is  not su rp r is ing  th a t  i t  i s  a major pa r tne r  in 
Seromwood Indus t r ies  (a wood process ing and manufacturing firm) in the 
Cross River S ta te ,  in addit ion to the f a c t  tha t  Romania a lso rendered 
a s i g n i f i c a n t  amount of  i t s  technica l  cooperation in tha t  s t a t e ;  and 
th a t  the Romanian leader ,  Nicolae Ceucescau, while v i s i t i n g  Nigeria ,  
spent a very s izeable  proport ion of h i s  time in the same s t a t e .  
Poland, on the other hand, had a program which involved the exchange 
of engineering and a rc h i tec tu ra l  professors  with some Nigerian univer­
s i t i e s  (an i n t e r e s t  which s t i l l  con t inues) ,  in add it ion to the p rov i ­
sion of technical  cooperation f o r  the modernization of the coal indus­
t r y .
The Gowon Government e r a ' s  most innovative con t r ibu t ions  to 
the nature of Nigerian foreign economic r e l a t i o n s  were in the areas  of 
global economy re s t ru c tu r in g ,  and African regional and subregional eco­
nomic in te g ra t io n .  In terms of global economic order r e s t r u c tu r in g ,  
Nigeria was very c ruc ia l  in the formation of a un if ied  f ron t  by the de­
veloping countr ies  ( the Afr ican,  Caribbean and P a c i f ic  (AGP) group) to 
negotia te  with the EEC for more equ i tab le  economic l inks  between 
both.^^* The basic logic  behind the Nigerian action was the idea 
th a t  a united developing world would lead to i t s  being able to improve 
i t s  negotia ting capacity  (due to  the sheer impact of t h e i r  number and 
u n i ty ) ,  and tha t  th i s  would even tua l ly  lead to a b e t t e r  and a more 
equ i tab le  l ink between the contemporary developed world and the AGP. 
Furthermore,  the Gowon Government goal was not only l imited to barga in­
ing fo r  b e t te r  economic l inks  between the EEC and AGP, but extended to 
an ult imate  goal of a fundamental overhauling of the contemporary
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in te rna t iona l  economic order.  Thus, Gowon asserted tha t  he wanted the 
developing countr ies  to  "reverse  the present system of trade and a id ,"  
which amounts to the developing countr ies  becoming "an exporter of 
cap i ta l  so despera te ly  required fo r  local development, to the develop­
ment of in d u s t r ia l i z ed  countr ies  th a t  often f a l s e l y  claim to be aiding 
175US." Thus, to Nigeria ,  the contemporary in te rna t iona l  o rder ,  in 
r e a l i t y ,  func tions  in such a way th a t  the developing countr ies  were 
giving economic aid to the developed countr ies  to continue to develop 
or sus ta in  th e i r  economies, and not v ice-versa .  This kind of reason­
ing also led to Nigeria playing an ac tive  ro le  in other global eco­
nomic forums, l ike  those under the United Nations agencies,  in order 
to help in fo s te r ing  condit ions  th a t  lead towards the r e s t ru c tu r in g  of 
the  contemporary in te rna t iona l  economic order.
Nigeria was even more involved in e f f o r t s  at  improving eco­
nomic conditions in Afr ica .  For example, regarding re la t ions  with the 
EEC, i t  s t ressed  the subjec t  of uni ty  (though mainly at the continen­
t a l  African l e v e l ) .  Thus, in Gowon's view, " i t  i s  b e t te r  for a United 
Africa to ta lk  to a United Europe.
In the arena of the general African economy, Nigeria was also 
wary of the ro le  of non-African f inanc ia l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and f a c i l i t i e s ,  
and thus was always opposed to  the opening of the Abidjan-based A fr i ­
can Development Bank (ADB) e q u i ty  to non-African s t a t e s ,  as a way of 
i t s  mobilizing re sources ,  with the argument " tha t  there were other 
ways to ge tt ing  addi t iona l r e s o u r c e s . T o  fu r the r  demonstrate 
N ige r ia ' s  commitment to the reduction of African coun t r ie s '  dependence 
on non-African cap i ta l  sources ,  the other ways of ADB mobilizing for
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resources  ( that  Nigeria suggested) turned out to mean Nigeria giving 
the ADB a s izeab le  amount to e s tab l i sh  the Nigerian Trust  Fund (NTF) 
within the ADB framework. However, Nigeria agreed to the e s t a b l i s h ­
ment of the NTF only a f t e r  receiving the assurance tha t  "the question 
of  opening the Bank's equity  to non-Africans,  would not be ra i sed
agai n .
The Gowon Government also shared the conception t h a t ,  though 
changing the nature of economic r e l a t io n s  between the developing and 
the developed countr ies  i s  an important means fo r  c reating a new i n t e r ­
national  economic order,  the capaci ty of the developing countr ies  to 
increase  economic l inks  among themselves (of ten tagged the South-South 
i n i t i a t i v e s )  i s  seen as being even more important in c rea t ing  th i s  new 
order .  The main reasoning behind th i s  view appeared to be t h a t  those 
benef i t ing  from the presen t  global economic s t a tu s  quo wil l  l i k e ly  be 
r e lu c t a n t  to dismantle such a s ta tu s  quo, and thus the task of c a t a l y ­
zing such a change will be car r ied  out mostly by and among the develop­
ing coun t r ie s ,  with or without the cooperation of the developed coun­
t r i e s .  Thus, the Gowon Government championed African economic in t e g r a ­
t i o n ,  and ac t ive ly  devoted e f f o r t s  to lead in i n i t i a t i n g  the nurtur ing 
of  such an in teg ra t ion  f i r s t  in the subregion of West Africa (through 
the formation of the Economic Commission of West African S ta te s ,
ECOWAS).179
On the whole, in terms of nonalignment and the nature  of Nige­
r i a  foreign economic r e l a t i o n s  during the Gowon Government e r a ,  i t  can 
be sa id  tha t  Nigeria,  by maintaining good economic l inks  with the West­
ern and Eastern blocs as shown above, was able to maintain a policy
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th a t  f i t t e d  with the avoidance of alignment with the superpower b locs '
180perspective  of conceptualizing nonalignment. Also,  by s t r e s s in g
the unity  of the developing c o u n t r i e s ,  in not only nego t ia t ing  but 
a lso  in build ing  new economic s t ru c tu re s  with the developed co un t r ie s ,  
some face ts  of N iger ia 's  foreign economic r e l a t i o n s  mir rored the i n t e r ­
national c o l l e c t iv e  bargaining framework and the global economy re o r -
181dering po l icy  perspectives  of conceptualiz ing nonalignment. In
the arena of regional and subregional economic in t e g r a t io n ,  N ig e r ia ' s
enthusiasm and leadership showed tha t  Nigeria in some circumstances
harbored a global input of a regional ideology (Pan-Africanism) per-
182spective of understanding nonalignment.
The Economic Commission o f  West African S ta te s
The formation and the s trengthening of ECOWAS, a l ready men­
tioned above, was a foreign po licy  area  t h a t  enjoyed much prominence 
in the post-Civ il  War era  of the Gowon Government and thus meri ts  sep­
a ra te  a t ten t io n  in th i s  study.
A major motivation fo r  the  c rea t ion  of ECOWAS was the des i re  
to crea te  b e t t e r  economic conditions  in member s t a t e s  and, through the
in teg ra t ion  of th e i r  economies, to  a s s e r t  t h e i r  economic and p o l i t i c a l
183independence from non-African sources .
Another major fac to r  tha t  fueled Nigeria in championing ECOWAS 
formation was the desire  to set  in motion the dynamics which would r e ­
duce France 's  influence in the West African region due to the percep­
t ion  th a t  France was a very sub t le  t h r e a t  to Nigeria,  and to the whole 
of Afr ica ,  due to i t s  "more formally  and e labora te ly  s t ru c tu red "
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links  with African coun tr ies  th a t  are i t s  former co lonies .This  percep­
tion  th a t  the Gowon Government developed toward France was mainly due 
to the l a t t e r ' s  support to Biafra  during the Civil War period and i t s  
a b i l i t y  to pressure some African countr ies  t h a t  were i t s  former colo-
I O C
nies to also do so. This created a s i tu a t io n  th a t  made Nigeria 
perceive France as having an antiquated im p e r i a l i s t i c  i n s t i n c t  of hop­
ing to balkanise A f r i c a ' s  most populous country in order  to strengthen 
French influence over i t s  former co lonies .  Thus, a major but l e s s  pub- 
l i i c i z e d  fac to r  fo r  Nigeria  j u s t  emerging from a Civil War to champion 
a regional economic in te g ra t io n  was th i s  des i re  to  c rea te  a s t ru c tu ra l  
framework tha t  would r e s u l t  in the reduction of France 's  ro le  in 
Afr ica .
Therefore ,  since N ig e r i a ' s  ac t ions ,  in r e l a t i o n  to the forma­
tion  of ECOWAS, were aimed at  providing condit ions  th a t  augmented the 
sovereignty of West African coun t r ie s ,  i t s  ac t ions  f i t t e d  in to  the na­
t ional sovereignty (guarantor ) perspective of nonalignment.
On the whole, in the sense tha t  N ig e r i a ' s  r o l e ,  in the forma­
tion of ECOWAS, mostly comes under the umbrella of Pan-Afr icanis t
id ea l s ,  i t s  ac t ions  in terms of nonalignment f i t s  in to  the global in ­
put of a regional ideology (Pan-Africanism) perspective  of conceptu-
187a l iz ing  nonalignment.
The Gowon Government and Pan-African Ideals  and Goals
188As the above assessment shows, the Gowon Government was
a s se r t iv e  in promoting the Pan-African idea l s  and goals of fo s te r in g  
unity ,  promoting b e t t e r  socioeconomic condi t ions ,  and strengthening
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nat ional  sovereignty in Afr ica ,  e spec ia l ly  when compared with the 
F i r s t  Republic. The Gowon Government was also very active in champion­
ing the decolonizat ion of Guinea Bissau and Southern Afr ica ,  and the
189removal of rac ia l  oppression in South Afr ica .  Nigeria also
190played a strong ro le  in helping strengthen the OAU.
In some in s tan ces ,  Nigeria acted in a way th a t  showed th a t  i t
subscribed to  a Pan-Africanism that  had a diasporadic f l a v o r .  This
was demonstrated by the f a c t  th a t  in 1975 Nigeria "as s is ted  in paying
191the s a l a r i e s  of c i v i l  servants  of Grenada," a country in the 
Caribbean with a population t h a t  is  made up predominantly of people of 
African ancestry.  Thus, Yakubu Gowon, the then Nigerian Head of
S ta t e ,  was seen as "a strong Pan-Afr icanis t"  who was "a defender of
the r igh ts  of" people of African ancestry "in d i f f e r e n t  pa r ts  of the
1 Qp
world." Add i t iona l ly ,  Nigeria provided a law enforcement t r a i n ­
ing program in Grenada.
Thus, in the sense th a t  the Gowon Government pursued Pan- 
African ideals  and goa ls ,  i t s  foreign policy in th i s  broad sense can
be seen as also f i t t i n g  into the global input of a regional ideology
193(Pan-Africanism) perspec t ive  of conceptualizing nonalignment in 
th a t  i t s  actions fo s te red  p o l i t i c a l ,  economic and social  progress and 
a peaceful atmosphere, in Africa and among people of African ancestry;  
and thus also helping in un ive rsa l iz ing  these phenomena.
The Southern African Problem
During the Gowon Government era ,  the fe s te r in g  problems of 
colonia lism and ra c ia l  oppression in Southern Africa covered Angola,
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Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa;^^^ and, while Nige­
r i a  (in concert with the OAU) did set  in motion actions  th a t  sought to 
resolve these  problems, i t  also developed some s p e c i f i c  pos i t ions  on 
the problems in some of th e se  countr ies .
On the problem in Zimbabwe, Nigeria,  cognizant of the f a c t  
th a t  the Ian Smith regime t r i e d  to use the Unila te ral  Declarat ion of 
Independence (UDI) to  r e ta rd  the e f f o r t  to solve the problems of colo­
niali sm and r a c ia l  oppression in that  country,  s t r e s s e d  th a t  there
195should be "no independence before majority ru le  in Zimbabwe." 
Thus, apart  from jo in ing  the e f f o r t  to make sure tha t  the Ian Smith 
regime UDI did not amount to anything more than a piece of paper,
Nigeria held the pos i t ion  th a t  Bri ta in  had a legal and moral re spons i ­
b i l i t y  in ensuring tha t  a country tha t  i t  had chosen to  colonize was 
genuinely decolonized. Therefore ,  to Nigeria,  "Br i ta in  must bear the 
primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  the events in Zimbabwe," and Nigeria con­
tinued to see Br i ta in  as "the administering Power over Zimbabwe".
Also, Nigeria held the p o s i t io n  tha t  i t  must be ensured th a t  Br i ta in  
"discharged i t s  ob l iga t ion  towards al l  the people" in th a t
c o u n t r y . 1 9 6
The reasoning behind the above Nigerian pos i t ion  seems to 
have been a percept ion th a t  Br i ta in  was e i th e r  lacking the moral and 
p o l i t i c a l  will to  t r e a t  the Ian Smith UDI as a gross r e b e l l io n  agains t  
the former 's  colonia l  au tho r i ty  (which i t  was), or t h a t  i t  was implic­
i t l y  colluding to  perpetuate  r ac ia l  oppression by a minor i ty  regime by
197feigning i n a b i l i t y  to  put down such a r e b e l l io n .  In f a c t  t h i s  
perception was very overt  in some other African c o u n t r i e s ,  some of
which had no doubt th a t  Br i ta in  was condoning or encouraging
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such a r e b e l l i o n .  For example, Tanzania, by breaking diplomatic r e l a -
1 qp
t i e n s  with B r i ta in  over the UDI i s sue ,  demonstrated tha t  i t
st rongly  held such a view.
Another aspec t  of N ig e r ia ' s  policy was advocacy of the e s tab ­
lishment of "more e f f e c t iv e  enforcement of s anc t ions ,  complete with
the preparedness to act  sw i f t ly  agains t  any country g u i l ty  of breaking
199sanctions"  agains t  the  Ian Smith regime.
In genera l ,  Nigeria appeared to have been le ss  than s a t i s f i e d  
with B r i t a i n ' s  po l icy  towards the s i tu a t io n  in Zimbabwe. Thus i t
warned th a t  i f  B r i t a in  was not eager to correc t  a problem which i t  had
moral and legal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  fo r ,  " i t  should not put obs tac les  in
the way of the people of Zimbabwe by aiding and abet t ing the i l l eg a l  
regime of Ian Smith.
Nigeria ,  convinced tha t  Bri ta in  was not prepared to genuinely 
decolonize Zimbabwe, saw the  l ib e ra t io n  movements of the l a t t e r  as 
the only force  capable of doing th a t ;  thus i t  urged tha t  encouragement 
should be given to the "authentic  rep re sen ta t iv e s  of the people of Zim­
babwe" so th a t  they can to "maintain the s t rugg le  agains t  oppression 
and explo i ta t ion ."^®^
On the problem of decolonizat ion in Angola and Mozambique, Ni­
geria  s t rong ly  supported se l f -de te rmina t ion  and independence of these 
coun t r ie s .  I t  even appeared to believe th a t  these  goals would soon be 
r e a l i z a b l e ,  and thus noted tha t  the Portuguese policy in these coun- 
t r i e s  "had run i t s  course ."
With regard to the Namibian s i t u a t i o n ,  Nigeria  was of the view 
tha t  South A f r i c a ' s  continued presence in t h a t  country had "no
209
legi t imate  or leg a l "  backing, and noted tha t  the In te rna t iona l  Court
pno
of Ju s t ic e  had r e s t a t e d  th a t  f a c t .  Nigeria was thus of the view 
tha t  i t  was the r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  of the in te rn a t io n a l  community to en­
sure tha t  South Africa be made to conform to in te rn a t io n a l  norms and
conduct. The l i b e r a t i o n  movement in Namibia a lso  enjoyed the support 
of Nigeria;  and th i s  support  appeared to be more important due to the 
continued i n a b i l i t y  of the in te rna t iona l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and frameworks 
to resolve th i s  problem.
The apar theid  problem in South Africa a lso  consumed the f o r ­
eign policy  a t t e n t io n  o f  Nigeria.  While the removal of t h i s  unjust  
system was a cardinal fo re ign  policy goal of Niger ia ,  i t  p a r t i c u la r ly  
championed the offens ive  to d i lu te  any e f f o r t  by South Africa to gain 
in te rna t iona l  r e sp ec t  or to buy time by pre tending to be in te re s ted  in 
having a dialogue with African co u n t r ie s .  Thus Nigeria noted tha t  
many viewed such i n t e r e s t  by South Africa "with skepticism" and added 
tha t :
Unless the whole e f f o r t  is  a ruse to d e f l e c t  African and 
world a t t e n t io n  from the cruel inhumanities which charac te r ize  
the ru le  of the Government of South Afr ica ,  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to 
understand why such dialogues should not begin within South
Afr ica .
Therefore,  Nigeria was of the view th a t  i f  South Afr ica  is  in te re s ted
in having a dia logue with African s t a t e s ,  as a cond i t ion ,  i t  should
s t a r t  a dialogue f i r s t  with i t s  oppressed popula t ion .  Addit ionally ,  
African coun t r ie s  were of  the view th a t  such a dialogue can only occur 
a f t e r  South Africa a t  l e a s t  denounces apar theid  po l icy  as an o f f i c i a l  
s t a t e  po licy  and sets  in motion forces  to dismantle the system created 
by such a s t a t e  policy .
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As in the case of Zimbabwe, sanctions have also been seen as a 
way of bringing down apar theid  (but only as one possible  way). Thus, 
fo r  South Africa and the countr ies  s t i l l  plagued with the problems of 
colonialism and r ac ia l  oppression ,  Nigeria also supported the concept 
of armed s t ru g g le .  In t h i s  connection, Nigeria noted th a t  the op­
pressed peoples in these  countries were "beginning to lose  f a i t h  in
the a b i l i t y  of the  in t e rn a t io n a l  community to a s s i s t  them in t h e i r
205peaceful s t ru g g le , "  and thus had turned to "arms s t rugg le" .  Nige­
r i a  was thus of the view th a t  armed struggle only followed the f a i l u r e
of the 'peace s t r u g g l e . '  At one point Nigeria even posited th a t  the
in te rna t iona l  community had no choice but to support th i s  arms s t r u g ­
g le .  I t  reasoned tha t  since  the in te rna t iona l  community, broadly,  is  
on the side of oppressed people in these co u n t r ie s ,  i t  "had t a c i t l y
agreed to whatever methods the l ib e ra t io n  movement might choose," and
206thus "could not disavow these  methods." However, i t  appears tha t  
Nigeria might have been seeking to impose such a view ra th e r  than be­
liev ing  tha t  there  was a basis for such a l ink between the sympathy
shown by the in te rn a t io n a l  community and t h e i r  being committed to 'any 
method' of reso lv ing  these  problems.
In terms of nonalignment, the Gowon Government's Southern
African policy cannot be said to  f i t  into the equid is tance  from the
207superpower bloc policy perspec t ive ,  since i t  was c loser to one of 
these blocs than the  o th e r .  This i s  butt ressed by the fa c t  tha t  while 
Nigeria was of the view th a t  the "Western Powers which p e r s i s t  in 
p o l i t i c a l ,  economic and m i l i t a r y  co l lus ion ,  e spec ia l ly  with Portugal 
and South Afr ica ,  sow the seeds of s t r i f e  in Africa agains t
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themselves," in the same breath i t  noted tha t  the "moral and material
help of other c o u n t r ie s ,  notably the s o c i a l i s t  coun t r ies ,  is  g rea t ly  
208apprecia ted ;"  This view of the ro le  of the two blocs did not con­
note an equid is tance  from the two b locs ,  in so fa r  as the Southern 
African issue was concerned.
However, the  nonaligned countr ies  mostly do not view nonalign­
ment in terms of equid is tance  policy per se,  and, Nigeria saw i t s e l f  
as following the po l icy  of the African and the nonaligned groups,  (the
two of which i t  saw as waging a "war agains t  colonialism and r a c i a l - 
209ism)."  Thus, to  such an ex ten t ,  Nigeria perceived i t s e l f  as be­
ing very nonaligned; and i t s  conceptualization of nonalignment f i t
more into the global input of a regional ideology (Pan-Africanism) per-  
210spective .  N ig e r i a ' s  pos it ion  on the Southern African problem,
th e re fo re ,  r e s t s  on the basic premise th a t  the main issue underlying 
t h i s  problem is  the s truggle  to guarantee basic human r ig h t s  and c i v i l ­
ized standards of human decency, ra the r  than concern for maintaining 
an equidis tance between the two superpower blocs,  per se, in r e l a t io n  
to the reso lu tion  of t h i s  problem. To Nigeria and other African coun­
t r i e s  those which according to th e i r  perception do not appear to genu­
inely  share the urgency of resolv ing t h i s  problem, and those t h a t ,  to
them, d ip lomatica lly  and m a te r ia l ly  support the genuine and speedy r e ­
solution of th i s  problem, are not to be equ id is tan t ly  placed by Nige­
r i a  and the OAU, in t h e i r  i n i t i a t i v e s  and act ions  which s e t  in motion
the dynamics tha t  aim at resolving the Southern African problem. Fur­
thermore, insofar  as the reso lu t ion  of t h i s  problem i s  seen as the r e ­
moval of the source of c o n f l i c t  that  can t r ig g e r  a global c on f l ic tua l
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s i tu a t io n ,  N ig e r i a ' s  and the OAU's ro les  in t h i s  is sue can be seen as
being in the i n t e r e s t  of a l l  mankind, r a th e r  than t h e i r  pursu i t  of a
narrow regional i n t e r e s t ,  while playing down the relevance of bipolar
211r e a l i t i e s  in r e l a t i o n  to the re so lu t ion  of t h i s  problem.
The Middle East Problem
One major f e a tu re  of N ige r ia ' s  policy toward the Middle East 
problem during the Gowon Government era was the advocacy of a compre­
hensive approach to the reso lu tion  of the problem; and t h i s  emphasis 
seemed to have been t r iggered  by N ig e r ia ' s  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  with the 
tendency of some to pay a t ten t ion  to the problem mainly when there  
were inc idents  and r e p r i s a l s .  Thus, to Nigeria ,  the road to "stable
peace" in the Middle East  is  through the tackl ing  of the problem "as a
212whole and not piece-meal on the basis  of inc iden ts  and r e p r i s a l s . "  
Addit ionally ,  i t  was not only content with the advocacy of a compre­
hensive peace plan,  but ac tua l ly  championed the formulation of such a 
plan; and, on behalf  of a group of coun t r ie s ,  i t  presented three p r in ­
c ip les  as the cornerstones for peace in the Middle East .  These were
"the peaceful se tt lement of d ispu tes ,  nonacquis it ion  of t e r r i t o r y  by
213war and re spec t  fo r  the sovereignty and t e r r i t o r i a l  i n t e g r i t y  of" 
a l l  of the coun tr ie s  in the a rea .  I t  also noted t h a t  these  three  p r i n ­
c ip l e s ,  apar t  from being in consonance with the United Nations re so lu ­
tion  242, did not add or remove anything from th a t  reso lu t ion
Another angle to  N ige r ia ' s  i n i t i a t i v e  was a new emphasis on 
pushing i n i t i a t i v e s  through the OAU, and as "a member of the 10-nation 
Committee of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on the Middle
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a s t " “^^ i t  helped push an African i n i t i a t i v e  on the reso lu t ion  of 
the Middle East problem.
However, though i t  emphasized tha t  the OAU e f f o r t  was "a com-
2 1 8plement, not an a l t e r n a t iv e  to the e f f o r t s  of" other in te rna­
t iona l  forums, i t  turned out th a t  th i s  OAU e f f o r t  amounted mostly to  
an end-product t h a t  made OAU countr ies  take a s tand  th a t  put them on 
the side of the Arab p os i t ion ,  ins tead of a p os i t ion  th a t  did not 
favor e i t h e r  the Arab world or I s r a e l .  For example, OAU resolu t ions  
became more d i r e c t  in holding only one p a r ty ,  in s tead  of a ll  the par­
t i e s  involved, as being responsible  for the problem in the Middle 
East .  One of these  r e so lu t io n s  ca l led  fo r  "the immediate and uncondi­
t iona l  withdrawal of I s r a e l i  fo rces  from a l l  occupied African and Arab 
t e r r i t o r i e s , a n d  even implied tha t  the OAU Charter i t s e l f  l e f t  
African countr ies  no option but to  support the Arab world since Egypt 
apar t  from being an Arab country i s  also an African country .  The OAU 
reaffirmed
in the name of African s o l i d a r i t y  and by v i r tu e  of A r t ic le  11, 
paragraph 1(c ) of the OAU Charter i t s  act ive  and to ta l  support 
for the Arab Republic of Egypt in t h e i r  leg i t im a te  s t ruag le  to 
recover e n t i r e l y  by a ll  means her t e r r i t o r i a l  i n t e g r i t y .
Thus, the  basic premise fo r  the  OAU pos i t ion  was t h a t  an African coun­
t ry  was occupied and, the re fo re ,  the need to  invoke the OAU Charter.
This OAU pos i t ion  eventually  led to African countr ies  breaking re la -
219t io n s  with I s rae l  which Nigeria did in 1973. However, i t  seems
t h a t ,  apar t  from the issue of an occupation of an African country,  the 
Nigerian and OAU act ions  were more the r e s u l t  of a stepped-up tendency 
by African and Arab countr ies  to support each o ther  on in te rna t iona l
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i s su es ,  a n d  t h e  f a c t  tha t  many African countr ies  (the North
African coun tr ies)  are also Arab countr ies ,  and thus have the a b i l i t y  
to ac t  as c a ta ly s t s  in bringing African and Arab coun tr ies  pos it ion  
c lose r  in in te rna t iona l  i s su es .  In Nigeria,  the fac t  t h a t  i t  has a
large  Muslim population was a lso  a fac to r  th a t  influenced i t s  ac t ions .
221The appeasement of "the Islamic s u s c e p t i b i l i t i e s "  was also seen 
as inf luencing the ac t ions  of Yakubu Gowon, the then Head of S ta te ,  
who i s  himself a C h r i s t i an .
However, i t  appears th a t  N ig e r ia ' s  action was more a des i re  
not to be seen as not following OAU requirements,  ra the r  than any spe­
c ia l  desire  to  take s ides  in the Middle East problem, and th i s  is  bu t ­
t re s sed  by fa c t  t h a t ,  even a f t e r  breaking r e l a t i o n s  with I s r a e l ,  i t  
s t i l l  r e i t e r a t e d  the l e t t e r ' s  r i g h t s .  Thus i t  warned th a t
there should be no i l l u s i o n s  about any so lu t ion  which does not
take into account the t e r r i t o r i a l  i n t e g r i t y  and sovereignty  of 
the Jk;ab people and the recognition t h a t  Is rael  i s  a r e a l -i ty .ZZz
In terms of the relevance of nonalignment to the Nigerian policy on
the Middle East problem during the Gowon Government e ra ,  N ige r ia ' s  ac­
t ions  f i t t e d  more with the global input of a regional ideology (Pan-
223Africanism) p e r spec t ive ,  since i t  viewed i t s  ac t ions  through an
OAU perspective .  This perspective  of nonalignment can a lso  be said to
f i t  N ige r ia ' s  po licy  due to the f a c t  tha t  i t  s t ressed  t h a t  the Middle
East problem should be solved "outside the context of the cold 
224war",^^ This implied th a t  the problem should be viewed from a
local and regional pe rspec t ive ,  ins tead of i t  being viewed as a 
problem whose so lu t ion  had to depend more on the need to balance the
superpower b locs '  ro le  and influence in the a rea .  I t  was seen as a
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problem whose solu tion had to depend on the des i res  of al l  d i r e c t l y  
affec ted  p a r t i e s  to l ive  in peace, harmony, and mutual t r u s t  and 
respec t .
An Overview
On the whole, Nigerian foreign policy during the Gowon Govern­
ment era witnessed expanded r e la t i o n s  with the East .  However, t h i s  did 
not lead to Nigeria having routine  close  r e l a t i o n s  with the l a t t e r  
since Nigeria did not jo in  the m u l t i l a te ra l  m i l i t a r y  and economic 
framework of the East (the Warsaw Pact or Comecon), or adopt i t s  
socioeconomic system. During th i s  period,  Nigeria a lso  had adequate 
r e l a t i o n s  with the West, e sp ec ia l ly  a f te r  the Civil War. For example, 
there  were conscious e f f o r t s  to increase a i r  force  m i l i t a r y  hardware 
from the West in order to avoid being over-dependent on the East in
t h i s  area.  Thus, in terms of r e l a t io n s  with West and the Eas t ,  Nige­
r i a ' s  r e la t io n s  f i t t e d  the avoidance of alignment with the superpower
blocs perspective of nonalignment. The analys is  of N ig e r ia ' s  foreign
economic r e la t i o n s  with both blocs also r e f l e c t  t h i s  perspective  of 
nonali gnment.
Addit ionally ,  Nigerian foreign economic r e l a t i o n s  also f i t t e d  
in to  the global economy reordering policy perspective  (in th a t  i t  pur­
sued actions  aimed a t  fundamentally overhauling the present in t e r n a ­
tional economic o rd e r ) ,  and the global input of a regional ideology 
(Pan-Africanism) perspec t ive  (in th a t  i t  emphasized reg iona l ,  and sub­
reg iona l ,  economic in teg ra t ion  in Africa as a means of augmenting the 
p o l i t i c a l  and economic v i a b i l i t y  of the co n t in en t . )  This l a t t e r
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perspective of nona l ignment was also re f le c ted  in the analyses of Nige­
r i a ' s  ro le  in Afr ica ,  and i t s  po l ic ie s  towards the Southern African 
and Middle East problems.
On occasions ,  N ig e r i a ' s  view of the world also emphasized the 
in te rna t iona l  r e l a t io n s  p o s i t iv e  innovator perspec tive  of nonalign­
ment in tha t  i t  advocated the democratization of global power and in ­
fluence.  This view was r e f l e c t e d  when Nigeria condemned the "impres­
sion th a t  . . . c o n f l i c t  can be resolved at  Geneva by the big powers, 
and th a t  small countr ies  need play no ro le  beyond th a t  of cheerleaders  
in the power game . . . "  Additionally ,  in some other circum­
stances,  Nigeria,  while apprecia t ing  the benef i ts  of de tente  also com­
plained of the
problems which may be c reated  by de ten te  such as the inc reas­
ing tendency of a few to see themselves as the sole  a rb i te r s  
of in te rna t iona l  peace and secur i ty  j o k i n g  so lu t ions  outside 
the United Nations to  world problems.
This s o r t  of view may be in te rp re ted  by some as r e f l e c t i n g  the oppor­
tu n i s t i c  foreign policy perspective  of nonalignment since  i t  connotes 
tha t  c loser r e l a t i o n s  between the two superpowers leave the nonaligned 
countr ies  not enough room to maneuver in and maximize t h e i r  benef i ts  
(possibly by explo i t ing  the d i f ferences  between the two superpowers), 
as would have been poss ib le  i f  an in tense  level of tension existed  be­
tween both blocs (and thus the apparent inadequate enthusiasm about de­
t e n te . )  On the o ther hand, some may view the above Nigerian view of 
detente as f i t t i n g  into the in te rna t iona l  r e l a t i o n s  p o s i t iv e  innovator 
perspective of nonalignment in th a t ,  ins tead of being unenthusias tic  
about detente  per se ,  Nigeria  supported detente unless detente meant
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powerful countr ies  beginning to  cooperate on entrenching a very h i e r a r ­
chical  in te rna t iona l  system. Thus, some might po s tu la te  tha t  Nige­
r i a ' s  view supports de ten te  i f  i t  a lso  means t h a t  the l e ss  powerful 
countr ies  benef i t  from de tente  through a move to democratize the i n t e r ­
national system. This view may also  be supported by the added Nige­
r ian  pos i t ion  th a t  the "small ,  medium-sized and developing countr ies
227must seek ac tive  p a r t i c ip a t io n  in the development of world order ."
The clamour fo r  a new world order i s  not only l imited  to the 
in te rn a t io n a l  p o l i t i c a l  o rder .  In f a c t ,  the clamour for a new in te rn a ­
tiona l  economic order by the nonaligned countries has been even more
in tense  than the former (and the overwhelming i n t e r e s t  of the non- 
al igned countr ies  in t h i s  is sue has even led some to  conceptualize  the 
phenomenon of nonalignment as a global economy reorder ing  phenomenon). 
Nigeria ,  in some of i t s  p a r t i c u l a r  ac t ions  and views, also s t r e s s e s  
t h i s  perspective of conceptualiz ing nonalignment. For example, i t  saw 
the workings of contemporary in te rn a t io n a l  economic r e l a t io n s  as "the 
r e a l i t i e s  of the unjus t  world economic system," while i t  also
ta lked  of the "unwill ingness of the i n d u s t r i a l i z ed  countr ies  to d i s a -
229vow the ex is t ing  imperial p a t t e rn s  of t rade  . . . "
Nigeria also shared the concep tua l iza t ion  of nonalignment
through the in te rna t iona l  peace guarantor  perspec t ive ;  hence, while de­
p loring the lack of achievement of much progress in the area of d i s a r ­
mament, and a t t r ib u t i n g  t h i s  s i tu a t io n  to  "the lack of confidence be-
230tween the great  powers," i t  was of the opinion th a t  the non-
aligned countr ies  has the duty of making the world more peacefu l.
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Thus, i t  advocated "a bolder approach on the p a r t  of the smaller coun­
t r i e s  . . .
The Muhammed/Obasanjo Government
The Muhammed/Obasanjo Government l a s t ed  from 1975 to 1979, and 
covered the  period th a t  Murtala Mohammed and l a t e r ,  Glusegun Obasanjo, 
were Heads of S ta te .  This government, as will  be shown below, paid 
much a t te n t io n  to African a f f a i r s ,  e sp ec ia l ly  the is sues  in Southern 
Africa;  and, in t h i s  arena of i t s  diplomatic a c t i v i t i e s ,  N iger ia 's  ac­
t ions  wil l  be examined within the context of t h e i r  r e l a t i o n  to the con­
cept of nonalignment. A ddi t iona l ly ,  the nonalignment content in Nige­
rian  foreign po l icy  will be examined in the areas of i t s  foreign eco­
nomic r e l a t i o n s ,  i t s  po licy  on the Middle East problem, and i t s  r e l a ­
t ions  with the West and East .
Rela tions  with the West and East
During the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government e ra ,  N ige r ia ' s  r e l a ­
t ions  with the West and East were dynamic in t h a t ,  on d i f f e r e n t  
i s sues ,  d i f f e r e n t  pos tures  were adopted. For example, in i t s  r e l a t i o n s  
with the West, there  was considerable s t r a i n  on the r e l a t io n s  with 
Bri ta in  over the issue of the l e t t e r ' s  in s i s t ence  on not giving in to 
the Nigerian demand fo r  the re turn  of Yakubu Gowon, a former Head of 
S ta te ,  in connection with the inves t iga t ions  over an abortive  attempt
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to topple the government. The level of d i f fe rences  between the two
countr ies  on th i s  issue was high enough to  lead to N ige r ia ' s  d e m a n d
fo r  the r eca l l  of the B r i t i sh  envoy in Nigeria.  Addi t iona l ly ,
"Nigeria decided to d ive rs i fy  i t s  foreign  reserve formerly held in
s t e r l i n g , "  and t h i s  action helped s t a r t  "a run on s t e r l i n g  which
prompted in d u s t r i a l i z e d  s t a t e s  to rush to the  pound's rescue ."
However, N ig e r i a ' s  r e l a t io n s  with Bri ta in  during the Muhammed/
Obasanjo Government era were not very warm even before th i s  issue
about Gowon's presence in Br i ta in  since t h a t  Government, in i t s  ear ly
234phase, had "abruptly  postponed in d e f in i te ly "  the v i s i t  of the
B r i t i sh  Queen to Niger ia ,  and had cause to refuse BBC correspondents ,
235who had arr ived  at  a Nigerian a i r p o r t ,  entry  into Nigeria .
Despite these  s t r a in s  and s t r e s s e s ,  Nigeria s t i l l  had adequate
r e l a t i o n s  with B r i ta in  since  i t  did not decide to break r e l a t i o n s  with 
the former. In f a c t ,  the a b i l i t y  of Nigeria to continue to maintain 
diplomatic r e la t io n s  with B r i t a in ,  despite  these problems in t h e i r  r e ­
l a t i o n s ,  led a foreign policy scholar  to observe th a t  "Many students  
of foreign  policy were perplexed tha t  Nigeria and Bri ta in  s t i l l  main-
p o c
ta ined diplomatic r e l a t i o n s  . . ."
On the issue  of Zimbabwean independence, Nigeria and Bri ta in  
found cause to  d i f f e r  on many occasions (while also being able to
share some views on some other occas ions) .  For example, while in Octo­
ber 1976 Nigeria re je c ted  proposals made by Br i ta in  and the United
Sta tes  fo r  the se t t lement  of the Zimbabwean c r i s i s ,  i t  found the pro-
237posais  the l a t t e r  two presented in 1977 as being reasonable .
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Addit iona l ly ,  i t  i s  important to note th a t  the problem over Gowon's
refuge in Brita in  had been quieted down, and Nigeria and Br i ta in  again
enjoyed r e la t i o n s  th a t  "were not only warm but charac te r ized  by mutual 
238understanding,"  However, true  to the f l u c tu a t in g  nature of the
r e l a t i o n s  between both,  during the  l a s t  months of the Muhammed/ 
Obasanjo Government, there  was again a very ser ious  c r i s i s  in t h e i r  r e ­
l a t i o n s  over the Zimbabwean is sue .  Nigeria s t rongly  suspected tha t  
Br i ta in  might recognize what the former considered a puppet regime, 
(which had been in s t a l l e d  through a sham e l e c t i o n ) .  This led to
"B r i t i sh  firms being barred from tender ing fo r  contrac ts  in 
239Nigeria" in 1979, and, in th a t  same year ,  the Nigerian Government 
na t iona l ized  the a sse ts  of a B r i t i sh  firm, B r i t i sh  Petroleum (BP), 
as par t  of i t s  campaign to ensure tha t  the kind of independence 
Zimbabwe would have would be a genuine one (through put t ing  pressure 
on Br i ta in  to r e f r a in  from helping in s ta l l  a puppet regime.) There­
fo r e ,  through these  actions  Nigeria helped the P a t r i o t i c  Front (PF) to 
have a f a i r  chance of contes ting f o r  e lec t ion  (which i t  won, and thus 
formed the f i r s t  government in an independent Zimbabwe).
In terms of r e l a t i o n s  with the United S ta te s ,  the ea r ly  phase 
of the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government was charac te r ized  by poor r e l a ­
t ions  between Nigeria and the United Sta tes ,  due to sharp dif ferences  
over the Angolan s t ruggle  for  independence, s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  and the
Southern African problems, genera l ly .  While Nigeria was pushing for
241the  Popular Movement for  the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) being r e ­
cognized, and supported,  as the sole n a t io n a l i s t  fo rce  to form a gov­
ernment in an independent Angola, due to i t s  perception th a t  other
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n a t i o n a l i s t  groups were being backed by South A fr ica ,  the United 
Sta tes  pre fe rred a union government in Angola th a t  involved a ll  the 
l i b e ra t io n  fo rces .  N ig e r ia ' s  decis ion seemed to have been based 
mostly on the desi re  to  have a government in Angola t h a t  would aid in 
the solu tion of the remaining problems in Namibia and South Africa 
(with the ideological  o r ie n ta t io n  of the government th a t  Angola would 
have not appearing to be of much concern to Nigeria as long as such a 
government would serve to fu r th e r  the  above Pan-African goals in South­
ern A fr i ca ) .  On the o ther  hand, the  United States was much concerned 
about a strong Soviet/Cuban influence  in Angola (through the MPLA) hav­
ing s i g n i f i c a n t  impact on Western s t r a t e g i c  and economic i n t e r e s t s  in 
t h i s  reg ion ,  and thus also a f fe c t in g  the nature of global powers f ac ­
t o r s .
The deep d i f fe rences  between Nigeria and the United Sta tes
over the general s i tu a t io n  in Southern Africa was ind ica ted  by the
f a c t  th a t  Henry Kiss inger ,  American Secretary of S t a t e ,  was on two oc-
242cas ions ,  in 1975, not allowed to v i s i t  Nigeria.  Fur ther s t r a i n ­
ing r e l a t i o n s  between the two countr ie s  was the fu ro r  over personal 
l e t t e r s  Pres ident Ford sent to African Heads of S ta te  seeking to ne­
gate the MPLA from having the sole  ro le  in Angola (and thus also seek­
ing to negate the Soviet and Cuban ro le  in the Southern African r e ­
g ion) .  N ig e r ia ' s  response to t h i s  l e t t e r  was th a t  i t  " rep l ied  in
243anger to Pres ident Ford 's  l e t t e r  and made public i t s  angry r e p ly . "
The net r e s u l t  of t h i s  tu s s l e  over Angola was th a t  Nigeria was able
to persuade the majori ty  of OAU member s t a t e s  to support  the MPLA as 
the sole l ib e ra t io n  force  in Angola and thus help f a c i l i t a t e  i t s
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forming the government of the independent Angola (though the other l i b ­
e ra t ion  forces  are s t i l l  con tes t ing  with i t  fo r  power in tha t  coun­
t r y ) .
However, the s t a t e  of N iger ia 's  r e l a t i o n s  with the United 
S ta te s  improved very g rea t ly  with the advent of the Car te r  Administra­
t ion  due to N ig e r ia ' s  percept ion tha t  tha t  adm in is t ra t ion  did not per ­
ceive the Southern African problem only in terms of bipola r p o l i t i c s  
and the power game.^^^ Thus, throughout the  remaining period of the 
Muhammed/Obasanjo Government e r a ,  N ige r ia ' s  r e l a t i o n s  with the United 
S ta te s  were continuously improving. This was shown by the fac t  th a t ,  
in 1977, Glusegun Obasanjo, the  then Nigerian Head of S ta te ,  paid the 
f i r s t  S ta te  v i s i t  by a Nigerian Head of S ta te  to the United Sta tes ,  
and t h i s  was rec ip rocated  in 1978 by Jimmy Car te r ,  the  then President 
of  the  United S ta tes  (which a lso  made i t  the f i r s t  S ta te  v i s i t  to Nige­
r i a  by an American Pres ident)
N ig e r ia ' s  r e l a t i o n s  with the East ,  l i k e  those with the West, 
were a mixture of some f r i c t i o n a l  areas and eras  and some tha t  were co­
ope ra t ive .  However, i t  i s  important to note t h a t  although there  were 
some c r i s e s  with the West, e sp ec ia l ly  over Southern African issues ,  
the  Soviet  Union was not "the power behind"^*^ these  c r i s e s .  In 
f a c t ,  "Moscow's f a i l u r e  to consult  with Nigeria  or the  OAU over Soviet 
involvement in Angola and in the Ethiopia-Somalia war"^^^ was a 
cause fo r  some f r i c t i o n  with Nigeria .  Nevertheless,  Nigeria chose to 
champion the  case fo r  the support  of the MPLA (which were backed by 
the Soviet Union and Cuba) among other OAU c o u n t r ie s ,  due to i t s  per ­
ception t h a t  the MPLA bes t  represented African i n t e r e s t s .  In
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connection with the S o v ie t ' s  strong influence in Ethiopia  and the 
Ethiopia-Somalia war, the OAU, probably due to i t s  loa th ing of issues 
th a t  i t  may not be able to  e a s i ly  reso lve ,  has not made sustained i n i ­
t i a t i v e s  in t h i s  d i r e c t io n .
I t  has a lso  been noted tha t  the Soviet  Union "avoided contact
and co l labora t ion  with Nigeria  in s p i t e  of N ige r ia ' s  e f f o r t s  to e f fe c t
248some link-up . . and inf luence,  over the Angolan issue and the
Ethiopian-Somalia war. Thus, the nature of N ig e r ia ' s  r e l a t i o n s  with
the Soviet  Union "was one of real  c r i s i s  in r e l a t i o n s ,  and both coun- 
249t r i e s  knew i t . " This,  s i tu a t io n  underscored the fa c t  tha t  the
250Soviet Union had not been able to carve a "special  pos i t ion"  fo r
i t s e l f  in Nigeria ,  desp i te  i t s  help to the l a t t e r  during the Civil
251War, and thus i t s  "ambition in Nigeria remains u n f u l f i l l e d . "  ( I t
must a lso  be noted t h a t ,  a f t e r  the Civil War ended, and the Soviet
Union did not succeed in carving up a special  pos it ion  fo r  i t s e l f  in
Nigeria ,  the Soviets s t i l l  expressed "new hopes . . . fo r  Sovie t-
252Nigerian cooperat ion,"  due to i t s  appreciation of "Niger ia ' s
253place in Africa and the world ."  Because of t h i s ,  the  African In­
s t i t u t e  of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, according to i t s  d i r ec to r ,  
Vasily Solodovnikov, decided to e s t a b l i s h  "a specia l  Nigerian sec­
tion ".^^4
However, Nigeria and the Soviet Union, despite  t h e i r  d i f f e r ­
ences s t i l l  maintained some good l in k s .  For example, Nigeria ,  "par t ly
pec
to c lea r  up any misunderstanding between Moscow'and Lagos," found 
i t  necessary to b r ie f  the  Soviet leaders  on i t s  support fo r  the Anglo- 
American proposals fo r  the sett lement of the Zimbabwean issue.
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That Nigeria found i t  very necessary to do t h i s  meant tha t  i t  was 
eager to maintain adequate r e l a t i o n s  with the Soviet  Union.
Nigeria ,  during th i s  period,  was also in ten s i fy in g  i t s  r e l a ­
t io n s  with Romania and Pol a n d . I t  has been noted th a t  t h i s  i n ­
t e n s i f i c a t i o n  of r e l a t i o n s  with these  countr ies  was an e f f o r t  to "corn- 
257pensate"  fo r  the f r i c t i o n  i t  had been having with the Soviet
Union, and to  ensure tha t  i t  had adequate r e l a t i o n s  with the East and
258thus maintain i t s  "nonaligned s t a t u s . "
Therefore,  as the above analys is  of N ig e r ia ' s  foreign policy
during the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government era  shows, N ig e r i a ' s  foreign
policy f i t t e d  into the avoidance of alignment with the superpower
259b locs '  po l icy  perspective  of nonalignment, since  Nigeria  did not
have rou t ine  close  t i e s  to e i t h e r  the West or the East .  This f a c t  can 
be fu r th e r  b u t t r e s sed  by the observat ion t h a t ,  in 1978, both the  Uni­
ted S ta tes  Chief of Army S taff  and the Commander-in-Chief of the
260Soviet Air Force v i s i t e d  Nigeria .  I t  i s  a lso important to note
t h a t ,  as shown above, N ige r ia ' s  " r e l a t io n s  with the USA, Bri ta in  and
261the USSR . . . were a l l  s t ra ined  a t  one time or another ."
The Middle East Problem
On the problem of the Middle East  during the Muhammed/Obasanjo
Government e ra ,  Nigeria "welcomed a l l  i n i t i a t i v e s  in the d i rec t ion  of 
262peace," and th i s  seemed to have been an obvious re ference  to the
United S t a t e s '  i n i t i a t i v e s  through the Camp David accord. However, in
the same b rea th ,  Nigeria saw the Camp David accords only as "a frame- 
262work," and added " tha t  the road to f ina l  peace was s t i l l  long and
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a r d u o u s . A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  by noting th a t  "the United Nations over 
the years  had es tab l ished  broad p r in c ip le s  for the reso lu t ion  of the 
Middle East  p r o b l e m , N i g e r i a  connoted tha t  the United Nations 
framework, and i n i t i a t i v e s ,  were s t i l l  the most appropr ia te  for the 
re so lu t ion  of the Middle East  problem. However, i t  must be noted tha t  
the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government s t i l l  continued an approach to th i s  
problem which had been i n i t i a t e d  during the preceding Gowon Government 
and which was not within the United Nations framework. I t  was, in ­
stead,  an OAU approach to the Middle East problem, and one which was 
more favorable  to one par ty  to the issue (the Arab world) since  i t  in ­
volved African countr ies  breaking diplomatic r e l a t i o n s  with Is rae l  on 
the grounds th a t  the l a t t e r  occupied t e r r i t o r i e s  t h a t  do not belong to 
i t .  In f a c t ,  the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government appeared to  be even 
s trengthening th i s  approach on t h i s  i s sue .  Instead of perceiving all 
pa r t i e s  involved in the  Middle East problem as having to compromise 
some of t h e i r  p o s i t io n s ,  i t  appeared to  perceive one party  as being r e ­
sponsible fo r  the impasse in e f f o r t s  to bring peace to the region 
since i t  observed tha t  "there were . . . uncertain prospects  for Mid­
dle East peace where the S ta te  of I s rae l  had doggedly held on to Arab 
lands conquered by force of arms. However, i t  i s  important to
note th a t  Nigeria also recognized t h a t  Is rael  is a r e a l i t y  tha t  al l 
mankind has to accept,  thus i t  r e fe r re d  to Is rael  in the above immedi­
ate statement as the "Sta te  of I s r a e l " .  Addit ionally ,  Nigeria recog­
nized the r ig h t  of the people of I s rae l  to a s ta te  of t h e i r  own within
protected and respected boundaries.  Thus i t  saw the means to a "dur-
9 filable and la s t ing  solu tion of the Middle East problems" as not
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only the recognit ion of "the l e g i t im a te  a sp i r a t io n s  of the P a l e s t i n i -
OÇLO
ans to a homeland of t h e i r  own," but as well the recognition of 
"al l  S ta te s  in the region to e x i s t  in peace with in  secure and recog-
2Ç.Q
nized borders"  This was an obvious reference  to N ig e r ia ' s  sup­
por t  to the  r i g h t  of the  people of I s rae l  to a homeland within secure 
borders which is  recognized, and respected,  by a l l  neighboring coun­
t r i e s  and the  general in te rna t iona l  community.
Never theless,  since Nigeria s t i l l  continued to i n s i s t  on not
^70having even diplomatic r e l a t i o n s  with I s ra e l "  (a party in the Mid­
dle East i ssue  more favored by the West), the Nigerian policy on the 
Middle East  problem can be said  not to  have f i t t e d  into the e q u id i s ­
tance from the superpower blocs policy perspec t ive  of conceptual iz ing 
271nonalignment. However, since  Nigeria ,  as ind ica ted  in a preced­
ing s e c t io n ,  tends to perceive the  Middle East problem as a regional 
issue in s tead  as problem th a t  can be understood mainly in terms of b i ­
polar p o l i t i c s ,  N ig e r ia 's  Middle East policy may also be seen as f i t ­
t ing in to  the global input of a regional ideology (Pan-Africanism) p e r -
272spective o f  conceptual iz ing nonalignment since  i t  saw i t s  ro le  as 
tha t  of t ry in g  to bring s t a b i l i t y  and peace to the p a r t i e s  involved 
(many of which are also OAU member s t a t e s ) ,  and thus also bring peace 
to the Middle Eastern region and the whole world. Moreover, i t  should 
also be noted tha t  N ig e r ia ' s  pos i t ion  accorded with t h a t  of most coun­
t r i e s  in the  nonaligned group and th a t  most nonaligned countries ap­
pear to favor the Arab p o s i t io n ,  due also to the  simple r e a l i t y  t h a t  
the Arab countr ie s  and countr ies  with dominant or s ig n i f i c a n t  Islamic 
popula tions  c o n s t i tu t e  a large number of the nonaligned coun t r ies .
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Foreign Economic Relations
As TABLES 5, 5 and 7 show, during the Muhammed/Obasanjo Govern­
ment e ra ,  Nigeria continued to have a very large percentage of i t s  
t rad ing  l ink with the West, both in terms of i t s  imports and exports ;  
while the East ,  as those same ta b le s  a lso  show, had a very neg l ig ib le  
share  of N ig e r i a ' s  foreign trade l in k s .
An important fea ture  of the Nigerian economy, during the 
Muhammed/Obasanjo Government, was a coordinated e f f o r t  to provide a 
very viable  economic platform th a t  could fuel  more i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n  
and encourage heavy in d u s t r ie s  in the manufacturing s ec to r  of the eco­
nomy. Thus the development of adequate energy re sou rces ,  chemical,  
s t e e l  and machine tool in d u s t r ie s  to provide the requ ired  inputs for 
the  manufacturing sec tor (in terms of providing i t  with cheap energy, 
primary and intermediate  raw m a te r i a l s ,  capita l ,  goods,  and r e la ted  
technological  in d u s t r ia l  in p u ts ) .  The iron and s t e e l  industry  was 
seen as a very c r i t i c a l  area in th i s  economic scheme; and i t  was th i s  
area  t h a t ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y ,  has afforded the Soviet Union an opportuni ty 
to  have a s i g n i f i c a n t  economic l ink with Nigeria .  As al ready noted in 
an e a r l i e r  sec t ion ,  during the Gowon Government e ra  the  Soviet Union 
had agreed to provide technical  cooperation for  the iron and s tee l  in­
dus try  and, though there  had been considerable  delay in implementa­
t i o n ,  the Soviet Union was eventually  designated to provide a ss is tance  
fo r  the centerp iece of the Nigerian s tee l  indust ry ,  the  Ajaokuta Steel 
Complex. For the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government, speedy progress in the 
s t e e l  industry was a top p r i o r i t y  program and th a t  meant increas ing 
economic contacts  with the Soviet Union in t h i s  a rea .  For example, in
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TABLE 5
PATTERN OF NIGERIA’S IMPORT TRADE RELATIONS 1976-1979
Country 1975 1977 1978 1979
% % % %
Britain 23.3 21.9 22.0 22.1
Bel gi um-Luxembourg 2.8 2.4 2.1 2.2
Denmark 1.1 1.2 0.8 0.8
France 7.2 6.9 7.2 7.3
Federal Republic of Germany 16.2 15.6 15.8 15.8
Ireland 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2
I ta ly 7.2 7.0 6.6 6.4
Netherlands 4.5 4.2 4.1 4.0
United S ta tes 10.7 11.1 10.9 10.9
Eastern Europe 1.8 2.5 2.0 1.8
Africa 0.9 1.2 1.0 1.2
Japan 9.3 10.8 10.9 11.0
Other Countries 14.8 14.9 16.3 16.3
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: The above import f ig u res  do not include petroleum.
Source: Culled from Nelson, op. c i t . ,  which based i t s  data on in fo r ­
mation co l lec ted  from Central Bank of Nigeria ,  Annual Report and 
Statement of Accounts fo r  the  Year Ended 31st  December, 1976; and Cen- 
t r a l  Bank of Nigeria ,  Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for  the 
Year Ended 31s t  December, 1979.
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TABLE 6
PATTERN OF NIGERIA'S PETROLEUM EXPORT TRADE RELATIONS 1976-1979
Country 1976 1977 1978 1979
% % % %
Bri ta in 9.1 6.3 2.6 2.1
Belgi um-Luxembourg 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.2
Denmark 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1
France 9.1 7.8 11.3 10.1
Federal Republic of Germany 5.3 5.2 7.5 6.8
Ire land 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
I t a l y 0.8 1.2 3.4 3.6
Netherlands 9.7 10.2 13.6 12.7
United States 36.1 41.8 44.1 46.8
Eastern Europe 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Africa 1.8 2.3 3.1 3.4
Japan 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other Countries 26.0 25.0 14.3 14.2
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Same as Table 5.
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TABLE 7
PATTERN OF NIGERIA'S NON-PETROLEUM EXPORT TRADE RELATIONS 1976-1979
Country 1976 1977 1978 1979
% % % %
Bri ta in 29.8 30.7 28.0 27.8
Belgi um-Luxembourg 1.9 1.7 1.2 1.1
Denmark 0.7 0.8 0 .3 0.3
France 2.0 2.9 9.3 9.6
Federal Republic of Germany 10.8 16.0 17.4 17.4
Ireland 0.5 0.0 0 .4 0.3
I ta ly 2.7 2.5 4.3 4.0
Netherlands 18.4 24.1 15.0 13.7
United S ta tes 17.7 10.9 11.9 12.2
Eastern Europe 7.3 3.3 4.2 4.1
Africa 5.7 3.1 3.5 3.7
Japan 1.6 1.4 0.6 0.6
Other Countries 0.9 2.6 3.9 5.2
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Same as Table 5.
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977, "the permanent s ec re ta ry  of the Federal Ministry of In d u s t r ie s ,  
Mai lam Ahmed Joda, led a delegation to Moscow . . . which included the 
p ro je c t  manager of the Nigerian Steel Development Author ity ,  Dr. Adeg- 
boye" to fa m i l i a r i z e  themselves "with the design of the iron and s tee l  
complex and with the method and organizat ion of production in the
0 7 0
USSR's own iron and s tee l  p lan ts  . . . "  Due to the f ac t  tha t
Nigerian Governments have devoted much resources to the iron and s tee l
indus try  and have also accorded i t  a v i ta l  ro le  in i t s  economic
schemes, the cooperation with the  USSR in t h i s  area has afforded the
l a t t e r  a s ig n i f i c a n t  l ink  to an important p a r t  of the Nigerian eco­
nomy.
However, there  have also been e f f o r t s  to d iv e r s i fy  external co­
opera tive  l inks  in the iron and s teel  indus t ry ,  which appears to be an 
e f f o r t  to avoid over-dependence on one source.  For example, the 
Aladja Steel Complex, which uses the d i r e c t  reduction process,  was
b u i l t  with the technical  cooperation of a German-Austrian consortium. 
Thus, in r e a l i t y ,  the iron and s tee l  indus try  i s  evolving in such a 
way tha t  ex ternal  cooperation l in k s  with both the West and the East 
have become poss ib le .
These so r t s  of e f f o r t s  to u t i l i z e  ex ternal  cooperative  l inks
(in economic undertakings where such l inks  are needed), in such a way
th a t  both the West and East are involved, was even more g la r ing  in the 
nation-wide o i l  product d i s t r ib u t io n  system const ruct ion  contrac t  
awards. While Tsvemepormexport, a Soviet f i rm, was awarded 180 m i l ­
l ion Naira to const ruct  two oil  p ip e l in e s ,  two oil  p ipe l ine  con trac ts  
were a lso  given to Western firms (Williams In te rn a t io n a l  from the Uni- 
ted S ta te s ,  and Montubi Montaggi Material Tubolari from I t a l y . )
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Thus, on the whole, during the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government 
e ra ,  N ige r ia ' s  foreign economic r e l a t i o n s  f i t t e d  into the avoidance of 
alignment with the superpower blocs policy perspective  of nonalign-
ment.^^^
The Southern African Problem
Nigeria,  during the period of Muhammed/Obasanjo Government,
was very much involved with the problems in Southern A fr ica .  As shown
in a sec tion above, Angola was o n e  area  in which i t s  involvement was
very st rong.  At the eve of Angolan independence, Nigeria made up i t s
mind to support the MPLA as the only n a t i o n a l i s t  group to  form the gov-
276ernment in Angola, and thus thwarting o th e r s '  e f f o r t s  to help
form a government involving a l l  the Angolan n a t i o n a l i s t  groups. The
Nigerian pos it ion  was tha t  the MPLA was "the t ru ly  n a t io n a l i s t  
277group", and th a t  the other groups,  apar t  from being "e thn ica l ly
278 279based movements", were being supported by South Africa (and
thus seen as undesi rable  to be p a r t  of the government of an indepen­
dent Angola since they might r e t a rd  the solu tion of the remaining prob­
lems in the Southern African reg ion) .  Thus, although N ige r ia ' s  motiva­
tion was a desi re  to  have a government in Angola tha t  would help the 
people achieve meaningful independence and also help in the e f f o r t s  to 
resolve the remaining problems in Namibia and South Afr ica ,  on b a l ­
ance, Nigeria helped i n s t a l l  a government in Angola which was suppor­
ted by the Soviet  Union and Cuba. However, the other Angolan n a t io n a l ­
i s t  groups th a t  were not able to be p a r t  of the Angolan government pro­
cess have been contes ting for power with the MPLA with arms.
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N ige r ia ' s  e f f o r t  to help the MPLA gain power involved "a d iplo-
?80matic b l i t z k r i e g  among African s t a t e s  on behalf  of the MPLA" for 
the l e t t e r ' s  i n t e rn a t io n a l  recognition  as the sole  p o l i t i c a l  force in 
Angola, and th i s  " re su l t ed  in v ic to ry  fo r  the Nigerian posi t ion at the 
1976 Extraordinary Summit of the Organization of African Unity held in 
Addis Ababa to d is cuss  the Angolan c r i s i s . "
N ige r ia 's  commitment to help susta in  the MPLA in Angola and to 
help i t  to build  a v iab le  and s tab le  po l i ty  was not l imited to d ip lo­
matic support .  Nigeria gave Angola 13 mil l ion Naira "as a cash grant"
28?and 52 mil l ion  Naira "in m i l i t a r y  and economic a i d ; " and for the 
Nigerian resources  l e v e l ,  t h i s  amount of ass is tance  was a la rge amount 
of money to give out and showed the high level of N iger ia ’s commitment 
to the MPLA.
On the Zimbabwe is sue ,  Nigeria worked towards an arrangement 
tha t  ensured tha t  the  l ib e ra t io n  forces  th a t  waged the armed st ruggle  
had a f a i r  chance of contes ting  for  e lec t ion  (which they won); and 
th i s  e f f o r t ,  as shown in an e a r l i e r  sec t ion ,  involved pressures on Bri­
ta in  not to help i n s t a l l  a puppet regime (the na t iona l iza t ion  of BP,
283also discussed in an e a r l i e r  sec t ion ,  was one of these  p ressures . )
In the f in a l  a n a ly s i s ,  N ige r ia ' s  opposition to the in te rnal s e t t l e ­
ment was successful  since  the P a t r i o t i c  Front was able to form the gov­
ernment fo r  the independent Zimbabwe.
The Namibian problem was seen by Nigeria as being caused by
284South African in t r ans igence ,  since the l a t t e r  continues to 
control  Namibia con tra ry  to the decis ion of the In te rna t iona l  Court of 
J u s t i c e .  This tended to push Nigeria to support the South West
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African People 's  Organization (SWAPO), an organization which t r i e s  to 
gain independence through negot ia t ions  where poss ib le ,  and through 
armed s t rugg le .  N iger ia ' s  strong support  fo r  th i s  group can be borne 
out by out by the f ac t  tha t  the former "saluted the leaders  of SWAPO 
and paid t r i b u t e  to the devotion of the organization and i t s  détermina-
pOC
t ion to f r ee  Namibia from i l l e g a l  occupation."
On the South African apar theid  problem, Nigeria continued to 
push for  the former to be " i so la ted  in all  areas of in te rna t iona l  en- 
deavor" through the demand for more sanctions agains t  i t .  Nige­
r i a  also posited  i t  would continue to press for  such i so la t io n  of
007
South A f r i ca ' s  " a l l i e s  and f r ien d s  in in te rna t iona l  forums."
Nigeria a lso  continued to favor armed s truggle  and asser ted
tha t  i t  "would continue to give diplomatic ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  f inanc ia l  and
288material  a s s i s tan ce  to the nat ional  l i b e ra t io n  movement." Unsur­
p r i s in g ly ,  i t  also reasser ted  the pos i t ion  th a t  i t  r e jec ted  any d i a ­
logue with South Africa without the l a t t e r  "renouncing i t s  po licy  of 
28Qapar the id ."  On the e f f o r t s  by South Africa to create  ban- 
tu s ta n s ,  Nigeria saw such action simply as "the quintessence of 
apar the id .
The f a c t  th a t  N ig e r ia ' s  pos i t ion  is  more on the side of l i b e r a ­
t ion groups, most of which are supported by Eastern sources,  makes
N ige r ia ' s  ac t ions  not f i t  into  the equid is tance  from the superpower
291b l o c ' s  policy perspective  of nonalignment. However, as the above 
analysis  shows, N ig e r ia ' s  pos i t ion  appeared to be based more on i t s  de­
s i r e  to support what, to i t s  best  judgment, represents  true African
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i n t e r e s t s  (with much less  concern with the question whether such sup­
port happen to also t a l l y  with or d i f f e r  from the  pos i t ion  of the West
or the Eas t) ,  with the understanding th a t  independence, j u s t i c e ,
peace, and p ro s p e r i ty  in Africa will  a l so  mean the un iv e r sa l i za t io n  of 
th i s  phenomena. Thus, N ig e r ia ' s  policy on the Southern African prob­
lem can be seen as f i t t i n g  more into the global input of a regional
?92ideology (Pan-Africanism) perspec t ive  of nonalignment."
The Muhammed/Obasanjo Government and African A ffa i r s
During the era of the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government, the
strengthening of Africa was "the corners tone of N ig e r i a ' s  foreign pol-  
^j.^,,293 Apart from the Southern African problems, Nigeria was i n ­
t e r e s t e d  in other African is sues  such as the e f f o r t s  to develop v i ­
able in t ra -A fr ican  economic cooperation and economic in teg ra t ion  in 
the West African sub-region. In the area of continenta l  economic 
l in k s ,  Nigeria ,  f o r  example, extended one mil l ion  Naira in f inanc ia l  
a ss is tance  to Somalia, and also  r e v i t a l i z e d  the Chad Basin Commis- 
sion.294 A ddi t iona l ly ,  apar t  from the a lready mentioned 20 mil l ion 
Naira a ss is tance  to Angola, Nigeria  a lso  extended 2.5 mil l ion  Naira in 
ass is tance  to Mozambique to enable the l a t t e r  to cope with the eco­
nomic hardships a r i s in g  from the c losure  of i t s  border with Zimbabwe,
pQC
in March 1976, in an e f f o r t  to help bring a speedy and acceptable 
se tt lement of the independence problem of the  l a t t e r .
On the sub jec t  of ECOWAS, the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government, 
l ike  the preceding Gowon Government, championed and helped build  th i s  
regional economic community, and was very in t e r e s t e d  in seeing i t  grow
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into  a viable  framework for  regional cooperat ion.  Thus, at  the Dakar
Summit of April 1979, an agreement th a t  visa requirements should be
abolished fo r  n a t iona ls  of ECOWAS co u n t r ie s ,  who are v i s i t in g  other
296member s t a t e s  fo r  n inety  days,  was reached. There was also an
agreement on the progressive reduction in t a r i f f  b a r r i e r s  against
goods o r ig ina t ing  from other ECOWAS s t a t e s  fo r  the following two 
297years .  Also, s i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  a nonaggression pact ,  signed in
1978, was to be supplemented by some form of m i l i t a r y  a l l iance  among
298the member co un t r ie s .
Nigeria continued to s trengthen the OAU in African a f f a i r s ;
but there also developed a new element, with Nigeria being impatient
with,  or i n to l e r a n t  o f ,  OAU member s t a t e s  (which to i t  were not 
'progressive* enough in outlook) without much concern fo r  consensus 
bui lding within the OAU.^^^
Another major African is sue  t h a t  Nigeria was involved with was 
the invasion of the Shaba province of Zaire in 1978 by Zairean d i s s i ­
dents based in Angola (which were sa id  to be backed by Cuban troops).  
Nigeria mainly concentra ted on helping to arrange a mediation between 
Zaire and Angola due to i t s  b e l i e f  t h a t  continued extra-Afr ican i n t e r ­
vention ( tha t  came from Western sources who encouraged some African 
s t a t e s  to do the same, on behalf  of Zaire ;  from Eastern sources, 
through the use of Cubans as condui ts ,  on behalf  of the Angolan-based 
Zairean d is s iden ts )^^^  could have been detr imental  to both Zaire and 
Angola. Thus, Nigeria st rongly  condemned those extra-African forces 
tha t  intervened fo r  the two s ides  in the c o n f l i c t .  Regarding those 
th a t  intervened for Za ire ,  Nigeria saw t h e i r  ro le  as "a most naked and
237
unashamed attempt to  determine (by external fo rce)  what A f r i c a ' s  true
c o l l e c t iv e  i n t e r e s t s  should b e , w h i l e ,  about those in Angola, he
to ld  "the Soviets and t h e i r  f r iends  . . . t h a t  having been inv i ted  to
Africa to a s s i s t  in the l i b e ra t io n  st ruggle  and the consol ida t ion  of
302national independence, they should not overstay t h e i r  welcome." 
Since N ige r ia ' s  pos i t ion  was a balanced rebuke of both the West and 
the East ,  N ig e r i a ' s  ro le  in the Shaba issue f i t t e d  in to  the e q u id i s ­
tance from the superpower b lo c ' s  policy perspective of nonalign- 
303ment. However, from the Nigerian perspec t ive ,  i t s  ro le  of concen­
t r a t i n g  on encouraging the reso lu t ion  of the issue  through a mediation 
process between Angola and Zaire ,  thus helping to stem continued e x t ra -  
African in te rven t ion  in t h i s  is sue ,  stemmed more from i t s  des i re  to 
pursue the genuine i n t e r e s t  of Africa and thus fu r the r  peace and s t a ­
b i l i t y  in Africa and the world, r a th e r  than from a sheer  des i re  to be 
eq u id i s tan t  from superpower blocs.  Thus, from the Nigerian viewpoint, 
i t s  role in the Shaba issue  t a l l i e s  more with the global input of a r e ­
gional ideology (Pan-Africanism) perspective of nonalignment, ra the r  
than with the equ id is tance  from the superpower b lo c 's  perspective  of 
nonalignment^^^ (even though i t s  posit ion on th is  Shaba issue was 
very balanced, in terms of i t s  equal resentment of Western and Eastern 
ro les  in th a t  i s s u e ) .  Addit ionally ,  the rebuke of Soviet  excesses on 
the Shaba issue shows t h a t  N ige r ia ' s  continued support for the MPLA 
government in Angola was based on what Nigeria considered to be the 
genuine i n t e r e s t s  of Africa (genuine independence fo r  Angola and a 
des i re  to have a government in Angola that  wil l  help in the re so lu t ion  
of the remaining problems in Angola and South Afr ica ) ,  and not on an
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attempt to rou t ine ly  l ink to the East .  Therefore,  a t  t h i s  junc tu re ,  i t  
can also  be sa id  th a t  the Nigerian policy on Angola, and on the whole 
of Southern Afr ica ,  t a l l i e s  with the global input of a regional ideo l ­
ogy (Pan-Africanism) perspect ive  of n o n a l i g n m e n t , s i n c e  Nigeria 
mainly views i t s  ro le  in th is  area as th a t  of promoting independence, 
peace, and j u s t i c e ,  s t a b i l i t y  and p rospe r i ty  in Afr ica ,  and on univer­
sa l iz ing  these  phenomena.
An Overview
An overa l l  view of Nigerian fo re ign  policy  during the era of 
Muhammed/Obasanjo Government, through the above analyses of N iger ia 's  
r e l a t io n s  with the West and the East ,  foreign economic r e l a t i o n s .  Mid­
dle East po l icy ,  and ro le  in Southern African and general African a f ­
f a i r s  shows th a t  though some of i t s  actions  did f i t  into the avoidance 
of alignment with the superpower b lo c ' s  pol icy perspec t ive  of nonalign­
ment, most of i t s  ac t ions  f i t t e d  more in to  the global input of a re -
306gional ideology (Pan-Africanism) perspective  of nonalignment.
Nigerian foreign  policy during t h i s  period also reveals  some 
fea tu res  of f a s c in a t io n  with a ' j u s t  cause'  m enta l i ty .  For example, a 
scholar who was much involved in the foreign policy  process^^^ dur­
ing the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government era  enunciated views tha t  in d i ­
cated th a t  t h i s  so r t  of mentali ty guided Nigerian Angolan pol icy .  Ac­
cording to him
there  is  no i n t r i n s i c  re la t io n sh ip  between success and the 
ju s tn e s s  of one 's  cause in p o l i t i c s —d e f i n i t e l y  not in in t e r n a ­
t iona l  p o l i t i c s .  Therefore, t h a t  in recognizing the MPLA
government in Angola we backed the winning horse does not mean 
th a t  we wil l  always be successful  in our p o l i c i e s —success be­
ing measured in terms of achievement of our o b je c t iv e s .  A lo t  
of us would have been disappointed i f  the MPLA had been
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defeated . . .  in Angola. But we would s t i l l ,  however, have 
been ^cgnvinced th a t  Nigeria was r ig h t  in recognizing the
MPLA.^OS
This view, coming from somebody who was c lo se ly  involved in the fo r ­
eign policy  process ,  means th a t  in some policy  formulation processes 
scoring p o l i t i c a l  v i c to r i e s  a t  home and abroad, through the pu rsu i t  of 
p o l ic ie s  tha t  are more bound to be success fu l ,  mattered le s s ,  while
the p u rsu i t  of p o l i c i e s  t h a t  passed the t e s t  of " jus tness  of one's  
309cause,"  whether they had the prospects of succeeding or not, mat­
te red  more. Thus, since  most of the foreign po l icy  issues  tha t  Nige­
r i a  was involved in concerned the is sue  of oppression and exp lo i ta ­
t ion  in Southern A fr ica ,  N ige r ia ' s  r o le  in t h i s  area a lso  f i t t e d  into 
the a l t r u i s t i c  pol icy  perspective  of nonalignment.  I t  was concerned 
le ss  with the v i c t o r i e s  at  home and the extension of influence abroad 
through the p u rsu i t  of successful  p o l i c i e s ,  while being concerned more 
with ju s tness  of i t s  p o l i c i e s  in terms of t h e i r  being able to bring in ­
dependence, peace,  j u s t i c e ,  s t a b i l i t y  and p ro sp e r i ty  to the Southern
African region, and thus a lso  universa l iz ing  these  phenomena.
On the natu re  of contemporary in te rn a t io n a l  economic r e l a ­
t i o n s ,  Nigeria observed t h a t ,  while
there  was a t  hand the economic and technological  means to end 
the  progress ive  and d e f in i t e ly  c o j i r o l 1 able d r i f t  to chaos in 
in te rn a t io n a l  economic r e l a t i o n s .
there  were " v ic i s s i tu d e s  experienced in e f f o r t s  to e s tab l i sh  a new in ­
te rn a t io n a l  economic o r d e r . T o  Nigeria ,  the  concept of new in­
te rna t iona l  economics has nothing to do with the  concept of in te rna ­
t ional a id .  Thus, i t  observed tha t
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Mere p a l l i a t i v e s ,  along the t r a d i t i o n a l  l ine s  of donor and 
r e c ip i e n t  not only were peripheral  to the s t ru c tu ra l  economic 
problems of developing coun t r ies ,  but also inh ib i ted  s e l f - r e ­
l iance and sus ta ined  growth.
Therefore,  Nigeria  saw the new in te rna t iona l  economic order as involv­
ing the demand fo r  "a c lea r  voice in the decis ions  th a t  a ffec ted  the
313management of the world economy." I t  also supported the demand 
for  the "reform of the in te rna t iona l  monetary s y s t e m . A d d i t i o n ­
a l l y ,  i t  was a lso  of the view tha t  i t  was "the r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  and o b l i ­
gation of the  developed countr ies  to make concessions and adjustments 
in t h e i r  approach to in te rna t iona l  economic r e l a t i o n s .
Nigeria a lso  seemed to have been of the view t h a t ,  with or 
without the cooperation of the developed world, the developing world 
will  have to  bear the r e s p o n s ib i l i ty  of c reating the new in t e r n a ­
tional economic order.  Thus, i t  ta lked of the developing countr ies  
seeking "ways to a r t i c u l a t e  programmes fo r  c o l l e c t iv e  s e l f - r e l i a n c e  in
protection of t h e i r  leg i t im ate  i n t e r e s t s , a n d  of t h e i r  stepping
317up in t ra-deve lop ing  world cooperation as very viable  means of c r e ­
a ting  th i s  new order .  I t  is  in t h i s  sense th a t  one can also apprec i ­
ate Nigeria championing the creat ion and the development of ECOWAS as 
a v iable  regional economic framework.
Therefore,  on the whole the above pos i t ions  and act ions  of
Nigeria f i t  into the global economy reordering policy perspec tive  of 
318nonalignment, since  all  those pos i t ions  and ac t ions  are in sup­
port  of overhauling the nature of contemporary global economy.
On the issue of the hope for Africa s tee r ing  c lea r  of nuclear 
c ap a b i l i ty ,  Nigeria wished tha t  such a "hope was not rendered naive by
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319the merchants of horror and the enemies of humanity." Put 
s t a r k ly ,  N ig e r i a ' s  view seems to imply tha t  i f  such a view of Afr ica ,  
in terms of African and global r e a l i t i e s ,  tu rns  out to be tha t  which 
th rea tens  the secu r i ty  of the people of the cont inent ,  then i t  will  be 
naive for Africa to s t i l l  hope fo r  i t s  not having the need to have a 
nuclear c a p a b i l i ty .  Thus, i f  t h i s  i n t e rp re ta t io n  of the above Nige­
rian  view is  c o r r e c t ,  N ige r ia ' s  pos it ion  on th i s  is sue f i t s  into  the
320posit ion  of s t reng th  policy perspect ive  of nonalignment. I t  con­
notes a des i re  to have an adequate possession of v i s ib le  and c red ib le  
power through which to  have the strength to crea te  new and b e t t e r  
global r e a l i t i e s  which will  r e s u l t s  in a democratized manifestation of
the global power conf igura t ion .  Thus, Nigeria viewed lack of progress
321in disarmament as a "super-Power co l lus ion" ,  and resented the
s i tu a t io n  where "the a t t i t u d e  of the nuclear Powers had served to con-
322firm the inequi ty  of a world dominated by super-Power hegemony." 
Fur ther ,  i t  p re fe r red  a democratized global power s t ru c tu re  which i t
yearns to bring about by contr ibuting  to the demise of the present
order by augmenting i t s  national power capab i l i ty  ( thereby subscribing
to the pos it ion  of s trength  perspective of nonalignment).
The Second Republic
The Second Republic l a s t ed  from la te  1979 to 1983, and was the 
f i r s t  c iv i l i a n  government a f t e r  th i r t ee n  years of various m i l i t a ry  gov­
ernments. Shehu Shagari was the President during the Second Republic.
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Nigerian nonaligned foreign policy during th i s  period will be 
examined in the areas  of foreign economic r e l a t i o n s .  Middle East po l ­
icy ,  Southern Afr ican ,  general African po l icy ,  and re la t io n s  with the 
West and the Eas t ,  s t a r t in g  with the l a s t .
Rela t ions  with the  West and the East
Nigeria,  during the ear ly  phase of the Second Republic,  had to 
deal with the controversy over the United S ta te s - led  campaign for the 
boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games (due to charges of the Soviet  
Union's invasion of Afghanistan).  N ig e r ia ' s  response to such a cam­
paign took two perspec t ives  of dealing with the Moscow Olympic Games 
boycott i s sue—an Afro-cen tr ic  and a global perspective .  Through the 
A fro-cen tr ic  p e r spec t ive ,  Nigeria mainly looked at  the boycott issue 
through the prism of African p o l i t i c s  and i s sues .  Africa i t s e l f  has a 
repu ta t ion  for boycotting sporting events in order to score p o l i t i c a l  
po in ts ;  and one would have assumed th a t  African countr ies  would not 
have found the idea of mixing sports  and p o l i t i c s  as a novel or repug­
nant one. And in r e a l i t y ,  African countr ies  did not feel th a t  the Uni­
ted Sta tes  was wrong in mixing spor ts  and p o l i t i c s .  But Nigeria and 
many African coun t r ie s  were unhappy th a t  the United States in the past  
had been opposing them fo r  conceptual iz ing in te rna t iona l  sporting  and 
p o l i t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s  as p a r t  and parcel  of one whole social  r e a l i t y .  
Thus, Nigeria responded to the United S ta tes  campaign for the boycott 
of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games was to remind the l a t t e r  th a t  i t  "had 
f a i l e d  to respec t  A f r i c a ' s  similar ca l l  fo r  the boycott of the 1975
opo
Montreal Olympics" (which the African countries  had campaigned
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fo r  due to t h e i r  resentment of the f a c t  th a t  New Zealand, which had 
had sporting l inks  with South Africa and thus  f a l l s  into the category 
of countries  which the African countr ies  usually  t r y  to o s t ra c iz e  fo r  
having such l inks  with the l a t t e r ,  was allowed to p a r t i c ip a t e  in the 
1976 Montreal Olympics). By point ing out pas t  United States  noncooper­
a tion  with African spor ts  boycott  e f f o r t s ,  Nigeria was advancing the 
r a t io n a le  for  i t s  noncooperation with the United Sta tes  campaign for  
the  1980 Moscow Olympics as being based on the simple logic  of r e c i ­
p ro c i ty .  Therefore,  Nigeria declared t h a t  i t  "had al ready made up i t s
324mind to go to  Moscow."
However, apar t  from the above Afro-cen tr ic  perspec tive  of look­
ing at the Moscow Olympics i s sue ,  Nigeria  a lso  looked at  t h i s  issue 
through a global perspec t ive .  According to a prominent p o l i t i c i a n ,  
Nigeria considered i t s e l f  as being " f r iend ly  with both the U. S. and
the Soviet Union," and thus " i t  could not jo in  one agains t  the 
325o th e r . "  Nigeria ,  th e re fo re ,  a lso  "invoked the nonaligned p r i n c i ­
ple  to r a t i o n a l i z e  i t s  decision to go ahead with i t s  plans to a ttend 
the  Moscow O l y m p i c s . T h e  fac t  th a t  Nigeria ,  in 1984, ( a f t e r  the 
Second Republic) also ignored the Soviet Union's campaign fo r  the boy­
c o t t  of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics, a lso  served to underscore the 
f a c t  tha t  the 1980 Nigerian re fusa l  to jo in  the 1980 Moscow Olympics 
boycott ,  on the  grounds of i t s  major foreign  policy p r in c ip le  of non- 
alignment, was a case of a genuine enunciat ion of such a p r in c ip le .
On the issue of the Afghanistan invasion by the Soviet  Union,
per se, "Nigeria expressed disappointment at  the Soviet action since
327i t  f e l t  no country had a ss is ted  the th i rd  world more," and thus
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Nigeria joined most nonaligned countr ies  to  vote in favor of a United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution condemning the Soviet action in 
Afghani Stan.
The United Sta tes  action in Grenada in 1983 also drew a nega­
t iv e  response from Nigeria .  I t  "condemned the invasion of Grenada by
329U.S. forces  together with some s ix  Caribbean co u n t r ie s , "  saw such 
an action as deplorable and u n j u s t i f i e d ,  and s p e c i f i c a l l y  denounced 
the use of force by superpowers to change governments they were uncom­
f o r ta b le  with.^^^ Addi t iona l ly ,  Nigeria also voted in favor of a
United Nations General Assembly re so lu t ion  condemning the United
331Sta tes  act ions  in Grenada.
The fac t  th a t  Nigeria condemned the act ions  of both the Soviet
Union and the United S ta tes  in regard to t h e i r  ac t ions  in connection 
with fo rce fu l  change of p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t i e s  in smaller neighboring 
countr ies  (Afghanistan and Grenada, r e s p e c t iv e ly ) ,  shows th a t  i t  d i s ­
played an equid is tance from the superpower b l o c ' s  policy perspec tive  
of nonalignment.
In 1983, Nigeria decided to  improve the c ap ab i l i ty  of the Nige­
rian  Air Force with the a cq u i s i t io n  of Anglo-French Jaguar ground a t -  
tack f i g h t e r  a i r c r a f t s .  This was s ig n i f i c a n t  in tha t  i t  s ignaled
tha t  the Second Republic Nigeria was about to break the dominance of 
Soviet a i r c r a f t s  in the Nigerian Air Force (which had been the r e a l i t y  
fo r  about the past  s ix teen  y e a r s ) ;  and the s ign i f icance  was fu r the r  
deepened by the fac t  th a t  the s o u r c e  fo r  the new a i r c r a f t  was in the 
West.
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Addit ionally ,  the Second Republic ' s  p o l i t i c a l  and diplomatic 
l inks  with the Soviet Union were not very cozy, even though the re  was 
no s p e c i f i c  major c r i s i s  in such l i n k s .  The 'average'  s i tu a t io n  in 
such l inks  was p a r t i c u l a r l y  ind ica ted  by the fa c t  tha t  the Nigerian am­
bassador to the Soviet Union, Tunde Oyeleke, had his f i r s t  opportunity 
to meet the Soviet Foreign M in is te r ,  Andrei Gromyko, when he accompa­
nied Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, then the Director-General  of the
Nigerian I n s t i t u t e  of In te rna t iona l  Affa irs  (NIIA), who was on a work-
333ing v i s i t  to Moscow, to see Gromyko.
Nigeria seems to have sensed tha t  i t s  r e l a t i o n s  with the
Soviet Union in the p o l i t i c a l  and diplomatic areas ,  per se ,  were not
very cozy. I t  seems to have t r i e d  to compensate fo r  the slack in 
these  areas  by stepping up t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s  in the economic areas since 
the Second Republic witnessed a tremendous expansion of Nigerian coop­
e ra t io n  with the Soviet  Union in the development of the s tee l  industry 
in Niger ia .  Also, the slack in the p o l i t i c a l  and diplomatic areas 
with the Soviet Union was compensated for with increased l inks  with
other East European c o u n t r ie s ,  fo r  example, through increased l inks  
with the German Democratic Republic (GDR)^^^ and Czechoslovakia.^^^ 
(However, i t  should also be noted th a t  th i s  technique of stepping up 
r e l a t i o n s  with other East European countr ies ,  in order to compensate 
fo r  slack in the r e l a t i o n s  with the Soviet Union, also was in place 
during the preceding Muhammed/Obasanjo Government e ra ;  and i t s  
sole aim has always been to  ensure tha t  i t s  r e l a t io n s  with the West 
and East were not lops ided . )
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Thus, on the whole, i t  can be said tha t  N ige r ia ' s  r e l a t i o n s
with the West and East conformed to the avoidance of alignment with
337the superpower b lo c ' s  policy perspective  of nonalignment. This 
was fu r th e r  underscored by the fac t  t h a t ,  in 1980, Nigeria "decided to 
reverse  . . . the neglect  of the Republic of Korea" by e s t a b l i s h ­
ing diplomatic  r e l a t io n s  with the former a t  the ambassadorial level 
and thus ensuring th a t  i t  not only had such diplomatic r e l a t i o n s  with
the Democratic People 's  Republic of Korea ( i t  had such l inks  with the
339l a t t e r  since 1975). Nigeria even pos ited th a t  i t  decided to
have dip lomatic  r e l a t io n s  with the two Koreas because of i t s  foreign
340policy p r in c ip le  of nonalignment.
Foreign Economic Relations
A prominent fea tu re  of the Nigerian economy during the Second 
Republic was i t s  creeping weakness due to f a l l i n g  o i l  p r i c e s ,  since  
about 85 percent of i t s  foreign revenue came from o i l .  An outgrowth 
from th a t  s i tu a t io n  was th a t  Nigeria was increas ingly  f inding i t  d i f f i ­
cu l t  to meet the repayments of loans i t  got from Western banks, and 
th a t  N ig e r i a ' s  economic r e l a t io n s  with the West amounted to i t s  being 
in a weaker pos i t ion  in re la t io n  to the l a t t e r .  (However, from la t e  
1983 there  had been e f f o r t s  to tune up the economy through the review 
of expenditures and attempts to increase  the p roduct iv i ty  and the 
d iv e r s i ty  of the sources of revenue; thus there  was the contention 
tha t  the economy was s t i l l  p o te n t ia l ly  s t rong .
Generally ,  the West and the East had adequate l inks  with Nige­
r i a .  For example, in the indus t r ia l  s ec to r  of the economy (in which
247
the re  was much a c t i v i t y )  both of the b locs '  p a r t i c ip a t io n  and coopera­
t ion  were e x i s t e n t .  Technical cooperation with Western firms was very 
strong in the automotive industry  with most of the car and truck 
p lan ts  having technica l  pa r tne rsh ips  with them. For example, an Aus­
t r i a n  firm tha t  provided the technical  a ss is tance  to a truck plant in
Bauchi was also to provide such ass i s tance  to a new p lan t  fo r  the pro-
342duction of "m i l i ta ry  type v e h ic l e s . "  However, Eastern contacts 
in the in d u s t r ia l  sec tor  were also s i g n i f i c a n t ,  e sp ec ia l ly  in the 
machine tool indus t ry .  Czechoslovakia gave a 55 mil l ion  Naira loan 
f o r  the establ ishment of a meta l lurg ica l  and engineering plant tha t  
would produce too ls  and automobile spare pa r t s  and machines, 
while the German Democratic Republic (GDR) o ffered  to give Nigeria a 
200 mill ion Naira l in e  of c r e d i t ,  p a r t  of which could be used to f u r ­
the r  develop the machine t o o l s  industry.^^ 4
One important fe a tu re  of Eastern economic contacts  with Nige­
r i a  was th a t  most of those con tac ts  were in the area of heavy indus­
t r i e s ,  as shown above, while most Western economic contac ts  were in 
the area of consumer goods. Thus, i t  is  not su rp r is ing  tha t  the 
Soviet Union, during the Second Republic,  also expanded i t s  role in 
the Nigerian economy, mainly through i t s  longstanding technical  coop­
e ra t ion  in the s tee l  indus t ry ,  since i t  provided technica l  cooperation 
to  the Ajaokutu Steel Complex, the cente rp iece  of the Nigerian s teel  
indus try ,  which a t  t h a t  period witnessed much a c t i v i t y  in i t s  develop­
ment. However, as shown e a r l i e r .  Western firms were also encouraged 
to p a r t i c ip a te  in other s tee l  pro jects^^^  in order to avoid a s i t u a ­
t ion  where N ig e r ia ' s  external cooperation in the s tee l  industry were
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mostly with the East .  Thus, i t  was " ca tego r ica l ly  s ta ted  th a t  Nige­
r i a ' s  doors would continue to remain open fo r  technological coopera­
t ion  and t r a n s f e r  from both the East and West,"^^^ and tha t  such a 
pos it ion demonstrated N ig e r i a ' s  nonalignment.
Thus, N ig e r i a ' s  economic r e l a t i o n s  with the West and East con­
formed to the avoidance of alignment with the superpower b lo c 's  policy 
of nonalignment, since i t  had economic r e l a t i o n s  with both b locs .
The Second Republic continued to support the increasing v i a b i l ­
i t y  of ECOWAS as a regional economic organization tha t  would help West 
African countr ies  r e a l i z e  t h e i r  fu l l  economic poten t ia l  and thus en­
hance t h e i r  economic and p o l i t i c a l  independence. Surpris ingly ,  the un­
fo r tuna te  Nigerian expulsion of undocumented na t iona ls  of ECOWAS mem­
ber s t a t e s  did not have much negative impact on the ECOWAS as a
body.349
Nigeria a lso  emphasized the need fo r  cooperation among the 
le ss  developed countr ies  as a way of improving th e i r  economies and aug­
menting t h e i r  ro le  in in t e rn a t io n a l  economic r e l a t i o n s .  This is  the 
so r t  of r a t i o n a l e  th a t  made Nigeria emphasize i t s  need to belong to 
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and thus 
view the world outs ide  the umbrella of the l a t t e r  as le tha l  and hos­
t i l e . T h e  need fo r  the l e ss  developed countr ies  to change the 
contemporary in te rn a t io n a l  economic order was even more emphasized by 
Nigeria ,  in i t s  r e l a t i o n s  with the European Economic Community (EEC), 
through i t s  lead in helping the African,  Caribbean and Pac if ic  (ACP) 
group to unite  in changing the nature  of i t s  r e la t io n s  with the 
EEC.33^ S p e c i f i c a l ly ,  Pe ter Afolabi,  then the Nigerian Ambassador
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to the EEC, was in the fo refron t  in such a p o s i t io n ,  his  main theme be­
ing th a t  the EEC coun tr ies  should be made to trade ra the r  than aid
352since he saw aid  as p a l l i a t i v e  and not c u ra t iv e .  He also  posited
tha t  the EEC would ra th e r  pre fe r to emphasize aid since i t  "uses i t s
353aid programme to  promote i t s  own t r ad e . "  and to p ro tec t  i t s  indus-
354t r i e s  from the goods from the le ss  developed coun t r ies .  Thus, 
Afolabi also urged the ACP countr ies  to emphasize t h a t ,  i f  the EEC 
wants to help them, they should help in the  area of i n d u s t r i a l i z a -  
t ion .^^^  Perhaps drawing from Nige r ia ' s  determined e f f o r t  to  bu ild  
a strong and v iab le  economy through emphasis on heavy in d u s t r i e s  and 
cap i ta l  goods production,  he also deplored the  s i tu a t io n  where the EEC 
found i t  more a t t r a c t i v e  to give ACP countr ies  a ss is tance  mainly in 
smal l -sca le  in d u s t r i e s  and thus urged the EEC to concentrate on he lp ­
ing in l a rg e - sca le  indus t r ia l  s c h e m e s . A f o l a b i  also urged the 
ACP countr ies  to change the s i tu a t io n  by emphasizing intra-ACP coopera­
t io n ,  and noted th a t  "the scope fo r  such cooperation remains enor-  
357mous." Thus, on the whole, i t  can be said  tha t  in some ways Nige­
r i a ' s  ac t ions  in the area of in te rna t iona l  economic r e l a t i o n s  a lso  pro­
moted the global economy reordering policy perspective of nonalign-
ocp
ment, since most of the above Nigerian actions  and p o s i t io n s  in 
re l a t io n  to regional economic o rgan iza t ions ,  and i t s  r e l a t i o n s  with 
the developed and developing coun t r ies ,  emphasized the need to  change 
the nature  of contemporary in te rna t iona l  economic r e l a t i o n s .
The Middle East Problem
Like governments in the other e ras ,  the Second Republic also 
paid a t t e n t io n  to the Middle East problem. The Second Republic did
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nothing to  change the pos i t ion  of r e l a t i o n s  with Is rae l  with which 
Nigeria had had i t s  diplomatic r e l a t i o n s  severed during the Gowon 
Government e ra .  Also, the Second Republic continued to echo the 
r a t i o n a l e  given by previous governments, which i s  t h a t  as long as Arab 
lands are occupied "Is rae l  could not expect normalization of r e l a t i o n s  
with Nigeria and A f r i c a . F u r t h e r m o r e ,  i t  saw the i n a b i l i t y  of 
the P a le s t in ians  to enjoy the " r igh t  of nationhood" as "the g re a te s t  
obs tac le  to any la s t in g  peace in the Middle E as t ."
N ige r ia ' s  ac tions  were more unfavorable to  the par ty  in the 
Middle East co n f l i c t  c lo se s t  to  the West ( I s r a e l ) .  I t  tended to see 
the l a t t e r  as the only par ty  th a t  had concessions to make without also 
requ i r ing  concessions from the other p a r t i e s ,  and without emphasizing 
the r i g h t s  of the people of I s rae l  to have a s t a t e  th a t  has secure and 
p ro tec ted  borders.  Thus, N ig e r ia ' s  action could not f i t  in to  the equ i ­
d is tance  from the superpower b l o c ' s  policy perspec tive  of nonalign­
ment.
However, Nigeria had based i t s  pos it ion  more on regional con­
s i d e r a t i o n s .  Thus, by not having a global perspective  of the Middle 
East problem, i t  played down the relevance of the equid is tance  from 
the superpower b lo c ' s  policy perspec t ive  in i t s  act ions  and p o s i t io n s .  
Nevertheless,  the changing r e a l i t i e s  of the s i t u a t io n  in the Middle 
East had made obsolete the r a t io n a le  i t  used to break diplomatic r e l a ­
t io n s  with I s r a e l ,  which i s  th a t  the l a t t e r  had in fr inged  on the 
t e r r i t o r i a l  in t e g r i t y  of an OAU member s t a t e  (Egypt).  After the Camp 
David accord improved the r e l a t i o n s  between Egypt and I s rae l  up to the 
poin t t h a t  both resolved most of  t h e i r  b i l a t e r a l  problems and decided
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to have diplomatic  r e l a t i o n s ,  N ig e r i a ' s  reg ionally-based  ra t iona le  fo r  
not resuming diplomatic r e l a t i o n s  with Is rae l  was s h a t t e red .  However, 
Nigeria quickly fashioned another reg ionally-based r a t i o n a l e ,  which 
was the view " th a t  the only condit ion f o r  resuming r e l a t i o n s  is for 
Is rae l  to reassess  i t s  stand on South A f r i ca ,"  thus  giving the im­
pression th a t  i t  was in search of a reason to maintain the s ta tus  quo 
in the nature  of i t s  r e l a t i o n s  with I s r a e l .
A possib le  reason fo r  N ig e r i a ' s  pos i t ion  appeared to be a de­
s i r e  by the OAU and the Arab World to maintain t h e i r  mutually-suppor­
t ing  diplomatic arrangement,  whereby they each support each o t h e r ' s  i n ­
te rna t iona l  pos i t ions  and causes;  the Arab World counting on OAU sup­
port  fo r  the Arab pos i t ion  on the Middle East problem, while the OAU 
counts on the Arab World to  support  the OAU posit ion on Southern A fr i ­
can problems.
Therefore ,  the only way nonalignment may be re levan t  to Nige­
r i a ' s  pos i t ion  may be through the global input of a regional ideology 
(Pan-Africanism) perspective  of nonalignment,  through which Nigeria 
might have seen i t s  ro le  as th a t  of helping to bring peace,  indepen­
dence, s t a b i l i t y ,  j u s t i c e  and p rospe r i ty  to  a ll  p a r t s  of Africa and 
thus u n ive rsa l iz ing  these phenomena.
The Southern African Problem
On Angola, Nigeria refused to see the Cuban presence in Angola 
as having anything to do with the so lu t ion  to the problem there ,  and 
thus r e jec ted  the Western pos i t ion  th a t  the re  should be a linkage of 
the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola to the  solu tion of the
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secu r i ty  problems the T i t t e r  has, stemming from South African
incurs ion in to  i t s  t e r r i t o r y  and i t s  support fo r  Angolan d is s iden t
fo rces  s t i l l  f ig h t in g  to topple the regime now in power in Angola.
Withdrawals of Cuban troops from Angola, apar t  from being l inked to
the  solu tion of the s ec u r i ty  problem in the l a t t e r ,  i s  also linked to
the  question of Namibian independence. Nigeria ,  however
saw no such l in k s  and unreservedly repudia ted the claims of
ex t ra -con t inen ta l  Powers to d ic ta te  to any African country who 
th e i r  f r iends  should be when t h e i r  national survival was 
th rea tened .
Thus, Nigeria was of the opinion tha t  Angola had the r i g h t ,  as a sover­
eign s t a t e ,  to have Cuban troops ,  or troops from any other country,  as 
long as the host country wanted them to be the re ;  and th a t  nobody e lse  
could determine fo r  Angola who i t  could in v i t e  to a s s i s t  in i t s  secu­
r i t y  problem.
On the South African problem of apar the id ,  Nigeria s t i l l  main­
ta ined  th a t  dialogue is  only possible  with South Africa when the l a t ­
t e r  rep laces  "the apar theid  system with genuine democratic majority 
rule."^®^ A ddi t iona l ly ,  while s t i l l  advocating more sanctions 
agains t  South A fr ica ,  Nigeria noted th a t  the "sanc tions  alone will not
q c c
destroy a p a r th e id , " and thus added t h a t  continued South African 
re fusa l  to  change such a system would also mean N ig e r i a ' s  continued e f ­
f o r t s  "to a s s i s t ,  encourage and support the s t ruggle  of South African 
n a t i o n a l i s t s  with a l l  the might and resources at  i t s  d i sp o sa l . 
N ig e r ia ' s  b e l i e f  might have been t h a t ,  sooner or l a t e r ,  the armed 
s truggle  concept of war of a t t r i t i o n  would sap the p o l i t i c a l  will  of 
South Africa and i t s  a l l i e s ,  and also make redundant t h e i r  super ior
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m i l i t a r y  hardware j u s t  as the armed s t rugg les  in Guinea Bissau,  Angola 
and Mozambique, through wars of a t t r i t i o n ,  crumbled the p o l i t i c a l  will 
of Portugal from within and paved the way for independence in those 
c o u n t r ie s .
On the s i tu a t io n  in Namibia, Nigeria noted the continued i l  l e -  
gal occupation of the former by South A fr ica ,  and saw Namibian in ­
dependence as "a cardinal object ive  of Nigerian foreign policy"^®^ 
in addi t ion  to r e i t e r a t i n g  N ig e r i a ' s  "unflinching  support for
SWAPO."^^^ Also, to Niger ia,  "the people of Namibia were denied
371t h e i r  in a l ie n ab le  r i g h t s "  due to "the co l lus ion  between South 
Afr ica  and i t s  Western a l l i e s . " ^ ^ ^
From the Western pe rspec t ive ,  Nigeria by supporting armed 
s t rugg les  (which the former saw as a lso  being supported by the  Eas t) ,  
and also by s ingling out the West as being responsib le  fo r  the p e r s i s ­
tence  of the  problem in Southern Africa (by accusing i t  of colluding 
with South Africa in order to t r y  to preserve the s ta tu s  quo in tha t
region) did not maintain a posit ion  th a t  f i t  in to  the equid is tance
373from the superpower b lo c ' s  policy perspective  of nonalignment. 
Ins tead i t s  pos it ion  was seen as co n f l i c t in g  with t h a t  of the West, 
while at  the  time i t  was f r iend ly  to n a t i o n a l i s t  forces  t h a t  were 
armed and supported by the East . Addi t iona l ly ,  the West considered as 
f a l s e  the accusat ion of i t s  collus ion to perpetuate  the problems in 
Southern Afr ica ;  and ac tua l ly  saw i t s  ro le  as th a t  of helping to bring 
peace in a very precar ious  s i t u a t i o n .
On the o ther hand, Nigeria saw i t s  pos i t ion  as being d ic ta ted  
by the r e a l i t i e s  and i t s  perception of genuine African i n t e r e s t s ,  and
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i t  a lso  saw i t s  destiny  as being " i n t r i c a t e l y  l inked with the  fortunes
of a l l  the  countr ies  of Africa and all  the peoples of African descent
abroad ."374 Therefore,  Nigeria saw i t s  pos i t ion  as f i t t i n g  into the
global input of a regional ideology (Pan-Africanism) perspective  of 
375nonalignment, since i t  saw i t s  pos i t ion  as fo s t e r in g  peace, 
j u s t i c e ,  independence, s t a b i l i t y ,  and p rospe r i ty  in Southern Africa,  
and thus also un ive rsa l iz ing  these  phenomena.
The Second Republic and African Affa i rs
Nigeria  s ta t in g  th a t  i t s  destiny is  " i n t r i c a t e l y  l inked with 
the fo r tu n es  of a l l  the coun t r ie s  in Africa and al l  the peoples of
African descent a b r o a d ,"37® as shown above, meant tha t  in terms of
foreign policy  the Second Republic continued to view Africa as the cen­
te rp iece  of i t s  foreign policy .377
Thus, on the s i t u a t io n  in Chad, Nigeria  was against  the i n t e r ­
vention of extra -Afr ican  forces  the re ,  while i t  thought t h a t  negotia­
t ions  among the d i f f e r e n t  groups in Chad were the most v iable  means of
378ensuring enduring peace in t h a t  country. Nigeria had a lso  played
379a major ro le  in an OAU peace-keeping operation in Chad, (and in
some c i r c l e s  the re  was s t i l l  support  for Nigeria playing a fu tu re  d i ­
rec t  r o l e  in th a t  country33®).
Nigeria  was also helping in the e f f o r t s  to f o s t e r  e f f i c i e n t
gather ing and dissemination of news and information in A fr i ca ,  and i t
supported the Pan-African News Agency (PANA) and also urged the News
381Agency of  Nigeria  (NAN) to  cooperate with the former. Fur ther­
more, by perceiving PANA's ro le  as th a t  of helping to stop the
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s i tu a t io n  where non-African news sources were only "too ready to 
d i s t o r t  news about Africa to s u i t  the t a s t e  of t h e i r  home
qpc
readers ,"  N ig e r ia ' s  pos i t ion  f i t t e d  into the c u l tu ra l  autonomy
383asse r t ion  perspective  of nonalignment in th a t  i t  sought to help 
a s s e r t  the cu l tu ra l  autonomy of African countr ies  through helping them 
play s ig n i f i c a n t  ro le s  in in t e rn a t io n a l  communication.
However, the Second Republic was perceived by many as not be­
ing able to vigorously pursue Pan-African goals,  and some even had nos­
t a l g i c  f ee l in g s  about the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government e r a ,  which was
384much id e n t i f i e d  with such vigorous Pan-African goals.  The Second 
Republic was seen as not having a c l ea r  and pos i t ive  pos i t ion  on major 
African problems l ike  the Western Sahara i s sue ,  the Chadian c o n f l i c t ,  
and the Libyan quest ion; and th a t  when these issues  did not enable the 
OAU to form quorums fo r  i t s  Summit meetings,  Niger ia,  ins tead  of lead­
ing in resolving the impasse on these  is sues ,  p re fe rred  to  engage in
385le ss  decisive compromising r o l e s .
Some also c r i t i c i z e d  N ig e r i a ' s  continued membership in the Com­
monwealth of Nations,  and saw th i s  as being incons i s ten t  with Africa
385being the cente rp iece  of N ig e r i a ' s  foreign policy .  Addit ionally ,
N ige r ia ' s  continued membership in t h a t  body was seen as an example of
Nigeria not leading by example s ince i t  had often urged African
387countr ies  to lessen t h e i r  ex t ra -Afr ican  r e l a t i o n s  f o r  the sake of 
ensuring g rea te r  a t t e n t io n  to African issues and insuring th e i r  inde 
pendence.
Nevertheless,  on the whole, Nigeria did play a major ro le  in 
African a f f a i r s  during the Second Republic, though th i s  was not as
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vigorous as had been the case during the preceding governmental e ra .
For example, Nigeria was active in Southern African issues  and the
ECOWAS, as shown above; and i t s  ac t ions  in general African issues  did
f i t  into the global input of a regional ideology (Pan-Africanism) pe r -
388spective of nonalignment s ince i t  sought to ensure independence, 
peace, s t a b i l i t y ,  j u s t i c e ,  independence and p rospe r i ty  in Africa and 
thus also universaliz ing t h i s  phenomena.
An Overview
On the whole, the Second Republ ic 's  r e l a t i o n s  with the West
and East ,  foreign economic r e l a t i o n s .  Middle East p o l icy ,  and i t s  ro le
in African a f f a i r s  shows th a t  Nigeria was nonaligned. S p ec i f ic a l ly ,
in terms of i t s  r e l a t io n s  with the  West and East and foreign economic
r e l a t i o n s ,  Nigeria displayed the avoidance of alignment with the super-
389power bloc perspective of nonalignment, while i t s  Middle East po l­
icy and ro le  in African a f f a i r s  mostly r e f l e c te d  the global input of a
390regional ideology (Pan-Africanism) perspective  of nonalignment.
In the area of in t e rn a t io n a l  economic r e l a t i o n s ,  Nigeria also
displayed the global economy reordering policy perspective  since i t
391sought to change the contemporary in te rna t iona l  economic system.
For example, i t  call ed  fo r  changes in the global areas of "money and 
f inance,  resource flow, i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n ,  and t rade  and p ro tec t io n -
oop
ism", and also  noted tha t  these  changes were very c r i t i c a l  "to
393the r ea l iza t ion  of the a sp i r a t io n s  of the developing co u n t r ie s . "
Additionally ,  the Second Republic Nigeria ,  in campaigning for 
disarmament, a lso  f i t t e d  i t s  ac t ions  in to  the in te rna t iona l  peace
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394-guarantor perspective of nonalignment. For example, i t  posited 
th a t  there  "must be disarmament" in order "to save mankind from 
untoward anxiety and holocaust .
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION
The nonaligned foreign policy t h a t  was manifested by Nigeria 
had dynamic f e a tu r e s ;  and th a t  r e a l i t y  underscored the fa c t  tha t  a mix 
of f a c to r s ,  at var ious t imes,  shaped the nonaligned content of Nige­
r i a ' s  foreign  p o l ic y .
As shown above, a moderate government (which at  the same time 
lacked cohesiveness due to  i t s  being a c o a l i t i o n  government made up of 
not very compatible elements)^ t r a n s l a t e d  in to  the Nigerian F i r s t  Re­
public  exh ib i t ing  a very mild form of nonalignment. The fa c t  tha t  the 
F i r s t  Republic did not ac tua l ly  s l ide  in to  a pos it ion  tha t  would have 
made i t  to be r o u t i n e ly  aligned to one p a r t i c u l a r  bloc was also t e s t i ­
mony to the f a c t  t h a t  the moderate governing group was s ig n i f i c a n t ly
checked by adequately mobilized domestic progressive p o l i t i c a l  c i r -  
2
c les  and fo rce s .
The Irons i  Government tha t  succeeded the F i r s t  Republic 
amounted to l i t t l e  change in Nigerian nonalignment policy due to  the 
very b r i e f  na ture  of th i s  p o l i t i c a l  e ra  and also to the fac t  tha t  
severe domestic p o l i t i c a l  problems focused the government's a t ten t ion
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on the domestic p o l i t i c a l  arena (and not much focus on the foreign 
policy arena).
On the other hand, the Civil War, which occurred during the 
Gowon Government era ,  led to Nigeria receiving  moral support and sub­
s t a n t i a l  m i l i t a r y  hardware from the Soviet Union.^ This,  .expec­
ted ly ,  led to improvements in N ig e r ia ' s  r e l a t i o n s  with the East .
The very a s se r t iv e  na ture  of the p o l i t i c a l  leaders  (and thus 
the government i t s e l f ) , ^  coupled with a robust  economy, made the suc­
ceeding Muhammed/Obasanjo Government era  go down in Nigerian h is to ry  
as one of the most aggressive in terms of foreign po licy  (which also 
meant tha t  during t h i s  period Nigeria was a s s e r t iv e ly  non-a ligned.)
The Second Republic contras ted  g rea t ly  with the Muhammed/ 
Obasanjo Government era  in t h a t  the governing group of the former was 
moderate,® which accounted fo r  i t s  mild nonalignment pos ture .  Dur­
ing t h i s  period ,  j u s t  as was the case during the F i r s t  Republic era ,  
the presence of domestic progressive  c i r c l e s  and forces  was c r i t i c a l  
in ensuring th a t  the Second Republic did not s l id e  in to  an i n te rn a ­
t iona l  pos it ion  th a t  s i g n i f i c a n t ly  compromised N ig e r ia ' s  nonaligned 
pos ture .^
Thus, an overa l l  view of Nigerian foreign  policy  shows tha t  
i t s  nonalignment content f luc tua ted  with time. The F i r s t  Republic in 
i t s  e a r ly  phase manifested a foreign policy th a t  made Nigeria to be 
very close  to the West, and to Bri ta in  s p e c i f i c a l l y .  Thus the F i r s t  
Republic,  while expanding diplomatic r e l a t i o n s  with Western countr ies  
in i t s  ear ly  phase, was very unenthusias t ic  about developing such 
l inks  with the Eas t .  Addi t iona l ly ,  N ig e r ia ' s  foreign  economic
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r e la t i o n s  were mainly with the West, and th e re  was not much in ten t ion  
of s i g n i f i c a n t ly  d ivers i fy ing  such r e l a t io n s  in the f u tu r e .  N ig e r ia ' s  
ro le  in African a f f a i r s  a lso  manifested a Western leaning o r i e n t a t i o n .  
For example, i t s  emphasis on gradualism, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  process ,  ade­
quate prepara t ion fo r  independence,  and general lack of open support 
for  n a t i o n a l i s t  groups engaging in  armed s t ru g g le s ,  in r e l a t i o n  to the 
decolonizing process ,  s e t  i t  apar t  from many African coun t r ies  and a t
times invi ted  c r i t i c i s m  from these  coun t r ies .  Thus, though Nigeria in
p r in c ip le  supported the decoloniza tion process and the end to minority 
regimes, i t  d i f f e red  from many African countr ies  over the issue  of the 
best  methods through which to a t t a i n  these goa ls .  I t  did not gener­
a l ly  favor  sudden changes (unaccompanied by adequate prepara t ion fo r  
independence) and armed s t ru g g le s ,  while many other African countr ies  
perceived tha t  emphasis on th i s  is sue was used by the colonizing
a u t h o r i t i e s ,  or minority regimes,  to delay independence or to s tage-
manage the independence movement in such a way th a t  by the time inde­
pendence comes about i t  is  only in the form of a c a r i c a tu re  of indepen­
dence, and thus the s t a t u s  quo p e r s i s t s  under the facade of subtle  neo-
g
colonial  arrangements.
S p e c i f i c a l ly ,  the  f a c t  th a t  the phenomena of gradualism, con­
s t i t u t i o n a l  process ,  adequate preparation fo r  independence,  and gen­
eral  nonviolent means in the  decoloniza tion process as s t re ssed  by 
Nigeria were a lso  the phenomena th a t  Western countr ies  s t r e s s e d  in the 
decolonizat ion process ,  meant th a t  on th i s  i s su e ,  e i t h e r  by accident
or design,  N ig e r ia ' s  pos i t ion  was close  to th a t  of the West. This was
evident in the Nigerian ro le  in the Congo in t h a t ,  though i t  genuinely
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desired  Zaire (then the Congo) to be independent, N ig e r ia ' s  pos i t ion  
leaned more towards those Congolese groups th a t  were more i d e n t i f i e d  
with nonradical and nonrevolutionary tendencies ;  and thus N ig e r i a ' s  
pos i t ion  was c lose  to those of Western coun t r ie s .  N ig e r ia ' s  ro le  in 
the United Nations Conci l ia t ion Commission, on which the Nigerian Min­
i s t e r  of External Affa i rs  served as the Chairman, p a r t i c u l a r l y  showed 
t h i s  o r i e n t a t i o n .
In the F i r s t  Republic, N ige r ia ' s  preoccupation with Common­
wealth a f f a i r s  a lso  revealed a pro-Western o r i e n t a t i o n  and very warm 
r e l a t i o n s  with B r i t a in ,  Addit ionally ,  the purely  b i l a t e r a l  r e l a t i o n s  
with Br i ta in  magnified the pro-Western o r i e n t a t i o n .  I f  the s h o r t ­
l ived  Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact had been f u l l y  implemented and was
not s h o r t - l i v e d ,  i t  could have been a f a c to r  t h a t  would have had the
F i r s t  Republic ro u t in e ly  al igned, m i l i t a r i l y ,  with a superpower bloc.
I r o n i c a l l y ,  the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact episode,  in the
way i t  manifested i t s e l f ,  was a lso  to ac t  as a c a t a ly s t  tha t  made the 
F i r s t  Republic of Nigeria reaff irm and r e a s s e r t  nonalignment as a c a r ­
dinal foreign  policy  p r in c ip le .  The pac t ,  apar t  from t r ig g e r in g  a mas­
sive and successful  demand fo r  i t s  abrogation ,  a lso  galvanized the 
fo rces  th a t  had long c r i t i c i z e d  Nigeria for not being able to a s s e r t  
an independent posture in in te rna t iona l  a f f a i r s .  Thus, the general
c r i t i c i s m  of the F i r s t  Republic 's  foreign po l icy ,  in a fu l l y  mobilized 
form, was to help the F i r s t  Republic in i t s  l a t e r  phases to be more a s ­
s e r t i v e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y .  Thus, an e a r l i e r  lukewarm a t t i t u d e  toward 
the East gradually  led to more diplomatic t i e s  with i t .  A ddi t iona l ly ,  
i t s  lukewarm a t t i t u d e  towards Eastern economic cooperation was
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replaced by Nigeria receiving f in an c ia l  a s s i s tan ce  from some Eastern 
coun t r ie s .  These actions helped to reaff irm N ig e r ia ' s  nonaligned c r e ­
d e n t i a l s .
The nonalignment content of Nigerian foreign  policy was to be 
fu r th e r  expanded by N ig e r ia ' s  re fusal  to be formally l inked to the 
European Economic Community (EEC) on the grounds t h a t  such an action 
will  be incons i s ten t  with i t s  policy of nonalignment (though a succeed­
ing p o l i t i c a l  e ra  in Nigeria was to  l a t e r  forge such a l i n k ) .  Addi­
t i o n a l l y ,  the F i r s t  Republic,  l i f t i n g  the ban on the shipment of colum- 
b i t e  to Eastern countries (while being aware th a t  the United States  
had a legal provision fo r  the ending of economic a ss is tance  to coun­
t r i e s  tha t  sent such s t r a t e g i c  m ater ia ls  to Eastern coun t r ie s ) ,  also 
showed tha t  nonalignment was c lea r ly  taking a cardinal pos it ion in 
N ige r ia ' s  foreign policy.
The F i r s t  Republic,  which was very nonassert ive  in i t s  ear ly  
phase,  was to crown i t s  nonaligned posture in a l a t t e r  phase by being 
the only African country to break diplomatic  r e l a t i o n s  with France 
over the issue of the l e t t e r ' s  atomic bomb t e s t s  in the Sahara de se r t .
The Ironsi  Government tha t  succeeded the F i r s t  Republic, due 
to i t s  very shor t  l i f e - s p a n ,  and i t s  preoccupation with serious  domes­
t i c  i n s t a b i l i t y ,  did not engage in any s i g n i f i c a n t  in te rna t iona l  i n i t i ­
a t ives  tha t  made N ige r ia ' s  in te rna t iona l  posture  to be s ig n i f i c a n t ly  
d i f f e r e n t  from th a t  of the F i r s t  Republic.
On the other hand, the Gowon Government, which followed the 
Ironsi  Government, did e f f e c t  changes in N ig e r i a ' s  in te rna t iona l  pos­
tu r e .  Nigeria,  during t h i s  period,  received much m i l i t a ry  ass is tance
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from the Soviet  Union in order to grapple with a very ser ious  problem 
of ending a movement toward secess ion; and the r e a l i t y  of th i s  Soviet 
ro le  in the Civil War, which ensued, was the l e t t e r ' s  c lo se r  r e l a t i o n s  
with Niger ia .  However, t h i s  r e la t io n sh ip  did not lead to Nigeria 
changing i t s  p o l i t i c a l  o r ie n ta t io n  to f i t  with th a t  of the East .  Addi­
t i o n a l l y ,  N ig e r i a ' s  r e l a t io n s  with the Soviet Union did not reach a 
point  where the former considered having any formal l ink  with e i th e r  
the Warsaw Pact or the COMECON. The fa c t  th a t  Br i ta in  a lso  extended 
some m i l i t a r y  help to Nigeria ,  though a t  a l e s s e r  l e v e l ,  meant tha t  
Nigeria s t i l l  had adequate l in k s  with the West. The pos t -C iv i l  War 
Gowon Government was even f u r th e r  to expand N ig e r ia ' s  Western l inks  in 
such a way th a t  the expanded l inks  with the East did not put the l a t ­
t e r  in a pos i t ion  tha t  i t  had a dominant pos it ion in N ig e r ia ' s  e x t e r ­
nal l i n k s .  Thus Nigeria was able to demonstrate the avoidance of 
alignment from the superpower bloc perspective of nonalignment.
The Gowon Government, unlike the F i r s t  Republic,  was also very 
a s se r t iv e  in championing the cause of uni ty ,  decolonization and socio­
economic progress  in Africa.  I t s  championing ro le  in the e s t a b l i s h ­
ment of ECOWAS, a regional economic organization in West Afr ica ,  to 
help member s t a t e s  a sse r t  t h e i r  economic independence, p a r t i c u l a r l y  
showed th a t  the Gowon Government desi red  to help fashion Africa in 
such a way th a t  i t  could be adequately dis tanced from superpower bloc
competition fo r  influence.  This ro le  was even more emphasized in Nige-
g
r i a ' s  help in creating a strong ACP framework th a t  could e f f e c ­
t i v e ly  deal with issues of economic re la t io n s  with the EEC. Thus, by 
helping the l e ss  developed countr ies  to c rea te  new global economic
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r e a l i t i e s  tha t  would allow them to assume more independent and non- 
a ligned ro le s  in the world, Nigeria during the Gowon Government era 
a lso  demonstrated i t s  strong commitment to the global economy reorder­
ing perspective  of nonalignment.
The Muhammed/Obasanjo Government, which followed the Gowon Gov­
ernment, was even more id e n t i f i e d  with a very a s se r t iv e  foreign pol­
icy .  This government had fundamental d if ferences  with the United 
S ta tes  over the Angolan independence issue and with B r i ta in  over the 
Zimbabwe independence is sue; but at  the same time i t  was able to r e ­
p a i r  the damages in r e l a t io n s  with the two countr ies to a level where 
Nigeria was again able to enjoy warm r e l a t i o n s  with both.  At the same 
time, while Nigeria was supporting the MPLA forces  in Angola, which 
were backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba, N iger ia 's  b i l a t e r a l  r e l a ­
t io n s  with the Soviet  Union in the p o l i t i c a l  and diplomatic areas were 
not p a r t i c u l a r l y  warm. Addit ionally ,  Nigeria t r i e d  to compensate fo r  
the  slack in p o l i t i c a l  and diplomatic r e l a t i o n s  with the Soviet  Union 
by stepping up economic l inks  with the l a t t e r ,  and by a lso  increas ing 
i t s  r e l a t i o n s  with other East European coun t r ies .  Thus, in terms of 
r e l a t i o n s  with the West and East , Nigeria  was able to maintain good 
r e l a t i o n s  with both; and, th e re fo re ,  a lso  making Nigeria ,  during the 
Muhammed/Obasanjo Government e ra ,  manifest  the avoidance of alignment 
with superpower bloc policy perspective  of nonalignment.
However, i t  was in the area of African a f f a i r s  t h a t  the  a s se r ­
t iveness  of the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government was most profound. Apart 
from st rongly  s t a t i n g ,  and demonstrating,  tha t  Africa was the cen te r ­
piece of i t s  foreign policy,  the Angolan independence i s sue  was to
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p a r t i c u l a r ly  show i t s  commitment to an A fro -cen t r ic  worldview. Thus, 
while i t s  b i l a t e r a l  r e la t io n s  with the Soviet  Union were not p a r t i c u ­
l a r l y  warm, Niger ia ,  due to i t s  a r r iv in g  a t  the conclusion tha t  the 
MPLA was the only n a t i o n a l i s t  group in Angola th a t  will  best  pursue 
genuine African i n t e r e s t  of ensuring genuine independence for Angola 
and also  helping in the solu tion to  the remaining problems in Namibia 
and South A fr ica ,  decided to champion the successfu l  move to help give 
the MPLA so le  p o l i t i c a l  control in Angola. Also,  by taking action 
th a t  might have hampered i t s  foreign economic r e l a t i o n s  (the n a t i o n a l i ­
zation of BP) in the course of i t s  e f f o r t  to  pressure B r i ta in  to help 
ensure tha t  Zimbabwe was able to  achieve genuine independence, Nigeria 
a lso shows th a t  i t  was able to make s e l f l e s s  s a c r i f i c e s  fo r  African in ­
t e r e s t s .
Thus, in terms of i t s  ro le  in African i s sues ,  Nigeria ,  during 
the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government e ra ,  manifested the global input of a 
regional ideology (Pan-Africanism) perspective  of nonalignment in th a t  
by advancing the cause of independence, j u s t i c e  and the reso lu t ion  of 
conf l ic t ing  issues  in Africa ,  i t  a lso  helped advance these  causes in a 
global sense.
However, the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government was able to act  on 
another African issue in such a way th a t  Nigeria  showed another p e r ­
spective of nonalignment. By s t rong ly  condemning the Soviet  Union and 
Cuba fo r  support ing Angolan-based Zairean d i s s id en ts  in connection 
with the invasion of the Shaba province of Za ire ,  and by condemning 
the Western countr ies  th a t  intervened on behalf  of Za ire ,  Nigeria 
demonstrated an equidis tance from the superpower blocs policy
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perspective  of nonalignment in th a t  both the East and West got an
equal weight of c r i t i c i sm  of t h e i r  ro le  in the Shaba is sue .  Neverthe­
l e s s ,  N ig e r ia ' s  action on t h i s  African issue appeared to r e f l e c t  a glo­
bal input of a regional ideology (Pan-Africanism) perspective of nona­
lignment in th a t  N iger ia 's  act ion was less  a concern fo r  adopting an 
equ id i s tan t  pos it ion  in r e l a t io n  to the West and East (though i t s  ac­
t ion  ac tua l ly  manifested such a pos i t ion)  and more a conscious concern 
about ex t ra -Afr ican in te rven t ion  in African a f fa i r s  (a concern that  
was also r e f l e c te d  in N ige r ia 's  constant condemnation of extra-African 
in te rven t ions  in the Chadian i s sue ,  while emphasizing an African solu­
t ion  to t h i s  problem.)
The Second Republic, which followed the Muhammed/Obasanjo Gov­
ernment, also displayed the nonalignment content of the Nigerian f o r ­
eign policy in a d i f f e r en t  way. The Second Republic vastly  improved 
i t s  r e la t io n s  with the West, and t h i s  led to the Nigerian Air Force,
which fo r  about the preceding twelve years had been equipped mostly 
with Soviet-made a i r c r a f t s ,  being equipped mostly with Western-made 
a i r c r a f t s .  During th i s  period N ige r ia ' s  r e la t io n s  with the Soviet
Union were not p a r t i c u l a r ly  warm, but at the same time i t  was not in a 
cold s t a t e  e i t h e r .  Nigeria continued the method of compensating for 
slack in p o l i t i c a l  and diplomatic  r e l a t i o n s  with the Soviet Union with
increased economic r e l a t io n s  with the l a t t e r  and also with the Eastern
European co un t r ie s .  Thus, on the whole, during the Second Republic,
Nigerian r e l a t i o n s  with the West and East f i t t e d  into the avoidance of
alignment with the superpower blocs policy perspective of nonalign­
ment. This perspective  of nonalignment was even demonstrated when
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Nigeria refused to boycott  the 1980 Moscow Olympic G a m e s , a n d  when 
i t  e s tab l i shed  diplomatic re la t ions  with the Republic of Korea in or­
der to assure  t h a t  i t  not only had such re la t io n s  with the Democratic 
People 's  Republic of Korea (which had ex is ted  for a long t ime).
However, the Second Republic was not very a sse r t ive  in African 
a f f a i r s .  I t s  indec is ive  ro le  in the OAU Summit problems in Libya, the 
Western Sahara is sue ,  and the Chadian issue  meant i t s  not exer ting a 
leading ro le  in African a f f a i r s .  I t  was also l e s s  a s s e r t iv e  in the 
Southern African i s sue ,  but i t  continued to support majority African 
p os i t ions .  Thus, despi te  the d i s s id en ts  in Angola s i g n i f i c a n t ly  con­
t e s t in g  for power with the MPLA with arms, Nigeria continued i t s  sup­
port  fo r  the  government formed by the l a t t e r .  Also, Nigeria re jected  
o the rs '  e f f o r t s  to l ink the withdrawal of Cuban troops  from Angola to 
the so lu t ion  of  the problem of the South African incursion into the 
Angolan t e r r i t o r i e s  and to the question of Namibian independence. 
Nigeria was a lso  very supportive of the  ECOWAS and thus helped West 
African coun t r ies  to bu i ld  the foundations for a fu tu re  a b i l i t y  to be 
more economically independent.
Thus, on the whole, during the Second Republic,  Nigeria mani­
fes ted  a global input of a regional ideology (Pan-Africanism) perspec­
t ive  of nonalignment in that  i t  helped f o s te r  the cause of indepen­
dence, j u s t i c e  and socio-economic p rospe r i ty  in A fr ica ,  and thus also 
helped u n iv e r s a l i z e  th i s  phenomena.
In ranking a ll  the perspect ives  of nonalignment ( id e n t i f i ed  
through the conceptual scheme developed by th i s  s tudy—see TABLE 9),  
TABLE 8  shows how they were manifested in the Nigerian foreign  policy
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in terms of importance.  Some of these perspec t ives  prominently r e l a t e  
to the Nigerian foreign pol icy ,  while others  r e l a t e  moderately, and 
s t i l l  others do not seem to r e l a t e  at  a l l .
S p e c i f i c a l ly ,  pe rspectives  t h a t  are ranked 8 th (see TABLE 8 ) ,  
which are those numbered 15 to 23, f a i l e d  to be manifested in Nige­
r i a ' s  foreign po l icy .  Finding adequate explanations  for the nonmani­
f e s t a t i o n  of these  perspec t ives  ac tua l ly  demand f u r t h e r  in v es t ig a t io n .  
Nevertheless,  t h i s  study does provide explanation fo r  the nonmanifes­
t a t io n  of some of these  pe rspec t ives .  For example, t h i s  study has 
shown t h a t ,  even though N ige r ia ' s  r e l a t i o n  with the East was, on the 
whole, normal, a t  no p a r t i c u l a r  time was i t  locked in to  a t i g h t  em­
brace with the l a t t e r .  The natural a l l y  logic  pe rspec t ive  of nonalign­
ment is  a conceptual outlook tha t  i s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  id e n t i f i e d  with the 
East and i t s  very c lose  a l l i e s  in the nonaligned world. Therefore,  i t  
is  not su rp r i s ing  th a t  natural  a l ly  logic  perspec t ive  was completely 
absent in N ig e r i a ' s  nonaligned policy.  Addi t iona l ly ,  t h i s  study also 
showed tha t  in many foreign policy is sue  areas ,  fo r  example, the South­
ern African and Middle East is sues ,  Nigeria mostly s t r e ssed  th a t  i n j e c ­
t ing  much global power p o l i t i c s  and geopo l i t i c s  into them often d i s ­
t o r t  the diagnoses of the problems, and thus produce inaccurate  formu­
lae fo r  cures .  Therefore,  expectedly,  the global power configura tion 
and s t r a t e g i c  r a t i o n a l i t y  perspectives  f a i l e d  to be manifested.
Perspect ives  numbered from 8  to  14 (see TABLE 8 ) are ranked 
7th ,  and are those th a t  only neg l ig ib ly  manifested in the Nigerian 
nonaligned p o l icy .  As in the case of the perspec t ives  th a t  were not 
manifested at  a l l ,  an adequate understanding of why these  perspectives
TABLE 8
RANK-ORDER OF PERSPECTIVES
The Number of Times a Perspective
Perspective Rank-Order Manifested in All Issue Areas in
All the P o lit ica l  Eras
1. Global Input of a Regional Ideology
(Pan-Africanism) Perspective 1 14
2. Avoidance of Alignment With the
Superpower Blocs Policy Perspective  2 10
3. Global Economy Reordering Policy
Perspect ive 3 6
4. In te rna t iona l  Peace Guarantor
Perspective  4 4
5. Opportunist ic  Foreign Policy
Perspect ive 5 3
6 . Alliance Against Alignment With
Superpower Blocs Policy Perspective 6  2
7. Independent In te rna t iona l  I n i t i a t i v e s
and Actions Capabili ty  Perspective 6 2
8 . Equidistance from Superpower Blocs
Policy Perspect ive 7 1
9. A l t r u i s t i c  Policy Perspective 7 1
ro
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TABLE 8 (Continued)
RANK-ORDER OF PERSPECTIVES
Perspective
The Number of Times a Perspective
Rank-Order Manifested in All Issue Areas in
All the P o lit ica l Eras
10. In te rna t iona l  Relations  Pos i t ive  
Innovator Perspective
11. Cultural Autonomy Assertion 
Perspective
12. In te rna t iona l  Collective  Bargaining 
F r a m e w o r k  P e r s p e c t i v e
13. Posit ion of Strength Policy 
Perspecti  ve
14. National Sovereignty Guarantor 
Perspective
15. Global Power Configuration 
Perspect ive
16. S t r a t eg ic  R a t iona l i ty  Perspective
17. Natural Ally Logic Perspective
10. Global Morality Fountain Perspective
19. Total Social Rea l i ty  Perspective
8
8
8
8
8
0
0
0
0
0
no
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TABLE 8 (Continued)
RANK-ORDER OF PERSPECTIVES
Perspecti  ve
The Number of Times a Perspective
Rank-Order Manifested in All Issue Areas in
All the P o l it ica l  Eras
20. Anti-Imperialism Worldview 
Perspective
21. Global P o l i t i c a l  Economy 
Perspective
22. Foreign Policy Strategy 
Perspecti  ve
23. Linkin'! of National Goals With 
In te rna t iona l  Goals Tools 
Perspective
8
8
rokO
NOTE: See TABLE 10 on how many times each perspective  manifested in the various issue areas in
the various p o l i t i c a l  e ra s .  The scores in th i s  table  are based on TABLE 10 data .
TABLE 9
THE DIMENSIONS OF NONALIGNMENT
Dimensions Perspect ives
The Power P o l i t i c s  Dimension Equidistance from Superpower Blocs Policy 
Perspect ive
Avoidance of Alignment With the Superpower Blocs 
Policy Perspective
Global Power Configuration Perspective
S t ra teg ic  R a t io n a l i ty  Perspective
Alliance Against Alignment With Superpower Blocs 
Policy Perspective
Natural Ally Logic Perspective
rolOro
The Ethical Dimension Global Morality Fountain Perspective
A l t r u i s t i c  Policy Perspective
In terna t iona l  Peace Guarantor Perspective
In terna t iona l  Rela tions Pos i t ive  Innovator 
Perspect ive
TABLE 9 (Continued)
THE DIMENSIONS OF NONALIGNMENT
Dimensions Perspectives
The Socio-Economic Dimension Total Social Reali ty  Perspective
C u l t u r a l  A u t o n o m y  A s s e r t i o n  P e r s p e c t i v e
Anti-Imperialism Worldview Perspective
In te rna t iona l  Col lective  Bargaining Framework 
Perspective
Global Economy Reordering Policy Perspective
rotou>
Foreign Policy Mechanism Dimension Foreign Policy Strategy Perspective
Opportunis tic  Foreign Policy Perspective
Global Input of a Regional Ideology 
(Pan-Africanism) Perspect ive
Posit ion  of Strength Policy Perspective
Linking of National Goals With In te rna t iona l  
Goals Tool Perspect ive
Independent In te rna t iona l  I n i t i a t i v e s  and 
Actions Capabil i ty  Perspective
National Sovereignty Guarantor Perspective
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only were neg l ig ib ly  manifested provides areas for f u r t h e r  research.  
However, a lso ,  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  study does provide some understanding 
of the neg l ig ib le  manifestat ion of some of these  p e r sp ec t iv e s .  For ex­
ample, Nigeria ,  as shown above, did not favor the e f f o r t s  of others  to 
view many foreign policy i s sue s ,  th a t  s t rongly  engaged i t s  a t t e n t io n ,  
mainly through power p o l i t i c s  and geopo l i t ica l  prisms. Ins tead,  i t  
often saw these is sues  mainly as regional i s sue s ,  which could best be 
resolved through regional s e n s i b i l i t i e s  and i n i t i a t i v e s  being allowed 
to be supreme. This accounts fo r  the neg l ig ib le  occurrence of the 
equid is tance from the superpower blocs pe rspec t ive ,  since  nonglobal­
ized issue areas (from the Nigerian viewpoint) meant the unnecessity 
of i t s  manifesting a conceptual perspective  of nonalignment tha t  is  
st rongly  shackled to a conception of the in te rna t iona l  system that  
sees i t  as a r i g i d l y  b ipolar  in te rna t iona l  o rder .
The n eg l ig ib le  occurrence of the a l t r u i s t i c  po licy  perspective 
of nonalignment, on the other hand, can be a t t r i b u t e d  to the fac t  
t h a t ,  as th i s  study shows, N ig e r i a ' s  nonaligned foreign policy  was 
often not manifested in a way tha t  did not take into considera t ion  i t s  
national i n t e r e s t s .
In terms of moderate manifestat ion in the nonaligned content 
of the Nigerian foreign pol icy ,  the perspectives  ranked 5th and 5th 
and numbering from 5th to 7th (see TABLE 8 ) ,  f a l l  in to  t h i s  category.
The moderate showing of the a l l i a n ce  agains t  alignment with superpower
blocs policy perspective  might have been an ind ica t ion  t h a t  Nigeria 
was not much concerned about the nonaligned group e x i s t in g  as a bloc
or not,  as long as the v i t a l i t y  and mission of the phenomenon
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continued to be adequately manifested.  In the case of the  moderate 
showing of the oppor tun is t ic  foreign policy perspective ,  t h i s  can be 
accounted for by the f ac t  t h a t ,  as t h i s  study shows, on some occa­
s ions ,  N ige r ia ' s  manifes ta tion  of nonaligned foreign policy had a con­
nota t ion  of expediency. The independent in te rnational i n i t i a t i v e s  and 
actions  c ap a b i l i ty  perspective  moderate showing, on the o th e r  hand, i n ­
d ica te  th a t  Nigeria ,  on the average,  was not obsessed with the narrow 
perception of nonalignment as a means of exercising independent i n t e r ­
national i n i t i a t i v e s  and ac t ions ,  per se.
In te rna t iona l  peace guarantor perspective (ranked 4th) i s  
shown by TABLE 8  to be s t rongly  manifested in the nonaligned foreign 
policy of Nigeria ,  s ince ,  except for  one governmental e ra ,  i t  was con­
s i s t e n t l y  present  in N ig e r ia ' s  nonaligned foreign policy from 1950 to 
1983. This strong showing can be e a s i l y  a t t r ib u te d  to the f a c t  t h a t  
Nigeria has cons i s ten t ly  championed e f f o r t s  to curb a c t i v i t i e s  and p re ­
occupations tha t  threaten  world peace.  The f ac t  tha t  TABLE 10 does 
show the in te rna t iona l  peace guarantor perspect ive  as not showing dur­
ing the Muhammed/Obasanjo government era does not mean t h a t ,  during 
th a t  period,  Nigeria abandoned the support for world peace. Rather ,  
i t  poin ts  to the f a c t  tha t  the asse r t iveness  of tha t  government, both 
in foreign and domestic foreign  policy areas,  resu l ted  in i t s  not a l ­
lowing i t s  c o n c e r n  for  a more peacefu l,  safer  and happier world to be 
accompanied by a naivete  about contemporary in te rna t iona l  r e a l i t y .
Avoidance of alignment with the superpower blocs po l icy ,  g l o ­
bal economy reordering pol icy ,  and the global input of a regional id e ­
ology (Pan-Africanism) pe rspec t ives ,  as shown by TABLE 8 , are the
TABLE 10
DIMENSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES OF NONALIGNMENT ACCORDING TO ISSUE AREAS
F i r s t
R epublic
Iro n s i
Government
Gowon
Government
Muhammed/
Obasanjo
Government
Second
R epublic
I s s u e  Areas:
The Power P o l i t i c s  
Dimension
E q u id is ta n c e
Avoidance
Global Power
S t r a t e g ic
A l l ia n c e
Natural
1 2 3 4 5
X X 
X
1 2 3 4 5
X X 
X
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
o>
The E th ic a l  Dimension
Global M o ra lity  
A l t r u i s t i c  
In te r -P e a c e  
I n t e r - R e la t io n s
TABLE 10 (Continued)
DIMENSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES OF NONALIGNMENT ACCORDING TO ISSUE AREAS
Muhammed/
F i r s t  I ro n s i  Gowon Obasanjo Second
R epublic  Government Government Government R epublic
Is s u e  A reas: 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
The Socio-Econom ic  
Dimension
T otal
C ultu ra l
A n t i -Im p er ia l  ism  
I n t e r - C o l l e c t i v e  
G l o b a l - P o l i t i c a l  
Global-Economy
X
X
rouo
The F ore ign  P o l i c y  
Mechanism Dimension
F ore ign  P o l i c y
O p p o r tu n is t ic
G lo b a l-In p u t
P o s i t i o n
L inking
Independent
N ational
X X X X 
X
X X X X
N otes:
TABLE 10 (Continued)
DIMENSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES OF NONALIGNMENT ACCORDING TO ISSUE AREAS
A. The numbers in  th e  t a b le  s tan d  fo r  th e  v a r io u s  fo r e ig n  p o l i c y  i s s u e  a r e a s ,  which are  
as fo l lo w s :
1 . R e la t io n s  w ith  West and E a st
2 .  General A fr ica n  A f f a i r s
00
3 .  Southern A fr ica
4 .  Middle E ast
5 .  I n te r n a t io n a l  Economic R e la t io n s
B. The p e r s p e c t i v e s  are i d e n t i f i e d  in  the  ta b le  by one o f  t h e i r  f i r s t  w ords, or by an 
a b b r ev ia ted  form o f  one or two o f  th o se  words. See th e  ch a p ter  on the  co n ce p t  o f  
nonalignm ent fo r  th e  f u l l  names o f  th e s e  p e r s p e c t i v e s .
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perspec t ives  tha t  t h i s  study showed to be most prominently manifested; 
and in order of importance are ranked 3 rd, 2 nd and 1 s t ,  r e sp ec t iv e ly .  
The avoidance of alignment with the superpower blocs po licy  perspec­
t i v e  of nonalignment being ranked th i rd  is  a c l ea r  indica t ion  th a t  
Nigeria i s  one of the nonaligned countries  tha t  be lieve th a t  nonalign­
ment ac tua l ly  means nonalignment (in terms of not forming routine  f o r ­
mal close  t i e s  with a superpower b loc) ,  though not in a r i g i d  sense.  
Thus, as an extension, i t  is  no surpr ise  tha t  TABLES 8  and 10 also 
showed th a t  t h i s  study indica ted  tha t  Nigeria a t  no time subscribed to 
the natural  a l l y  logic  perspective  (a perspective tha t  d i r e c t l y  con t ra ­
d i c t s  perspectives  l ike  the avoidance of alignment with the superpower 
blocs policy pe rspec t ive ) .  The second ranking of  the global economy 
reordering policy  pe rspec t ive ,  on the other hand, a t t e s t s  to the f a c t  
t h a t  t h i s  study showed th a t  Nigeria was a s s e r t iv e  in the area of a r ­
t i c u l a t i n g ,  and engaging i n ,  actions tha t  aimed a t  c rea t ing  a new in ­
t e rna t iona l  economic order.  However, t h i s  perspective  was overwhelm­
ingly  being manifested in the in te rna t iona l  economics r e l a t i o n s  issue 
area  only. This perspective  being manifested overwhelmingly in only 
one issue a rea ,  appears to have meant tha t  the great  i n t e n s i ty  of th i s  
pe rspec t ive ,  in the nonaligned content of Nigerian foreign policy has 
not been portrayed adequately.
TABLE 8  shows th a t  the Afro-centr ic  perspec tive  i s  ranked 
f i r s t .  This study also showed that  Nigeria conceptualized many of the 
foreign po licy  issues that  confronted i t  in a mostly regional perspec­
t i v e .  This perspec tive  was prominent in al l  the p o l i t i c a l  eras (see 
TABLE 10), and i t  blanketed almost al l  issue areas during the Gowon
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Government the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government, and the Second Republic 
e ra s .  Thus, i t  i s  proper to conclude tha t  such an in tense  manifesta­
t ion of the Afro cen t r ic  perspective  in the nonaligned content of the 
Nigerian foreign  policy accounted fo r  Nigeria being seen as adopting 
Africa as the cente rp iece  of i t s  overa ll  foreign po l icy .
I t  i s  important to  note t h a t ,  though the avoidance of a l ign ­
ment with the superpower blocs po l icy ,  the global economy reordering 
policy ,  and the global input of regional ideology (Pan-Africanism) per­
spectives  were a l l  prominent throughout a l l  p o l i t i c a l  e ras  (see TABLE 
1 0 ) ,  t h i s  study also showed th a t  the l a s t  was more manifested in
c le a r ly  more issue areas both in terms of magnitude and in ten s i ty  (see 
TABLES 8  and 10).  Therefore,  i t  i s  very important to also note that  
though the other two perspec t ives  were a lso  c o n s i s t e n t ly  prominent, in 
comparison with the Afro-cen tr ic  pe rspec t ive ,  the l a t t e r  was more im­
por tan t .
The Afro-cen tr ic  emphasis of Nigerian foreign policy,  apart
from being accompanied by the p e r s i s t e n t  r e i t e r a t i o n s  by various Nige­
rian Governments tha t  Africa is  the cente rp iece  of N ige r ia ' s  foreign 
po l icy ,  had also ac tua l ly  r e su l ted  in most Nigerian diplomatic r e ­
sources being involved in African issues  or A fr ican-re la ted  is sues .  
Bolaji Akinyemi s t ressed  th i s  r e a l i t y  when he pos ited  tha t  Africa as
"the cornerstone of N ig e r ia ' s  foreign policy  has been an a r t i c l e  of
f a i t h  since 1950, and t h a t ,  the re fo re
Seventy-five percent of the time and energy of the foreign 
Office s t a f f  is consumed by African a f f a i r s .  Ninety-five per­
cent of the technica l  and f inanc ia l  a s s i s tan ce  during th is  
period was direc ted  a t  the con t inen t .  Over 75 percent of the
301
policy d i f f e r en ces  between Nigeria and other in d u s t r i a l i z ed  
countr ies  revol^\^ around African i s sues ,  e sp e c ia l l y  Southern 
African i s s u e s .  “
The f a c t  t h a t  the above data on the percentages of fo re ign  
policy resources  devoted to African i s sues ,  and on the percentage of 
African r e l a t e d  issues  in terms of all policy d i f fe rences  Nigeria had 
with i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  coun t r ie s ,  also goes to b u t t r e s s  the f a c t  th a t  
Nigerian foreign policy has been very A fro -cen t r ic .
This A fro-cen tr ic  emphasis in Nigerian foreign policy a lso  ac­
counts fo r  N ig e r ia ’s nonalignment often manifesting the global input
of a regional ideology (Pan-Africanism) perspective  of nonalign- 
13ment, in t h a t  most of i t s  ac tions  advances the cause of indepen­
dence, j u s t i c e ,  peaceful coexis tence and socioeconomic prosper ity  in 
Afr ica,  thus also helping to un ive rsa l ize  th i s  phenomena.
However, as noted e a r l i e r ,  a preoccupation with a regional o u t ­
look (in t h i s  case an A fro-cen tr ic  outlook) of in te rna t iona l  r e l a t i o n s  
sometimes connotes an inconsistency with the u n iv e r s a l i s t i c  view of 
nonalignment. A regional worldview may mean th a t  a country is  only i n ­
te re s ted  in fo s te r in g  the i n t e r e s t s  of only one p a r t i c u l a r  region of 
the world, while nonalignment is mainly concerned with fo s te r ing  more 
wholesome human exis tence a l l  over the world. An understanding of the 
Afro-centr ic  worldview and nonalignment, however, does dispel the no­
tion of such incom pat ib i l i ty  between these  two concepts.  The Afro- 
cen tr ic  worldview i s  the product of the Pan-Africanism concept which 
gave b i r th  to Pan-African movements in the ear ly  20th Century, and 
l a t e r  c r y s t a l l i z e d  into a very i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t y  in 
the form of the OAU. However, i t  must be noted th a t  though the
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Pan-Africanism concept, the Pan-African movement, and the  OAU do not 
mean exact ly  the same th ing ,  they a l l  share the same major t e n e t s .  
Some of these  tenets  are the fo s te r ing  of independence, s e l f -  
de termination,  j u s t i c e ,  peace, un i ty ,  and socioeconomic progress  in 
A f r i c a ; a n d  these  tene t s  are almost synonymous with the major 
themes th a t  most perspectives  of the nonalignment concept share.
S pec i f ic a l ly ,  one area of s im i l a r i t y  between the A fro -cen t r ic  
worldview and nonalignment is  t h a t ,  j u s t  as nonalignment, the Afro- 
c en t r i c  worldview, in terms of i t s  main driving fo rce ,  i s  the expres­
sion of a des i re  by r e l a t i v e l y  l e s s  powerful countr ies  to be able to 
a s s e r t  themselves independently in an in te rna t iona l  system dominated 
by superpowers, by being able to safeguard t h e i r  sovereignty ,  p ro tec t  
t h e i r  t e r r i t o r i a l  i n t e g r i t y ,  and develop r e l a t i v e l y  s e l f - r e l i a n t  and 
adequate socioeconomic condi tions  for  t h e i r  c i t i z e n s .  Both concepts 
a lso  operate on the assumptions th a t  the contemporary opera tional  mode 
of  the  in te rna t iona l  system needs to function b e t te r  by being able to 
i n s t i t u t e  a more globally  s e n s i t iv e  and f a i r  mode of p o l i t i c a l ,  eco­
nomic and cu l tu ra l  contac ts  among countr ies  and peoples,  and also be 
able to focus more on cooperat ive aspects of r e l a t i o n s ,  while deempha­
s iz ing  conf l ic tua l  r e l a t i o n s .  Although th i s  l a s t  phenomena can only 
be reduced to acceptable l e v e l s ,  and not e l iminated,  the a b i l i t y  to i n ­
c reas ing ly  reduce i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  conf l ic tua l  r e l a t i o n s  i s  often 
seen as being very encouraging. Also, the Afro-centr ic  worldview, by 
emphasizing African p o l i t i c a l ,  economic and cultura l  in t e g ra t io n  (with 
some exponents of th i s  worldview pos i t ing  th a t  such a s p i r a t i o n s  should 
be achieved immediately, while o thers  p refer  gradual r e a l i z a t i o n  of
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such, a s p i r a t i o n s ) ,  seeks to  build  an Africa th a t  i s  strong enough to 
stand by i t s e l f  without any need to be aligned to any superpower bloc.  
This a lso  means t h a t ,  l i k e  nonalignment, the A fro-cen tr ic  worldview 
seeks to mold a world which has a democratized configura tion of global 
power, and is  a lso  more peacefu l.  This so r t  of reasoning led people 
l ike  Kwame Nkrumah to p o s i t  th a t  "The emancipation of the African con­
t in e n t  i s  the emancipation of m a n ; a n d  thus c l e a r ly  showing tha t  
the A fro -cen t r ic  worldview, l ik e  nonalignment, seeks to l i b e r a t e  man­
kind from global conceptions and modes of in t e r a c t i o n s ,  among the coun­
t r i e s  and peoples of the world, t h a t  are dysfunctional to  human prog­
r e s s .
The shared conceptual outlook of both the A fro -cen t r ic  world­
view and nonalignment have led some, l ik e  Idang, to pos i t  th a t  "there 
is a l inkage between nonalignment and African nationa lism [ t h a t ]  ad­
mits of no d e b a t e , a n d  also tha t  "not only i s  nonalignment a de­
l sr i v a t iv e  of the idea of Pan-Africanism," but th a t  " i t  i s  also an 
extension of African nationalism to the to the in te rna t iona l  
l e v e l . "19
Thus, since  Niger ia ,  from 1950 to 1983, manifested a foreign
pol icy t h a t  mostly exh ib i ted  the global input of a regional ideology
20(Pan-Africanism) perspec t ive  of nonalignment, i t  can be concluded 
tha t  such an exh ib i t ion  of t h i s  perspective  of nonalignment meant th a t  
the Nigerian foreign po l icy ,  during the period covered by t h i s  study, 
embraced the p r in c ip le  of nonalignment.
Focusing j o i n t l y  on the three perspec t ives  TABLE 8  shows as 
being the most prominent in the nonaligned content of the Nigerian
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foreign po l icy ,  the nonalignment phenomenon in Nigeria can also be un­
derstood in another way. The th ree  pe rspec t ives  are the global eco­
nomy reordering policy ,  the avoidance of alignment with the superpower 
blocs pol icy ,  and the Afro-cen tr ic  pe rspec t ive .  The prominence of 
these perspectives  can be in te rp re ted  to mean tha t  N iger ia ' s  nona­
ligned policy  was mostly conceptualized in terms of s tee r ing  c lea r  of 
formal l in k s  with superpowers, the changing of global economic r e a l ­
i t i e s  and as being synonymous with p o l i t i c a l ,  economic and social  r e ­
constructions  and r e v i t a l i z a t i o n s  in A fr ica .  TABLE 10 also shows tha t  
Nigeria s t r e s s e d  the avoidance of alignment with superblocs po licy  per ­
spective mostly in the issue areas of i t s  r e l a t io n s  with the West and 
East and in te rna t iona l  economic r e l a t i o n s .  Addi t iona l ly ,  the same per­
spective manifested in the Middle East issue  area in the e a r l i e r  p o l i t ­
ical  e ra s .  On the other hand, the global economy reordering policy 
perspective was v i r t u a l ly  r e s t r i c t e d  to the area of in te rn a t io n a l  eco­
nomic r e l a t i o n s .  The Afro-centr ic  pe rspec t ive ,  which i s  most mani­
f e s ted  in terms of issues across a ll  p o l i t i c a l  e ra s ,  reveal a pa t te rn  
(see TABLE 10) tha t  shows ac tua l ly  tha t  Nigeria was s i g n i f i c a n t l y  con­
sumed in conceptualizing i t s  nonaligned policy a t  sub-systemic l e v e l s .  
However, such an overwhelming view of the world through a subsystemic 
prism can create  s i tu a t io n s  of misunderstanding in an in te rna t iona l  
system where many co un t r ie s ,  e sp ec ia l ly  the superpowers and those be­
longing to th e i r  bloc,  conceptual ize the world at systemic l e v e l s .  
This,  in p a r t i c u l a r ,  explains  why Niger ia,  on some occasions ,  had mis­
understandings with some of these  coun tr ies .
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Some o f  th e s e  p e r s p e c t iv e s  o f  n onalign m en t, w hich have been 
i d e n t i f i e d  through th e  co n cep tu a l scheme d evelop ed  by t h i s  stu d y  ap­
pear a l s o  to  have co n cep tu a l p r o f i l e s  th a t  are  c lo s e r  t o  th o se  o f  some
p a r t ic u la r  p e r s p e c t iv e s .  T h e re fo re , a l l  th e  p e r s p e c t iv e s  can be
grouped in  term s o f  s c h o o ls  o f  th o u g h t, which w i l l  h ere  be r e fe r r e d  to  
as th e  d im en sion s o f  n on a lign m en t. Such an e x e r c is e  r e s u l t s  in  th e  de­
velopm ent o f  fo u r  d im en sion s o f  nonalignm ent as shown in  TABLE 9 .  
T hese d im en sion s are th e  power p o l i t i c s ,  th e  e t h i c a l ,  th e  s o c io e c o ­
nom ic, and th e  fo r e ig n  p o l ic y  mechanism d im en sion s o f  nonalignm ent. 
However, th e s e  d im en sion s are n ot w a t e r - t ig h t ,  s in c e  some o f th e  p er­
s p e c t iv e s ,  e x p e c te d ly ,  a re  b o r d e r lin e  c a s e s  and c o u ld  be c l a s s i f i e d  
in to  more than one d im en sion .
T hus, t h i s  s tu d y , a p a rt from f in d in g  o u t  t h a t  th e  co n ce p t o f  
n onalignm ent has tw e n ty -th r e e  p e r s p e c t iv e s  ( s e e  TABLE 8 ) ,  a ls o  d e v e l­
ops n onalignm ent a s a co n c e p t w ith  fou r major co n cep tu a l d im en sio n s, 
when th e  v a r io u s  p e r s p e c t iv e s  are grouped a ccord in g  to  t h e ir  s im i la r ­
i t i e s  (a s  shown in  TABLE 9 ) .
The power p o l i t i c s  d im ension r e la t e s  nonalignm ent to  th e
sh ap in g  o f  g lo b a l power by c o u n tr ie s  or group o f  c o u n t r ie s ,  in  term s 
o f  how th e  s t r u c t u r e ,  th e  c o n f ig u r a t io n , th e  m o b il iz a t io n  and th e
dynam ics o f  power in  th e  in te r n a t io n a l  system  a re  m a n ife s te d . The p er­
s p e c t iv e s  th a t  b e lo n g  to  t h i s  dim ension a re  e q u id is ta n c e  from su p er­
power b lo c s  p o l i c y ,  a v o id a n ce  o f  a lign m en t w ith  th e  superpower b lo c s  
p o l i c y ,  g lo b a l power c o n f ig u r a t io n , s t r a t e g ic  r a t i o n a l i t y ,  a l l ia n c e  
a g a in s t  a lig n m en t w ith  superpower b lo c s  p o lic y  and n a tu ra l a l l y  lo g ic  
p e r s p e c t iv e s  ( s e e  TABLE 9 ) .  The e th ic a l  dim ension o f  nonalignm ent
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r e f e r s  to the dimension th a t  conceptual ize nonalignment as in jec t in g  
e th ic a l  cons idera t ions  in to  the conduct or r e l a t i o n s  among peoples and 
co u n t r i e s .  The pe rspec t ives  of nonalignment t h a t  come under th i s  d i ­
mension are global mora l i ty  founta in ,  a l t r u i s t i c  po l icy ,  in te rna t iona l  
peace guarantor,  i n te rn a t io n a l  r e l a t io n s  pos i t ive  innovator perspec­
t i v e s  (see TABLE 9).  On the other hand, the socioeconomic dimension 
sees nonalignment as a phenomenon th a t  is  assoc ia ted  with the dynamics 
of evolving new global socia l  and economic r e a l i t i e s .  Total social  r e ­
a l i t y ,  cu l tu ra l  autonomy a s s e r t io n ,  an t i - imper ia l ism worldview, i n t e r ­
national c o l l e c t iv e  bargaining framework, global p o l i t i c a l  economy and 
global economy reorder ing  po licy  perspectives  belong to th i s  dimension 
of nonalignment (see TABLE 9).  In the case of foreign policy mechan­
ism dimension, nonalignment i s  seen as a t o o l ,  an approach or a s t r a ­
tegy of foreign  po l icy .  The perspec tives  th a t  come under th i s  dimen­
sion are foreign po l icy  s t r a t e g y ,  oppor tun is t ic  foreign policy ,  global 
input of a regional ideology (Pan-Africanism),  pos i t ion  of s trength  
po l icy ,  l inking of  na tiona l goals with in te rn a t io n a l  i n i t i a t i v e s  and 
ac t ions  c a p a b i l i t y ,  and national sovereignty guarantor  perspectives  
(see TABLE 9) .  The fo re ign  policy mechanisms dimension a lso ,  in r e f e r ­
ence to i t s  above conceptual p r o f i l e  and pe rspec t ives ,  i s  re la ted  more 
to a nonaligned country u n i la te ra l  i n i t i a t i v e s  and actions  than to the 
nonaligned group phenomenon, per se.
In r e l a t i n g  these  various dimensions of nonalignment to the 
var ious foreign policy  issue  areas ,  t h a t  Nigeria was involved in,  more 
in t e r p r e t a t i o n s  of Nigeria"s  nonaligned policy emerge. TABLE 11 shows 
t h a t ,  in the issue area of r e l a t io n s  with the West and East ,  the power
TABLE 11
DIMENSIONS OF NONALIGNMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES
West/East General African Southern Middle 
Relations  Affa i rs  African East
In te rnational
Economic
Relations
The Power P o l i t i c s  
Dimension
The Ethical  Dimension
The Socio-Economic 
Dimension
The Foreign Policy
Mechanism Dimension
7
5
0
5
1
0
2
5
0
1
0
3
0
3
6
4
g
Note;
The numbers ind ica te  the number of times perspective  in each dimension manifested in 
each issue area in a l l  the p o l i t i c a l  e ra s .  See also TABLE 10.
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p o l i t i c s  dimension was very prominent,  with the perspectives  in t h i s  
dimension being manifested seven times in a ll  t h i s  issue area in a l l  
the p o l i t i c a l  e ra s .  The e th ica l  and foreign policy  mechanism dimen­
sions were also well manifested,  with both fea tu r ing  five  times each. 
This can be in te rp re ted  to mean t h a t ,  in the area of r e l a t io n s  with 
the West and the East ,  Nigeria manifested a nonaligned policy th a t  
paid a t ten t io n  to global power shaping, s t ru c tu re  and dynamics, i n ­
jec ted  some dose of e th ica l  concerns to i t s  actions  and viewed nona­
lignment as a vehicle  fo r  the accomplishment of ce r ta in  goals.
TABLE 11 also shows tha t  in the area of general African a f ­
f a i r s ,  N ig e r ia ' s  policy mostly incorporated socioeconomic and foreign
policy mechanism dimensions, with the l a t t e r  being more manifested.
Addit ionally ,  the power p o l i t i c s  dimensions was only neg l ig ib ly  mani­
fe s ted .  This can a lso  be in te rp re ted  to mean t h a t ,  in the area of gen­
eral  African a f f a i r s ,  Nigeria conceptualized nonalignnment mainly in 
terms of the evolution of new social  and economic r e a l i t i e s  on the con­
t i n e n t ,  and as a vehicle for the a tta inment of ce r ta in  goals .  In r e l a ­
t ion  to the Southern African i s su e ,  s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  N iger ia 's  policy 
mostly manifested e th ica l  and foreign policy mechanism dimensions, and 
th i s  can be extended to mean th a t  in t h i s  issue area N iger ia 's  nona­
lignment po licy  paid a t t en t io n  to  e th ic a l  considera tions  and conceptu­
alized  nonalignment in terms of means of solving a p a r t i c u la r  problem. 
N ige r ia ' s  Middle East policy also saw nonalignment as a means phenome­
non since i t  mainly re f l e c te d  a foreign policy mechanism dimension. 
Also, th i s  issue area was also viewed through global power dynamics,
since the power p o l i t i c s  dimension also re la ted  to i t .  In the area of
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in te rna t iona l  economic r e l a t i o n s ,  N ig e r i a ' s  nonaligned policy had the 
power p o l i t i c s ,  the socioeconomic and the fo re ign  policy mechanism d i ­
mensions. This can also be in te rp re ted  to mean t h a t ,  in th i s  issue 
area,  i t  assoc ia ted  nonalignment with the global power dynamics, and 
the evolution of new social and economic r e a l i t i e s ,  and also saw i t  as 
a vehicle  f o r  the  accomplishment of c e r t a in  goa ls .
In terms of r e la t io n  the dimensions of N ig e r ia ' s  nonaligned
policy to fo re ign  policy issue,  there  a lso  emerges another way of in­
te rp re t ing  N ig e r i a ' s  nonaligned pol icy .  By examining the issues  that  
re la ted  to each p a r t i c u l a r  dimension, i t  i s  found th a t  while some d i ­
mensions r e l a t e d  to only few i s su es ,  o thers  r e l a t e d  to many i s sues .
For example, the power p o l i t i c s  dimension was s i g n i f i c a n t  in the area 
of N ig e r ia ' s  r e l a t i o n  with the West and East ,  in te rna t iona l  economic 
r e l a t i o n s ,  general  African a f f a i r s ,  and Middle East (see TABLE 11).
Many conclusions  can be drawn from t h i s  so r t  of manifes ta t ion .  One is  
th a t ,  in terms of the  dimension of nonalignment,  N ig e r ia ' s  nonaligned 
policy s i g n i f i c a n t l y  re f le c ted  the power p o l i t i c s  dimension. This
also can be in te rp re te d  to mean th a t  Nigeria was not ac tua l ly  wary in
associa ting nonalignment with the s t r u c tu r e ,  the  mobilization and the
dynamics of global power. A fu r th e r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of th i s  is  a con­
clusion t h a t  Nigeria  tended to see nonalignment a lso  at global p o l i t ­
ical  systemic l e v e l ,  in addit ion to the more prominent focus at  the r e ­
gional level (as shown above, through much a ssoc ia t ion  with Afrocen- 
t r i c  p e r sp e c t iv e ) .  However, TABLE 11 also  shows th a t  the power p o l i ­
t i c s  dimension was most manifested in the is sue  area of r e l a t io n s  with 
the West and the East . Thus, th i s  also leads to the conclusion that
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Nigeria viewed nonalignment through th i s  dimension mainly in th a t  i s ­
sue area.
The e th ica l  dimension was re l a t ed  to two i s s u e s —West/East r e ­
la t io n s  and Southern A fr ica—and th i s  means Nigeria nonaligned policy 
ac tua l ly  r e f l e c t e d  e thical  considera tions  in very few is sue  areas ,  
with more of such manifestat ion in the former is sue  area (see TABLE 
11). The socioeconomic dimension was also r e f l e c te d  in very few issue 
areas since i t  manifested a lso  in only two issue a re a s—general A fr i ­
can a f f a i r s  and in te rna t iona l  economic r e l a t i o n s .
On the o ther  hand, the foreign policy mechanism dimension thor ­
oughly accompanied N ige r ia ' s  nonaligned pol icy ,  since i t  was r e f le c ted  
in all the i s s u e s .  This also led to the conclusion th a t  N ige r ia ' s  
overall  nonaligned foreign policy was mostly seen as the vehicle for 
accomplishment of cer ta in  goa ls .  The tendency of N ig e r i a ' s  nonaligned 
policy to be t inged with some dose of expediency on s ig n i f i c a n t  number 
of occasions,  as th i s  study revealed,  can thus bes t  be explained by 
t h i s  fac t  th a t  a l l  issue areas r e f l e c ted  th i s  foreign policy mechanism 
dimension (a dimension to which belongs the oppor tun is t ic  foreign pol­
icy p e rspec t ive ) .
The f a c t  tha t  the foreign po licy  mechanism dimension appeared 
in all is sue a reas ,  however, i s  most explained by the f ac t  tha t  the 
Afro-centr ic  perspec t ive ,  which t h i s  study shows to manifest  in all  i s ­
sue areas ,  and to be most prominently manifested in the overa ll  Nige­
rian  nonaligned policy,  belongs to th i s  dimension of nonalignment. 
(The Afro-cen tr ic  perspective i s  grouped in to  t h i s  dimension due to 
the fac t  th a t  i t  i s  mostly conceptualized as a foreign po licy  approach
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or a vehicle for the evolution of new p o l i t i c a l ,  social  and economic 
r e a l i t i e s  in A fr ica ) .
The various dimensions of nonalignment can also be re la ted  to 
the manifestation of nonalignment during the various p o l i t i c a l  eras 
manifested the power p o l i t i c s  and foreign policy  mechanism dimensions 
more, with the l a t t e r  being more prominent. The F i r s t  Republic and 
I rons i  Government in terms of the in t e n s i ty  of the manifestat ion of 
a l l  the dimension were lower,  in comparison to the Gowon Government, 
Muhammed/Obasanjo Government and the Second Republic.  The l a s t  three 
by f a r  exhib ited  a l l  the dimensions more. For example, the Gowon Gov­
ernment adequately manifested a ll  the dimensions,  with the foreign pol­
icy mechanism dimension t r e b l in g  the other dimensions in in te n s i ty  
(see TABLE 12). This leads to the view th a t  the Gowon Government 
s t rong ly  conceptualized nonalignment as a foreign policy means, s t r a ­
tegy or approach phenomenon. In f a c t ,  of a l l  the p o l i t i c a l  e ras  con­
s idered ,  the Gowon Government most manifested th i s  dimension of nona­
lignment (see TABLE 12).
The Muhammed/Obasanjo Government and the Second Republic also 
manifested much in t e n s i t y  in a l l  the dimensions of nonalignment ex­
cept  the e th ica l  dimension. I t  is  important to note tha t  the e th ical  
dimension was the l e a s t  prominent dimension throughout a ll  the p o l i t ­
ica l  eras (see TABLe 12),  and th i s  fu r th e r  confirms the conclusion 
th a t  N iger ia ' s  nonaligned policy often was not fashioned without much 
considera tion given to N ig e r ia ' s  national i n t e r e s t s  and the r e a l i t i e s  
of contemporary in te rna t iona l  r e l a t i o n s .  As in the case of the other 
dimensions, the foreign po licy  mechanism dimensions were very
TABLE 12
DIMENSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES OF NONALIGNMENT AND NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY
Muhammed/
F i r s t  Ironsi  Gowon Obasanjo Second
Republic Government Government Government Republic
The Power P o l i t i c s  
Dimension
The Ethical  Dimension
The Socio-Economic 
Dimension
The Foreign Policy
Mechanism Dimension
3
1
1
3
3
1
1
3
2
2
2
6
3
1
2
5
w
Note;
The numbers in the tab le  indica te  the number of times perspectives  in each dimension 
were manifested in each corresponding p o l i t i c a l  e ra .  See a lso  TABLE 10.
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prominent during the Muhammed/Obasanjo Government and the Second Repub­
l i c  eras .
However, i t  is  important to note t h a t  the foreign  policy mecha­
nism, during the F i r s t  Republic and the Ironsi  Government e ra s ,  mani­
fes ted  the same in te n s i ty  as the power p o l i t i c s  dimension, and tha t  
both were a lso  manifested in a moderate manner (see Table 12).  This 
is  explained by the f a c t  that  the Afro-centr ic  pe rspec t ive ,  which be­
longs to the foreign policy  mechanism dimension, was not much promi­
nent during these  two p o l i t i c a l  e ras .  This also led to the conclusion
tha t  these two p o l i t i c a l  e ra s ,  unlike the l a t t e r  th ree  p o l i t i c a l  e ras ,
did not s t rong ly  view nonalignment as foreign policy  means, s t ra tegy  
or approach phenomenon. The fac t  tha t  the moderate F i r s t  Republic coa­
l i t i o n  government, in p a r t i c u l a r ,  as shown in e a r l i e r  chapte rs ,  did 
not pursue fo re ign  policy  in a very ac t ive  manner fu r th e r  bu t t resses  
th i s  view.
On the other hand, TABLES 10 and 12 show the l a s t  th ree  p o l i t ­
ical eras as more manifesting all the dimensions of nonalignment, and
th is  is much bu t t ressed  by the fac t  tha t  t h i s  study showed Nigeria as
being more a s s e r t i v e  during those e ra s .  A dd i t iona l ly ,  these  three po­
l i t i c a l  e ras  a l so  most prominently manifested the foreign policy mecha­
nism dimension, and thus were the p o l i t i c a l  eras  t h a t  mostly associa te  
nonalignment to foreign policy means, s t r a teg y  or approach.
Also, when the conclusion tha t  the foreign po l icy  mechanism d i ­
mension, unlike any o ther  dimension, was re la ted  to  a l l  issue areas 
(see TABLE 11) i s  l inked with the conclusion tha t  t h i s  same dimension 
displayed more in i n t e n s i ty ,  in a l l  the p o l i t i c a l  e r a s ,  than any other
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dim ension  { s e e  TABLE 1 2 ) ,  th er e  a r i s e s  an o th er  c o n c lu s io n  t h a t ,  more 
than any o th e r  d im en sio n , th e  fo r e ig n  p o l ic y  mechanism d im en sio n , both  
in  term s o f  m agnitude and i n t e n s i t y ,  was m ost m a n ife s te d  in  th e N ige­
r ia n  fo r e ig n  p o l i c y .
When n o te  i s  taken  o f  th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  A fr o -c e n tr ic  p ersp ec ­
t i v e  b e lo n g s  t o  t h i s  dim ension o f  n onalignm ent (and i s  a ls o  th e  m ost 
prom inent o f  th e  p e r s p e c t iv e s  in  t h i s  d im e n s io n ), th e  forem ost p o s i ­
t io n  o f  t h i s  p e r s p e c t iv e  in  the N ig er ia n  n o n a lig n ed  p o l i c y ,  as t h i s  
stu d y  sh ow s, i s  fu r th e r  e s t a b l i s h e d .  T h e r e fo r e , t h i s  stu d y  shows th a t  
N ig e r ia ,  from 1960 t o  1 9 8 3 , m a n ifes ted  a n o n a lig n ed  fo r e ig n  p o lic y  
th a t  m o stly  had an A fr o -c e n tr ic  p e r s p e c t iv e  w h ile  a l s o  m a n ife s t in g  a 
m ostly  fo r e ig n  p o lic y  mechanism d im en sion .
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the f a c t  t h a t  the Afro-cen tr ic  emphasis in the Nigerian foreign 
policy  has not been uniform (for example, the F i r s t  Republic did 
not pay enough a t t e n t io n  to Afr ica ,  while the Muhammed/Obasanjo 
Government did so very v igorous ly).
12. I b id .
13. See the chapte r  on the concept of nonalignment.
14. These goals are a lso  usually  pursued for the people of African 
descent elsewhere.
15. See the chapte r on the concept of nonalignment.
15. Kwame Nkrumah, Conciencism: Philosophy and Ideology fo r  Decolo-
• n iza t ion  (London: Panaf, 1974), p. 78.
17. Idang, op. c i t . , p.  29.
18. I b id .
19. I b id .
20. See the chapte r on the concept of nonalignment.
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